Preemptive Strike: Law in the Campaign for Clean Trucks by Cummings, Scott L.
UC Irvine Law Review
Volume 4








Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the
Transportation Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by
an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Scott L. Cummings, Preemptive Strike: Law in the Campaign for Clean Trucks, 4 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 939 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol4/iss3/3




Law in the Campaign for Clean Trucks 
Scott L. Cummings* 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 940 
I. Law in the Development of the Ports ..................................................................... 945 
A.   Local Power: Annexation and Autonomy ........................................... 947 
B.  Federal Power: Industrialization in the Shadow of Regulation ......... 955 
C.  Global Power: The Logistics Revolution, Free Trade, and 
Deregulation ............................................................................................... 959 
D.  Local Impact: Community, Labor, and the Environment ................. 972 
II. The Port As a Unit of Legal Analysis ..................................................................... 981 
A.  Local Governance ..................................................................................... 981 
B.  Nonlocal Governance .............................................................................. 984 
C.  Preemption ................................................................................................. 987 
III. Resisting the Ports: Activism in Separate Spheres .............................................. 989 
A.  The Hundred Years’ War: Community Mobilization Against 
Port Expansion .......................................................................................... 989 
B.  Labor’s Municipal Strategy: Contracting Around the 
Independent-Contractor Problem ........................................................ 1001 
C.  The Turning Point: China Shipping and the Clean Air Action  
Plan ............................................................................................................ 1010 
IV. Reforming the Ports: The Campaign for Clean Trucks ................................... 1042 
A.  The Alliance: Forming the Coalition .................................................... 1042 
1.  Personnel ........................................................................................... 1042 
2.  Partnerships ....................................................................................... 1047 
3.  Policy .................................................................................................. 1056 
B.  The Affirmative Phase: Mobilizing Local Law .................................. 1059 
 
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. For their critical feedback and support, I am grateful to Rick 
Abel, Sameer Ashar, Catherine Fisk, Robert Gottlieb, Sean Hecht, Michael Klarman, Doug NeJaime, 
Sanjukta Paul, Ben Sachs, Noah Zatz, and Jon Zerolnick. I am deeply indebted to the UCLA Institute 
for Research on Labor and Employment for its generous and enduring support. And I could not have 
completed this project without the excellent research assistance of Michael Fenne, Doug Smith, and 
Alyssa Titche, and the incredible efforts of the law review editors, particularly Amy Bowles, Anne 
Conley, Catriona Lavery, Margaux Poueymirou, Marco Pulido, Joseph Roth, and Thomas Worger. 
          
940 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:939 
1.  The Outside Game: Developing the Program, Exerting 
Pressure .............................................................................................. 1059 
2.  The Inside Game: Mobilizing Legal Expertise, Moving 
Policy .................................................................................................. 1067 
3.  The End Game: Passing the Clean Truck Program ................... 1079 
C.  The Defensive Phase: Responding to Federal Law ........................... 1094 
1.  Private Litigation I: The Injunctive Phase .................................... 1094 
2.  Public Litigation: Federal Agency Intervention .......................... 1108 
3.  Private Litigation II: The Merits Phase ......................................... 1112 
4.  Private Litigation III: The Supreme Court Phase ....................... 1118 
D.  The Aftermath: Maneuvering Around Preemption ........................... 1123 
1.  A Legislative Window—Closed .................................................... 1124 
2.  Law and Organizing—A Renewed Challenge ............................. 1130 
a.  Misclassification Litigation ...................................................... 1130 
b.  Union Organizing ..................................................................... 1141 
V. Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 1146 
A.  Context ...................................................................................................... 1146 
B.  Campaign .................................................................................................. 1150 
1.  Scale .................................................................................................... 1150 
2.  Opportunity ....................................................................................... 1152 
3.  Strategy ............................................................................................... 1154 
4.  Lawyering ........................................................................................... 1155 
C.  Outcome ................................................................................................... 1156 
1.  Constraint .......................................................................................... 1157 
2.  Countermobilization ........................................................................ 1159 
3.  Adaptation ......................................................................................... 1160 




This Article recounts and analyzes the epic campaign to raise work and 
environmental standards at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. This 
campaign emerged as a fight over air quality, but developed as a struggle over the 
conditions of short-haul truckers, whose precarious economic status as independent 
contractors contributed to poorly maintained trucks that were a key cause of air 
pollution. The campaign itself thus became a moment of labor-environmental 
interest convergence and an opportunity to rebuild a historically frayed alliance. It 
was also viewed by labor as a chance to test a new strategy of investing in campaigns 
around regionally sticky industries in order to advance a more ambitious project of 
citywide economic change. 
The campaign rested on an innovative legal hook: the port, as a publicly owned 
and operated entity, had the power to define the terms of entry for trucking 
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companies through concession agreements—essentially private contracts 
permitting trucks onto port property. The campaign therefore hinged on how these 
agreements treated truckers and what types of standards the agreements set. Labor 
and environmental activists formed a coalition with residents of low-income 
communities adjacent to the port. Together, they sought to make new law that 
would convert truckers into employees of their companies (thus enabling 
unionization), while requiring the gradual upgrading of trucks to reduce pollution. 
Lawyers working with the coalition crafted that law to minimize ex ante legal risk 
and ultimately defended it—with mixed results—against a federal preemption 
challenge. 
This Article uses the story of the campaign to examine how contemporary 
labor law is made, unmade, and remade—and the consequences (sometimes 
unintended) of doing so, both positive and negative. In broad terms, it focuses on 
how social movements mobilize law to change economic conditions for workers 
and how countermovements use law to limit—and even reverse—movement 
gains.1 
The campaign is, in the end, a story about the shifting geography of legal 
power and how movements and countermovements seek to use legal tools at 
different levels of regulatory authority within the structure of federalism to advance 
their ends.2 In Los Angeles and Long Beach, the ports were initially built through 
assertions of local power to advance regional industrialization in the context of 
strong federal regulation and limited global trade. Port authorities were given 
autonomy to promote industrialization and succeeded in facilitating manufacturing-
led regional growth, while the rise of the federal regulatory state in the New Deal 
era empowered labor to share in its benefits. Beginning in the 1970s, globalization 
disempowered local governments, which lost their manufacturing base, and federal 
deregulation disempowered port truckers, who lost their union representation. 
Federal labor and transportation law, created in part to benefit workers, became a 
hindrance to them by decentralizing industry control and affirmatively preventing 
collective worker action by truckers—who were recast as independent contractors 
 
1. By focusing on this movement-countermovement dynamic, the Article builds upon 
scholarship in the burgeoning law and social movement field. For the classics, see, for example, JOEL 
F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE 
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). For important recent work, see TOMIKO BROWN-
NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHT 
MOVEMENT (2011); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers 
and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879 (2007); Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization 
Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663 (2012); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007). 
2. See Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING: 
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 69 (Austin Sarat & Stuart 
Scheingold eds., 1998). 
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prohibited by antitrust and labor law from organizing. In the 1990s, local 
governments reasserted control over the ports to appropriate their revenue, but 
externalized the costs of growth on local communities. 
In the clean trucks campaign, these communities fought back by turning to 
still-potent federal and state environmental law. Organized labor seized the 
opportunity to reshape the entire port trucking industry by redirecting city power 
over the ports to advance labor goals—harnessing the city as a market participant 
to create local law that enabled labor organizing and avoided federal preemption. 
Organized labor thus attempted to re-regulate a sector of the globalized logistics 
industry—port trucking—tethered to the regional economy by keeping law local: 
changing the rules of the ports to facilitate trucker unionization, while 
simultaneously addressing the environmental and community impacts of port 
growth. The trucking industry responded by taking law out of the local arena, using 
litigation to bring the policy outcome of the campaign back under the very federal 
regulatory regime labor sought to avoid. 
It is against this backdrop that the Article examines how the clean trucks 
campaign operated and what it achieved. The analysis proceeds from the 
perspective of movement actors advancing the campaign, and draws upon 
interviews and a systematic review of campaign documents and legal materials.3 The 
arc of the story builds from separate and uncoordinated activism by different 
movement actors around the negative impact of port operation and expansion on 
local communities, to a moment of interest convergence resulting in the passage of 
the Clean Truck Program, to an industry-led legal challenge that succeeded in 
carving apart what the coalition had done. 
Focusing on campaign formulation and execution, the Article explores why 
labor activists and lawyers came to focus on the ports as a target, how they 
developed an alliance with environmentalists, and what factors influenced decisions 
about legal objectives (legislation revising concession agreements) and the mix of 
tactics to achieve it. It emphasizes three main themes. 
First, in terms of campaign objectives, the Article shows how law shaped the 
way movement actors understood labor and environmental issues at the ports and 
how to address them. There were top-down and bottom-up movement processes 
at work. The study traces how these forces were joined around a mutual analysis of 
convergent legal interests. From the top-down, organized labor had developed a 
sophisticated legal analysis of the trucking industry, identifying its independent-
contractor structure as the main impediment to unionization. Labor strategists 
identified the ports as a target of legal opportunity: they were sticky to the region—
not vulnerable to capital flight—and the Los Angeles port was under the authority 
of a local government friendly to labor interests. From the bottom-up, community 
 
3. For this Article, I conducted interviews with twenty-five key movement actors (pursuant to 
UCLA Institutional Review Board protocol #G08-06-076-02), reviewed legal materials related to all 
litigation and administrative proceedings, and reviewed internal campaign documents made available by 
the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports. 
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groups, increasingly in concert with environmentalists, understood the local impacts 
of port expansion as a problem of regulatory capture: port governance was 
controlled by logistic industry firms and their governmental allies, who excluded 
communities from meaningful participation. Community groups also identified 
trucking as a key cause of local pollution and congestion, and focused on 
participation in port governance as the path to change. The clean trucks campaign 
was explicitly designed to harmonize labor, environmental, and community interests 
by crafting a master legal solution to the intertwined problems of deunionization 
and pollution. The drivers’ independent-contractor status was defined as the causal 
link: forcing low-paid, mostly immigrant drivers to operate as owners 
simultaneously decreased their pay and increased pollution since they could not 
afford to upgrade and maintain their trucks. Changing the drivers’ legal status was 
the campaign’s lynchpin. 
The Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy—known as LAANE—
organized the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports with key labor, community, and 
environmental allies, particularly the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
(Teamsters) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). Together, they 
sought to redesign local law to advance mutual interests: “greening” the ports, while 
improving economic conditions for drivers. In 2008, after two years of impressive 
organizing, the coalition won a Clean Truck Program in Los Angeles that amended 
port rules to permit trucking companies to enter port property only if they 
completed a double conversion: of trucks (from dirty old diesel-fuel to modern low-
emission vehicles) and of drivers (from independent contractors to employees). 
From the campaign’s perspective, using the legal power of the city to force trucking 
companies to internalize the costs of employment and maintenance would create a 
sustainable foundation for clean trucking over time and permit trucker unionization. 
Achieving this policy reform required more than just a well-designed plan—it 
required that local politics lined up in the coalition’s favor and coalition actors 
executed their plan at a high level. This points to the second theme of the case study: 
understanding the complex interplay of opportunity and resources in framing the 
legal campaign and moving it forward. Since trucking deregulation in the 1980s, the 
Teamsters had long sought ways to organize port truckers. The confluence of a 
prolabor Los Angeles mayor and a decisive environmental legal challenge by NRDC 
to block port expansion created the possibility of achieving labor’s goals. The launch 
of Change to Win, and its association with successful local labor organizations, 
provided the resources to make it happen. And the formation of a coalition of labor, 
environmental, and community groups brought the political muscle necessary to 
move local officials to produce change. In this way, top-down labor planning 
intersected with bottom-up resistance to port activities at a moment of political 
opportunity to create a powerful coalition with the political leverage to make law, 
which the coalition succeeded in doing. 
The Article’s third theme focuses on how law shaped campaign tactics. In a 
system of weak federal labor regulation, organized labor relied on environmental 
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law—with the crucial legal power to delay port growth—as the initial lever to create 
space for legal reform. From there, labor turned to the local government, where it 
had built political power, to advance legal change that would facilitate employee 
conversion. However, for political and legal reasons, the frame of that local legal 
change sounded in environmental justice: employee conversion was necessary to 
green the port and reduce impacts on local communities. Politically, this facilitated 
forming the coalition and persuading local officials. Legally, employee conversion 
was linked to the goal of reducing port emissions and thus avoiding further 
environmental legal challenge—which was deemed critical for the port, as a market 
participant, to ensure orderly and efficient operations. In this way, federal 
preemption law shaped how movement lawyers, in particular, thought of the 
possibilities for regulatory change at the local level—and how those understandings 
were translated into policy reform. The Article thus highlights how federal 
preemption was a primary battleground on which the contest over labor’s local 
strategy played out. Movement lawyers mobilized law in the administrative and 
legislative process to support readings of preemption doctrine in a context of 
jurisprudential uncertainty in order to minimize preemption risk and validate the 
Clean Truck Program. Although they succeeded in getting the law passed, they were 
not entirely successful in defending the law from a preemption attack by the 
trucking industry in a case that ultimately made its way to the Supreme Court. 
How should the campaign be judged and what can be learned from it? In its 
conception and execution, the campaign was highly effective. Powerful alliances 
were built, a sophisticated policy was crafted that achieved labor and environmental 
goals, opposition was thwarted, and legislative passage secured. Yet the policy was 
only partially implemented. The Los Angeles Clean Truck Program’s labor 
centerpiece—the provision converting port truckers to employees to enable 
unionization—was enjoined and invalidated by the industry’s preemption challenge 
under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act. Yet, the industry 
lawsuit did not challenge the entire Clean Truck Program and left standing the 
conversion of the port trucking fleet to low-emission vehicles. As a result, what 
remained of the Clean Truck Program advanced environmental interests by 
mandating clean trucks, but undercut labor interests by withdrawing the legal basis 
to organize drivers. In so doing, the drivers themselves suffered a setback: with 
employee conversion undermined in federal court, drivers assumed the burden of 
purchasing and maintaining clean trucks without the economic benefits promised 
by employee status. 
This outcome suggests the tradeoffs of using alternate legal frameworks—
here, environmental and local government law—as proxies for advancing economic 
rights. This move is necessitated by weak labor law, but to be successful it must 
thread a difficult needle. On the one hand, these proxy battles, at best, result in 
industry restructuring that indirectly facilitates unionization. This is a powerful tool 
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that has been successfully used in other contexts.4 But it also raises challenges. 
Joining labor policy to stronger regulatory frameworks—like environmental law—
risks the stronger regulatory claim being validated to the detriment of the labor 
claim. Thus, if the argument for a Clean Truck Program is centrally about reducing 
port pollution and avoiding environmental lawsuits (rather than unionization), then 
the environmental objective could be read by policy makers or courts as trumping 
the labor one. The joinder of labor and environmental claims, which strengthens 
the coalition, also makes it vulnerable to industry countermoblization that seeks to 
“divide and conquer.” As the case study shows, industry litigation on preemption 
grounds succeeded in splitting apart and reallocating the gains from a policy 
campaign built upon mutual interest—resulting in environmental victory but labor 
setback. 
The nature of this challenge—federal preemption—also highlights the 
difficulty of nesting labor-facilitating regulation in local government law. Ultimately, 
labor’s local strategy is never entirely local. Rather, it is framed by the overhang of 
federal law—and not just labor law, as it turns out, but other federal regulatory 
structures as well—that both shapes legal strategy and pulls activists back into the 
federal system to either defend or circumvent challenges to carefully crafted local 
policy. Planning for preemption is thus a key part of the lawyering process during 
the campaign, but one fraught with uncertainty, since predicting judicial outcomes 
is such an inexact science. 
Finally, the outcome of the campaign for port truck drivers—burdened with 
the costs of acquiring and maintaining expensive new clean trucks, but without 
employee status and potential union benefits—spotlights the issue of constituency 
representation and how it operates in the context of bottom-up law reform 
campaigns. Within law, the classic accountability concern is with top-down lawyers 
making choices that are inconsistent with constituent interests. Here, movement 
lawyers effectively served as outside counsel to the organizations driving policy 
development. It was movement leaders, and not movement lawyers, making the 
major campaign policy calls—and deciding to take the risk to pursue reform, even 
though there was a small, but nontrivial, chance that truck drivers might bear the 
brunt of clean truck conversion without reaping the benefit. 
I. LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PORTS 
The Port of Los Angeles sits in the San Pedro Bay, directly adjacent to the 
Port of Long Beach to the east. The bay itself is tucked under the Palos Verdes 
Peninsula, which juts out prominently south of Santa Monica Bay. The ports are 
located in distinct municipalities, subjecting them to different rules and political 
pressures—and making them competitors for cargo business. However, as a 
functional matter, they form an integrated unit: sharing the same land mass, 
 
4. See generally Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1153 (2011). 
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benefitting from the same infrastructure, and connecting to a unified transportation 
system of roads and rail.5 Individually, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach 
are the first and second largest, respectively, in the United States; together, they 
form one of the largest port complexes in the world.6 
The geography of the ports, both physical and man-made, is a central feature 
in the struggle over their impact and control. This geography—and the inequality it 
demarcates—has been shaped by interlocking international, federal, state, and local 
legal decisions. These decisions have facilitated the ports’ development as an engine 
of regional economic growth—and a gateway to globalization—while concentrating 
its most harmful externalities in some of the region’s lowest income communities. 
As law has contributed to the growth of the ports complex, it has also distributed 
the costs and benefits of that growth unequally—enabling some communities to 
escape the worst impacts, while appropriating others in the project of expanding 
global trade. This project has resulted in transportation and land use decisions that 
have contributed to segregation and environmental degradation in surrounding 
communities, while also creating winners and losers among workers. 
The history of the port’s legal development can be roughly broken into three 
phases. In the first, from the mid-1800s through the 1920s, law was used to 
appropriate the harbor—created by and beholden to outside capital—to the project 
of city building. In Los Angeles and Long Beach, the ports were wrested from 
private ownership, constituted as public entities, and given broad powers as 
independent agencies to build the infrastructure necessary to promote economic 
development. This process was led by local business elites advancing a vision of the 
ports as key to regional industrialization. While both ports fueled this growth, they 
increasingly began to compete, establishing an inter-port dynamic that would shape 
future development. 
The second phase, from the Depression to the 1970s, was marked by the rise 
of the regulatory state and a working compromise among business elites, labor, and 
local communities to share the benefits of port growth. In this period, the ports 
were harnessed to fuel industrialization and facilitate U.S. exports, building the Los 
Angeles region as a manufacturing stronghold, led by aerospace and auto 
production. Strong federal regulation of transportation and labor produced stable 
industry patterns and powerful unions, which were able to negotiate their share of 
the peace dividend. Trade barriers permitted internal manufacturing development. 
Port expansion occurred, but had yet to achieve a scale that impaired surrounding 
communities, whose residents reaped economic benefits of jobs and local 
investments (though began to suffer from intensifying oil extraction). 
 
5. See EDNA BONACICH & JAKE B. WILSON, GETTING THE GOODS: PORTS, LABOR, AND THE 
LOGISTICS REVOLUTION 45 (2008). 
6. Id. (noting that, as of 2004, the two ports combined were the third largest in the world). As 
of 2011, the Port of Los Angeles was the sixteenth largest in the world by container volume, while the 
Port of Long Beach was ranked twenty-first; combined, they formed the eighth largest port in the world. 
Marsha Salisbury, The JOC Top 50 World Container Ports, J. COM., Aug. 20–27, 2012, at 24, 26. 
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In the third phase, beginning in the 1970s, this arrangement unraveled in the 
face of globalization and the decline of the regulatory state. Against the backdrop 
of free trade, the ports became conduits of globalization, powered by the rise of 
intermodalism, which connected the U.S. market to East Asian exporters and fueled 
prodigious growth. Federal deregulation and weakened labor laws contributed to 
industry reorganization that empowered shippers and negatively impacted the least 
powerful workers in the logistics supply chain—namely, port truck drivers, whose 
downgrading to independent contractors undermined their economic position. 
Globalization also disempowered city governments, which saw the development 
benefits of export-led growth dwindle, and with it, the job and tax benefits of local 
manufacturing. Los Angeles and Long Beach responded by reasserting greater legal 
control over the ports in order to shore up faltering city budgets and harness port 
growth to power development of the regional service economy. This move allied 
cities with the project of continuous port expansion—since it was through 
expansion that jobs were created and local revenues grew. Although the ports 
continued to compete, they also made joint investments in transportation and 
logistics infrastructure to maintain their comparative advantage over other 
locations.  
Increasingly, this growth came at a cost to regional air quality, which was 
polluted by the diesel-fuel-driven port transportation network. The ports’ negative 
externalities fell with greatest force on adjacent low-income communities, which 
were made to absorb the most significant environmental and land use impacts. 
Disempowered by a legal system in which local elites worked with global capital to 
expand port capacity, these communities—in collaboration with a resurgent labor 
movement—sought to gain greater input into port governance in order to adapt 
local control to their own ends. To do so, they turned back to a tool from the 
regulatory state—environmental law—to leverage changes to local policy that 
would better align port growth with community and labor interests. That is where 
the campaign for clean trucks began. 
A. Local Power: Annexation and Autonomy 
The creation of the Port of Los Angeles was shaped by the clash of competing 
economic ambitions for the region.7 As local business elites used law to ultimately 
wrest control of the port from outside capital around the turn of the twentieth 
century, they built the foundations of a transportation infrastructure within the city’s 
jurisdictional boundaries that connected shipping, rail, and roads. In this process, 
local elites used legal strategies to annex the harbor property—facilitating dramatic 
growth in city territory and population—and created a municipal governance 
 
7. See STEVEN P. ERIE, GLOBALIZING L.A.: TRADE, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 47 (2004). See generally BD. OF HARBOR COMM’RS, THE PORT OF LOS ANGELES 23–
38 (1913) (providing a history of the Port of Los Angeles); CHARLES F. QUEENAN, THE PORT OF LOS 
ANGELES: FROM WILDERNESS TO WORLD PORT 27–56 (1983) (discussing the growth and evolving 
role of the Port of Los Angeles between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
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structure that conferred broad legal authority on the Port of Los Angeles to pursue 
dynamic expansion plans. The goal was to take port control away from outside 
entrepreneurs in order to build the economic foundations for manufacturing-driven 
city growth. 
First used as an outpost to supply Spanish missionaries in the late 1700s, the 
San Pedro harbor became an important trading center after Mexico took control in 
1822, and American land acquisition and commercial activity expanded.8 The U.S. 
annexation of California after the Mexican-American War, followed by the Gold 
Rush, brought American settlers streaming west.9 As the volume of passenger and 
commercial shipping increased, the need for transportation infrastructure grew. 
Investment was spurred by the struggle for control over lucrative regional trade. 
Rancheros gained early advantage, developing the first San Pedro-to-Los Angeles 
stagecoach shipping route after the war,10 but the balance quickly shifted to new 
entrepreneurs. 
Delaware transplant Phineas Banning entered the market and swiftly 
established a staging business between the harbor and Los Angeles that extended 
on to Salt Lake and Fort Yuma.11 When competition for the San Pedro route 
became too fierce, Banning bypassed it altogether, transferring his shipping business 
to land he purchased north of the harbor, which he named Wilmington.12 While 
Banning’s quest for market dominance was disrupted by the Civil War, his postwar 
strategy sought to monopolize trade to Los Angeles through the construction of a 
rail line from the harbor.13 Banning thus entered politics, where he used his 
influence as a state senator to gain passage of a bill authorizing the Los Angeles & 
San Pedro Railroad charter, and then won a hard-fought local ballot initiative 
authorizing municipal bond financing.14 Construction of the line, which ran along 
Alameda Street, was completed in 1869, marking the creation of the Alameda 
transportation corridor.15 With the rail line in place, Banning then turned to 
improving the port itself, which was too narrow and shallow for large sea vessels. 
He persuaded the federal government to add two jetties and then dredged the 
channel to a serviceable depth—thereby facilitating a nearly hundredfold increase 
in total port commerce between the late 1860s and 1886.16 
 
8. See CHARLES F. QUEENAN, LONG BEACH AND LOS ANGELES: A TALE OF TWO PORTS 13–
16 (1986). Cowhide was the major trading commodity. Id. at 23. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. See REMI A. NADEAU, CITY-MAKERS: THE MEN WHO TRANSFORMED LOS ANGELES 
FROM VILLAGE TO METROPOLIS DURING THE FIRST GREAT BOOM, 1868–76, at 24 (1948). 
12. QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 26. 
13. See id. at 29–30. During the war, Banning ceded some of his property to the Union army to 
build a new base; he was rewarded with a construction contract and he profited from the shipment of 
military supplies. Id. at 29. 
14. NADEAU, supra note 11, at 26–27. 
15. Id. at 27–29. 
16. See ROBERT M. FOGELSON, THE FRAGMENTED METROPOLIS: LOS ANGELES, 1850–1930, 
at 108–09 (1967). 
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The Los Angeles & San Pedro Railroad did not stay within Banning’s control 
for long. Indeed, its initial construction was motivated in part by the desire to 
connect Los Angeles to the approaching transcontinental railroad, which local elites 
believed could only be secured by offering its owner—Leland Stanford’s powerful 
Southern Pacific Railroad—ready-made rail access to the harbor.17 The Southern 
Pacific, anchored in San Francisco, threatened to bypass Los Angeles without a 
generous public subsidy,18 which included acquiring Banning’s rail line.19 After 
fierce lobbying, Congress passed a law directing the transcontinental railroad to run 
through Los Angeles.20 Yet the terms of any deal between Los Angeles and the 
Southern Pacific were yet to be worked out and ultimately subject to local voter 
approval. Determined to bring transcontinental service to Los Angeles, Banning—
along with other elite Angeleno businessmen who formed the “Committee of 
Thirty”—reluctantly agreed to support a $600,000 subsidy to the Southern Pacific, 
which included a controlling share in Banning’s Los Angeles & San Pedro 
Railroad.21 A bitter election contest ensued, but the Southern Pacific subsidy was 
passed handily by county voters in 1872.22 Four years later, the construction of the 
Southern Pacific line to Los Angeles was completed23—officially connecting the 
city, and the San Pedro harbor, to the national market. The population of Los 
Angeles at the time was approximately 10,000.24 
Growth occurred rapidly, yet the position of the San Pedro harbor as the 
gateway to Los Angeles was still uncertain. Local boosterism helped attract a wave 
of new immigrants, who the Southern Pacific eagerly transported west.25 Yet, with 
Los Angeles firmly within its grasp, “The Octopus” (as the Southern Pacific was 
called) squeezed local shippers subject to its virtual monopoly.26 Saddled with debt 
and eager to protect its investment in the San Francisco port, the Southern Pacific 
raised rates on Los Angeles shippers and refused to build out the San Pedro 
harbor.27 Competitors sought to challenge the Southern Pacific with rival rail lines 
and ports—provoking harsh reprisals by the railroad. In the 1870s, the Southern 
Pacific crushed a plan to build a new railroad and port in Santa Monica; and as 
Banning’s efforts to dredge the San Pedro harbor began to pay off in the 1880s, the 
 
17. See NADEAU, supra note 11, at 23–24. 
18. See FOGELSON, supra note 16, at 52. 
19. See ERIE, supra note 7, at 49; see also Steven P. Erie, How the Urban West Was Won: The Local 
State and Economic Growth in Los Angeles, 1880–1932, 27 URB. AFF. REV. 519, 526–27 (1992). 
20. See NADEAU, supra note 11, at 73. 
21. Id. at 78; see also The “Committee of Thirty,” L.A. HERALD, Feb. 3, 1883, at 3. 
22. NADEAU, supra note 11, at 79–86; see also ERIE, supra note 7, at 49. 
23. ERIE, supra note 7, at 49. 
24. See id. at 46; see also FOGELSON, supra note 16, at 56 (reporting that, in 1880, the population 
of the city of Los Angeles was 11,183 and the county population was 33,381). 
25. FOGELSON, supra note 16, at 63–66. For the classic account of the construction of the 
California Dream, see KEVIN STARR, INVENTING THE DREAM: CALIFORNIA THROUGH THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA (1985). 
26. ERIE, supra note 7, at 49–50; QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 33. 
27. ERIE, supra note 7, at 49; QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 33. 
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Southern Pacific rerouted its own line from Los Angeles to the west side of the 
main channel in San Pedro, thereby circumventing Wilmington—and effectively 
putting the Wilmington port out of business.28 
Yet the competition was unrelenting: with one rival building a port in Redondo 
Beach and another laying new rail tracks through East Wilmington, the Southern 
Pacific made a dramatic play to defeat both threats by abandoning San Pedro 
altogether.29 With local businessmen consumed by the threat of losing regional 
shipping to San Diego’s superior natural harbor, the Los Angeles Chamber of 
Commerce, led by Los Angeles Times owner Harrison Gray Otis, pressed Congress 
to fund construction of an artificial deep-water harbor at San Pedro.30 As Congress 
vacillated, the Southern Pacific, under the control of Collis Huntington, surprised 
local leaders by opposing the selection of San Pedro as the harbor site, instead 
endorsing Santa Monica, where it had quietly made significant waterfront 
investments.31 The Chamber, which resented the Southern Pacific’s power and 
opposed its tourism-oriented vision for Los Angeles development,32 seized the 
chance to have a decisive confrontation with the railroad. With Congress unwilling 
to choose sides without the backing of the California delegation, the Chamber 
lobbied Senator Stephen White (Otis’s personal lawyer),33 who championed San 
Pedro and vilified the already-unpopular Southern Pacific.34 After a bitter political 
struggle, the California delegation eventually coalesced around White’s leadership, 
defeating a proposed $3 million appropriation for Santa Monica. The delegation 
secured massive federal funding for the Army Corp of Engineers to build a 
breakwater in the San Pedro Bay, which commenced in 1899 (and was completed 
in 1912)—finally securing San Pedro’s place as the port of entry to the Los Angeles 
region.35 
The “free harbor” movement, however, was not a complete success. The city 
of Los Angeles lacked legal control over the harbor, which lay sixteen miles to the 
south of downtown, within San Pedro and Wilmington.36 And despite its failed 
Santa Monica gambit, the Southern Pacific still monopolized port operations in the 
San Pedro harbor through its ownership of the waterfront.37 Municipal control was 
therefore necessary to build the port and ultimately break the Southern Pacific 
monopoly. The U.S. acquisition of the Panama Canal in 1904 and its impending 
completion heightened the sense of urgency among local businessmen eager to 
 
28. QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 37–44. 
29. Id. at 49–51. 
30. FOGELSON, supra note 16, at 110. 
31. See QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 51. 
32. See ERIE, supra note 7, at 50. 
33. Id. at 52–53. 
34. ERIE, supra note 7, at 53; see also FOGELSON, supra note 16, at 112–14. 
35. FOGELSON, supra note 16, at 112–14. 
36. ERIE, supra note 7, at 54. 
37. FOGELSON, supra note 16, at 114–15. 
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solidify Los Angeles’s place as the major western port city.38 So, too, did the 
machinations of adjacent Long Beach—on the east side of San Pedro harbor—
which had been incorporated in 1888 and steadily grew with the arrival of rail 
connection.39 As the free harbor fight solidified plans to dredge and improve the 
west side of the harbor, Long Beach expansionists sought to exploit the commercial 
prospects of the east side. After securing federal funds for inner harbor dredging in 
1903, business leaders urged Long Beach to annex Terminal Island, the massive 
landmass running the width of the San Pedro Bay that separated the outer harbor 
from an inner channel connected to a tributary of the Los Angeles River.40 Although 
this effort failed, an annexation battle ensued, with Los Angeles unsuccessfully 
trying to annex Long Beach as the latter acquired more land up to the Wilmington 
border. In 1909, Long Beach won an election to acquire the eastern half of Terminal 
Island.41 In the face of this incursion, Los Angeles moved to exert greater control 
over the western part of the harbor. 
Doing so required a series of legal maneuvers. Because state law only allowed 
the consolidation of contiguous cities, Los Angeles first had to extend the reach of 
its jurisdictional border down to the port, which it did in 1906 by annexing the 
unincorporated “shoestring district”42—a one-mile-wide strip of land from Los 
Angeles’s southern border due south to San Pedro.43 From there, the Los Angeles 
City Council took the symbolic step of creating a board of harbor commissioners 
in 1907,44 as it turned to the more formidable task of actually acquiring the harbor 
itself by annexing San Pedro and Wilmington, whose skeptical residents had to be 
convinced to vote for consolidation.45 
Before annexation could be formally considered, state law had to be amended 
to authorize the consolidation of charter cities (those, like Los Angeles, that had 
chosen home rule by ratifying their own city constitution) and noncharter cities 
(those, like San Pedro and Wilmington, which had not opted for charter status and 
were thus governed under the state’s general law). The consolidation law was duly 
amended in 1908, after spirited lobbying by local business elites—and over the 
Southern Pacific’s objection.46 In the electoral campaign for consolidation, Los 
Angeles used its most powerful form of persuasion: the promise of its vast 
resources. Realizing that they lacked the funds to significantly improve the port, 
 
38. ERIE, supra note 7, at 60–61. 
39. QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 37, 45–46. 
40. Id. at 61. 
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42. FOGELSON, supra note 16, at 115. 
43. QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 62. 
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Angeles, and the cities to be annexed. Wilmington was incorporated in 1872. Donna St. George, 
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46. See FOGELSON, supra note 16, at 115. 
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which powered the local economies, San Pedro and Wilmington residents acceded 
to the annexation plan, in exchange for Los Angeles committing $10 million for 
harbor improvement, agreeing to build a truck highway from the harbor to 
downtown, and promising additional infrastructure investments.47 San Pedro and 
Wilmington formally voted in favor of consolidation with Los Angeles in 1909,48 
within days of Long Beach’s Terminal Island annexation.49 
Consolidation did not fully settle the matter since ownership of much of the 
waterfront property remained in dispute. The city of Los Angeles challenged title of 
the Southern Pacific and other purported landowners under the antiquated State 
Admissions Act, which assigned ownership of navigable waters to the state.50 Los 
Angeles brought a series of lawsuits to perfect its title, which was settled once and 
for all by the 1911 passage of the state Tidelands Trust Act, which made Los 
Angeles trustee of the tidelines—land under the normal ebb and flow of the tide, as 
well as submerged land and navigable waterways—that constituted the harbor.51 
Now firmly located on city-owned land, the Port of Los Angeles—an independent 
municipal department governed by an appointed board of harbor commissioners—
was officially born. 
The history of the port as an instrument of private enterprise appropriated to 
municipal control influenced its subsequent role in regional growth. After 
consolidation, the port remained semiautonomous, but its mission was shaped by 
local business elites who sought to build its power in order to facilitate Los Angeles’s 
growth as an export-led manufacturing economy. To accomplish this, the port was 
placed under the power of a proprietary department established in the model of the 
city’s formidable Department of Water and Power, and governed by the harbor 
commission.52 Under the 1913 Los Angeles charter amendment, a board of three 
harbor commissioners, appointed by the mayor and approved by the city council, 
was given “possession and control . . . of the entire water front of the city.”53 The 
commission’s power included broad authority to manage and lease port property, 
hire personnel, and pass rules of operation, as well as the right to set rates (subject 
to city council approval), collect revenue, and issue bonds (subject to voter 
approval).54 Although technically independent, the harbor commission in its early 
phase relied on support from local business elites to win greater authority and 
control. In collaboration with the Chamber of Commerce, the commission secured 
a series of charter amendments that enlarged its bureaucratic authority, expanding 
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54. See id. §§ 168–186. The proprietary nature of the Port of Los Angeles is atypical: only 
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its size to five commissioners, and giving it greater power over budget, personnel, 
policy making, and contracting in ways that further diminished mayoral and city 
council control.55 Because it kept shipping rates low to promote trade, the port 
required public financing for major improvements and leveraged local business 
support to win approval of over $30 million in municipal bond funds by 1932.56 
However, as Progressive Era citizen resistance to public subsidies grew, the harbor 
commission eventually was forced to abandon bond referenda and become self-
financing through shipping fees and tariffs.57 Thus dependent on revenue from 
shipper and carrier use to fund operations and improvements, the commission 
became increasingly focused on the satisfaction of its main customers: import-
exporters, ocean steamship liners, railroads, and trucking companies.58 Yet—still 
insulated from intense competition—the harbor commission was at this point able 
to strike bargains that fueled Los Angeles’s rapid growth. 
Powered by the real estate boom in the late 1880s (and undeterred by the 
bust),59 Los Angeles’s population grew tenfold to 100,000 in 1900 and then more 
than tripled to 320,000 in 1910; by 1930, the city’s population had surpassed one 
million.60 During this time, port commerce shifted from imports to a more balanced 
two-way flow, as the discovery of oil and the beginnings of Los Angeles’s 
industrialization significantly increased export traffic. In the period before World 
War I, immigrants in search of the California dream fueled a strong demand for 
building construction and, as a result, lumber imports dominated port trade, driving 
an eleven-fold increase in total port commerce from 1900 to 1917.61 After the war, 
oil production skyrocketed with a series of major oil strikes around Long Beach 
beginning in 1921, and oil exports—which had been growing in the prewar 
period—increased dramatically, facilitated by the opening of the Panama Canal that 
same year, which permitted oil to be immediately shipped for refining on the East 
Coast.62 Port commerce doubled by 1922 to over ten million net tons.63 As a 
Chamber-led push to promote Los Angeles industrialization won some early 
success—with Ford Automobile and major tire companies opening regional plants 
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to take advantage of Los Angeles’s shipping facilities—exports surged and port 
commerce grew further, reaching nearly thirty million net tons by 1930 and 
establishing the Port of Los Angeles as the largest on the West Coast.64 
The Port of Los Angeles’s growing regional dominance occurred alongside the 
upstart ambitions of neighboring Long Beach. As the Port of Los Angeles began to 
take shape in the early 1900s, local developers purchased harbor property and began 
dredging to create a rival deep-water port in Long Beach.65 The arrival of new 
industry—most notably the Craig Shipyard and then the Southern California Edison 
power plant—added momentum to the harbor project, which remained in the 
hands of private developers even after the official creation of the Port of Long 
Beach in 1911.66 Despite a series of city-backed bond measures to support harbor 
development,67 World War I and major flooding reinforced the perception that the 
harbor’s private owners were unable to undertake improvements at the necessary 
scale to build and maintain a world-class port. As a result, the city of Long Beach 
finally acquired ownership of its port in 1916, promptly issuing bonds for further 
upgrades.68 
The 1921 Signal Hill oil strike radically changed the fortunes of Long Beach, 
newly awash in “black gold” and able to finance the massive improvements 
necessary to create a world-class port.69 That year, the city passed a new charter, 
establishing a harbor department, with authority to manage the city-owned harbor 
asset.70 A $5 million bond issue in 1924 financed a breakwater that transformed the 
port into a deep-water rival to its Los Angeles neighbor,71 separated by an invisible 
jurisdictional line, but otherwise integrated into a massive port complex. On the 
Long Beach side, a series of ballot initiatives through the early 1930s gave the harbor 
department proprietary status along the model of Los Angeles, with a harbor 
commission that possessed similar independent powers.72 Los Angeles, appreciating 
the threat, attempted again to consolidate authority by creating a unified port 
district, but Long Beach rejected the overture.73 A wealthy city with larger 
aspirations, Long Beach preferred to challenge Los Angeles head-on, quadrupling 
its port tonnage to four million between 1926 and 1930.74 Though still far below 
the Port of Los Angeles in overall volume, the Port of Long Beach had established 
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itself as a serious competitor, causing each city to ratchet up investment to secure 
its share of trade. 
B. Federal Power: Industrialization in the Shadow of Regulation 
Although the Depression slowed growth dramatically at both ports, wartime 
mobilization and the postwar prosperity that flowed from U.S. economic 
dominance once again transformed the ports—and their relationship with the 
communities connected to them. The regulatory state that emerged from the 
Depression set the template for postwar growth. Wartime industrial investment 
fueled a postwar manufacturing boom, particularly in Southern California, where 
wartime manufacturing of aircraft and ships was retooled for the peacetime 
economy. Import tariffs reduced foreign competition and encouraged export-driven 
industrialization, in which the ports became key distribution centers. Federal 
regulation of transportation permitted the ports to negotiate favorable terms with 
shippers and carriers, which they could then reinvest in infrastructure development. 
Transportation regulation, coupled with newly minted federal labor laws, also gave 
unions power to negotiate a favorable share of growth for port workers. Those 
workers, particularly truck drivers, benefitted from the postwar regime, while local 
communities—increasingly under stress from oil production—had not yet incurred 
the blight of rapid port expansion. It was a fragile stability that rested on federally 
regulated industrial prosperity. 
Trade was significantly interrupted by the Depression—which decreased port 
revenues and forced greater reliance on federal assistance for harbor 
improvements75—and World War II. These events nonetheless drew attention to 
two aspects of port development that would prove crucial in the postwar period. 
One was oil production, which despite decreased demand, remained a mainstay of 
harbor exports during the 1930s and, in Long Beach, generated revenues that 
financed ongoing harbor improvements. The 1932 discovery of the Wilmington Oil 
Field under the harbor (the third largest oil field in the United States) triggered 
increasing oil extraction and refining activities in the harbor area, while also 
contributing to harbor subsidence on the Long Beach side.76 By the mid-1930s, 
Wilmington and Long Beach were marked by the relentless rise and fall of oil 
pumps, and significant areas had been conveyed to oil companies, whose operations 
often abutted the houses, schools, and stores that residents used.77 At the beginning 
of World War II, seventy-five percent of all cargo shipped through the Port of Los 
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Angeles was oil.78 The cataclysm of World War II appropriated the ports to the 
national interest, while simultaneously laying the foundation for an even greater 
postwar role building regional industrialization. Petroleum was needed in huge 
amounts to support the war effort and drilling intensified around the ports, reaching 
17,000 barrels a day in 1943.79 Wartime brought naval bases to the strategically 
valuable San Pedro harbor, which became the central conduit for the transportation 
of military personnel and the distribution of locally manufactured aircraft and ships 
to Allied forces in the Pacific.80 
Manufacturing production spurred by the war became the basis for regional 
economic growth after the war’s end. Both ports invested substantially in postwar 
repurposing to convert facilities back to civilian uses and to build for increasing 
trade afforded by the peacetime dividend.81 Under pressure to be financially self-
sufficient, the ports promoted new local development,82 while also cultivating global 
connections, sending trade missions to Asia and Europe.83 The pressure on Long 
Beach, in particular, to increase port revenues grew more intense in the 1950s, when 
it lost control over its lucrative oil revenue after the state amended the Tidelands 
Trust Act in 1951 to allocate fifty percent of oil revenues to the state for purposes 
unrelated to the harbor.84 Faced with a dwindling oil subsidy, the Port of Long 
Beach launched an aggressive pricing strategy to lure shipping away from Los 
Angeles, which allowed Long Beach to quadruple its port tonnage in the 1960s, 
causing it to nearly equal its rival Los Angeles’s total by 1971.85 
The rise of manufacturing powered postwar economic growth in the Los 
Angeles region and the ports grew in relation to regional prosperity. Ports and their 
workers shared in some of the benefits of growth under a set of federal laws that 
regulated transportation and labor, giving ports and unions negotiating strength to 
extract benefits. Port transportation was tightly controlled by an interlocking federal 
regulatory system governing carriers: the ocean steamship companies, railroad lines, 
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and trucking firms that moved cargo. This system gave ports more authority to set 
rates, while consolidating the trucking industry in ways that facilitated unionization. 
Part of this structure predated the New Deal. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 
governed interstate railroad companies and established the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) to police unfair competition by mandating reasonable shipping 
rates.86 The Shipping Act of 1916 similarly regulated ocean carriers, establishing the 
Shipping Board (which became the Federal Maritime Commission) to police 
anticompetitive practices87—by setting uniform price schedules and exempting 
port-to-port rate agreements from antitrust law.88 The Motor Carrier Act, which 
regulated trucking, was passed in 1935.89 The Act set routes, regulated rates, and 
limited market entry to firms able to secure a certificate of “convenience and 
necessity” from the federal government.90 
Taken together, this regulatory system had two important effects that 
benefited the ports and organized labor. First, it strengthened port negotiating 
power relative to shippers and carriers. Companies that wanted to ship goods had 
to contract with ocean steamship lines to transport cargo along authorized routes 
from port-to-port, and then separately contract with inland carriers (rail or trucking) 
to haul cargo to and from the ports.91 Because federal agencies controlled shipping 
rates and routes, shippers were not able to negotiate single “through rates” to move 
their cargo from door-to-door on a single bill of lading.92 Fixed carrier pricing meant 
that shippers saw little financial advantage to rerouting, which gave ports greater 
bargaining power to negotiate higher fees for access.93 These fees supported further 
port expansion. 
Federal regulation also shaped labor relations for port workers. For these 
workers, the Depression exacerbated what had long been the painful reality of 
substandard and often inhumane working conditions.94 Harbor railroads had been 
built using low-paid and sometimes forced labor, while maritime workers on ships 
and their longshore counterparts, who loaded and unloaded cargo on the docks, 
labored in dangerous settings and often for little pay.95 The labor militancy of the 
1930s—culminating in the 1935 passage of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), which established employee collective bargaining rights—began to 
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challenge these conditions. Labor discontent erupted in 1934, when the 
International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) struck ports along the West Coast, 
including those in San Pedro, demanding uniform wage rates and union-controlled 
hiring halls.96 Ship owners refused, brought in strikebreakers, and enlisted local 
police in cracking down on the protesters.97 After two ILA members were killed on 
“Bloody Thursday,” the federal government intervened and brokered an agreement 
that established the first industry-wide collective bargaining unit. The International 
Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) was created shortly thereafter and 
became a powerful force at the ports.98 
Following this victory, the Teamsters also achieved success in organizing the 
growing number of port truck drivers, who hauled cargo to and from the ocean 
steamships.99 During the first part of the twentieth century, the Teamsters had made 
little progress against the strong open-shop forces in Los Angeles.100 The turning 
point occurred in an audacious 1937 campaign that used the threat of the then-still-
legal secondary boycott to force Los Angeles trucking companies to recognize the 
union and negotiate a contract.101 The 1935 Motor Carrier Act prevented a carrier 
from shipping cargo outside its region if another carrier refused to connect.102 
Because the San Francisco trucking firms had already unionized, the Teamsters used 
the pressure of their refusal to accept Southern California hauls to force Los Angeles 
firms to unionize upon risk of losing access to the lucrative Bay Area market.103 
This, combined with the ILWU’s refusal to cross the Teamsters picket lines at the 
port, succeeded in unionizing the largest—and most antiunion—regional carrier, 
Pacific Freight Lines, and to subsequently win an agreement that unionized the 
regional trucking industry.104 Building on the foundation of this agreement, the 
Teamsters became one of the most successful unions in the state (and also the 
nation), achieving dramatic union growth that helped increase trucker wages and 
benefits through the 1960s.105 The Teamsters’ success contributed to the broader 
rise of the postwar labor movement in Los Angeles, which at its height in the mid-
1950s had over thirty-five percent of nonagricultural private sector workers under 
union contract.106 Much of the increase in union density was attributable to the 
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growth of manufacturing, particularly in the aerospace industry.107 This growth 
depended on the ports to facilitate exports to the expanding global marketplace. 
During this time, the interests of the ports, local business, and organized labor 
aligned over the project of port expansion. 
This alignment, which lasted from World War II to the 1970s, marked a 
transitional moment. As the growth engine of local trade shifted from city building 
to globalization, and the federal regulatory regime governing transportation and 
labor relations crumbled, the ports and some workers—specifically truckers—lost 
power. Globalization, deregulation, and new transport technologies shifted power 
to global shipping firms, which were increasingly able to set terms with the ports 
and other carriers. As the ports grew to meet demands for expanded facilities to 
accommodate rapidly increasing global trade, the ports’ relations with workers and 
local communities was once again recast—with new tensions emerging. 
C. Global Power: The Logistics Revolution, Free Trade, and Deregulation 
Globalization would lift port activity to new heights and also fundamentally 
change its nature. As the volume of global trade through the ports began to expand 
dramatically in the 1970s, it also changed in composition from a balanced export-
import flow to an import-dominated stream.108 This transformation profoundly 
altered the role of the ports: from building the local economy to facilitating the 
global one. 
The result was a growth ratchet. Rapidly expanding global trade, deregulation, 
and more powerful shippers weakened port negotiating strength, as shippers of 
goods could drive a harder bargain by threatening to direct cargo to different West 
Coast ports. To maintain their advantage, the ports had to outcompete rivals—and 
each other—at the level of infrastructure and service. This required massive new 
investments, typically publicly financed, in port facilities and transportation 
networks. As port infrastructure was developed, it became more attractive for 
shippers; as more goods flowed through the ports, the transportation infrastructure 
had to be expanded to accommodate the increased volume; as infrastructure was 
built out, the harbor attracted even more shipping in an iterative cycle. Competition 
between Los Angeles and Long Beach contributed to this growth pressure, which 
was no longer consistent with the interests of labor unions and surrounding 
communities. Indeed, the ports’ emergence as the global ports of entry to the United 
States depended on industry restructuring, which undermined the labor bargain 
struck in the postwar period, and infrastructure expansion, which encroached on 
the ports’ low-income community neighbors. As a result, the ports’ integration into 
the global market imposed significant local externalities and generated intense local 
friction—provoking political efforts to reign in port autonomy and ultimately 
igniting community and labor mobilization against port expansion. 
 
107. Id. at 61. 
108. BONACICH & WILSON, supra note 5, at 47. 
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During this period, global trade—and port growth—was facilitated by 
technological and legal changes that served to reinforce one another. Beginning in 
the 1950s, transportation innovations promoted growth by making it more efficient 
and cost-effective to move production farther away from the point of sale. The key 
advance was the advent of containerization and, from that, the rise of 
intermodalism, which dramatically reduced the cost of moving goods from one 
form (or modality) of transportation to another.109 Containerization was the term 
given to the creation of shipping containers in standardized sizes (typically eight by 
six by twenty feet, often called twenty-foot equivalent units, or TEUs) that could be 
locked in place on different types of transport systems—steamships, trains, and 
trucks—and could also be stacked on top of each other for maximum shipping 
volume.110 This allowed goods to be packed in containers at the point of origin and 
then shipped unaltered via an interconnected transport system to the destination. 
Costly and time-consuming loading and unloading of cargo under the break-bulk 
system—in which pallets of cargo would be transported by crane and loaded by 
hand—was thereby eliminated.111 As a result, goods production could be 
increasingly remote from the point of sale and transportation could be made more 
mechanized and efficient.112 This appealed to shippers, which sought to reduce 
labor costs by outsourcing production to countries with lower labor standards, and 




109. Id. at 50–54. 
110. Id. at 51. 
111. Id. at 50; see also QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 133 (“While the average longshore gang of 
sixteen to eighteen men could handle eight to ten tons of cargo in regular packaging, a five-man team 
could move 450 tons of containerized goods and expend only a fraction of the effort and energy doing 
it.”). 
112. BONACICH & WILSON, supra note 5, at 51. 
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Figure 1: Container Ship Entering Port of Los Angeles113 
 
Achieving the long-term efficiencies of containerization, however, required 
substantial short-term capital investment to create the necessary port facilities. With 
interport competition constraining how much the ports could exact through user 
fees, the resources for infrastructure development came from public subsidies, as 
the cities competed to maintain their share of trade. In 1960, Los Angeles launched 
a $50 million project, financed by municipal bonds, to build new berths and 
terminals, and to upgrade other facilities.114 Long Beach used its declining oil 
revenues to follow suit.115 Although Long Beach lost its oil revenues in 1965, it 
turned to municipal bond financing to fund further improvements in 1970, 
including the creation of new container terminals and a freight station. Los Angeles 
also issued more bonds to finance the expansion of its container terminal.116 
Despite parity in infrastructure investment, the port rivalry began to tilt in 
Long Beach’s favor as Los Angeles’s too-shallow harbor impeded entry of the large 
“post-Panamax” containerships that moved containers from Asia (so named 
because they were too big to fit through the Panama Canal).117 These ships were the 
logical extension of containerization, which incentivized shipping lines to build 
bigger ships to haul more containers per trip, thus reducing the number of trips (and 
 
113. Photograph taken by author. 
114. QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 135. 
115. ERIE, supra note 7, at 88–89. 
116. QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 143. 
117. Dan Weikel, Freighters Enter the Age of the Mega-Ship, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1999, at A1. 
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their associated costs), while increasing revenue per trip.118 In the Port of Long 
Beach, oil-extraction-induced subsidence had the benefit of naturally deepening the 
harbor and permitting the docking of post-Panamax vessels.119 As Los Angeles 
began to lag behind, local political officials lobbied for federal financial assistance 
for additional dredging, which it won in 1981; the project was completed two years 
later.120 By this point, the Port of Long Beach had surpassed its Los Angeles 
counterpart in total cargo, although Los Angeles remained more profitable because 
of higher fees and rents.121 Containers constituted an increasing share of port cargo: 
the proportion of cargo shipped via containers through West Coast ports grew from 
roughly fifteen percent in 1970 to thirty percent by 1980.122 By 2000, containers 
comprised fully two-thirds of West Coast port traffic, and approximately seventy 
percent of those containers came through the ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach.123 
Containerization promoted, and was also a product of, rapidly expanding 
global trade routed through the ports. Despite the global recession in the mid-1970s, 
port traffic continued to grow geometrically, increasingly as a result of manufactured 
imports from the emerging markets of the Pacific Rim.124 Still critical to regional 
economic activity, with one estimate suggesting that over 200,000 jobs depended 
on maritime trade,125 the ports became increasingly geared toward facilitating 
imports,126 and routing them to delivery points deep within the national economy—
and often times beyond to Europe. This transformation of the ports into central 
nodes in the global supply chain was authorized and promoted by interrelated legal 
change. 
The decline of trade barriers permitted the rise of Asian imports. Trade 
liberalization through multilateral agreements, particularly the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, and bilateral agreements with trading partners, significantly 
reduced the costs of imports to the United States and thus helped fuel the growth 
of export-driven economies, particularly China and the so-called East Asian 
Tigers.127 As manufactured goods could be produced more cheaply in foreign 
countries with lower labor standards, production was outsourced and U.S. trade 
shifted toward imports. Whereas in 1970, the United States still had a $3 billion 
trade surplus, by 1976, it had turned into a deficit, with exported manufactured 
goods running increasingly behind imports beginning in 1983.128 The postwar 
 
118. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 150. 
119. ERIE, supra note 7, at 90. 
120. Id.; see also QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 150 (describing the $61 million dredging project). 
121. ERIE, supra note 7, at 91. 
122. BONACICH & WILSON, supra note 5, at 59. 
123. Id. at 59–60. 
124. QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 147, 149; see also BONACICH & WILSON, supra note 5, at 47. 
125. QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 147. 
126. See id. at 149. 
127. See ERIE, supra note 7, at 22. 
128. BONACICH & WILSON, supra note 5, at 47. 
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industrialization enabled by trade barriers gave way to deindustrialization associated 
with free trade. As Asia came to dominate the import market, the strategically 
positioned San Pedro ports reinvented themselves, becoming the gateway of this 
new trading regime.129 
That this occurred was not preordained by geographic advantage. The 
northwest ports of Seattle and Tacoma were closer to East Asia.130 However, the 
Los Angeles and Long Beach ports offered shippers superior infrastructure and 
service—an advantage that had to be maintained.131 Because of their political 
autonomy, both ports were able to move quickly—and in coordination—to build 
facilities for container traffic and upgrade the transportation infrastructure required 
to move it.132 Intermodalism became even more important with the development 
of landbridge, by which containers shipped into the ports were loaded onto trains 
for further transport across the United States.133 Landbridge was quicker and more 
cost-effective for large volume exporters from China, which could load up post-
Panamax ships and bypass the Panama Canal for East Coast and transatlantic 
shipments.134 But landbridge’s efficiency depended on robust intermodalism—an 
integrated transportation system that relied on legal deregulation to permit ocean 
steamships, railroads, and truckers to enter into rate-setting agreements that allowed 
door-to-door service.135 
Deeper integration began to take shape in the 1970s, when the federal system 
of transportation regulation that had enabled the ports to set favorable rates was 
dismantled. Railroad deregulation came first, followed by the 1980 Motor Carrier 
Act, which deregulated trucking. The Act dramatically changed the trucking 
industry: making it easier for new companies to enter the market, deregulating 
routes, and reducing industry authority to set general rates,136 which permitted 
discriminatory pricing (through, for example, high-volume discounts).137 In 1984, 
Congress passed the U.S. Shipping Act, which deregulated ocean steamshipping,138 
allowing rates and routes to be set by individual companies.139 In addition, the 
Shipping Act permitted ocean steamship lines to contract directly with trucking and 
 
129. See Daryl Kelley, Edgerton on Junket with Port Officials to Asia, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1985, at 
LB8. Politicians also did outreach to other regions, such as Latin America, to promote harbor trade. See 
The Region, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1985, http://articles.latimes.com/1985-10-02/news/mn-16051_1_los 
-angeles-mayor-tom-bradley. 
130. BONACICH & WILSON, supra note 5, at 61. 
131. Id. at 62–63. 
132. Id. at 63. 
133. Id. at 53. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 54. 
136. BELZER, supra note 90, at 64–65. 
137. BONACICH & WILSON, supra note 5, at 54, 103. 
138. Id. at 54. 
139. TALLEY, supra note 88, at 150. 
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rail carriers to set door-to-door rates,140 thus authorizing them to establish “single 
through rates on intermodal shipments” without incurring antitrust liability.141 
Taken together, deregulation completed the legal transformation necessary to 
achieve intermodalism. By authorizing intermodal contracts, shippers (i.e., 
manufacturers and retailers that owned cargo) were able to negotiate through rates 
directly with ocean steamship carriers, which contracted with trucking and rail 
carriers to provide door-to-door service on one bill of lading142—without regulatory 
barriers or antitrust exposure.143 Because standardized rates were no longer 
required, ocean carriers could negotiate directly with individual rail and trucking 
carriers for the best prices to reduce overall shipping costs.144 Because ocean carriers 
dealt in such high container volume, they could exert downward price pressure on 
rail and trucking companies, which were forced to compete among themselves (and 
authorized to do so by deregulation) in order to be part of intermodal contacts. In 
addition, the ability to set door-to-door rates gave shippers greater power vis-à-vis 
the ports. By threatening to run their intermodal routes through other ports, 
shippers could negotiate more favorable port access fees and demand 
improvements to facilitate intermodal connections. 
To maintain their dominance over container traffic, the Los Angeles and Long 
Beach ports were forced to respond to these changes. This required building the 
infrastructure needed to permit efficient container transport from steamship to rail, 
which became the critical mode of transportation in the landbridge system.145 
Containers coming off steamships were placed on rail cars in two locations: some 
were moved directly from steamships to railcars at on-dock rail facilities, while 
others were transported to off-dock rail yards by short-haul, or drayage, truckers.146 
On-dock loading required interconnected rail lines and loading facilities at the port. 
The Harbor Belt Line Railroad, unifying the tangle of separately owned railways in 
the port complex, was completed by the Los Angeles harbor commission and 
railroad companies in the 1930s.147 This system was augmented and loading facilities 
expanded to permit intermodalism.148 
 
140. Id. at 150. 
141. EDWARD JAMES TAAFFE ET AL., GEOGRAPHY OF TRANSPORTATION 161 (1996). 
142. Talley, supra note 93, at 211–12. 
143. See TAAFFE ET AL., supra note 141, at 161–62. 
144. Talley, supra note 93, at 212, 214. 
145. ERIE, supra note 7, at 23 (stating that containerization “placed a premium on the capacity, 
efficiency, and ground accessibility of local port and airport facilities”). 
146. See David Jaffee, Kinks in the Intermodal Supply Chain: Longshore Workers and Drayage 
Drivers 16 ( June 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.unf.edu 
/uploadedFiles/aa/coas/cci/ports/REPORT_Port%20Paper%2010-%20SASE-Kinks%20in%20the 
%20Intermodal%20Supply%20Chain.pdf. Bonacich and Wilson cite estimates that sixty-five percent 
of Los Angeles/Long Beach containers are bound for U.S. destinations; of these, twenty-five percent 
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note 5, at 115. 
147. FOGELSON, supra note 16, at 118. 
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Off-dock shipping required new investments to create massive areas where 
trucks could congregate to transfer their loads to rail cars that could then easily 
connect to transcontinental lines. To achieve this, the San Pedro ports coordinated 
their first major joint project, in concert with the Southern Pacific Railroad (later 
Union Pacific, or UP): construction of a $50 million Intermodal Container Transfer 
Facility (ICTF), completed in 1986, to allow mass movement of containers from 
ships to off-dock rail lines operated by UP.149 The other major off-dock rail 
connection was located near downtown Los Angeles, with four major intermodal 
rail yards: three operated by UP (the East LA yard in Commerce, the LA Trailer and 
Intermodal Container Facility just east of the Los Angeles River, and the City of 
Industry Yard) and the fourth (Hobart, just west of the Interstate 710 freeway in 
Commerce) operated by Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF).150 All of these 
yards were serviced by drayage trucks.151 
The 150-acre ICTF was built five miles from the ports in Carson (on the 
border of Wilmington), at the terminus of State Highway 103 (called the Terminal 
Island Freeway),152 and adjacent to the interchange of two major freeways 
(Interstate 405 and Interstate 710).153 The ICTF was designed to alleviate truck 
impacts at the ports by routing traffic to a massive facility with ample parking and 
faster loading service.154 Yet in its attempt to reduce port congestion, the ICTF 
introduced a new source of gridlock into the community: increasing drayage truck 
traffic on the freeways and surface streets coming to and from the ports. This 
 
they have to be consolidated with other partially full containers, they are loaded onto trucks and then 
transported to consolidator warehouses, some of which are located near the port but others are as far 
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Alameda Corridor rail project and the expansion of the 710 freeway. Id. Part of it is now being 
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increase in truck traffic highlighted a counterintuitive problem. Although landbridge 
placed railroads at the center of trade distribution, drayage trucking was essential to 
move containers from steamship to off-dock rail lines—and also to move cargo 
from the ports to local warehouses.155 Containerization thus increased demand for 
trucking in proportion to rail, placing strain on the region’s overtaxed freeway 
system, while overtaking local roadways in port communities and in the 
communities around the downtown intermodal yards. 
The symbols of Southern California mobility—the freeways—were supposed 
to alleviate the burdens of local traffic. But freeway expansion in Los Angeles and 
Long Beach occurred without containerization in mind—and ultimately could not 
handle the ever-increasing volume of truck traffic necessary to serve the ports. 
Freeway development was fueled by postwar suburbanization that created the vast 
car-dependent metropolis. The design of the freeways was, however, done with the 
ports in mind. Construction began in the 1950s, spurred by federal investments and 
local pressures. The primary route into the Port of Los Angeles was built through 
northern San Pedro via the Harbor Freeway (Interstate 110), running due south 
from downtown Los Angeles. That freeway, funded by a state gas tax and federal 
interstate highway money,156 was built between 1952 and 1970, extending piece-by-
piece from Pasadena, south of downtown Los Angeles, and then bisecting African 
American communities in the south central part of the city.157 What is now known 
as the Long Beach Freeway (Interstate 710) forms the eastern border of 
Wilmington. With federal money, Interstate 710 was built from 1954 to 1975, 
designed to connect Long Beach to Pasadena, bypassing downtown Los Angeles; 
however, it was only extended just past the Interstate 10 freeway in Alhambra as the 
proposed link to Pasadena was thwarted by community opposition.158 These 
freeways became the main conduits for the increasing volume of heavy-duty drayage 
trucks pulled to the harbor by free trade. 
Increasingly linked through a dense intermodal transportation system, 
container shipments through Los Angeles and Long Beach surged, increasing from 
9 million tons to 122 million tons between 1970 and 1994.159 In 1986, the San Pedro 
port complex passed New York-New Jersey as the largest in the United States; the 
next decade, container volume doubled.160 Auto imports, particularly from Asia, 
powered this growth—with over 150,000 autos coming into the Port of Los Angeles 
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159. ERIE, supra note 7, at 23. 
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in the first five months of 1985—creating jobs in the regional auto processing 
industry, but also producing severe space constraints in the port itself.161 In 1990, 
nudged forward by frequent trade missions of public officials,162 the Port of Los 
Angeles surpassed New York as the nation’s busiest by volume.163 
Once again, this growth—achieved by creating better intermodal 
connections—placed new pressures on existing infrastructure. Specifically, 
enhanced links to rail transport began to overtax the rail system itself. More—and 
more efficient—rail connection was thus needed to avoid another bottleneck. By 
the end of the 1980s, the rail system—operated primarily by the two major railroads, 
UP and BNSF—was a complex web viewed as impeding the movement of ports-
related goods by forcing rail cars to travel old branch lines, pass through numerous 
crossings, and share track with other freight and passenger trains. This slowed on-
dock rail loaded directly at the terminals and off-dock rail loaded at the ICTF.164 In 
response, Los Angeles and Long Beach created a joint powers authority in 1985 
authorizing the development of the Alameda Corridor project, a twenty-mile high-
speed, elevated line from both ports connecting to the transcontinental railroad.165 
The Alameda Corridor rail, running through Wilmington (then north through 
Carson, Compton, Lynwood, Watts, South Gate, Huntington Park, and Vernon), 
was completed in 2002 with $2.4 billion in federal, state, and local financing.166 
Carrying roughly 15,000 trains a year,167 it consolidated track to more efficiently link 
on-dock rail to eastern destinations,168 while creating better connections to the 
ICTF for off-dock transfer.169 
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The Alameda Corridor was one of several large-scale megaprojects 
coordinated between both ports to deal with massive projected increases in port 
traffic.170 In the mid-1980s, both ports adopted the “2020 Plan” to upgrade and 
integrate maritime trade and land transport systems to deal with an anticipated 250% 
increase in tonnage.171 A 1998 study predicted that, with appropriate infrastructure 
investments, cargo at the ports would double by 2020, making Los Angeles the 
“trading center of the world.”172 Although Long Beach eventually withdrew from 
formal coordination, both ports nonetheless completed nearly $4 billion in joint 
investments by 2000, with Long Beach focusing on land acquisition and 
redevelopment, and Los Angeles on dredging and the creation of new terminals and 
rail lines.173 These investments correlated with growth. From 1990 to 2000, total 
TEUs increased by 130% in the Los Angeles port and by 188% in Long Beach.174 
By 2005, the Los Angeles-Long Beach ports complex was the fifth largest in the 
world, with a combined fourteen million TEUs of traffic.175 Three-quarters of trade 
into the Los Angeles Customs District were imports and most of those (eighty-five 
percent in 2005) were from Asia (with nearly half from China).176 
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container carrier,181 to move from Long Beach,182 Los Angeles eked back ahead in 
2000, handling 4.9 million TEUs to Long Beach’s 4.6 million.183 
Even with new infrastructure, however, the ports were tested by the surge in 
overall volume.184 The most prominent challenge came in 2004, when over 100 
ships were diverted to other ports because of an unanticipated increase in ship 
traffic, which could not be handled by existing longshore, rail, and trucking 
systems.185 To prevent future bottlenecks, more longshoremen were hired and the 
acute stress was alleviated.186 Yet the episode underscored the transformation of 
labor relations in the context of intense port competition.187 
The advent of containerization had initially threatened longshore jobs. No 
longer needed for the difficult and time-consuming loading process, longshoremen 
were redeployed for container transport, which involved movement via overhead 
crane and attachment to trucks and trains.188 The immediate consequence of 
containerization was to reduce the demand for longshore work since container 
transport, which relied on mechanization, required fewer labor hours.189 This 
provoked labor unrest and the ILWU struck both ports in 1971.190 The strike lasted 
roughly four months and caused a cargo reduction of two million tons at Los 
Angeles.191 With the power to choke port traffic, longshore workers demonstrated 
that even though they were fewer in number, they remained a force to be reckoned 
with.192 As container trade grew rapidly following deregulation, demand for 
dockworkers began to grow again and their bargaining position strengthened as the 
ports became crucial nodes in the import chain. Just as intermodalism forced the 
ports to invest in infrastructure and service to keep shipping lines satisfied, it also 
made the ports invest in labor peace, since even a minor disruption could send 
 
181. THE WORLD BANK & PUBLIC-PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE ADVISORY FACILITY, PORT 
REFORM TOOLKIT, MODULE 2: THE EVOLUTION OF PORTS IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD 48 (2d ed. 
2007), available at http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/documents/toolkits/Portoolkit/Toolkit 
/pdf/modules/02_TOOLKIT_Module2.pdf. 
182. Dan Weikel, Major Shipping Firm to Leave Long Beach Port for Los Angeles, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
28, 1999, at B1. 
183. ERIE, supra note 7, at 142–43. 
184. Asian imports continued to lead the way. See Asian Imports Up 20% Over a Year Ago, L.A. 
TIMES, June 18, 1998, at D2; Gregory Stephen, Imports Climb at L.A., Long Beach, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 
1998, at C2. 
185. BONACICH & WILSON, supra note 5, at 120–21. 
186. Id. 
187. See, e.g., Chris Kraul, Mexican Port Hopes to Be Big in Containers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1991, 
at D2. 
188. BONACICH & WILSON, supra note 5, at 177. 
189. QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 132–33. This reduction in longshoremen was welcomed by the 
ports, which had seen shippers divert cargo to San Francisco and San Diego as a result of labor unrest 
in the 1950s. See id. at 131. 
190. Id. at 143. 
191. Id. at 143–44. 
192. See, e.g., James Flanigan, Striking Costs: Region Has Much to Lose if Shippers Decide to Go 
Elsewhere, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1997, at D1. 
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shippers elsewhere.193 This significantly bolstered the longshoremen’s bargaining 
position relative to the ports, permitting them to grow their membership, bid up 
wages, and build the ILWU’s organizational strength.194 
The longshoremen’s new position reflected a broader power shift. As a 
gateway to the regional market, the ports in the industrial era were empowered by 
federal regulation to charge higher fees and align port growth with local interests. 
However, deregulation and intermodalism changed this equation,195 rendering the 
ports a pass-through to the global market. Particularly as shippers could divert cargo 
to different ports, they gained more bargaining power to drive down rates and 
demand port amenities that permitted larger volume. The ports were forced to 
continuously invest in new infrastructure to maintain their advantage. This 
investment no longer fostered local industrial development as it had in the postwar 
period. To the contrary, Los Angeles and Long Beach found themselves increasingly 
under fiscal strain because of deindustrialization, which was now itself intrinsically 
linked to the ports. The political autonomy the ports had acquired to build the 
regional economy became an increasing liability, as port revenues were used to 
benefit the ports’ global shipping clientele by continuously upgrading the 
intermodal system.196 
No longer reaping a return on local industrial development, Los Angeles and 
Long Beach sought to assert greater control over the ports in an effort to claim 
more local fiscal benefit. By the early 1990s, the Los Angeles harbor commission’s 
vaunted independence still existed, but had been reined in by charter amendments 
that gave the city council greater oversight authority: imposing limits on significant 
contracts, requiring council approval for certain types of leases, making it easier to 
terminate key personnel, and ultimately giving council authority to approve 
important commission decisions.197 Long Beach underwent similar changes to limit 
 
193. Talley, supra note 93, at 213–17; see also Tim Waters, Cargo Moves Again After Accord Ends 
Port Strike, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1986, at B1 (reporting that the strike by longshoremen in support of port 
office workers over job security was the longest in fifteen years and resulted in a three-year contract, 
under which “employers agree not to transfer jobs out of the union’s jurisdiction”). 
194. BONACICH & WILSON, supra note 5, at 177–79; see also Talley, supra note 93, at 214–16; 
Henry Weinstein, 4,000 Dockers Walk Out Over 5 Deaths in a Year, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1985, at A1. For 
the same reasons, harbor pilots, a small group that steered cargo ships through the ports, also exerted 
great leverage to negotiate large salaries and benefits (they were set to make over $140,000 in 2001 after 
a year-long strike in 1997–1998). Dan Weikel, Port Chief Agrees to Sign Harbor Pilots’ Delayed Contract, L.A. 
TIMES, July 10, 1998, at B5. 
195. BONACICH & WILSON, supra note 5, at 57. 
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197. ERIE, supra note 7, at 82–83 tbl.4.1. 
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harbor commission power.198 These changes made it easier for local politicians to 
adapt port activity to city agendas shaped by declining revenues.199 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Los Angeles and Long Beach—suffering 
from manufacturer outsourcing and the end of Cold War-driven defense 
production—sought a share of port resources to infill dwindling city taxes.200 In 
1992, state lawmakers permitted the two cities to divert some port discretionary 
reserves to replace property tax taken by the state to fund its own budget shortfall.201 
Once this temporary provision expired, the cities sought to use their greater power 
over the harbor commissions to extract revenue—by charging more for city services 
(like police and fire).202 When this practice was challenged under the Tidelands Trust 
Act,203 cities changed course by using port funds to build tax-revenue-generating 
harbor projects, like the Long Beach Aquarium, under an expanded definition of 
public benefit.204 With the ports no longer fueling local industrialization, city 
governments looked to them to play a new regional role: creating logistics industry 
jobs and spurring retail growth foundational to the ascendant service-based 
economy. While this strategy sought to address local fiscal needs, it exacerbated the 
impact of port expansion on local port communities as infrastructure megaprojects 
like the ICTF and Alameda Corridor rail resulted in increased congestion and 
pollution. By linking municipal finances to port growth, cities committed 
themselves to a development program with increasingly serious local consequences. 
D. Local Impact: Community, Labor, and the Environment 
The ports’ local impact is a function of their dual identity: at once “an integral 
function in the globalization of production,” the ports are also “one of the most 
 
198. Id. at 86–87 tbl.4.2. These changes included asserting council approval over budgets and 
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them to balance budgets in light of lost state funding; the city of Los Angeles was expected to receive 
$44 million from the Port of Los Angeles). A class action was filed arguing that the law was 
unconstitutional and seeking recovery of $69 million to the Port of Los Angeles and $21 million to the 
Port of Long Beach. Susan Woodward, Harbor to Help L.A., Long Beach Fight Suit, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 
1994, at J15. 
202. Jeff Leeds & John Cox, L.A. Harbor Panel Votes to Pay City $80 Million in Fees, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 25, 1995, at B3 (“The Los Angeles Harbor Commission, hoping to end a two-year dispute, has 
decided to pay the city about $80 million in fees after a private study found that the port has underpaid 
for municipal services since 1977.”). 
203. Dan Weikel, City to Repay $62 Million to Port of L.A., L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at B1 (stating 
that the State Lands Commission and some shipping companies sued Los Angeles in 1996, arguing that 
the payments violated the state Tidelands Trust Act requiring that port revenue be used only on harbor 
projects; that suit was settled in 2001, with the city agreeing to repay $62 million to the port). 
204. ERIE, supra note 7, at 126–29. 
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localized and embedded industries of all.”205 As such, they are special kinds of 
agglomeration economies, where cargo distribution facilities—steamships, rail, 
trucks, and support services—cluster.206 It is precisely this clustering that creates 
externalities, both positive and negative, for local communities. These externalities 
stem from two types of organizational relationships within the global supply 
chain.207 One is interorganizational: the relationship between different economic 
actors linked across the chain—from shippers to ocean liners to dock workers to 
rail and trucks to warehouses.208 From a geographic point of view, there has to be 
space appropriated to permit “transshipment”: the transfer of cargo, especially 
containerized cargo, from one transport mode to the next. Over time, with port 
growth, that space becomes more built out, putting more pressure on surrounding 
communities and increasing environmental risk. The second type of relationship is 
intraorganizational: the formal division of labor within specific firms, like 
trucking.209 In firms connected to port logistics, there are different models of 
providing services—through employees and independent contractors—which are 
authorized by distinct legal standards. These intraorganizational relationships have 
significant implications for workers in two key areas of intermodal logistics: terminal 
operations and drayage trucking.210 This section examines how these inter- and 
intraorganizational relationships have contributed to the creation of environmental 
justice problems in low-income communities with weak political power and the 
degradation of labor standards in industries with weak legal protections. 
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As the peninsula slopes southeastward, toward the ports, its change in 
municipal jurisdiction is marked by dramatically different socioeconomic 
conditions. Although separated by only a few miles, San Pedro is distinguished from 
Palos Verdes in crucial respects. It encompasses the Port of Los Angeles, which lies 
on the eastern edge of the community, abutting the harbor’s main channel, and also 
includes the western part of Terminal Island. San Pedro is therefore a key point of 
access to the port, which drayage trucks traverse from the Harbor Freeway 
(Interstate 110) either in order to cross into Terminal Island or to travel down to 
facilities along the main channel.213 On-dock rail lines also run along San Pedro’s 
eastern edge as they snake their way to the Alameda Corridor exchange. The 
neighborhood’s northeastern border also abuts the ConocoPhillips Oil Refinery in 
Wilmington, which creates a cluster of environmental hazards in that corner. 
Because it is within Los Angeles city proper, San Pedro receives a lower level of 
services than Palos Verdes, symbolized by the chasm between the public school 
systems.214 There are other markers of socioeconomic divide. Palos Verdes is nearly 
four-fifths white, highly educated (nearly sixty percent holding a college degree), 
older on average (median age of fifty), and more affluent (median income of 
approximately $130,000) than San Pedro, whose residents—two-fifths Latino and 
a quarter immigrant—are relatively younger (median age of thirty-four), less 
educated (roughly one-quarter are college educated), and less well-off (median 
household income of $57,000).215 
Just before it terminates in San Pedro, the Harbor Freeway cuts along the 
western border of Wilmington, which is bounded by the Long Beach Freeway 
(Interstate 710) on the east. Wilmington’s northern border is defined by the 
ConocoPhillips Los Angeles Refinery (in addition to the ConocoPhillips Oil 
Refinery to the west and Tesoro Los Angeles to the east), thus encircling it with 
environmental hazards. The strip of land on its southern border is part of the port’s 
 
for real estate development in the 1950s; as a building boom commenced, developers and homeowners 
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functioning inner channel, lined with terminals (including the massive TraPac 
Container Terminal) and crossed by streets and rail lines, separated from the 
residential part of the city by Harry Bridges Boulevard (named after the founder of 
the ILWU) and above that, in the western part of the community, the recently 
developed Wilmington Waterfront Park. Trucks access this part of the port from 
the freeways on both sides, as well as the surface streets, which are often travelled 
by trucks connecting between the docks and the ICTF. In this way, Wilmington, 
even more so than San Pedro, exists as an adjunct to the port transportation system. 
As a result, the community itself is more disadvantaged, with a higher level of 
segregation and lower socioeconomic indicators than San Pedro. Nearly ninety 
percent of Wilmington residents are Latino and almost half are immigrants; the 
community has a median household size of four and a median income of $40,000; 
and only five percent of residents have a college degree.216 
 
Figure 4: Trucks Waiting on Figueroa Street, Wilmington217 
 
As with land use, the labor impacts of port development also vary.218 The 
market for landside workers at the port is highly segmented in ways that reflect legal 
differentiation. All port workers, from longshoremen to truckers, are theoretically 
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in a position to choke distribution along the supply chain. But the legal power to 
take advantage of that position differs. Because longshoremen are employed by port 
firms, they are legally empowered to organize and exempted from antitrust law. It 
is the combination of their legal and market position that gives them significant 
bargaining power, which they have been able to use to unionize and negotiate 
relatively high wages and benefits.219 From a market perspective, their leverage rests 
not just in complete shutdown, but also in delay. Given the “just-in-time” nature of 
global distribution, slowdowns pose a significant threat to shippers, who prefer to 
buy labor peace to ensure logistical efficiency.220 The risk of capital flight is 
minimized because of the massive up-front investments required to facilitate 
transport, which enhances longshoremen’s bargaining power.221 
In the 1990s, the ILWU used its power to negotiate a contract with the Pacific 
Maritime Association (PMA)—the West Coast employer trade group—that 
increased wages nine percent, expanded the union’s jurisdiction into harbor 
trucking, and rejected the creation of a computerized job-dispatch system that 
longshoremen believed would take job assignment power away from the union 
hiring hall.222 In 2002, alleging work slowdowns, the PMA locked out the 
longshoremen in an effort to decrease their clout,223 producing a six-week backlog 
and causing President George W. Bush to invoke the Taft-Hartley Act to reopen 
the ports.224 As shippers began to reroute cargo to the East Coast, the PMA backed 
down, agreeing to a six-year contract—“the most lucrative in the union’s 70-year 
history”—that increased hourly wages to thirty dollars, substantially increased 
pension benefits, and provided strong employment security protections.225 As the 
episode reinforced, longshoremen had become the ports’ “labor aristocracy.”226 
Drayage truck drivers, in contrast, had sunk to the bottom of the labor 
hierarchy.227 Although also in a position to choke supply, their status as independent 
contractors—a consequence of deregulation—meant that they could not organize 
and therefore lacked the ability to coordinate labor action that would allow them to 
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leverage collective gains. Prior to deregulation, strong transportation and labor 
regulation permitted the Teamsters to organize firm employees, which they did with 
great success.228 Deregulation introduced fierce competition and increased the 
number of firms, particularly in the drayage sector.229 Drayage trucking companies 
also systematically moved to a system of contracting out,230 under which firms 
assigned work to nominally “independent” owner-operators,231 who purchased or 
rented their own trucks and were paid by the load or trip, rather than by the hour.232 
This insulated companies from trucker liability and also significantly reduced labor 
costs by eliminating the need to pay employment taxes and benefits (such as health 
care and retirement). It also shifted the downside industry risks, particularly the cost 
of bottlenecks and delays associated with port clearance and cargo identification, to 
the drivers—who became responsible for truck maintenance, fuel, tolls, taxes, and 
other expenses. As such, trucking firms became “non-asset-based companies,” 
shedding fixed expenses to increase their share value.233 In addition, and most 
crucially, the move to independent contractors undermined unionization, since 
independent contractors were banned from union organizing under antitrust law.234 
As a result, the conditions of port truckers deteriorated sharply.235 Belman and 
Monaco reported that truckers’ wages fell by twenty-one percent from 1973 to 1995, 
and that one-third of that decrease was attributable to deregulation.236 In Los 
Angeles and Long Beach, the independent-contractor form came to predominate in 
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the drayage trucking sector, with nearly ninety percent of truckers so designated.237 
For these drivers, the average annual salary, after expenses, was $28,000.238 In part 
because of delays, they worked on average fifty-six hours per week, thereby earning 
an effective wage rate of less than ten dollars per hour.239 
The drayage labor force also came to be defined by workers of color. By 2000, 
in Los Angeles and Long Beach, port truckers were almost entirely Latino and nearly 
half were immigrants.240 Bonacich and Wilson describe the shift from white drivers 
at mid-century to predominantly nonwhite drivers beginning in the mid-1980s as a 
product of deregulation and immigration. Entrepreneurialism was long part of the 
trucker ethos and, in the immediate wake of deregulation, some white drivers 
became owner-operators. Yet the industry rapidly shifted. The increase in 
immigration during the 1980s, powered by Central American civil wars, brought 
more immigrant job seekers into the industry in part because “you didn’t need a 
green card or an I-9 form.”241 Firms became smaller, more immigrants entered, and 
wages declined.242 Bonacich and Wilson report that by 1985 the Teamsters had “lost 
the harbor.”243 They called a strike, but the “Central Americans did not want the 
union because of the green card issue,” and the strike failed.244 Tensions between 
truckers and longshoremen flared as truckers felt disrespected by the largely white 
longshoremen, whose hourly pay structure made them in no hurry to reduce the 
transport delays that plagued truckers.245 Observers identified the drayage sector as 
the most problematic element of port logistics, characterized by delay, poor safety, 
and pollution.246 The “handoff” from ocean steamships to trucks was viewed as 
inefficient:247 to pick up their cargo, truckers had to idle in long queues to enter the 
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port, access the terminal, obtain their chassis, and load their containers.248 Yet it was 
a system that benefited trucking companies (which externalized the cost of labor 
and pollution) and shippers (which were able to pay trucking firms less for their 
services).249 Accordingly, those with economic power in the system had no incentive 
to change the arrangement.250 
At the start of the new millennium, there were roughly 16,000 drayage trucks 
servicing the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports each day.251 Because drivers could 
not generally afford to upgrade, this fleet was aging—the ports were the place where 
“old trucks went to die”252—and ran on diesel fuel, a known carcinogen.253 Truck 
emissions, combined with those from ocean carriers and dock transport equipment, 
caused significant air pollution, which threatened trucker and broader community 
health. A 2007 NRDC report showed that the black carbon inside truck cabs 
increased “health risks by up to 2,600 excess cancers per million drivers.”254 Overall, 
the California Air Resources Board found that diesel particulate matter emissions 
from all port-related activities constituted roughly one-fifth of all such emissions in 
the Los Angeles basin.255 Communities near the ports had cancer risk levels that 
“exceeded 500 in a million”; further from the port, the risk was less but still 
significant.256 From the perspective of community and labor groups, law had 
contributed to these harmful effects—by disempowering local communities and 
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truck drivers relative to the port. Their response would be to try to reshape the law 
to fix the problems it had produced. 
II. THE PORT AS A UNIT OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Changing law requires understanding the law sought to be changed, what 
levers exist to do so, and what constraints are in place. Restructuring the port thus 
meant analyzing its distinct legal character as a local government entity bound to 
the national and global marketplace. The port possessed broad, locally derived, 
regulatory powers over operations; yet those local powers shaped nonlocal activities 
and thus overlapped with state and federal regulatory regimes—particularly those 
that related to transportation, labor, and the environment. Nonlocal regulation 
asserted minimum standards and demanded uniformity. This could be a spur to 
local reform—requiring port action to comply with nonlocal regulatory mandates—
but could also operate as a limit on any port legal change deemed inconsistent with 
federal authority. Reforming port policy to respond to environmental and labor 
problems required evaluating and connecting three aspects of this legal regime: (1) 
the port’s local power as a city entity to make law through its internal governance 
structure; (2) nonlocal governance schemes that could be leveraged to pressure the 
port to act, but could also limit that power; and (3) the potential scope of local 
authority within the federal preemption doctrine. 
A. Local Governance 
Port governance is a function of the spatial organization of port activity and 
the relation between its constituent parts. The essential unit is the port itself, which 
is defined as a facility at which ships dock and are loaded and unloaded (with cargo 
or passengers), providing a conduit between the sea and “hinterland.”257 As a 
geographic matter, a port is divided between maritime and land domains. Port 
waterways include an inner harbor, inside the breakwater, and in some cases, 
channels to access different areas of the port. In terms of landmass, a port may be 
constructed on the landside area of the harbor or adjacent islands. The port facility 
is broken down into smaller units. Ports are constructed with wharves—technically, 
structures that permit ships to dock—and these are divided into quays (parallel to 
the shoreline) and piers (perpendicular to the shoreline). Each type of structure is 
further divided into berths, which are the slips into which an individual ship fits for 
loading and unloading. 
Overlaid on these structures is a basic unit of port organization: the terminal. 
A terminal is the place where freight and passengers either originate or terminate.258 
In practice, there are multiple terminals within a port that are distinguished by 
function. Contemporary ports are divided into terminals dedicated to different types 
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of cargo: containers, break-bulk (goods packed in boxes or other noncontainerized 
forms), dry bulk (loose cargo like grain or coal), liquid bulk, automobiles, and 
passengers. Terminals may be run directly by the local port authority, but with 
increasing worldwide “port devolution,” large global ports typically contract out to 
private “terminal operators” that coordinate the passage of cargo from marine to 
land transportation.259 Within a given terminal, there may be multiple terminal 
operators leasing sections that encompass specific berths and the surrounding land, 
which contains loading equipment, access to road and rail, and storage. In most 
large ports around the world, terminals are run by transnational corporations within 
the global supply chain.260 
There are different types of terminal operators. Some are vertically integrated 
with shippers or ocean carriers, while others are independent terminal operating 
firms that provide systematic logistical services at the ports—unloading to truck and 
rail (on dock and off ), as well as warehouse transport. In the contemporary port 
industry, there has been increasing corporate consolidation such that there are a 
small number of logistics companies that offer comprehensive intermodal 
services.261 In addition, some carriers have sought to integrate port services by 
setting up port terminal subsidiaries, as have a few shippers. For instance, at the 
Port of Los Angeles, there are terminals leased to shippers (e.g., ExxonMobil), 
carriers (e.g., China Shipping), and dedicated terminal operators (e.g., TraPac).262 
Workers for companies in the terminal areas are generally employees of the terminal 
operators or firms subcontracted by them. These include longshoremen and the 
clerks responsible for checking in goods from the steamships and ensuring they are 
conveyed to the correct railcar or truck. 
How a port is legally structured depends on its relation to local government. 
Based on their peculiar history, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are city 
departments with the power to control port property. This power ultimately derives 
from the public trust doctrine, codified in the Tidelands Trust Act, under which the 
state holds the tidelands in trust for the use and benefit of the people in promoting 
navigation and commerce.263 The state has granted some trust lands to local 
governments, including Los Angeles and Long Beach, which hold the property as 
legislative trustees to advance defined trust purposes.264 The cities, in turn, have 
created propriety harbor departments to manage trust property.265 
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Port governance is established by city charter. In Los Angeles and Long Beach, 
the current port structure—the product of amendments over the past twenty-five 
years reigning in port independence—gives local officials significant control over 
port personnel and policy. The Los Angeles Board of Harbor Commissioners 
consists of five members appointed by the mayor, subject to city council approval; 
board members may be removed by the mayor without council confirmation.266 
The board delegates day-to-day operations to a professional staff, particularly the 
executive director (also called the general manager), who is given supervisory 
authority.267 The executive director has substantial enforcement and 
implementation power,268 but is constrained by the board, which has the power to 
hire and fire the director.269 This structure confers significant mayoral control since 
the mayor appoints the commissioners who then appoint a director subject to 
termination at will.270 Creating and implementing new port rules may therefore be 
advanced through mayoral selection of harbor department personnel. Those 
personnel are empowered to make port rules and enter into port contracts, subject 
to approval by city council, which thereby wields ultimate legislative authority. The 
board has the statutory power to “[m]ake and enforce all necessary rules and 
regulations governing the maintenance, operation and use of the Harbor District,” 
and “[f ]ix and collect rates and charges for the use of the Harbor Assets”271—in 
both cases subject to council approval.272 It also has the power to enter into “any 
franchise, concession, permit, license, or lease” in furtherance of departmental 
purposes, subject to council approval for agreements of more than five years.273 
Certain decisions, including leasing large (more than 3000 feet) port space, must be 
approved by four-fifths of the board and two-thirds of city council.274 As this 
suggests, significant port rule change can be effectuated through internal board 
approval validated by city council, thus requiring cooperation between the mayor 
and council members to change port policy. 
The port operates, and generates revenue to cover costs and capital 
improvements, through the board’s exercise of its charter powers. It generates 
revenue primarily from two sources: shipping income, which comes from fees 
imposed on cargo, and permit (or rental) income, which consists of charging port 
occupants for the right to use port property.275 Permit income is negotiated via 
individual contracts with port users, which include terminal operators as well as 
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carriers. Terminal operators enter into leases allowing them to operate, maintain, 
and build cargo-handling facilities and related infrastructure, while carriers enter 
concessions that give them the right to enter and use port property for specified 
purposes and under negotiated conditions.276 In this way, the port’s operations are 
defined through contract, with the board negotiating the terms of use and rates. 
Port rules set by the board establish the permissible scope and conditions of port 
contracts, thus giving the harbor commission—and ultimately the local officials to 
whom it is accountable—the power to define who can enter the port and under 
what terms. 
B. Nonlocal Governance 
Because they are linked to regional economies and globally networked 
transportation systems, when ports exercise local power, they invariably affect 
nonlocal interests. Ports thus act in a regulatory environment in which local 
authority intersects with—and ultimately is limited by—federal and state laws 
designed to promote minimum standards and uniformity. These laws can cut in two 
different directions. On one side, federal and state authority can force a port to take 
action and internalize costs that it may otherwise resist. Those seeking reform of 
port operations may turn to nonlocal law as leverage to do so. On the other side, 
federal law may preclude action a port may want to take—or at least limit action to 
specific circumstances in which it has a defined local impact. In this way, any legal 
change must be sensitive to the preemptive force of federal jurisdiction. 
The effect of nonlocal law depends on whether it seeks to regulate or 
deregulate, and how its standards have been interpreted relative to the interests of 
specific constituencies. When nonlocal law regulates a field in a manner viewed by 
a constituency as harmful, that constituency is forced to seek alternative legal 
avenues of redress. Federal labor law fits into this category: a national scheme 
designed to promote worker interests, which has been interpreted over time in ways 
deemed hostile to those interests.277 At its inception, New Deal-era legislation 
codified the collective bargaining system,278 which was validated by courts,279 
ushering in a period of robust private sector unionization.280 However, what began 
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as a framework to enable worker collective action ultimately became a constraint.281 
Reactionary legislative amendments,282 damaging judicial interpretations,283 and 
industry capture of administrative processes reshaped the legal playing field.284 As a 
result, the system of workplace elections established under the NLRA is now viewed 
by organized labor as disadvantaging unions, which do not have effective tools to 
respond to employer retaliation. Unions have therefore turned away from the 
federal system of collective bargaining to advance unionization, seeking instead to 
leverage other sources of legal pressure to gain employer recognition and negotiate 
contracts.285 
In contrast, when nonlocal law provides strong regulatory standards and 
empowers constituency action, it can be an effective tool for reform. In the case of 
the ports, state and federal environmental policy has played this role. In 1970, 
Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), covering projects 
funded or approved by federal agencies, while California passed a similar state law, 
known as the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), covering projects 
requiring state or local agency approval.286 NEPA requires that new developments 
evaluate potential negative environmental impacts and mitigation measures; CEQA 
requires environmental impacts to be mitigated to the extent feasible, and may 
permit development despite negative impacts if it is determined there are overriding 
benefits.287 These laws apply to port infrastructure expansion and add a layer of 
environmental review that can be asserted by stakeholders to try to mitigate 
harms.288 Neither law can completely block expansion, but both can delay it (and 
increase costs) by permitting public comments on environmental review plans and 
potentially requiring that incomplete plans be redone. 
The federal Clean Air Act—the key parts of which were also passed in 1970—
requires compliance with air quality standards for pollutants from stationary and 
mobile sources.289 The Act requires compliance with national standards and sets up 
federal-state partnerships to establish state implementation plans, which may be 
enforced against regulated sources through citizen lawsuits.290 California has its own 
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state Clean Air Act, which also requires the creation of local air quality plans to 
regulate certain pollutants at more stringent levels than those mandated by federal 
law.291 State standards are set by the California Air Resources Board (CARB), which 
oversees local air quality management districts (AQMDs).292 AQMDs have 
authority to set and implement state plans in compliance with state and federal law, 
subject to approval by CARB, which is charged with submitting the state plans to 
the EPA.293 CARB is also responsible for regulating mobile sources of air pollution 
and sets specific motor vehicle emission standards.294 AQMDs regulate fixed 
sources of air pollution, which require AQMD permits to operate.295 Together, 
these federal and state environmental laws give government officials and local 
citizen groups tools to challenge port development and implement higher 
environmental standards. 
Federal law designed to deregulate a marketplace—imposing a ceiling rather 
than setting a floor—has the opposite effect: disabling local regulation that proposes 
to raise standards above a minimum baseline. Federal transportation deregulation 
asserts federal law as one such ceiling. The Shipping Act of 1984 gives the Federal 
Maritime Commission jurisdiction over ports to promote competition, requiring 
“just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to or connected with 
receiving, handling, storing, or delivering property.”296 The commission polices 
interport coordination on rulemaking in order to ensure that it does not reduce 
competition by producing “an unreasonable reduction in transportation service or 
an unreasonable increase in transportation cost.”297 Any effort to set joint standards 
between the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports is subject to this check on 
anticompetitive measures, which can be enforced by the Federal Maritime 
Commission through a civil injunctive action. 
For trucking, the deregulatory framework centers on the Federal Aviation 
Administration Authorization Act (FAAA),298 passed in 1995 to prevent states and 
localities from passing trucking standards that would circumvent the deregulatory 
provisions of the 1980 Motor Carrier Act. The FAAA explicitly preempts 
nonuniform state regulation of motor carriers.299 Designed to be identical with the 
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preemption provision contained in federal airline legislation,300 the FAAA provides 
that a state or locality “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision 
having the force or effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor 
carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.”301 Ports seeking to enact 
any policy change affecting trucking have to avoid the preemptive effect of the 
FAAA. 
C. Preemption 
The possibility of FAAA preemption highlights a fundamental challenge 
facing proponents of legal reform at the ports: to make local policy change affecting 
environmental and labor interests, the ports would have to position any rulemaking 
within the ambiguous space for local action afforded by federal preemption 
doctrine.302 Federal preemption derives from the Supremacy Clause,303 but courts 
have started from the premise that local laws are not automatically precluded by 
federal law without a clear showing of congressional intent to do so.304 Such intent 
may be explicitly stated in the statutory text of federal law or may be implied from 
the purposes federal law serves.305 Implied preemption occurs either when local law 
actually conflicts with federal law or the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive 
that it is deemed to occupy the legislative field.306 Federal labor law has been held 
to impliedly preempt local laws interfering with the NLRA’s “integrated scheme of 
regulation,”307 and precludes local regulation in other areas left to be controlled by 
the free play of market forces.308 Environmental laws such as the Clean Air Act are 
generally viewed as asserting “floor preemption”—prohibiting local laws that fall 
below minimum standards, but permitting local regulations exceeding federal 
minimums and giving states significant roles in regulatory development and 
enforcement.309 The FAAA explicitly preempts state or local laws contrary to the 
federal policy of trucking deregulation.310 
Whether federal law is determined to preempt a specific local act depends not 
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just on the scope of the federal law, but also on the nature of the local act itself.311 
A key doctrinal distinction is between local action that is regulatory and proprietary. 
Federal law only preempts local actions that are “tantamount to regulation,”312 not 
market participation by a local entity in its proprietary capacity.313 Thus, even when 
federal law has preemptive effect, a local government is not generally preempted if 
it directly participates in the marketplace as a proprietor through the purchase of 
goods and services.314 However, the line between regulation and participation is 
vague and contested. Courts have recognized that even local procurement can be 
used in ways that constitutes regulation and thus may be preempted.315 The seminal 
market participation case in the labor law context—which upheld a state-negotiated 
project labor agreement—asserted that the state was acting in a proprietary role 
when it had “no interest in setting policy” and when its action was “‘specifically 
tailored to one particular job’ and ‘aimed to ensure an efficient project that would 
be completed as quickly and effectively as possible at the lowest cost.’”316 The 
market participation exception cuts across substantive legal domains and could give 
space for local action despite other federal regulatory schemes, namely, 
environmental and transportation law. Thus, in theory, the market participant 
exception to the preemption doctrine provides a pathway for localities to pass rules 
affecting port operations designed to protect local investment and promote efficient 
operations. 
Yet in the early 2000s, on the cusp of the clean trucks campaign, the precedent 
interpreting market participation in the labor, environmental, and transportation 
contexts was thin. Within the Ninth Circuit, no appellate case applying the 
exception in the labor context had moved beyond permitting project labor 
agreements.317 In 2004, the United States Supreme Court held that the Clean Air 
Act preempted an effort by the South Coast Air Quality Management District 
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(SCAQMD) to set fleet emission standards;318 however, it invited the parties to 
consider the market participation exception and, on remand, the district court held 
that the rules “as applied to state and local government actors, fall within the market 
participant doctrine and are therefore outside the scope of” the Act.319 In the only 
reported case on the issue, the Ninth Circuit applied the market participant 
exception to the FAAA, upholding a Santa Ana law requiring vehicles be towed by 
city-approved trucks as an exercise of the city’s proprietary power.320 While market 
participation offered a route for local action on port trucking, there was thus little 
doctrinal guidance on how to navigate that route in practice.321 It was into this 
uncertain space that the campaign for clean trucks cautiously stepped. 
III. RESISTING THE PORTS: ACTIVISM IN SEPARATE SPHERES 
Although the legal road to clean trucks ultimately ran through the doctrine of 
preemption, the activism that generated the port challenge emerged from the 
specific grievances of local residents affected by port expansion. Through the 1990s, 
community activists sought a greater voice in port governance to fight the local 
impacts produced by the ports’ global role. This bottom-up mobilization came to 
focus on the dysfunctional drayage truck sector as a key source of community 
concern. It thus ran on a parallel—and independent—track relative to top-down 
planning processes within the labor movement, which were also directed toward 
trucking reform. Labor lawyers focused on legal strategies to transform the 
independent-contractor structure of trucking at the ports, but lacked the immediate 
legal and political hook to advance their plan. The entry of environmental advocates 
aligned with community interests—but also motivated by the regional effects of 
port pollution—altered the political balance. Wielding the power of environmental 
law, these advocates succeeded in blocking a crucial port expansion project—and, 
in so doing, created the opening for a broader challenge to port trucking that would 
unite community, labor, and environmental groups. 
A. The Hundred Years’ War: Community Mobilization Against Port Expansion 
Activism against port growth—and particularly against its environmental and 
community impacts—took root in the areas most affected by it: San Pedro, 
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which held that a state may not delegate its regulatory authority to a municipality under the FAAA’s 
safety exception). 
321. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 280, at 1571 (noting that the market participation exception is 
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preempted). 
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Wilmington, and adjacent neighborhoods through which the port transportation 
system cut. Tensions were long simmering and erupted around proposed terminal 
and transportation infrastructure expansion. Opposition emerged within different 
communities, responding to the encroachment of particular projects, and reflecting 
the differential impact of port development. 
Antagonism between the ports and surrounding communities was not always 
rancorous, and varied over time and by location. The early years of port 
development helped to build San Pedro and Wilmington, with each community 
receiving resources for schools and services, and experiencing housing and 
commercial development.322 By the 1930s, the port communities enjoyed prosperity 
supported by tourism and local entrepreneurship.323 The growth of postwar 
aerospace manufacturing further buoyed middle-class life in the South Bay.324 But 
this began to change in the 1980s, and particularly with the recession of the early 
1990s, when aerospace downsizing cost the area more than 15,000 jobs.325 This 
economic decline coincided with continued port expansion, driven by growing 
Asian imports, and codified in the joint infrastructure projects encompassed in the 
2020 Plan.326 As port growth inexorably encroached on surrounding communities, 
tensions with residents grew.327 However, the distinctive geographies and histories 
of Wilmington and San Pedro meant that the impacts of port development and the 
responses to them were different. 
Wilmington, occupying nine-square miles at the ports’ northern border, had 
long been the region’s industrial workhorse. Perched on the massive Wilmington 
Oil Field, by the 1980s the community of 40,000 residents was home to dozens of 
oil refineries and over 100 working oil wells, as well as numerous waste disposals, 
auto-wrecking plants, and junk yards.328 It also contained rail-switching yards and 
was well traveled by trucks coming to and from the ports. In a 1985 series, the Los 
Angeles Times described Wilmington in ravaged terms: 
It is planted atop one of the nation’s most productive oil fields, and dozens 
of petroleum-related companies have interests here, but residents see few 
signs of the millions of dollars that those firms and other industries make. 
 
322. See QUEENAN, supra note 8, at 63. 
323. See St. George, Wilmington: Community of Contradictions, supra note 45 (“In that era—as near 
as the community ever came to a heyday—Wilmington attracted tourists who traveled on cruise lines 
from the port to Santa Catalina Island, Hawaii and the South Pacific. What is now a pawn shop was a 
J.C. Penney store. The Don Hotel, where rooms now rent for $15 a night, catered to affluent steamship 
passengers.”). 
324. See Deborah Belgum, A School’s Not-So-Golden Anniversary, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 1996, at B10. 
325. Kenneth J. Garcia & Janet Rae-Dupree, Aerospace Slump Casts Its Shadow, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
5, 1992, at B3; see also Janet Rae-Dupree, These Trying Times: Job Security Evaporates as Economic Ripple Effect 
Hits Home, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1991, at B3. 
326. Dean Murphy, Port in a Storm: Harbor Profits Are Rising, but So Are Neighbors’ Complaints, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1987, at SB12; Nancy Yoshihara, 2020: A Southland Port Plan for the Long Haul, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1987, at E3. 
327. See Murphy, Port in a Storm, supra note 326. 
328. See St. George, Wilmington: Community of Contradictions, supra note 45. 
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Instead, residents say, they see only industry’s noxious fumes, noise and 
truck traffic . . . . Situated near the geographical bottom of Los Angeles, 
Wilmington also appears to be at the bottom of government priorities . . . . 
[seen in its] debris-cluttered vacant lots and side streets, in its growing 
number of homeless people, in its withering business district, and in the 
hundreds of junked automobiles that line city streets.329 
In the Times’s view, Wilmington served as a “regional dumping ground with 13 
closed waste dumps—one of the largest concentrations in the city of Los Angeles—
and six toxic-waste storage or treatment plants. It also [was] the proposed site of 
one of the largest hazardous-waste treatment facilities in the state.”330 
Many reasons were cited for Wilmington’s decay. Land use planning had been 
haphazard and short sighted. Wilmington’s community plan, a zoning document 
that had been promulgated in 1970, created a hodgepodge of development, with 
residential, commercial, and industrial uses mixing uneasily in the same areas.331 
Despite efforts to protect residents from industrial use, sixty residential dwellings 
were in areas zoned for manufacturing; new high-density apartment development 
was adding to a sense of overcrowding.332 Other resident complaints were that toxic 
waste cleanup was poor despite a number of legislative efforts to secure financing; 
and the city-led redevelopment of a 232-acre industrial park near the waterfront, 
though designated in 1974, lagged due to lack of financing and government will.333 
Most of the community’s ire, however, focused on the Port of Los Angeles, which 
owned substantial property (including twenty percent of decaying East Wilmington) 
and dominated land use decisions, often in disregard of community concerns.334 
Responding to that ire, the port’s executive director, Ezunial Burts, declared: “The 
port does not have a responsibility to develop a community.”335 
Faced with these interlocking problems, community members began to take 
action in the 1980s. Residents—about two-thirds Latino, primarily blue collar, and 
roughly one-half homeowners—drew upon existing institutions and a sense of 
cultural pride to begin challenging what many viewed as the community’s 




331. Sheryl Stolberg, Wilmington, Harbor City Plan Will Be Revised Again: L.A. Planners Delay Action 
After Hearing, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1989, at B10 (South Bay ed.). 
332. St. George, Wilmington: Community of Contradictions, supra note 45. 
333. See id. 
334. See Murphy, Port in a Storm, supra note 326. 
335. St. George, Wilmington: Community of Contradictions, supra note 45. 
336. Donna St. George, Wilmington—Battered but Not Broken: Pride and Community Spirit Persevere 
Despite Area’s Problems, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1985, at SB1. The Times reported that “[a]bout 45% of 
Wilmington’s 11,518 dwelling units are owner-occupied homes.” Id. “[T]he area remains largely blue-
collar and union-oriented, with 63% of its population employed as laborers and 12 union halls located 
in the community.” Id. “Latinos now make up at least 67% of Wilmington’s population, compared to 
27.5% citywide.” Id. The remaining population was 22% Anglo, 8% Asian and American Indian, and 
4% black. Id. Unemployment stood at 8%. Id. Undocumented immigrants were estimated at 10–20% 
of the population. Id. 
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subsidizing the existence of the harbor with our city streets and the air we 
breathe.”337 
Activism sought to both advance an affirmative development agenda, while 
simultaneously seeking to mitigate port externalities. On the affirmative side, 
residents attempted to assert greater control over community development and to 
promote city and port investment in community-sensitive ways. Overcrowding was 
an early target, with a homeowners’ group pressing for a moratorium on high-
density apartments,338 and defeating a proposed 189-unit apartment development 
in East Wilmington.339 But the major demand was commercial development and 
recreational access to the harbor, which was completely blocked off by port facilities 
south of Harry Bridges Boulevard, depriving Wilmington of a public beach. Despite 
a city-led effort in the mid-1980s to enlist activists and business interests to address 
land use problems,340 tensions remained high. To defuse the situation, the city chose 
former head of the Los Angeles City Planning Commission, Calvin Hamilton, to 
conduct a $35,000 study of waterfront development in Wilmington,341 in order to 
seek ways that the port could be a “better neighbor.”342 His plan, released in 
October 1987, proposed a wish-list of revitalization projects, totaling $1 billion, that 
among other things called for the creation of a Mexican-themed waterfront 
marketplace at Slip No. 5 (at the intersection of Harry Bridges and Avalon 
Boulevards), simultaneously promoting commercial development and achieving the 
goal of beach access.343 The basic principles of the Hamilton proposal were adopted 
by the Wilmington Home Owners in their twenty-eight-point proposal to the 
harbor commission.344 They were also the foundation for a study plan offered by 
City Council Member Joan Milke Flores,345 a former city hall secretary who lived in 
San Pedro and had represented the South Bay in the Fifteenth District since 1984.346 
However, the Hamilton proposal quickly ran into problems. Most notably, it 
clashed with the port’s own Hazardous Facilities Relocation Plan, which proposed 
relocating several hazardous oil terminals (primarily in San Pedro) to a new landfill 
 
337. Murphy, Port in a Storm, supra note 326. 
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342. Murphy, Port in a Storm, supra note 326. 
343. Sheryl Stolberg, Cinderella-by-the-Sea, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1987, at U24. 
344. Sheryl Stolberg, Homeowners Offer Plan to Upgrade Community, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1987, at 
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TIMES, Apr.2, 1989, at B1. 
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but pointedly did not propose moving the notoriously hazardous Wilmington 
Liquid Bulk Terminals, the existing tenant at Slip No. 5.347 
Activists thus took a different tack. They lobbied Los Angeles planning 
officials to include zoning changes to facilitate waterfront development in a citywide 
rezoning project initiated in 1988.348 They also pressured the city’s Industry and 
Economic Development Committee (on which Flores sat) to recommend moving 
the Wilmington Liquid Bulk Terminals from Slip No. 5.349 These efforts ultimately 
bore fruit, with the planning commission’s new zoning scheme permitting 
commercial development on the waterfront alongside industrial use; as a result, the 
harbor commission agreed to create community access to the waterfront at Slip No. 
5 and to relocate the Wilmington Liquid Bulk Terminals and its attendant hazardous 
materials.350 That sparked new activity: the city appointed a resident advisory group 
to plan the details of the waterfront development and jumpstarted its flagging 
industrial park redevelopment plan.351 Some observers began to imagine a “revival” 
in Wilmington.352 To achieve it, community energy poured into shaping a revision 
of the Wilmington community plan—a process initiated by Flores in 1983353—
which residents argued should include new buffer zones to protect residential areas, 
preservation of the historic Banning Park neighborhood, traffic mitigation, 
downtown revitalization, and waterfront development.354 ExxonMobil resisted a 
proposal to redesignate the Wilmington Oil Field as “urbanized,” potentially 
requiring it to cap some active oil wells; yet the city ultimately backed the 
redesignation, paving the way for the plan’s approval in 1990355—and raising hopes 
for a community renaissance. 
Yet it was not meant to be. The harbor commission rejected the resident 
advisory committee’s call for incorporating the historic Heinz Pet Food Cannery, 
located near Slip No. 5, into the proposed waterfront development,356 and the city 
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ultimately agreed to allow the port to raze the cannery to make way for an equipment 
storage facility.357 Although the port continued to agree in principle to a waterfront 
development, its resistance to the cannery underscored that its support was limited 
to a modest development that would not fundamentally interfere with port 
expansion. 
 
Figure 5: Road in East Wilmington358 
 
Zoning changes in notorious East Wilmington—wedged between the 
Dominguez Channel and Terminal Island Freeway, adjacent to a sulphur processing 
plant at the port—could not unwind the damage created by decades of neglect and 
incompatible land uses, giving rise to its status as a “Third World” community 
marked by “unpaved dirt tracks,” “garbage piles,” “[f ]eral dogs,” prostitutes, and 
drug dealers.359 
Residents in the Far East Wilmington Improvement Association alleged that 
the port and city were conspiring to intentionally neglect the community to enable 
the port to purchase land for expansion at low prices.360 As recession swept through 
the region in the early 1990s, the community’s fortunes declined further, with the 
Los Angeles Times calling East Wilmington “arguably the most run-down section of 
 
357. Greg Krikorian, Cannery Monument Proposal Is Canned, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1990, at B13. 
358. Photograph taken by author. 
359. See Clay Evans, They Call this Part of Wilmington “Third World,” L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1990, at 
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360. Greg Krikorian, East Wilmington Business Owner Sues City over Area’s Blight, Crime, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 1991, at B3. 
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Los Angeles.”361 The economic downturn also caused interest in redevelopment to 
falter. Plans for waterfront commercial development waned, while the port offered 
to make good on its promise to provide waterfront access with a modest community 
center at the original port site, known as “Banning’s Landing,” which was already a 
public landing at the base of Avalon Avenue.362 This concept was first proposed in 
1988 and approved by the harbor commission in 1995; however, by 2000, Banning’s 
Landing—beset by cost overruns and structural problems—still sat incomplete.363 
Although the port insisted the project would be completed the next year, residents 
were dubious. Longtime activist Gertrude Schwab remarked, “We don’t put much 
faith in what the port tells us any more. If it’s ever finished, we will shout 
hallelujah.”364 
Alongside the push to promote a positive development agenda in Wilmington 
were resident efforts to mitigate the harms imposed by port activity and growth. 
The impact of transportation was a constant concern as truckers increasingly used 
Wilmington streets to access the port and dumped empty containers on vacant lots 
around the community.365 In 1987, Schwab reported to the harbor commission that 
two trucks per minute passed through the intersection at Avalon Boulevard and 
Anaheim Street—Wilmington’s main crossroads.366 The commission promised to 
create a dedicated truck route that would bypass residential streets, but the timeline 
was over a decade long,367 and the port’s immediate decision to approve the 
Wilmington Liquid Bulk Terminals’ concrete importing plant fueled further 
resentment about increased trucking.368 Community efforts focused on keeping 
trucks off residential streets. Resident complaints that police neglected Wilmington 
resulted in sporadic traffic enforcement spikes,369 followed by a city-ordered ban on 
heavy trucks from three of the community’s main streets.370 The city commissioned 
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a half-million dollar traffic study,371 which resulted in a 1994 harbor commission 
traffic plan that included a proposal to build a sound wall on Wilmington’s southern 
border.372 Yet as off-dock rail connections intensified drayage around the port, 
truck travel continued to increase. 
Residents also contested other port externalities. As more containers came 
into the ports than went out,373 residents complained that they were being 
haphazardly stored throughout the community creating visual blight and physical 
risks.374 Council Member Flores introduced a motion in the city council requiring 
the port to track container movement in order to devise a plan to minimize 
community impact,375 yet containers continued to pile up and increasingly became 
targets of theft.376 Residents also voiced discontent about ongoing environmental 
degradation, particularly in light of the 2020 Plan, which the port’s own 
environmental impact report noted would worsen air quality and further restrict 
commercial fishing and public recreation.377 As one leader of the Wilmington Home 
Owners put it, “The conclusion seems to be if it is economically beneficial for the 
ports, to hell with local communities.”378 Community groups also fought against the 
debris and noise created by scrap metal processers, beating back a port proposal to 
relocate one company from San Pedro,379 but having their complaints about the 
renewal of a twenty-seven-year lease for a large processor on Terminal Island fall 
on deaf ears.380 
San Pedro, to the west, also had similar complaints about scrap yards,381 as 
well as others focused on the environmental impact of port tenants, like Kaiser 
International, the Los Angeles port’s largest commodity exporter, which bulk 
loaded coal and petroleum coke. Residents and pleasure boaters lodged a complaint 
with the SCAQMD to prohibit coke storage on the ground that it spewed black 
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dust, causing air pollution and sullying nearby boats and houses.382 Although district 
officials initially denied Kaiser a key permit, an appeals panel decided to allow 
continued operations, citing the fact that the harbor was a “working port.”383 
Residents carried on the fight, eventually prompting city council to move Kaiser’s 
bulk loading facility away from San Pedro’s recreational facilities.384 
The fact that the Kaiser complaint emanated from recreational boaters 
highlighted a key difference between San Pedro and Wilmington. While 
Wilmington’s zoning made it the “backland” for the port’s industrial uses, San 
Pedro had emerged as the port’s recreational and commercial hub—a fact that 
Wilmington residents often highlighted with internecine frustration to emphasize 
their differential treatment.385 San Pedro’s position resulted from a different 
geography and distinct history. Abutting the harbor’s west and main channels, San 
Pedro’s recreational development grew partly from the obsolescence of its older 
port facilities, which became incompatible with the need for larger berths and 
calmer waters to accommodate container vessels; the federal government’s 
handover of Fort MacArthur on the West Channel’s Cabrillo Beach in the 1970s 
also provided the land necessary for recreational development.386 With greater 
recreational use mandated by state law in 1976, the port adopted a strategy of 
bifurcation, with San Pedro the recreational choice given its geographic benefits and 
higher proportion of residentially and commercially zoned land, which precluded 
Wilmington-style industrial expansion.387 Against this backdrop, the port and city 
sought to exploit San Pedro’s advantages. The port itself owned several properties 
on the tidal lands and in the late 1980s pursued aggressive development, investing 
over $3 million to upgrade Ports O’ Call Village, the 1960s-era shopping center on 
the main channel, while also moving forward with plans to develop a $100 million 
marina (with over 1000 slips) and recreational complex on Cabrillo Beach,388 as well 
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as a $60 million facility for cruise ships that included commercial development and 
a hotel.389 
The city also saw economic opportunity: in 1985, the Los Angeles Community 
Redevelopment Agency approved a hotel in the Beacon Street redevelopment area 
overlooking the main channel, envisioned as a place for corporate visitors to the 
port and tourists disembarking from the World Cruise Center.390 The city also 
agreed to provide funding for a downtown revitalization plan.391 Despite concerns 
that redevelopment would rob San Pedro of its ethnic distinctiveness,392 for many 
residents, the overdue investment was producing a welcome boom, particularly as 
the cruise center—with day trips to Catalina Island—made San Pedro a tourist 
destination.393 The recession, however, made sure the good times did not last and 
the promise of port-led redevelopment turned into another disappointment. A 
decade of financial and legal problems stalled the redevelopment of Ports O’ Call 
Village,394 which entered a steep decline,395 while the opening of a Carnival cruise 
terminal in Long Beach undercut San Pedro’s position as the cruise industry’s 
regional hub.396 
Beset with difficulties, San Pedro and Wilmington began serious efforts to 
secede from the city of Los Angeles in the late 1990s397—a threat made more 
credible by the simultaneous effort by Hollywood and the San Fernando Valley.398 
In a play to tamp down secessionist fever, and quell what activists called the 
“Hundred Years’ War,” Republican Mayor Richard Riordan and other city officials 
made gestures to promote greater community involvement in port planning.399 As 
a harbor commissioner noted when rolling out the new community plan, “There 
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has been unparalleled expansion and prosperity in the port . . . . The one frontier 
not tackled has been port-community relations. We need to round out the mayor’s 
tenure in order to be a complete success.”400 The secessionists were not placated. 
Despite conciliatory efforts by the newly elected mayor—South Los Angeles native 
and scion of a powerful Democratic family, James Hahn401—the secessionists 
proceeded to advance their bid by making the economic case for independence to 
the Los Angeles County Local Area Formation Commission (LAFCO), whose 
approval was required before the issue could be put to city voters.402 Despite an 
aggressive case by secession supporters, LAFCO ultimately concluded that an 
independent harbor city would not be economically viable,403 particularly in light of 
a California State Lands Commission recommendation to keep the port with the 
city of Los Angeles in the event of secession.404 
It was fitting that the secession movement’s decline occurred against the 
backdrop of yet another dispute between the port and Wilmington residents that 
tested the genuineness of the port’s new community partnership. In 2001, as part 
of its drive to add twenty-five acres to the TraPac container terminal in the West 
Basin by expanding it north across Harry Bridges Boulevard to C Street, the port 
proposed building a twenty-foot-high concrete wall to separate the community from 
the new terminal boundary.405 The plan, which had been previously proposed early 
in the 1990s, brought a firestorm of controversy, as residents once again complained 
that the port’s talk of community collaboration did not match its actions, which 
would further undermine the goal of harbor access.406 As one community activist 
put it bluntly, “We don’t need the Berlin Wall.”407 At a community meeting in April, 
when the details of the port’s plan to expand Harry Bridges Boulevard to 
accommodate six lanes of truck traffic was revealed, residents exploded.408 At that 
meeting was Jesse Marquez, a former aerospace electrician born and raised in 
Wilmington. As a high school track athlete whose lungs burned when he ran, 
Marquez was radicalized by a chemical plant fire that injured his family members.409 
At the moment the expansion plan was unveiled, Marquez recalled shouting, “Hell 
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no, over my dead body. If anybody wants it, tell them that [at] my house this 
Saturday we’ll form a committee. We’re going to fight this project.”410 A working 
group of about fifteen residents met to establish the Wilmington Coalition to stop 
the wall.411 In the weeks that followed, the meetings grew to fifty residents and the 
following year the group secured funding from the Liberty Hill Foundation to set 
up an independent organization that in 2003 changed its name to the Coalition for 
a Safe Environment—which ultimately succeeded in preventing the wall’s 
construction.412 
Other port-related projects caused similar disruption—and produced similar 
community responses. The Alameda Corridor rail line cut through East 
Wilmington, eliminating many of the gritty neighborhood’s only businesses,413 while 
intermodal truck and rail traffic disrupted community life in adjacent cities like 
Carson and around the downtown rail yards.414 Commerce, home of the UP East 
LA and BNSF Hobart yards servicing the ports and bisected by the 710 freeway, 
experienced drayage truck increases as port traffic grew in the 1990s.415 A series of 
town hall meetings brought out residents concerned with the safety and 
environmental impact of the trucks.416 City neglect prompted a handful of families 
to begin meeting as an ad hoc group. An informal survey confirmed the extent of 
community concern with the impact of the rail yards and trucking on safety, health, 
and property.417 With the leadership of Angelo Logan, an aerospace mechanic, the 
families formed East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice in 2000.418 
Galvanized by the Alameda Corridor project and plans for a massive expansion of 
the 710 freeway to accommodate more port trucks, East Yard became focused on 
strategies to address the trucks’ noxious byproduct: diesel exhaust.419 Resident 
research into truck pollution revealed that while infrastructure design 
disproportionately impacted their community, the underlying cause of pollution 
stemmed from the nature of the port trucking industry itself.420 This point was 
brought home at a community forum in 2005 to address diesel exhaust, at which 
resident truck drivers spoke. Logan recalled the event: 
They . . . really laid out their situation in terms of the way in which they 
were being exploited and their hands being tied in terms of . . . not being 
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them to be good environmental health stewards. And immediately 
thereafter . . . [we] realized that there was a real issue in terms of the 
trucking industry and the way that the trucking industry was exploiting the 
drivers themselves.421 
B. Labor’s Municipal Strategy: Contracting Around the Independent-Contractor Problem 
During this time, leaders within organized labor were also focused on ports, 
but from a distinct perspective. For the Teamsters, trucking deregulation decimated 
the ranks of what had been one of the strongest unions in the United States.422 
Whereas forty-six percent of the country’s approximately one million truckers were 
unionized in 1978, only twenty-three percent of the roughly two million truck 
drivers were in unions by 1996.423 An even lower percentage of the nearly four 
million truckers nationwide were in unions by the early 2000s.424 
In the wake of deregulation, truckers tried to organize independent 
associations. Central American drivers, who comprised the vast majority of truckers 
at the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports, formed their own organizations in the 
1980s as vehicles for community support and labor struggle. One of these 
associations, the Waterfront Rail Truckers Union (WRTU), formed in 1986, 
spearheaded a series of strikes to address delays and other disputes,425 one of which 
involved WRTU members withholding containers until they received payment from 
a bankrupt trucking company.426 Members were radical and militant. In the late 
1980s, they began challenging their classification as independent contractors by 
roughly two dozen port trucking companies, including H&M Terminals Transport, 
Inc.427 In tax filings with the IRS, the truckers argued that by not classifying them 
as employees, the companies were evading Social Security, state disability, and 
unemployment taxes.428 The IRS agreed in some cases and in 1991 initiated an audit 
of H&M and other companies.429 WRTU truckers also picketed H&M, highlighting 
the fact that although many drivers worked exclusively for one firm and even carried 
company identification cards, they were unable to organize unions or apply for 
workers’ benefits.430 As one organizer asserted, the drivers “don’t want to be made 
fools of anymore.”431 Although the WRTU receded in importance, independent 
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organizing continued into the 1990s,432 with other groups such as the Latin 
American Truckers’ Association protesting the impact of fuel costs.433 Some of 
these independent groups reached out to unions, which were unwilling to invest the 
resources to support an organizing campaign.434 
The situation changed in the mid-1990s when truckers initiated a large-scale 
union organizing drive—led not by the Teamsters, but the Communications 
Workers of America (CWA).435 The truckers’ connection to the CWA was partly 
driven by personal contacts with CWA organizers, but was also a function of the 
lack of interest shown by the Teamsters.436 CWA Local 9400 began holding 
meetings for workers in 1995 and 1996, quickly attracting thousands.437 To 
demonstrate this growing strength, in May 1996, CWA organized picketing in front 
of terminal gates, which was enjoined when the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) 
filed suit in Long Beach Superior Court.438 The truckers organized convoys from 
the ports to highlight their plight and labor leaders persuaded the Los Angeles City 
Council to pass a resolution in support of unionization.439 
However, there remained the thorny problem of the drivers’ predominantly 
independent-contractor status, which precluded them from organizing. To get 
around this problem, CWA launched a dual campaign. One part was a traditional 
unionization effort directed at the handful of companies that still used employees; 
the second involved an ambitious plan, to be financed by entrepreneur Donald 
Allen, to create a new trucking company, the Transport Maritime Association 
(TMA), which would hire truckers as employees and then contract them out to the 
existing companies at higher rates.440 In May 1996, roughly 4000 truckers declined 
to accept contracts from their existing companies and instead signed up to be TMA 
employees with the promise of pay at twenty-five dollars per hour.441 Despite a 
diversion of some cargo, the trucking companies held fast and refused to contract 
with TMA.442 When one of the lead organizers suffered a heart attack and it turned 
out that Allen lacked the resources to bring TMA to scale, the campaign died, with 
some faulting the CWA for not investigating Allen’s finances and for lacking 
sophisticated knowledge of the port trucking industry.443 Although the campaign 
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failed to advance trucker unionization,444 it did reveal a deep desire among the 
workers for change, their willingness to take action, and the economic vulnerability 
of the port to a trucking strike. 
The CWA campaign also refocused efforts to address the independent-
contractor problem. Labor leaders identified two approaches. One was to find a 
way to directly organize truckers as independent contractors without running afoul 
of antitrust law. Without amending federal antitrust law, which seemed politically 
impossible, the value of this approach was uncertain, since any state effort to permit 
independent-contractor organizing could be deemed preempted. The Teamsters did 
put some effort into this strategy, pursuing a legislative campaign to permit direct 
organizing of independent contractors; but its effort to pass a state law exempting 
independent contractors from antitrust law failed when Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger vetoed it in 2005.445 From there, the Teamsters abandoned that 
project. 
Instead, the Teamsters pursued a second approach, in which truckers would 
be legally converted into employees and then organized under the NLRA. The 
CWA campaign attempted to do this by creating the labor-leasing firm, TMA, which 
was to hire drivers as employees, who would then be unionized—passing the 
increased costs onto trucking firms in the form of higher contract rates.446 In the 
wake of that failed campaign, truckers adopted another strategy that echoed earlier 
WRTU efforts: litigation challenging the truckers’ misclassification. In 1996, lawyer 
Fred Kumetz brought suit on behalf of thirty drivers who claimed that they had 
been misclassified as independent contractors by forty transportation companies.447 
The suit sought class action certification to represent a larger class of 6500 harbor 
truckers claiming $250 million in damages—primarily to recover payments made 
for insurance coverage (which included workers’ compensation).448 Kumetz, a 
plaintiff’s lawyer not associated with organized labor, was approached by truckers 
after TMA collapsed.449 In filing the suit, Kumetz argued that “the drivers, nearly 
all Latino immigrants, frequently are coerced by ‘fly-by-night’ companies into 
signing exploitative contracts without understanding the contents and are duped 
into paying for workers’ compensation and liability insurance without 
understanding the law.”450 Some plaintiffs alleged that having to pay for insurance 
(and other ownership costs) reduced their earnings to below the poverty level.451 In 
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response, Robert Millman, a lawyer from labor defense powerhouse Littler 
Mendelson, claimed that “[i]t would not be economically feasible to treat these 
people as drivers. The cost of goods would just go skyrocketing.”452 
The contracts at issue in the case gave truckers the choice of obtaining their 
own insurance or getting it through the trucking firms’ less expensive group policies, 
the cost of which would be deducted from the truckers’ compensation.453 The 
companies charged the drivers more than the cost of premiums paid and also made 
the drivers responsible for a $1000 deductible payment that was not specified in the 
contracts.454 In 1999, the case—Albillo v. Intermodal Container Services—was certified 
as a class action and tried before a special panel of three retired judges appointed by 
the California Superior Court and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board.455 
In 2000, after trial, the panel ruled that there had been no violation of the workers’ 
compensation provision of the Labor Code, nor had plaintiffs proven a violation of 
the state unfair business practices law, or shown fraud or deceit.456 However, the 
trial court did find that the firms failed to comply with insurance disclosure 
requirements and consequently awarded the truckers injunctive relief and 
restitution, although the court refused to award attorneys’ fees. The California Court 
of Appeal, in a 2003 published decision reversing the trial court in part, held that 
the firms did violate the Labor Code by electing to be covered by workers’ 
compensation while “requiring [drivers] to bear the cost of obtaining workers’ 
compensation insurance.”457 Yet even this success, while compensating workers for 
wrongful payments, did not achieve the large-scale goal of employee conversion; in 
fact, it produced the opposite effect by making firms less likely to elect workers’ 
compensation coverage in the first instance. 
As the Teamsters watched the CWA campaign and Albillo lawsuit unfold, they 
began devising plans for their own initiative. In 2000, the Teamsters, through its 
Port Division, announced a nationwide port trucker campaign, run by assistant 
director Ron Carver.458 Coming on the heels of the trial court set back in Albillo, 
lead Teamsters organizer Ed Berk was undaunted: “I don’t think they’re going to 
throw in the towel on this one court case.”459 However, the Teamsters had absorbed 
the lessons of that case, and the CWA campaign before it, concluding that the way 
to win was not through piecemeal organizing or lawsuits, but through broad change 
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that could convert large numbers of independent contractors back into employees. 
Although many inside the union believed that independent contractors were 
misclassified as such, the barriers to individual enforcement were too high to justify 
a case-by-case strategy and, as Albillo highlighted, even success in court did not 
ensure change in industry practice. As Teamsters attorney Mike Manley reflected, 
the union’s view was that “you really can’t [address the industry] through a campaign 
of Board elections and slugging it out in representation cases. The industry is too 
vast . . . you’d be doing it forever.”460 In Los Angeles, there were some unionized 
firms, like Horizon, and others that still hired truckers as employees, like Toll, but 
without addressing the independent-contractor problem, the industry would remain 
low wage. The key was to “transform the market.”461 
The Teamsters’ national campaign initially pursued different tracks. In Miami, 
the Teamsters joined forces with an existing effort by independent truckers to gain 
recognition as employees. In 2000, the truckers cancelled their leases and refused to 
sign new contracts, instead demanding that the companies hire them as employees 
through the Teamsters hiring hall.462 The union had reached out to a handful of 
small companies that agreed to hire truckers as employees; the strategy was to send 
truckers to work for those companies, which, along with a few other companies 
that the ILA had already unionized, would gain market share, forcing other 
companies to follow suit.463 However, the trucking companies held firm, and the 
campaign fizzled, resulting in a small increase in hauling fees after a campaign 
marred by lawsuits and allegations of harassment.464 Organizers complained, “We 
didn’t get even 25 percent of what we wanted,”465 reinforcing the limited effect of 
striking without first securing employee status. In Los Angeles, the Teamsters 
focused on the policy arena at an early stage. Although the union suggested that it 
might reintroduce a new version of the failed TMA, only on more solid financial 
footing, its major efforts were directed toward disrupting port operations and 
pressuring local decision makers to act to address trucker conditions.466 In February 
2000, the Teamsters unveiled a port truckers’ “bill of rights,” and generated publicity 
for it by organizing truck convoys from the ports to Los Angeles City Hall.467 
However, these efforts did not show a clear path around the independent-
contractor problem. 
Despite significant challenges, port trucker unionization remained one of the 
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major prizes of Teamsters organizing in the new millennium. In raw numbers, the 
scale of port trucking was modest, with approximately 40,000 port truckers 
operating as independent contractors out of an overall trucking industry of almost 
four million.468 However, port trucking was an area of historic strength, and there 
were practical and strategic reasons to pursue unionization in that sector. As a 
practical matter, there was a potential legal hook for organizing: the legal status of 
ports (like Los Angeles and Long Beach) as proprietary departments under the 
umbrella of local government meant that they could potentially influence the nature 
of trucking through their contracting power. Discussions of how to make this 
happen were underway in 2004 when Mike Manley was hired in the Teamsters’ 
office of general counsel, headed by Pat Szymanski.469 Manley, from Kansas, 
worked as an organizer at the East Lawrence Improvement Association before 
deciding to become a lawyer.470 In 1980, he enrolled in Kansas Law School, and 
then went to a Kansas City law firm, Blake & Uhlig, where he eventually became 
partner.471 The firm was general counsel to the International Brotherhood of 
Boilermakers, and Manley remembered that when he was hired, there was “great 
interest in the fact that I had done a lot of work for the boilermakers and 
shipyards—which I guess shows how deep the department was in the [ports] 
campaign at that point.”472 When Manley got the Teamsters job, and was assigned 
to the Port Division to help organize port drivers, he remembered incredulously 
asking Szymanski: “What are you doing? . . . They are independent contractors.”473 
As Manley quickly learned, the plan was to change that status by focusing on 
the ports’ role as market participants. In conversations with Ron Carver, the 
question was: “Is there a way to kind of leverage the port to declare [truckers] to be 
employees?”474 Figuring out an affirmative answer to that question was not only 
important on its own terms but had broader strategic implications. The ports were 
key nodes in the larger supply chain that led from manufacturing exporters to 
regional warehouses, and ultimately to large retail chains, such as Wal-Mart. Some 
labor leaders believed that if unions could gain a stronger foothold in the ports, it 
would contribute to a longer-term campaign to organize retail giants.475 This was 
something that the Teamsters had argued for, but “didn’t get necessarily a lot of 
traction . . . in terms of resources” from union leadership at the AFL-CIO.476 
That changed with the formation of Change to Win—an alliance of 
progressive unions that broke away from the AFL-CIO in September 2005.477 
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Change to Win—established with “little structure, [but a] big focus on 
organizing”478—set up the Strategic Organizing Center, which was built around 
different industry sectors, with the goal of identifying “how the pool of existing 
resources at Change to Win could expand the pace [of ] organizing.”479 The center 
was “like a startup” that put “together experienced organizers and campaigners [to 
take] a fresh look at industries that were basically nonunion.”480 By bringing together 
organizers and researchers from different unions, the goal was to innovate 
according to “best practices.”481 It divided up the economy into different industry 
sectors: transportation, retail, home construction, and food processing.482 
John Canham-Clyne and Nick Weiner both volunteered to work on 
transportation.483 Canham-Clyne was a former freelance writer who covered the 
Iran-Contra affair for In These Times and wrote a book on single-payer health care.484 
He left journalism in 1996 to work as the research director for Congress Watch at 
Public Citizen, and from there was recruited to the Hotel Employees and Restaurant 
Employees International Union (HERE) to direct campaign research for their 
hospital-organizing campaigns, first in Las Vegas and then in New Haven.485 After 
Change to Win was formed, Canham-Clyne was recruited to its core staff.486 There, 
he was joined by Nick Weiner, who also came from HERE, where he first worked 
with locals in Baltimore and Washington, D.C., and then joined the national hotel 
organizing effort at the UNITE-HERE office in D.C.487 
Together Canham-Clyne and Weiner set out to research the trucking industry, 
becoming the bridge between Change to Win and the existing Teamsters leadership. 
Through their research, Canham-Clyne and Weiner identified the ports as a 
potential target of opportunity for organizing. As one of the few publicly owned 
pieces of freight infrastructure, ports offered “potential hooks” for organizing: 
many were in friendly political jurisdictions and drayage was a relatively sticky 
industry because of the massive infrastructure investment at the ports.488 On the 
basis of this research, Change to Win launched a national ports campaign, directed 
by Canham-Clyne, to build upon the Teamsters’ existing organizing efforts and 
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“move [that] work forward faster.”489 The larger goal, in line with that articulated 
by the Teamsters, was to “organize the supply chain.”490 The ports were the first 
link in this chain because they were a “chokepoint” that could be used to leverage 
other wins.491 
Although the Teamsters had invested in port trucking, the involvement of 
Change to Win was a crucial step forward.492 Teamsters leaders believed that any 
port campaign had to be comprehensive: even though individual ports were sticky, 
the power of shippers to divert cargo to competitor ports meant that there had to 
be a unified national strategy, otherwise there was a “real risk” that any individual 
port campaign could be easily broken.493 As Canham-Clyne reflected, “The 
Teamsters were trying to find a way to help poor drivers get out of the legal box 
that they were in . . . since deregulation.”494 Change to Win attempted to build on 
“a foundation of real commitment from the Teamsters to try to figure out this 
knotty puzzle,” recognizing that the workers had the will to strike, but because of 
the independent-contractor problem, “there had to be an additional lever to 
discipline the industry.”495 Canham-Clyne understood that his job was to 
“essentially sew together a lot of really good work that had been done before and 
build the alliance in a much deeper way than had previously existed, so that we 
would make sure that as we went down the road, both politically and legally, that 
we couldn’t be divided.”496 
With Change to Win staff and resources in place, a working group was formed 
and serious planning commenced in 2006.497 Within the Teamsters, Manley, Carver, 
and Chuck Mack (West Coast Vice President of the Teamsters and head of the Port 
Division) met repeatedly with Canham-Clyne and Weiner to develop an organizing 
theory and strategy, which focused on “strengthening the local political control over 
the ports.”498 The plan was to target ports in “blue” states or localities with friendly 
political climates: Los Angeles-Long Beach, Seattle-Tacoma, Oakland, New York-
New Jersey, and Miami. From Manley’s perspective, if the campaign could get these 
ports to “adopt a model that made drivers employees,” “more than 50 percent of 
what was coming into the country would be through facilities where port drivers 
are employees. And then you’d go to second tier targets . . . [which] are harder nuts 
to crack.”499 During these meetings, organizers like Weiner drew on their past 
experiences dealing with local governments and airports to develop a strategy 
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predicated upon a concession model: contractually linking the entry of trucking 
firms onto port property to the conversion of truck drivers from independent 
contractors to employees. As Weiner recalled, “once we started looking into port 
trucking, we kind of came up with [the concession] theory. And then we vetted the 
theory and that took a few months.”500 
An early question focused on the legality of different possible options for 
organizing port truckers specifically and low-wage workers in contingent work 
arrangements more broadly. In 2006, there was a meeting of the “legal tribes” in 
Washington, D.C., where prominent labor lawyers gathered to discuss new 
strategies.501 This meeting included the Teamsters’ Manley, as well as Szymanski, 
who had left the Teamsters to become general counsel to Change to Win; Brad 
Raymond, the new general counsel of the Teamsters; Judy Scott, general counsel to 
the Service Employees International Union; and long-time outside union counsel, 
Stephen Berzon of Altshuler Berzon, and Richard McCracken, of Davis, Cowell & 
Bowe.502 One of the issues discussed was the legal feasibility of using the port’s 
status as a city entity to convert truck drivers into employees.503 It was a familiar 
idea to those present, discussed in various forms for some time. But at that point, 
with Change to Win backing, the time had finally come to advance the strategy. The 
question was: “Is this doable?”504 
The concession model held appeal for a number of reasons. For one, it had 
been tested in other forms and had proven an effective tool for organizing. In 
particular, lawyers associated with the unions had done work on airport organizing 
in which the airport authorities, as public agencies, had used concession agreements, 
or franchises, to require food and beverage vendors to remain neutral in union 
organizing campaigns.505 Thus, from a mechanical point of view, union lawyers were 
familiar with the technical aspects of city contracting and how it potentially related 
to labor issues. Perhaps most crucially, the concession model was viewed as legally 
defensible against the backdrop of federal preemption. The union lawyers involved 
had experience with city contracting models to create living wage laws and job 
training programs, and believed that the same concept could be adapted to the ports 
under a market participant theory.506 For this analysis to work, there had to be a 
justification for the market participation itself. That justification turned out to lie 
less in trucking’s labor relations than in its environmental impact. 
 
500. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 480. 




505. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 480. A similar concept had been used 
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agreements. Scott L. Cummings & Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing Local Government Law for Low-Wage 
Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 187. 
506. For instance, attorney Richard McCracken had advised UNITE-HERE on the market 
participant exception in connection with these projects. Telephone Interview with John Canham Clyne, 
supra note 479. 
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C. The Turning Point: China Shipping and the Clean Air Action Plan 
That labor and environmental legal analyses would harmonize around the 
market participant exception to preemption was not clear on the cusp of the clean 
trucks campaign. Unlike the labor movement, mainstream environmental 
organizations still could wield some power through federal and state regulatory 
regimes, and had not yet clearly defined their relation to locally based initiatives. 
Judicial recognition of a market participant exception to the Clean Air Act did not 
occur until 2005.507 It was at that point, at least in theory, that the legal interests of 
the labor and environmental movements in asserting the market participant 
exception were in unison. But there still needed to be a cause upon which to act 
jointly. That cause would be port pollution. 
Throughout the “Hundred Years’ War,” port communities had become all-
too-familiar with the immediate reality of port pollution.508 The storage and 
transport of hazardous materials created a number of risks.509 Oil spills were a 
continuous problem.510 Toxic chemicals stored at the ports occasionally sparked 
fires.511 There were ongoing battles over debris and noise caused by scrap metal 
processors,512 and struggles over the location of coal exporting facilities.513 Other 
port-related problems drew increasing environmental attention. South Bay traffic 
 
507. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., No. CV00-09065FMC(BQRX), 
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compliance with a federal regulation requiring mitigation for destroying tidal lands). 
509. Sheryl Stolberg, Stiff Rules Focus on Port’s Many Risks, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1990, at A30. In 
1998, the port and one of its contractors paid a million dollar fine to settle a federal action against them 
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510. A 1985 spill of nearly 19,000 gallons of crude oil occurred after a Mobil employee 
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Continues After Oil Fouls San Pedro Beach, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1985, at B5. A 1991 spill of 12,000 gallons 
was the result of a tanker’s fuel tank overflow. Judy Pasternak, Oil Spill Damage Estimate Expands, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1991, at B1. Port congestion produced other near misses. George Hatch, Near-Misses at 
Sea Spur Call for ‘Traffic Cop,’ L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1991, at B1 (describing proposal passed by legislature 
to create private vessel tracking system to guide port traffic). 
511. Sparks Start L.A. Port Blast, Fire, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1985, at A1. 
512. Lisa Richardson, Neighbors Want Scrap Yard to Clean Up Its Act, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1993, 
at B3 (“Harbor-area boat- and homeowner groups have asked the Port of Los Angeles to demand sharp 
reductions in noise, air and water pollution at the Hugo Neu-Proler scrap yard, which wants the port 
to renew its 27-year Terminal Island lease. Labor leaders, meanwhile, have warned harbor officials not 
to take steps that would endanger the 165 jobs at the yard, where discarded cars, refrigerators and other 
metal refuse are shredded and the scrap is loaded aboard ships for export.”). The residents ultimately 
failed to prevent the lease renewal, while union leaders later charged Hugo with labor violations. See 
Dan Weikel, Firm at Port in Hot Water over Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1999, at C2. 
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TIMES, July 29, 1993, at B3. 
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ranked among the city’s worst,514 and traffic impacts were a key cause of community 
discontent. 
Slower to develop was the recognition of the ports as an environmental 
problem susceptible to challenge by the environmental movement. This recognition 
grew as port expansion increasingly bumped up against environmental regulation. 
As the early 1990s brought Plan 2020, large-scale port development came to hinge 
on environmental clearance.515 The California Coastal Commission—a quasi-
judicial body charged with approving all coastal development, including port 
expansion, under the land and water stewardship provisions of the California 
Coastal Act516—emerged as an important actor. The commission initially withheld 
approval of a dredging-and-landfill project deemed crucial to Plan 2020’s expansion 
plan until the Port of Los Angeles agreed to offset the loss of 582 acres of 
waterways.517 When the port agreed to replace the waterways on an acre-for-acre 
basis elsewhere in Southern California, the commission gave the project a green 
light, but retained authority to review each stage.518 
Regulatory attention increasingly focused on the defining environmental 
problem of the Los Angeles basin: smog. Regulation was shaped by the different 
tools available to federal and state agencies to deal with key pollution sources. Ships, 
which used dirty “bunker” fuel high in sulfur content,519 were known to be 
significant polluters, but the ports’ power to regulate them was ambiguous. Shipping 
lines generally asserted that federal and local regulators did not have power to 
control vessel emissions while they were in international waters—a view that had 
some precedential support.520 Within U.S. boundaries, the EPA had deferred the 
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to cleanup a scrap metal site vacated by National Metal and Steel before the port knew of the extent of 
environmental contamination). 
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question of whether it had authority to regulate foreign-flagged ships.521 There was 
a strong argument that ports could, however, impose rules on ships once docked 
under an exception to the Clean Air Act permitting local in-use regulations for 
nonroad sources of emissions.522 This focused attention on what such on-dock rules 
should look like. A 1984 SCAQMD study revealed that two percent of the area’s 
nitrogen oxide—a key component of smog—came from port ships burning diesel 
fuel while idling.523 In response, the SCAQMD issued a proposed rule requiring 
ships to plug into dockside electric power524—an operation known in the industry 
as “cold ironing”—which became an important goal of environmental advocacy. 
Regulators also searched for ways to address diesel truck pollution. While CARB 
had been granted authority by the EPA to set vehicle emission standards, the “in-
use” exception to the Clean Air Act also allowed the ports to regulate the “use, 
operation, or movement” of trucks,525 which opened the possibility of imposing 
restrictions on idling. 
The immediate battle revolved around setting regional air quality standards in 
the first instance. From the earliest period of federal clean air regulation, there were 
fights about regional compliance with the Clean Air Act. California’s first State 
Implementation Plan for the South Coast Air Basin was rejected by the EPA in 
1972.526 After a series of delays and revisions, California submitted a proposed plan 
for ozone and carbon monoxide in 1982, but conceded that even if implemented, 
it would not meet mandatory national air quality standards.527 When the EPA 
nonetheless approved the state plan, a citizen lawsuit was filed, resulting in a Ninth 
Circuit order reversing the approval and ordering the EPA to “face up” to its 
obligation to implement national standards.528 The Coalition for Clean Air and 
Sierra Club promptly filed another lawsuit to force the EPA to do so, which resulted 
in a settlement agreement committing the EPA to finalize its own plan.529 After 
further backtracking,530 the Ninth Circuit again ordered the EPA to finalize smog 
control regulations requiring the South Coast Air Basin to dramatically reduce 
ozone ingredients hydrocarbon and nitrogen oxide by 2010.531 When it was 
unveiled, the EPA’s plan focused on reducing emissions from trucks, ships, and 
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airplanes—mobile sources over which the SCAQMD did not have regulatory 
jurisdiction.532 
Yet the federal plan’s release provoked a local outcry over the scope of its 
proposed changes, which included taxing shipping and airline companies, requiring 
trucking companies to replace diesel engines, limiting out-of-state trucks to one 
Southern California stop, and forcing ocean liners to steam 100 miles offshore.533 
Government officials and industry representatives expressed concern over the 
plan’s $5.4 billion total price tag and argued that, if fully implemented, it would 
preclude the construction of the Alameda Corridor project and effectively shut 
down the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports.534 With that threat looming, officials 
negotiated a compromise that deferred federal compliance for another three 
years.535 In 1997, the SCAQMD adopted a new state plan that relaxed approximately 
thirty control measures. The EPA disapproved this part of the state plan and 
environmental groups again sued the SCAQMD to enforce the previous 
standards—leading to a revised plan in 1999 to strengthen ozone control measures, 
accelerate the implementation timeline, and provide an explicit commitment to 
attaining the federal standard.536 
While the ports thus received a temporary reprieve, it was clear that they could 
no longer expect to conduct business as usual. The environmental and health 
impacts of diesel fuel vehicles were receiving increasing attention.537 In 1999, a 
front-page Los Angeles Times story reported on the danger of diesel-fuel-burning 
vehicles, whose higher fuel content and intense heat-burning engines produced 
greater concentrations of carbon, sulfur, and nitrogen oxide.538 “At the Ports of 
Long Beach and Los Angeles—massive operations that are filled with trucks, ships, 
trains and cranes—workers breathe some of the most severe doses of diesel exhaust 
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found anyplace in California.”539 A seminal 2000 SCAQMD study on the relation 
between air pollution and cancer, entitled the Multiple Air Toxics Exposure Study 
(MATES II), concluded that about seventy percent of the carcinogenic risk in the 
basin was “attributed to diesel particulate emissions.”540 The study made specific 
reference to the negative impact of diesel emissions coming from the ports and 
connected transportation networks.541 The communities of greatest risk, 
unsurprisingly, were adjacent to the ports.542 A map published with the study (Figure 
6) highlighted the increased cancer risk in harbor communities and galvanized 
residents who began to mobilize around environmental justice—distributing the 
map at official meetings and public actions.543  
At a 2001 conference on air pollution at the University of Southern California 
(USC), Coalition for a Safe Environment director Jesse Marquez challenged 
assembled scientists to link their findings on air pollution to the unregulated growth 
of the ports and their impact on local low-income communities.544 New 
partnerships between community activists and the scientific community began to 
develop. The stage for environmental action against the ports was set—though that 
action initially would play out once again in court. 
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that the lease created security risks, with Congressman Duncan Hunter—a 
Republican from military stronghold San Diego—proposing federal legislation to 
bar foreign entities from leasing the naval station property.552 Objections also came 
from the Audubon Society, which wanted to preserve a habitat for black-crowned 
night herons, and the California Coastal Commission, which initially expressed 
concern about contamination from dredging (though it ultimately granted its 
approval).553 The preservationist group Long Beach Heritage challenged the 
commission’s decision to permit the demolition of naval station buildings, which 
had been deemed eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places.554 
Long Beach Heritage took its challenge to court. Represented by 
environmental lawyer Jan Chatten-Brown, the group filed suit under CEQA to 
oppose terminal development. The challenge rested on the timing of the Port of 
Long Beach’s environmental approval, which was conducted after the port had 
already entered into a letter of intent with COSCO to lease a container storage 
facility on “Pier T in the former Naval Station.”555 The board approved the project 
environmental impact report (EIR) on September 3, 1996, and two months later 
the city of Long Beach entered into a “Preferential Assignment Agreement” giving 
COSCO “a nonexclusive preferential assignment of the wharf and contiguous wharf 
premises” of over 100 acres on the Pier T site.556 Long Beach Heritage filed a 
petition for writ of mandate, which was consolidated with similar suits filed by the 
Audubon Society and the cities of Vernon and Compton.557 In February 1997, after 
trial, Superior Court Judge Robert O’Brien rejected Long Beach’s EIR as a 
“foregone conclusion” and ordered the city to “reconsider the project free and clear 
of any pre-commit[ment] . . . and with a complete evaluation of the EIR before 
deciding on the project.”558 Long Beach held a public hearing and issued another 
approval, but Chatten-Brown argued it was still marred by the fact that it was made 
for property already encumbered by an existing lease.559 When Judge O’Brien 
agreed, rejecting the EIR for a second time, the Port of Long Beach rescinded the 
lease and disavowed the letter of intent in order to reconsider the plan—which it 
promptly reapproved.560 Stating that the entire environmental review process had 
become “simply something to get through,” Judge O’Brien agreed once again to 
consider its adequacy.561 On September 2, 1997, O’Brien—for the third time—
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rejected the EIR as a “post hoc rationalization for the Board’s approval of the 
Project” and ordered a new review “without pre-commitment, pre-approval, or pre-
disposition, as required by the California Environmental Quality Act.”562 The city 
appealed and the Navy began considering alternative uses for the site.563 The CEQA 
process for the COSCO terminal plan, however, was rendered moot when Congress 
passed a defense bill that contained a prohibition on leasing the base to COSCO.564 
Representative Hunter, along with his colleagues James Inhofe (R-OK) and Randy 
“Duke” Cunningham (R-CA) had argued that China could use the base for “military 
purposes and intelligence-gathering.”565 This argument aligned anticommunists and 
veterans organizations, which joined with environmentalists and preservationists to 
permanently block the port from permitting a company flying a Chinese flag from 
using the old naval base site. 
With Long Beach thwarted, the Port of Los Angeles pursued its own China 
partner. Residents had made inquiries to the harbor commission about plans for the 
West Basin site of the former Todd Shipyard and Chevron area just north of the 
Vincent Thomas Bridge in San Pedro. Their answer came on March 28, 2001, when 
the harbor commission approved a lease with China Shipping Holding Company 
(China Shipping).566 Under the terms of the $650 million lease, 567 China Shipping 
would occupy a 174-acre terminal built by the port, which would support entry of 
up to 300 vessels—approximately 1.5 million containers—a year.568 The terminal—
to be located at berths 100 and 102—would be designed to accept 9100 TEU 
container vessels, which were larger than any at the time.569 
Community resistance was swift. San Pedro Peninsula Homeowners United, 
led by activist Noel Park, and the San Pedro and Peninsula Homeowners Coalition 
challenged the proposed terminal, which was to include two new wharves and ten 
massive cranes (up to sixteen stories high) 500 feet from resident homes, along with 
a backland area with new roads to accommodate traffic.570 On May 8, 2001, at a 
tense meeting in which residents were given only five minutes to speak, the Los 
Angeles City Council rejected resident demands that it conduct an EIR prior to 
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approving the project.571 Instead, the council approved the project by a unanimous 
vote.572 Residents thus turned to court, contacting NRDC to pursue legal action. 
On June 14, 2001, NRDC—representing the resident groups San Pedro and 
Peninsula Homeowners Coalition and San Pedro Peninsula Homeowners United, 
as well as the Coalition for Clean Air and NRDC’s own members—filed suit against 
the city, port, and harbor commissioners.573 Petitioners—represented by Gail 
Ruderman Feuer and Julie Masters of NRDC along with Chatten-Brown and 
another private environmental lawyer, Roger Beers—argued that, in approving the 
project, the city had failed to comply with CEQA,574 which required an EIR of 
significant developments that identified environmental issues and how they would 
be mitigated, and provided a period for public comment.575 Petitioners thus sought 
a writ of mandate directing the city to conduct a new project-specific EIR.576 “It’s 
time for the port to consider the needs of local communities before it approves a 
massive expansion in their backyard,” claimed NRDC’s Masters.577 The suit 
emphasized the environmental impact of the incoming ships themselves, as well as 
increased tugboat activity (over 500 trips per year) and truck traffic (an estimated 
one million new trips) to support them.578 
The technical legal issue focused on the port’s effort to exempt the China 
Shipping project from CEQA review by arguing that its approval was encompassed 
within two EIR processes that predated the lease agreement. The first was a 1997 
EIR conducted by the harbor department that approved the development of a 
multifaceted West Basin Transportation Project to “optimize container transport 
capabilities,” which included plans to deepen and widen the basin, create a new on-
dock railway linked to the Alameda Corridor, and build a new wharf at berths 98 
through 100 to accommodate the largest container vessels.579 The second was a 
2000 Environmental Impact Statement/Environmental Impact Review (EIS/EIR) 
conducted by the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers to evaluate the impacts of a harbor 
dredging operation that proposed using dredged material to create a landfill between 
berths 97 through 109 as a potential site for container storage or docking in order 
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to “accommodate the most modern vessels.”580 In preparing for the lease 
agreement, the harbor commission told China Shipping that the “elements 
contained in the lease have been adequately assessed in the [1997] West Basin 
Transportation Improvements Program EIR . . . and have been adequately assessed 
in the [2000] Port of Los Angeles Channel Deepening EIS/EIR. . . . As such, the 
Director of Environmental Management has determined that the proposed activity 
is exempt.”581 The city attorney’s office approved a permit authorizing the 
construction of the China Shipping terminal from landfill taken from the harbor 
dredging project.582 Under the final twenty-five-year lease agreement, China 
Shipping was granted the right to use berths 100 and 102 to construct terminal, 
wharf, and backland space, to be built in three phases: phase one included 
construction of the container terminal and first wharf at berth 100 by November 
2002; phase two involved the extension of the first wharf and the completion of the 
second (at berth 102) by March 2005; and phase three involved the construction of 
backland space to support the terminal.583 Apparently concerned that the scale of 
the new project might not be encompassed in the prior EIRs, the city also entered 
into a “side letter agreement,” approved by city council, which stated that the port 
and city “will use their best efforts to minimize negative environmental impacts” 
with respect to emissions from container ships, tugboats, trucks, and rail lines 
accessing the new terminal.584 
Petitioners argued that the lease committed the port to all three phases of the 
development, and that the 1997 and 2000 EIRs did not even address the potential 
impacts of phase one—much less all three.585 In particular, the 1997 EIR 
emphasized near-dock rail access, not container terminal construction, and did not 
contemplate the much larger scope of environmental impacts—including bigger 
wharves, larger operation space, more ships, and more trucks—while the 2000 
review emphasized dredging.586 The defendants—represented by lawyers from the 
city attorney’s office and outside counsel Morrison & Foerster and McCutchen, 
Doyle, Brown & Enersen—denied these allegations.587 
In 2002, after the suit was filed, activists held a protest in the Knoll Hill 
neighborhood of San Pedro, just next to the proposed China Shipping project.588 
In a convergence of political interests, harbor secessionists had seized on the project 
 
580. Id. at 620. In April 2001, the Army Corps issued China Shipping a permit to build the first 
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L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2002, at B4. 
581. NRDC, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622 (citation omitted). 
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585. Id. 
586. Id. at 622. 
587. Answer to Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, NRDC v. City of Los Angeles, No. 
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to rally support for their cause, inviting African American leaders angry at newly 
elected Mayor James Hahn (a San Pedro resident) for breaking his promise to 
endorse African American Bernard Parks for a second term as police chief.589 
Hahn’s sister, Janice, also a San Pedro resident, represented the Fifteenth District 
(which linked Watts to the Harbor communities of San Pedro and Wilmington) and 
supported residents pushing for a new environmental review of the China Shipping 
project.590 In an effort to tamp down community controversy, Mayor Hahn had 
appointed a Port Community Advisory Committee, which a week prior to the 
protest had recommended that the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers conduct a new 
environmental review of the China Shipping site.591 But that recommendation was 
rejected by the harbor commission and Hahn remained in political hot water.592 
The state trial court in the NRDC suit provided no relief.593 On May 30, 2002, 
the trial court rejected the environmentalists’ challenge, holding that the first phase 
of the China Shipping project was within the scope of the 1997 EIR and therefore 
did not have to be redone; because the city and port had apparently conceded that 
an EIR would have to be done on subsequent project phases for berth expansion, 
the trial court held those challenges to be moot.594 
On appeal, the petitioners asserted that the trial court lacked substantial 
evidence to support a CEQA exemption.595 In doing so, their brief placed front and 
center the issue of air pollution caused by diesel-powered vehicles: 
[T]he transportation of . . . containers to and from the site would generate 
a tremendous increase in the use of diesel trucks, diesel tugboats, and off-
road diesel equipment, polluting the air and water and burdening the local 
streets and freeways. Of particular concern to Appellants who live nearby, 
and to members of the Appellant environmental groups, is the tremendous 
quantity of diesel exhaust—a known carcinogen—that would be pumped 
into the surrounding community.596 
In response, the defendants focused on the scope of the earlier environmental 
reviews. They argued that the prior approvals clearly encompassed the development 
contemplated in phase one, and that the lease approval was conditioned on a 
subsequent environmental review for phases two and three—which were therefore 
not at issue.597 In their brief, the defendants contended that berth 100, formerly the 
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site of Chevron’s wharf, was used for container storage and handling at the time of 
the lease and that the proposed changes would actually “increase efficiency and 
reduce impacts because it puts the wharf closer to the Berth 100 backlands.”598 The 
defendants further contended that the selection of the West Basin site for China 
Shipping was the result of listening to residents, who had earlier proposed that any 
growth in container handling should be conducted there and that resident failure to 
participate in the 1997 EIR process showed their acquiescence.599 In addition, 
defendants asserted that the 1997 EIR explicitly contemplated the berth 100 wharf, 
and the 2000 EIS/EIR clearly proposed using dredged material to expand the China 
Shipping site “to provide more backlands and allow construction of an additional 
container wharf.”600 In their view, the impacts had already been accounted for and 
to the extent that they had not, the residents only had themselves to blame for not 
participating in the earlier processes. 
The attorney general of California weighed in with an amicus brief on behalf 
of petitioners, arguing that by committing itself to construct all three phases of the 
development but only purporting to approve phase one, the defendants had 
improperly segmented the project in direct violation of CEQA, reducing it “to a 
process whose result will be largely to generate paper, to produce an EIR that 
describes a journey whose destination is already predetermined and contractually 
committed to before the public has any chance to see either the road map or the 
full price tag.”601 As part of its appeal, petitioners asked the appellate court to stay 
the terminal’s construction,602 which the court declined to do, although it did 
expedite hearing the case, setting argument for October 18, 2002.603 
In the meantime, NRDC’s Feuer went to federal court arguing that the Army 
Corps had failed in its 2000 enviornmental review to adequately evaluate the China 
Shipping project, again asking for an injunction against further development.604 
District Court Judge Margaret Morrow agreed, issuing a temporary restraining order 
(TRO) on July 24 “as work crews were pouring 100 feet of new concrete in a rush 
to complete the China Shipping Holding Co. terminal,” which was over halfway 
done.605 Fifty residents attended the court hearing, including community activist 
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Marquez, who was astonished by the court decision: “This kind of thing has never 
happened before.”606 But the community’s enthusiasm was short lived. Three days 
later, Judge Morrow refused to convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction, 
holding that the petitioners had not proved sufficient harm in letting the project 
proceed, while the port asserted that delay would cost it $1.2 million per day and 
undermine its reputation in the competitive shipping world.607 
The state court took a different view. After hearing the case on October 18, 
the appellate panel decided to issue a stay, blocking construction of the key phase-
one element: the 1200-foot wharf at berth 100, which had already been nearly 
completed.608 Reversing the decision below, the appellate court curtly dismissed the 
port’s contention that the China Shipping project was encompassed under the 
previous EIR as “supported neither factually nor legally.”609 Specifically, the court 
held that because the China Shipping project did not arise until after the completion 
of either EIR, it could not “be considered part of the overall ‘project’ addressed in 
those documents.”610 “The fact that the port and China Shipping entered into a side 
letter agreement . . . provides adequate support for appellants’ argument that the 
port was required to prepare an initial study leading to either preparation of an EIR 
or a negative declaration for this Project. This was not done.”611 In a stunning blow 
to the port, the appellate court not only found the city to have violated CEQA and 
ordered a new EIR addressing all phases of the project, it also directed “the trial 
court to issue an injunction consistent with the stay we have issued precluding 
further construction or operation of the Project pending completion of the 
environmental review process.”612 The Los Angeles Times reported that the injunction 
“bars the pouring of 200 additional feet of concrete needed to complete the wharf,” 
which was nearly ninety percent finished.613 The Court of Appeal rejected the city’s 
request for re-hearing by the city,614 and the California Supreme Court denied a 
petition for review.615 
Court victory did not end the terminal fight. Under the rules of CEQA, it 
simply required the city and port to go back and conduct an appropriate EIR.616 
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Skirmishes continued, with the environmental groups failing to block delivery of 
four sixteen-story high cranes to the China Shipping site as the court held that 
unloading the already assembled cranes fell outside of the injunction.617 Yet time 
was of the essence: “In the competitive world of global trade, the Port of Los 
Angeles did not want to lose an important customer such as China Shipping to 
another port.”618 The coalition therefore had important leverage, which it used to 
negotiate an unprecedented—and game-changing—settlement. 
On March 5, 2003, in order to circumvent a lengthy battle over the project, 
the port and environmentalists entered into a $60 million settlement agreement, 
financed entirely through port revenue.619 The agreement, approved by Superior 
Court Judge Dzintra Janavs, permitted the port to finish phase one of the project 
within weeks while it awaited completion of the EIR, which it was still required to 
do (the coalition reserved the right to challenge any inadequacy in the EIR).620 In 
exchange, the port—in an unprecedented concession to environmental 
improvements—agreed to specific mitigation measures, which included requiring 
container handling equipment to use alternative fuels,621 installing “low profile” 
cranes,622 building facilities for “shoreside electrical power for ship hoteling,” 
retrofitting China Shipping ships to use electrical power while docked,623 creating a 
traffic mitigation plan,624 and setting aside $50 million over five years for 
community-specific mitigation.625 This community mitigation fund included $10 
million for the Gateway Cities Program to provide “incentives to replace, repower 
or retrofit existing diesel-powered on-road trucks,” $20 million for air quality 
mitigation, and $20 million for aesthetic improvements to the community, including 
parks and landscaping.626 In Feuer’s words, “Today is Day 1 in the greening of the 
Port of Los Angeles.”627 
Yet the greening project was nearly over as soon as it began. In a startling 
setback, it was quickly revealed that the port had not consulted China Shipping 
about the settlement terms, particularly the requirement that all docked ships turn 
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off their diesel engines and plug into electrical outlets.628 As it turned out, China 
Shipping leased its ships and would not commit to the retrofitting needed to convert 
them to electrical power, which it estimated would cost $300,000 per ship.629 With 
a fleet of 100 ships, the cost would be well beyond the $5 million the port committed 
in the settlement for retrofitting. With the deal in jeopardy, city and port officials 
engaged in damage control. Port executive director Larry Kelly flew to Shanghai to 
meet with China Shipping representatives, while city officials indirectly blamed 
NRDC for the failure to notify China Shipping of the settlement terms—arguing 
that a confidentiality requirement imposed by the plaintiffs prevented city officials 
from revealing the terms of the settlement until after it was executed.630 NRDC’s 
Feuer responded in disbelief: “It never actually dawned on us that they weren’t 
talking to China Shipping.”631 If the city had asked for permission to run the 
settlement by China Shipping—whose buy-in was obviously critical to effectuating 
the deal—Feuer was sure the plaintiffs would have provided permission to do so.632 
As the prospect of a lease renegotiation grew, the Los Angeles city controller issued 
an audit stating that the true cost of the settlement would be twice as much as the 
city had advertised633—a figure that city officials vehemently rejected.634 
A year after the landmark settlement, the completed terminal sat vacant as city 
officials worked to salvage the lease. As negotiations unfolded, NRDC agreed to a 
revised proposal under which China Shipping would commit to plug in seventy 
percent of docked ships rather than the one hundred percent proposed in the 
original agreement, while only making two cranes low profile; however, NRDC held 
fast to its demand that the port include language in the EIR recognizing the project’s 
“aesthetic impacts” on the surrounding communities.635 At this the port balked, 
claiming it did not want to “prejudge” the outcome of the environmental review.636 
After a flurry of meetings, an amended settlement was hammered out, with the port 
agreeing to make clear that the original $20 million community fund was “being 
created in part to allow for the mitigation of the aesthetic impacts of the China 
Shipping terminal off of port lands,” while the environmentalists agreed to language 
that the port was “not prejudging whether these impacts are adverse or 
significant.”637 This resolution cleared the way for China Shipping to take 
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occupancy, which it did in May 2004638—marking the creation of what was hailed 
as the world’s first green terminal, with cold ironing (i.e., dockside electrical plug-
in) capability “expected to eliminate more than three tons of nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
and 350 pounds of diesel particulate matter for each ship that plugs in.”639 Council 
Member Janice Hahn summed up what activists hoped would be the foundation for 
future change: “The China Shipping Settlement sets a precedent of how we do 
things at the Port today and into the future.”640 
 
Figure 7: China Shipping Container Terminal641 
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Hahn’s claim turned out to be prescient, as the China Shipping victory 
reinforced other efforts to stem port-related diesel emissions. At the federal level, 
the EPA passed a series of rules setting more stringent diesel emission controls on 
heavy-duty highway vehicles (trucks) to take effect in the 2007 model year,642 as well 
as similar standards on nonroad vehicles (trains and ships).643 At the local level, 
resident and environmental groups, in newfound alliance, began pressing Mayor 
James Hahn for stronger city regulation. The ground was laid by Mayor Hahn, who 
as a candidate promised harbor residents that he would commit to a “no net 
increase” policy capping port emissions at 2001 levels.644 In the face of an expected 
quadrupling of container traffic at Los Angeles and Long Beach by 2025,645 
particulate matter from port sources was predicted to increase from 1000 to over 
2700 tons per year.646 In a letter to San Pedro activist Noel Park, Hahn also 
committed to “review all past, present and future environmental documents in an 
open public process to ensure that all laws—particularly those related to 
environmental projects—have been obeyed, all city procedures followed, and all 
adverse impacts upon the communities mitigated.”647 As secession fever raged and 
the China Shipping fight was at its height, Mayor Hahn, in his first “state of the 
harbor address,” promised to promote a greener port by moving industrial uses to 
Terminal Island and creating a recreational waterfront promenade from Vincent 
Thomas Bridge to the breakwater.648 As part of his address, Hahn indicated that the 
port was developing green policies, such as a conversion of port machines to low-
emission technology and the creation of a no-net-increase plan.649 Some of the items 
in the speech, such as cold ironing, found their way into the China Shipping 
agreement. How Hahn planned to implement “no net increase” remained unclear. 
Hahn’s plan interacted with—and was pushed forward by—the continuous 
flow of evidence of port pollution and regulatory responses to it. In an 
environmental report card issued in early 2004, NRDC and the Coalition for Clean 
Air issued Los Angeles a C– and Long Beach a C for their environmental 
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practices.650 In its press release announcing the report card, NRDC stated that the 
two ports released as much diesel exhaust as 16,000 idling trucks per day.651 In a 
subsequent report, NRDC systematically reviewed the negative health impacts of 
port emissions and made a number of proposals to mitigate them.652 Among those 
recommendations were replacing extremely old trucks, retrofitting others, and 
mandating the use of cleaner burning fuels.653 In addition, following the China 
Shipping model, the report recommended moving ships to shoreside electrical 
power654—a proposal advanced by CARB in April. The NRDC report also 
identified the need for stricter rules on truck idling,655 noting that a 2002 bill 
sponsored by Democratic state Assemblyman Alan Lowenthal from Long Beach, 
which banned idling for more than thirty minutes outside the port, had been largely 
circumvented by moving the trucking queue inside port property.656 In July 2004, 
CARB approved a rule prohibiting diesel vehicles of 10,000 pounds or more from 
idling more than five minutes anywhere.657 
During this period, Assemblyman Lowenthal upped the pressure on Mayor 
Hahn to make good on his no-net-increase promise. In February 2004, Lowenthal 
introduced Assembly Bill 2042, which required the ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach, in concert with the SCAQMD, to set the ports’ air quality baseline at 2001 
levels and required the ports to “ensure that all future growth . . . will have a zero 
net increase in air pollution.”658 The bill, backed by NRDC (fresh off its China 
Shipping win) and other environmental groups, was strongly opposed by shippers, 
local chambers of commerce, and the ports themselves. In objecting to the 
proposed bill, the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association (PMSA)—the industry 
trade group representing shipping lines and terminal operators—argued that the 
ports were already developing emission-reducing technology and that the bill “erects 
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a vague and potentially prohibitive obstacle to future growth (that would) send a 
negative message to the international trade community.”659 The PMSA also tried to 
use the complexity of environmental agency jurisdiction to its advantage.660 The 
legislative record stated that the PMSA “cautions against assigning mobile source 
emission regulation to a regional agency [i.e., the SCAQMD], a prospect that could 
create ‘islands of divergent authority for sources that travel between air districts (and 
other state and federal jurisdictions).’ For this reason, they believe authority should 
remain with the ARB and federal EPA.”661 Marching in lockstep, the Long Beach 
Chamber of Commerce similarly objected to the bill’s “conflicting approach to 
mobile source emissions,” while decrying the 2001 baseline as unrealistic.662 
Similarly, the Port of Long Beach rejected the baseline as “unachievable,” 
particularly in light of its lack of authority over ocean going vessels, and reiterated 
the lack of regulatory clarity.663 In response, Lowenthal amended the bill to reset 
the emissions baseline to 2002.664 Nonetheless, the Long Beach Board of Harbor 
Commissioners voted to oppose AB 2042,665 setting up a conflict with the Long 
Beach City Council, which the next day unanimously voted to support “AB 2042 in 
order to protect public health and safety by avoiding an increase in air pollution 
from the ports of San Pedro Bay.”666 The city council thereby directed the city clerk 
“to transmit a copy of th[e] resolution to the Governor, to the members of the 
California Legislature representing the Long Beach and Los Angeles areas, and any 
other officials, agencies, entities, and individuals as may be deemed appropriate.”667 
It was against this backdrop that environmentalists and harbor residents, 
armed with the China Shipping victory, set their sights on Long Beach, which had 
begun to move forward with its own 115-acre expansion project at Pier J in a new 
attempt to accommodate COSCO—away from the forbidden naval station 
property.668 Pier J, at the southern tip of the port below the venerable Queen Mary, 
had nearly doubled in size in the early 1990s to accommodate Maersk’s container 
 
659. Port of Long Beach and Port of Los Angeles: Air Pollution: Hearing on A.B. 2042 Before the Assemb. 
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664. Assemb. B. 2042, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (as amended by Leg. Assembly, 
May 5, 2004). 
665. News, LBREPORT.COM (May 3, 2004), http://www.lbreport.com/news/may04/lowbilz2 
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/may04/lowbilz3.htm. 
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668. Rick Holguin, New Terminal Opens, Along with Scores of Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1993, at J1. 
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vessels and a new on-dock rail yard.669 A decade later, the site was targeted for 
further expansion via landfill designed to increase the pier complex to 385 acres in 
three phases, to be completed by 2015.670 Toward that end—and careful to avoid 
the problems that beset the China Shipping project next door—the Long Beach 
Board of Harbor Commissioners circulated a draft EIR for Pier J in 2003.671 In 
response, the SCAQMD staff issued two comment letters. The first, sent on 
February 7 by the CEQA section program supervisor, argued that increased port 
traffic could contribute to a carbon monoxide hotspot and proposed mitigation 
measures that included turning off idling trucks and installing electrical connections 
to plug in docked ships.672 The second letter, sent by the planning and rules manager 
on October 8, homed in on what would become a key objection: that the port had 
not adequately accounted for increased diesel emission from the project.673 
Specifically, the letter argued that in modeling the health risk assessment, the port 
had assumed a seventy-five percent reduction of diesel emissions from heavy-duty 
vehicles based on the phase-in of the EPA’s 2001 diesel rules and CARB’s 2001 
Risk Reduction Plan.674 However, the SCAQMD contended that because those 
rules applied prospectively, with the EPA rule not fully phased in until 2010, the 
port had to factor in delays in emission reduction due to truck turnover—which it 
had not done, thus understating the impact of increased truck traffic caused by the 
expansion.675 
The SCAQMD reiterated this central objection in its July 30, 2004 comments 
on the final EIR.676 NRDC, pivoting from its negotiations on the amended China 
Shipping settlement, also provided comments critical of the expansion plan.677 
Although the threat of litigation was only thinly veiled, in August the port 
nonetheless approved the EIR, triggering an appeal to the city council by NRDC 
and other groups.678 While awaiting the meeting, NRDC’s position received further 
 
669. Id. 
670. Deborah Schoch, Residents Fight Port Expansion, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2004, at B1. 
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County, CA, 68 Fed. Reg. 48344 (Aug. 13, 2003). 
672. Letter from Steve Smith, Program Supervisor, Cal. Envtl. Quality Act Section, S. Coast Air 
Quality Mgmt. Dist., to Dr. Robert Kanter, Dir. of Planning, Port of Long Beach (Feb. 7, 2003) (on file 
with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
673. Letter from Susan Nakamura, Planning & Rules Manager, S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. 
Dist., to Dr. Robert Kanter, Dir. of Planning, Port of Long Beach (Oct. 8, 2003) (on file with the UC 
Irvine Law Review). 
674. Id. 
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EPA rule went into effect, all trucks entering the port would have 2007 model year compliant engines, 
even though the rule only applied to the production of new trucks—not their purchase. Id. 
676. Letter from Susan Nakamura, Planning & Rules Manager, S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. 
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677. Deborah Schoch, Port’s Effort to Cut Smog Is Criticized, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2004, at B1. 
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support. On September 9, USC researchers released a study in the New England 
Journal of Medicine finding that children who lived in smoggy areas, particularly those 
surrounding the ports, were more likely to have permanently underdeveloped 
lungs.679 Another USC study found increased rates of cancer downwind of the 
ports.680 Armed with this evidence at the city council meeting on September 14, 
NRDC’s Feuer offered a powerful critique of the Pier J EIR, emphasizing that it 
did not harmonize with the no-net-increase approach to which the council had 
already committed and that it incorrectly set 2015 as the air quality baseline despite 
the fact that phase one construction would be done in 2007.681 She cited China 
Shipping as precedent, noting that the EIR did not address feasible plans to reduce 
emissions like cold ironing. In parrying council member questions about the port’s 
legal authority to mandate cold ironing,682 she stressed the port’s authority as the 
landlord: “[T]hat’s the power the Port has. The Port can say as a condition of the 
lease that you need to have plug ins at this facility . . . . I think there’s no question 
there’s legal authority to do it.”683 NRDC was supported by staff from the 
SCAQMD, but was opposed by some labor union representatives, who questioned 
the impact on jobs, as well as the port’s director of planning, who characterized the 
NRDC proposals as “pie in the sky.”684 NRDC, however, carried the day. In the 
words of Council Member Jackie Kell, Feuer had made the port’s EIR “look like a 
complexion full of zits.”685 
The Long Beach city council decided to delay a vote on the EIR and port staff 
recommended its rescission. This came on the heels of a harsh letter from the 
SCAQMD that reiterated its main technical objections, “strongly” recommending 
that the port “reconsider” the EIR in order to “ensure that requirements” under 
CEQA and NEPA were met.686 Litigation was again threatened.687 In light of this, 
port director of planning Geraldine Knatz supported the EIR’s rescission, stating 
 
679. W. James Gauderman et al., The Effect of Air Pollution on Lung Development from 10 to 18 Years 
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that “[o]ur feeling is that we want to have the best document that we can have.”688 
The board agreed, formally rescinding its approval at a September 29, 2004 
meeting.689 Keeping on the pressure, Feuer urged the board “not just to go back to 
address and analyze these issues but . . . to please send the message [to staff ] that 
what they have adopted is not enough, that this Board wants more and that more 
can be done.”690 In response, Commissioner James Hankla applauded NRDC for 
doing “this Board a great service,” and said that “staff should consider the Board is 
directing it to evaluate this process de novo and evaluate every single aspect of the 
EIR from the standpoint of NRDC, Coalition for Clean Air, Earth Corps as well as 
AQMD.”691 In recalling this outcome, one NRDC lawyer emphasized its 
significance, noting that although China Shipping had received the most attention, 
the Pier J victory was a “pretty big deal because . . . it’s very rare to have an agency 
go back on its position and win at an administrative level.”692 
As a vindication of Long Beach’s no-net-increase stance, Pier J also set the 
stage for the final battle over AB 2042. As the political debate neared its resolution, 
no-net-increase opponents succeeded in scaling the bill back—setting the air quality 
baseline at a more recent year (2004),693 while weakening enforcement.694 Even in 
this watered down state, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger was not willing to anger 
the ports and Chamber of Commerce on this issue. Although he asserted that 
“[i]mproving the quality of our air is a priority of my Administration,” he stated that 
“this bill will not reduce pollution in any way,” and instead directed the California 
EPA and CARB “to work with the ports, the railroads, other goods movement 
facilities, local air districts, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency . . . and local 
communities to develop such a program for our ports throughout the state.”695 In 
a nod to industry arguments of jurisdictional competence, he concluded that “[a]s 
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most of the pollution is generated by federally regulated sources, I urge the federal 
government to provide the necessary incentives and regulations.”696 
The defeat of no net increase at the state level had the effect of galvanizing 
efforts around Mayor Hahn’s local initiative. On July 7, 2004, residents were 
outraged by the release of a Plan to Achieve No Net Increase of Air Emissions at 
the Port of Los Angeles, authored by the port with the aid of the Houston-based 
Starcrest Consulting Group.697 The plan was presented to the Hahn-created Port 
Community Advisory Committee.698 What upset residents most was the plan’s claim 
that the port could achieve Hahn’s promise of “no net increase” without any major 
new programs by assuming a sharp reduction in air pollution based on the China 
Shipping truck retrofitting program.699 Residents objected that the program would 
only replace 400 of the more than 6000 trucks that were more than twenty years 
old—and noted even that would not be completed until 2008.700 
Embarrassed by the blowback, Mayor James Hahn and Council Member 
Janice Hahn instructed port director Larry Keller to establish a task force to develop 
a credible strategy.701 In the wake of the conflict, Keller resigned.702 Mayor Hahn 
appointed a twenty-eight-member No Net Increase Task Force, which began 
meeting in October 2004 and included Noel Park (also on the Port Community 
Advisory Committee) and Feuer, along with representatives from industry, labor 
unions, and other community and environmental groups. Despite this, critics 
continued to blast the mayor for failing to keep his promise to remediate projects 
completed prior to 2001.703 
The task force persevered, considering a range of initiatives to deal with port 
emissions, which included an ambitious (and, at $35 million, expensive) replacement 
program to convert 1000 old diesel trucks to 2004 clean models.704 Industry groups 
participated but were wary, with one terminal operator suggesting that a plan 
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mandating cold ironing would not “survive a constitutional challenge.”705 Although 
the task force was supposed to present a plan to Hahn by December 31, 2004, 
election year politics appeared to intervene, with the group’s draft proposal delayed 
until just before the hotly contested primary between Hahn and challenger Antonio 
Villaraigosa in March 2005.706 Yet the delay did not dampen the efforts of the panel, 
which received a boost from state and federal environmental regulators who began 
collaborating with members to produce a sustainable plan.707 A draft plan was 
released on March 3, which contained proposals—without attending to cost or 
feasibility—for cleaner fuel, subsidized new truck conversion, and cold ironing.708 
The most controversial proposal—converting rail lines to electricity—drew 
strenuous objection from BNSF and UP, whose attorney complained that “[i]t’s a 
real stretch when you consider these things don’t exist.”709 Despite progress, the 
plan was perhaps most notable for what it did not include: support from 
neighboring Long Beach, which rejected an invitation to participate and instead 
produced its own green port plan in January 2005 without input from air quality 
regulators.710 Opining on the Los Angeles plan, Port of Long Beach Planning 
Director Robert Kanter reiterated the complaints he voiced in the Pier J fight, 
stating that “[t]here are some radical ideas, pie-in-the-sky ideas, that I don’t think 
are likely to take place in the near term.”711 
Nonetheless, the Los Angeles task force forged ahead, producing an emission-
reduction plan projected to prevent 2200 premature deaths over twenty years at a 
cost of $11 billion.712 Yet industry resistance to aspects of the plan prevented 
consensus; as a result, the task force did not vote to endorse the plan,713 but rather 
simply turned over its recommendations to Mayor Hahn one week before the end 
of his term.714 The 600-page report was impressive in its detailed scientific analysis 
of emissions and in the scope of its policy proposals,715 which included sixty-eight 
separate control measures for different emission source categories (ocean going 
vessels, harbor craft, cargo handling equipment, rail, and heavy duty vehicles).716 
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The plan’s basic structure was to offer analysis and recommendations proposed by 
air regulators and environmentalists, while interlineating industry objections 
throughout. 
In addition to fighting over specific regulations, industry and 
environmentalists clashed on the issue of the port’s legal authority to implement the 
proposals—a harbinger of fights to come. Section 5 of the report provided a 
detailed legal analysis that focused primarily on the issue of federal preemption, 
particularly with respect to the Clean Air Act.717 That analysis was drafted through 
rancorous negotiations between SCAQMD and NRDC (particularly Gail Feuer) on 
one side, and lawyers for the PMSA and rail lines on the other. The result was a 
carefully worded analysis that offered a sweeping review of preemption doctrine 
and a proposal-by-proposal legal analysis, which was impressive in its 
comprehensiveness, while exposing the deep differences between environmental 
and industry lawyers on the issue of local authority. 
While the SCAQMD and NRDC asserted that the port’s implementation of 
no-net-increase measures “could be characterized as proprietary conduct that is 
exempt from federal preemption under the market participant exemption,”718 rail 
and PMSA lawyers were much more skeptical, arguing that the Port of Los Angeles 
“may not adopt a sweeping set of control measures through its contracts and leases 
in order to implement broad social policy regarding air quality under the guise of 
the market participant exception.”719 The legal gauntlet was thus thrown down. On 
July 30, 2005—his last day in office—Hahn endorsed the No Net Increase Task 
Force report and recommended “that the Villaraigosa administration adopt the 
report’s finding to make sure that the Port of Los Angeles is the nation’s leader in 
clean air standards.”720 Although many task force members had hailed the plan as a 
step in the right direction, some community representatives were disappointed with 
Hahn’s failure to keep his no-net-increase promise, instead tossing the “hot potato” 
to the next mayor.721 
For his part, the new mayor seemed determined not to drop it. To the contrary, 
Villaraigosa—a former union organizer and Democratic speaker of the California 
Assembly, who had campaigned on a platform of green growth and swept into the 
mayor’s office with a progressive coalition of labor, environmental, and other liberal 
constituencies—appeared committed to aggressive action to meet the seemingly 
intractable problem of reconciling port expansion with environmental and 
community health. His first moves signaled the priority he was to give to greening 
the ports and building upon the ultimately inadequate Hahn no-net-increase effort. 
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Attention focused on his choice of city commissioners, which constituted a critical 
exercise of influence that set policy direction for the powerful agencies that shaped 
Los Angeles.722 For Villaraigosa, filling vacancies on the harbor commission at the 
Port of Los Angeles was high on his priority list upon taking office. Against the 
backdrop of China Shipping and the sense that port expansion was threatened by 
ongoing environmental clashes, the mayor was committed at the outset to 
appointing board members with environmental experience and community 
credibility.723 In addition, the recent resignation of port director Keller left a vacuum 
in leadership, which the mayor wanted to quickly fill. 
The process Villaraigosa initiated to find qualified city commissioners was 
designed to not simply reward supporters or promote insiders. Upon his election, 
Villaraigosa convened an advisory group of seventy-five diverse stakeholders and 
asked them to create a pipeline of applicants for commission positions who were 
“not the usual suspects,” but rather people “who think outside the box, who are 
creative, who come from all over the city.”724 One of those people was Jerilyn López 
Mendoza, a UCLA School of Law graduate and long-time environmental lawyer, 
who headed the Environmental Justice Project at the Environmental Defense Fund, 
where she had been for five years.725 In addition to environmental expertise, 
Mendoza had a deep familiarity with labor issues and the complexity of Los 
Angeles’s proprietary departments, having just been lead lawyer on the campaign 
that produced a multi-million dollar community benefits agreement with the Los 
Angeles International Airport.726 Mendoza was contacted by two members of the 
Villaraigosa transition team, Paula Daniels, former member of the California Coastal 
Commission, and Cecilia Estelano, a partner at Munger, Tolles & Olson.727 With 
their encouragement, Mendoza filled out an application and was soon contacted by 
a screening firm that, she recalled, “asked me . . . pointed questions, like what was 
my theory of social change and how did I define my work in terms of environmental 
justice?”728 Mendoza made it to the final stage, where she met with the mayor, along 
with Bud Ovrom, deputy mayor for housing and economic development, and 
Sharon Delugach, who was coordinating commission appointments. At that 
meeting, Mendoza and the mayor engaged in a lengthy “exchange of monologues, 
where he would sort of explain things to me from his perspective and then I would 
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sort of explain my perspective based on his perspective.”729 In this conversation, 
Mendoza recalled the mayor laying out his position: 
[The Port of Los Angeles is] always going to be a working port . . . . It 
really is just one of our most important economic assets. It’s never going 
to be Marina del Rey. It’s never going to be a tourist location . . . . My 
vision for the port is I want to see the cleanest, greenest port in the 
world . . . . Do you think that’s possible?730 
Mendoza’s answer was yes, “if you have the political will.”731 Her selection as 
commissioner indicated that the will was indeed there—a view underscored by the 
appointment of David Freeman, who was former energy secretary to President 
Carter, general manager of the Tennessee Valley Power Authority, energy czar to 
Governor Grey Davis, and head of the Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power.732 Freeman, a close adviser to Villaraigosa, was considered someone able to 
get things done.733 Freeman and Mendoza were appointed in July 2005, and 
confirmed in September, along with Kaylynn Kim, a private attorney; Doug Krause, 
general counsel of East West Bank; and Joe Radisich, president of the Southern 
California District Council of the ILWU.734 
The new board immediately signaled a different approach, holding its first 
scheduled meeting in an overflowing community center in Wilmington,735 rather 
than its traditional spot in the San Pedro Harbor Administration Building.736 There, 
Freeman, as board president, criticized the Hahn no-net-increase plan’s 2001 
emissions baseline, telling the crowd, “[s]urely, you can’t settle on that.”737 He asked 
port staff to evaluate the Hahn task force plan, moving with a greater sense of 
urgency by requesting a review of which proposals could be accelerated and 
expanded.738 
This urgency was heightened as multiple regulatory bodies vied to restrict port 
emissions. The SCAQMD’s chairman calculated that the ports produced 100 tons 
of NOx a day, more than six million cars, while also producing twenty percent of 
the region’s diesel particulate matter, responsible for 1700 premature deaths a 
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authority to regulate the port complex as a single stationary source.740 CARB kept 
the pressure up, finding that the port increased cancer risk up to fifteen miles 
away,741 while also linking cargo transportation, particularly near the port, to a host 
of health problems, which it estimated cost over $6 billion to treat.742 CARB’s study 
found that 2400 people died annually as a result of port-related air pollution, many 
of them in surrounding neighborhoods.743 
Public health care costs and ongoing community opposition pushed forward 
regulatory action.744 In April 2006, as part of a Governor Schwarzenegger-
sponsored initiative to meet federal clean air deadlines, CARB approved a plan to 
reduce goods-movement emissions to 2001 levels through a variety of proposals—
including cleaner ship fuel, cold ironing, and replacing old diesel trucks.745 Yet the 
lack of funding or mandatory requirements caused Harbor Commission President 
David Freeman to scoff: “Are they ordering people to do things? No? Then what 
the hell good are they?”746 Community residents also complained.747 Regulatory 
agencies and environmentalists pointed fingers, with state agencies contending that 
they had no authority to regulate the biggest polluters—ocean going vessels and 
railroads—while NRDC disagreed.748 The port, for its part, attempted to negotiate 
emission reductions into ocean vessel leases, while the shipping industry was 
developing its own market-based emission control plan.749 The challenge for the 
Villaraigosa administration was promoting the Los Angeles port as a regional 
growth engine, while dealing with its “bad reputation” as a source of pollution and 
other community detriments.750 
Commissioners Freeman and Mendoza explicitly viewed meeting this 
challenge as their primary goal. As Freeman remembered, tackling the green growth 
problem 
was the reason the mayor named me and [Mendoza] and people like that 
to get the job done. . . . I mean, obviously the exact details of how we were 
going to go about it were not preordained, but . . . I was put on there 
because of my environmental credentials and the fact that the mayor knew 
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me as a person that wasn’t just a bullshit artist but kind of made things 
happen that we talked about.751 
As Mendoza recalled, the board viewed its mission as executing the mayor’s goal of 
making the Port of Los Angeles “the cleanest, greenest port in the world.”752 In 
discussing how to do that, the commissioners quickly 
realized two things: one was everything we did had to be in close 
coordination with Long Beach. [Without coordination,] the customers and 
other people who work and live at the port would just move over to Long 
Beach where they didn’t have to deal with it . . . . The second thing we 
realized was that we weren’t going to get anything done unless we adjust 
all sources of pollution . . . even though we knew that trucks were of 
primary concern . . . .753 
The commission moved assertively on both fronts. 
To promote inter-port cooperation, the first order of business was hiring a 
port director that could reach across the bay to her Long Beach counterparts. That 
process was managed within the mayor’s office by small group of advisors that 
included David Libatique, who became part of Villaraigosa’s transition team and 
then was assigned to the Los Angeles Business Team as port liaison, under the 
supervision of Deputy Mayor Bud Ovram.754 Libatique joined Villaraigosa’s 
transition team in 2005 after working as a deputy to Council Member Martin 
Ludlow.755 With a master’s degree in public policy from Harvard, Libatique was a 
policy generalist who was charged during the mayoral transition with preparing 
background memos on the ports. It was “a natural fit” and Libatique immediately 
found himself enmeshed in port-related air quality work.756 Libatique helped vet the 
port director candidates, ultimately presenting three to the mayor.757 The goal was 
to find a new director who would “focus on dealing with the environmental impacts 
but create a path forward for the port to continue to be an economic engine for . . . 
the city.”758 In January 2006, the mayor selected Geraldine Knatz, formerly 
managing director of the Port of Long Beach, who held a doctorate in biological 
science and was viewed as a strong supporter of “greening and growing.”759 With 
twenty-three years of experience at Long Beach, Knatz was also seen as a bridge 
builder who could advance the coordination agenda.760 
With Knatz in place, the commission reached out to Long Beach to advance 
 
751. Telephone Interview with S. David Freeman, Interim Gen. Manager, L.A. Dep’t of Water 
& Power Water Sys. & Former Comm’r, L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs (Apr. 29, 2013). 
752. Telephone Interview with Jerilyn López Mendoza, supra note 723. 
753. Id. 




757. Id. Libatique also vetted the candidates for the harbor commission. 
758. Id. 
759. Jim Newton, Once Rivals, Local Ports Clear Air in Partnership, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2006, at A1. 
760. Id. 
          
2014] PREEMPTIVE STRIKE 1039 
a joint plan that would attempt to comprehensively address the port complex’s 
multiple sources of pollution—recognizing that when it came to pollution, there 
was no “dividing line in the air.”761 Although the mayor made his harbor 
commission and port director selections with “green growth” in mind, Libatique 
recalled that “there wasn’t that much advanced planning about how everything was 
going to roll out.”762 Instead, the mayor entrusted his new team to develop a plan, 
which it quickly set to do. Shortly after Knatz was hired, she and Freeman met with 
their Long Beach counterparts to set a framework for discussions that would lead 
to a comprehensive policy—to be called the Clean Air Action Plan (CAAP).763 With 
the process and goals agreed upon, both ports’ harbor commissions began holding 
joint monthly meetings to discuss the details. Mayor Villaraigosa reached out to 
union leaders to gain their support, arguing that enhanced environmental standards 
at the port were good for the health of union members.764 Commissioners and port 
staff also met with industry leaders to get them on board. With labor and 
environmentalists aligned behind a new plan, industry was on the defensive. 
According to Freeman, the message to industry representatives was clear: the ports 
could promise expansion only if shippers and other industry players agreed to clean 
up the system. In Freeman’s terms, the board said “you come to us with an 
expansion proposal and we’ll approve it . . . [if you] clean up what you’re doing.”765 
Both commissions were in a position to facilitate growth plans provided that 
they complied with environmental goals. It was ultimately the ports’ power to reject 
or delay expansion that provided the leverage needed to get industry buy in. And 
although shippers and carriers had other ports they could use, those ports were 
generally not as attractive because of preexisting infrastructure investments in Los 
Angeles and Long Beach, as well as access to the lucrative regional market.766 It was 
in this context that the Los Angeles and Long Beach harbor commissions developed 
the outlines of CAAP, a draft of which was circulated in July 2006.767 The main 
approach was to regulate emission sources tied to the ports—by, for example, 
requiring docked ships to burn cleaner fuel or adopt cold ironing.768 Other parts of 
the plan referenced ambitious goals for overall emission reductions, but the outlines 
were still tentative.769 
By the time the final plan was released in November 2006, a focus on trucks 
had crystallized.770 While the draft plan was vague on the trucks piece, the final plan 
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emphasized replacing the diesel trucks that accessed the port and offered a clearer 
road map to effectuate that goal.771 Although explicitly presented as a “living 
document,” the CAAP Technical Report, through Control Measure HDV1, 
provided a clear emission control framework for “Heavy-Duty Vehicles”—which 
formed the foundation for what would ultimately become the Clean Truck Program. 
The report’s central contribution was to recognize that port drayage trucks, on 
average over ten years old, were a significant source of air pollution and to call for 
the rapid greening of the entire drayage truck fleet serving the ports within a five-
year period.772 In order to cut diesel emissions by nearly half, the report focused on 
replacing and retrofitting what it estimated to be the 16,800 “frequent and semi-
frequent trucks” that accounted for roughly eighty percent of all port calls.773 The 
goal was to achieve “clean” standards, which meant replacing or upgrading all 
“frequent caller” trucks (those that made more than seven calls per week) to meet 
EPA 2007 emission standards; for “semi-frequent caller” trucks (3.5 to 7 calls per 
week), the goal was to replace or upgrade trucks that were model year 1992 or older, 
while retrofitting newer trucks with certified emission reduction technologies.774 To 
do this, the report proposed to provide “significant incentives to owner/operators 
to encourage accelerated turnover/retrofits, and on the terminal side to maximize 
the use of ‘clean’ trucks through lease requirements and/or other mechanisms.”775 
The financial impacts of various incentive programs were modeled, with the 
main proposal to replace roughly half the trucks and retrofit the other half estimated 
to cost approximately $1.8 billion.776 The report acknowledged that even with ports 
contributing $300 million and the SCAQMD another $36 million,777 “additional 
funding on a massive scale will be needed.”778 Only a tentative implementation 
framework was provided, with several options put on the table to move the 
ambitious plan forward, ranging from those imposing costs directly on drivers to 
those shifting all costs to the public.779 Each plan was evaluated in light of emissions 
goals but also taking into account “wages/quality of life” for truck drivers.780 
Proposals included requiring individual drivers to display an emblem indicating 
emission compliance; imposing an “impact fee at the gate” on dirty trucks; assigning 
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exclusive franchises to clean trucking companies “that can document that their 
drivers are paid a ‘prevailing wage’”; creating a joint powers authority that would 
buy trucks and hire drivers, thus competing with existing for-profit companies; and 
having the ports directly buy trucks and hire drivers, mandating that only city drivers 
would be allowed on port property.781 The commissioners included a specific 
timeline for action because “we didn’t want it to be just a clean air plan that implied 
it was going to be put on a shelf somewhere.”782 Thus, they asked port staff to 
develop “further program details” and an “implementation plan” for review and 
approval “by end of 1st quarter 2007.”783 
On November 20, 2006, after a raucous, four-hour joint session of the harbor 
commissions,784 at which numerous residents and officials (including the mayor) 
testified, both ports approved CAAP by a unanimous vote.785 As if to further 
underline the importance of the trucking piece, the presidents of both ports read a 
statement into the record, which directed their “respective staffs to work 
expeditiously to bring forward a plan” to tackle the “dirty truck problem.”786 The 
“skeletal outline” of this program included “a 5-year, focused effort to replace or 
retrofit the entire fleet of over 16,000 trucks that regularly serve our Ports with 
trucks that at least meet the 2007 control standards and that are driven by people 
who at least earn the prevailing wage.”787 The directive made clear that the ports 
were to restrict noncompliant trucks from entry and that the fees necessary to fund 
the program “would be imposed on ‘shippers,’ and not on the drivers.”788 
Furthermore, the ports were instructed to “invite private enterprise trucking 
companies to hire the drivers on terms that offer the proper incentives and 
conditions to achieve the Clean Air Action Plan goals while resulting in adequately 
paid drivers.”789 The goal of CAAP was to reduce diesel truck emissions by eighty 
percent.790 
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Although the vote was hailed as a serious step toward addressing the “diesel 
death zone,” large questions remained about CAAP’s implementation and funding, 
despite pledges from the ports of $200 million and the SCAQMD of $48 million, 
as well as the passage of state Proposition 1B, which authorized $20 billion in bond 
funding for transportation projects, $1 billion of which was targeted to support air 
clean up.791 The focus on trucks previewed—and was pushed forward by—the 
emergence of a new environmental-labor alliance that saw clean trucks as a way to 
achieve emission reductions, while advancing the Teamsters’ long-standing goal of 
unionizing port truckers. Evidence of this was on display at the final joint port 
meeting on CAAP, where truckers testified and parked outside in solidarity, while 
NRDC lawyer Melissa Lin Perrella made the sustainability argument that would 
define the clean trucks campaign: “The problem is that if you give a poor truck 
driver a clean truck, he needs to be able to afford maintaining it.”792 Reducing 
pollution over the long term would require raising the standards of the truck drivers. 
The campaign for clean trucks was thus born. 
IV. REFORMING THE PORTS: THE CAMPAIGN FOR CLEAN TRUCKS 
A. The Alliance: Forming the Coalition 
1. Personnel 
How CAAP came to focus on clean trucks was in part a story of regulatory 
efficacy. In the complex jurisdictional framework for air regulation, drayage trucks 
that serviced the ports came to be viewed as within port control in a way that ocean 
going vessels and rail trains were not. Yet the move toward clean trucks was also a 
product of political opportunity and interest convergence. Opportunity was built 
upon the ports’ need to develop a sustainable growth plan for the future that 
accounted for environmental concerns. All stakeholders recognized the need for a 
sustainable emission control framework. The question was what it would look like. 
By highlighting the need to clean up 16,000 dirty diesel trucks, CAAP made a 
potential link between environmentalism and unionism—which the labor 
movement was eager to strengthen. Hence, cleaning up trucks was connected to the 
concept of transforming the structure of the drayage truck industry in a way that 
implicated drivers’ employment status. For organized labor, environmentalists 
brought the regulatory leverage and community activists brought the grassroots 
credibility. For environmental and community leaders, labor brought political heft 
and the ability to move local power. 
There were both top-down and bottom-up processes at play. The top-down 
process was driven by Change to Win, which was in the midst of formulating its 
ports strategy, focused on the concession model, at the very moment the CAAP 
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process was moving toward its approval. The intersection between Change to Win’s 
ports campaign and CAAP occurred by design, but the precise timing was 
somewhat fortuitous. The Blue-Green Alliance, a formal collaboration between 
labor and environmental groups, was founded as way to overcome historic 
antagonisms to develop policies that created good jobs and a healthy environment. 
Carl Pope, director of the Sierra Club, announced an initial agreement between the 
Sierra Club and the United Steel Workers union in June 2006.793 He then began 
meeting with other labor leaders to build out the alliance. 
In July, Pope met with top officials at Change to Win to discuss potential 
collaborations. At that time, although Change to Win had begun to move forward 
with its five-port concession strategy, the ports team did not have a strong grasp of 
the local situation in Los Angeles. The Sierra Club, in contrast, had just completed 
a video about the China Shipping case—called “Terminal Impact”794—and, 
through the local chapter, was deeply engaged in ongoing efforts to stem port 
pollution. It was also around this time that news reports indicated that Dubai was 
trying to buy a terminal at the Port of Los Angeles, which raised security 
concerns.795 In discussing Change to Win’s ports campaign, Pope, who was closely 
connected to local Sierra Club activists, mentioned the CAAP process. Change to 
Win’s Nick Weiner, who was at the July meeting, remembered that Pope’s mention 
of Los Angeles, although “just happenstance,” allowed the port’s team to key in on 
Los Angeles as an auspicious site and to “connect the dots” between the concession 
model and the environmental piece.796 As Weiner recalled, “we discovered that, oh 
right, these are old polluting trucks and they contribute to the pollution in L.A. in 
particular. [The Pope meeting] kind of just happened . . . around the same time so 
that we were able to then further develop [the concession] theory.”797 
From there, Weiner and his colleagues were assigned to “figure out L.A.,”798 
a task they undertook with speed and intensity. Weiner and John Canham-Clyne 
immediately reached out to Maria Elena Durazo, head of the powerful Los Angeles 
County Federation of Labor, and Madeline Janis, director of the Los Angeles 
Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), which was known for spearheading 
passage of Los Angeles’s Living Wage Ordinance in 1997.799 LAANE’s mission, 
creating a “new economy that works for everyone,” was advanced by “championing 
the role that local government can play in nudging either individual industries or the 
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broader regional economy.”800 With LAANE’s support, the campaign “took off,”801 
with the goal of passing a concession policy at the ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach. Although Change to Win launched its campaign nationwide, there was 
optimism about Los Angeles because “the politicians and politics lined up . . . [and] 
our ability to build a coalition lined up” because the “infrastructure was already 
there.”802 For Canham-Clyne, the key factors leading to Los Angeles were the 
strength of the local labor movement, which had helped elect Mayor Villaraigosa 
and held him accountable; the “air quality crisis” and the work of environmental 
groups to address it; and the “very specific willingness of [the] drivers to fight.”803 
It was on this basis that Change to Win focused its energy on Los Angeles. 
The first order of business was to mobilize local infrastructure in support of 
the campaign. “Change to Win always felt strongly that . . . to be effective on the 
ground, you needed a lot of people who really knew the landscape.”804 Change to 
Win chose LAANE, known for its sophisticated campaign research and policy 
work, to house staff and be the focal point of the coalition building process. As 
Canham-Clyne recalled, “We did want to make sure that LAANE was 
involved . . . because they had demonstrated experience in bringing together 
community organizations and the labor movement in ways that actually 
functioned.”805 Change to Win thus made an initial funding grant to LAANE in 
order to support campaign hiring and administrative assistance.806 Hiring was 
overseen by Change to Win’s Weiner and Canham-Clyne, who sought to bring in 
personnel with skills necessary to move the port agenda. A key member of this team 
was Jon Zerolnick, who joined LAANE in 2006.807 A Yale undergraduate who 
pursued graduate labor studies at the University of Massachusetts, Zerolnick was a 
researcher with deep experience in corporate campaigns.808 During college, he 
worked in the dining halls as a member of HERE Local 35 (with which he went on 
strike). During graduate school, he interned with HERE Local 11 in Los Angeles. 
When HERE offered to hire him full-time, Zerolnick dropped out of graduate 
school and went to Las Vegas to work on a culinary workers campaign with Local 
226.809 He then served as a researcher on a campaign to organize workers at the 
Venetian hotel. From there, Zerolnick went to Denver to join the AFL-CIO on a 
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multi-union organizing campaign at the Denver International Airport and then 
came to Los Angeles in 2002 to staff the research department of the United 
Farmworkers union.810 When the Change to Win split occurred, he consulted with 
unions for a while until he received a call from Canham-Clyne in 2006, inviting him 
to become part of the ports team at LAANE, to which Zerolnick was already 
attracted because of “the overlap of policy and . . . coalition building and 
organizing.”811 
Zerolnick was soon joined by Patricia Castellanos, who was technically hired 
first after an interview with Canham-Clyne but took some time off and thus started 
just after Zerolnick.812 Castellanos brought a number of key experiences and skills 
as an organizer with the proven “ability to build coalitions.”813 She had roots in the 
South Bay after working there on a number of electoral campaigns in the early 
1990s, including the fight against the anti-immigrant initiative, Proposition 187.814 
She then spent nearly a decade at AGENDA, a South Los Angeles-based 
community organizing group and progressive think tank, where she worked on 
policy and education campaigns with environmental justice groups around the 
country.815 Castellanos also brought connections to the mayor’s office. She had 
campaigned for Villaraigosa in 2005 and joined his staff once he was elected, 
working on goods movement policy under Larry Frank in the Neighborhood 
Services office, where she was “trying to build relationships for the mayor in that 
area.”816 Like Zerolnick, Castellanos was affirmatively recruited. She had “heard 
rumblings” about the ports campaign when Canham-Clyne called to ask if she was 
interested.817 Roxana Tynan from LAANE also reached out to encourage 
Castellanos, who joined the staff in August 2006 and spent the first few months 
applying for foundation grants to staff the project at “a high level.”818 She succeeded 
in securing an initial grant from Hewlett Packard and gradually increased funding to 
support two organizers and three researchers at the height of the campaign.819 
Although they were both housed at LAANE, which was the campaign’s “glue,” 
Castellanos and Zerolnick worked with Weiner and Canham-Clyne in an 
“integrated” relationship in which they considered themselves “all staff together.”820 
From the outset, the campaign’s mission was advancing the concession 
concept designed by Weiner and Canham-Clyne. In its basic form, the concept was 
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companies to effectuate a double conversion: of their fleet to clean trucks and of 
their drivers to employees. The market-based rationale, which formed the legal hook 
upon which the plan rested, was that the double conversion was necessary to 
provide sustainable emission reductions which were, in turn, necessary to ensure 
stable port growth. Employee conversion was key to making the trucking 
companies internalize the long-term costs of clean fleet acquisition and 
maintenance. A short-term subsidy could incentivize the drivers to buy clean trucks. 
But to have those trucks maintained over time required that they be owned by the 
entities best able to bear that cost: the trucking companies themselves. When 
Weiner and Canham-Clyne reached out to LAANE, they had already fully “hatched 
this idea” in D.C.821 Thus, at the point of initial coalition building, Zerolnick and 
Castellanos understood that the plan, though still incomplete, would adopt the 
“essence” of what had been developed by Change to Win, in conversation with 
LAANE and key environmental groups, and that it involved the “port creating a 
direct contractual relationship with trucking companies.”822 
Weiner and Canham-Clyne advanced the concession model against the 
backdrop of careful legal analysis, which had been conducted by the Teamsters’ 
Mike Manley and Andrew Kahn of the Teamsters’ outside law firm Davis, Cowell 
& Bowe in San Francisco. The Teamsters retained Kahn because they needed 
California counsel and because Kahn and Richard McCracken, another partner at 
Davis, Cowell & Bowe, had been involved in the early conversations about port 
organizing—and were among the nation’s leading labor lawyers on strategic 
campaign work. The legal question to Manley and Kahn was: “politically if we could 
pull this off, would it withstand challenge?”823 Their analysis looked at the possibility 
of a lawsuit based on federal preemption and also researched potential actions by 
the Federal Maritime Commission under the Shipping Act. With respect to the 
commission, the lawyers concluded that the employee provision was not 
discriminatory and met the Shipping Act’s reasonableness test.824 On preemption, 
their conclusion was that “we should be okay. A port would have authority, as a 
market participant and as a matter of its proprietary rights, to restrict who could 
come onto its property.”825 The lawyers were sure that the American Trucking 
Associations (ATA) would sue the ports if the Clean Truck Program passed, but 
they believed that the ports would ultimately prevail. With Manley’s analysis of the 
program as a valid exercise of port authority, the campaign was given legal clearance. 
As Weiner recalled, “the attorneys thought we had a pretty good case in the Ninth 
Circuit” and the “likelihood was remote” that the Supreme Court would ultimately 
take the case.826 
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2. Partnerships 
The campaign’s critical first steps involved bringing together a diverse range 
of partner groups with the expertise to shape policy and the power to move political 
decision makers. Key among these groups were labor, environmental and 
environmental justice organizations, public health advocates, and faith-based 
groups. For LAANE, the initial goal was to convince partner organizations that 
addressing environmental and community impacts meant transforming the port 
trucking industry in a way that achieved employee conversion.827 
The campaign was built upon the political power of organized labor and thus 
solidifying local union alliances was a crucial starting point. Getting buy-in from the 
“blue” side of the blue-green alliance was important given historical tension 
between unions and environmentalists, particularly around the port where unions 
like the ILWU and Building and Trades Council viewed environmental roadblocks 
to port expansion as inconsistent with their members’ economic interests. As the 
campaign got underway, LAANE met with local union leaders from ILWU Local 
13 and Teamsters Local 848, both of which had been active on port trucking 
issues.828 Dave Arian from ILWU Local 13 and Miguel Lopez from Teamsters Local 
848 were key leaders, who would come to play important roles in the CAAP 
implementation process. Lopez, as the Teamsters port division representative, was 
deeply involved in efforts to organize port truckers. In 2004, he led a petition to the 
Port of Los Angeles to make shippers and terminal operators pay a fuel surcharge 
to compensate drivers for increased diesel costs.829 The following year, he and 
ILWU Local 13 President Mark Mendoza organized a protest against the new Los 
Angeles and Long Beach PierPass system, which assessed a cargo fee during peak 
hours to permit ports to stay open four nights a week and Saturdays—forcing 
truckers to work extended shifts without more compensation.830 Yet despite this 
collaboration, there were tensions between the ILWU and Teamsters from the 
outset, reflecting longstanding interests. The Teamsters had nothing to lose in the 
campaign and everything to gain. With no port drivers under union contract, the 
Teamsters saw fixing the independent-contractor problem as a solution to one of 
the union’s most intractable organizing dilemmas. For the ILWU, in contrast, the 
campaign posed serious risks to its already strong position at the ports since any 
reduction of port activity meant a potential threat to its membership. In line with 
 
827. See, e.g., Colleen Callahan, Clean Trucks Program Case Study (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
828. See Press Release, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Teamsters and ILWU Announce Port 
Legislation Strategy (Feb. 4, 2002), available at http://teamster.org/content/teamsters-and-ilwu 
-announce-port-legislation-strategy (noting that the unions were joining to support state bills to force 
terminal operators to pay fines for making truckers idle while waiting for cargo and to require trucks to 
be safety certified). 
829. See Teamsters Deny Any Role in Planning Work Shutdown for L.A. Port Drivers, AM. SHIPPER, 
Apr. 28, 2004, available at http://www.labornet.org/news/0504/lateamst.htm. 
830. See Scott Martindale, Port Truckers Rally Against Off-Hours Plan, DAILY BREEZE, July 25, 
2005, available at http://teamster.org/content/daily-breeze-port-truckers-rally-against-hours-plan. 
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these divergent positions, the Teamsters locals (848 in Long Beach and 63 in East 
Los Angeles) signed on to the campaign—with Miguel Lopez eventually joining the 
campaign’s steering committee—while the ILWU declined. 
To gain traction with the ports, the coalition had to send a “strong 
message . . . that you can’t expand unless you are going to clean up your 
pollution.”831 The environmentalists brought the “legal muscle” to make good on 
this threat and thus were crucial allies in the overall plan.832 Castellanos was the 
point person for outreach and took the first steps toward building and deepening 
relations with environmental partners. Some of this groundwork had already been 
laid by LAANE’s participation in an earlier campaign to negotiate a community 
benefits agreement with LAX, in which LAANE worked with environmental 
advocates—particularly Jerilyn López Mendoza of Environmental Defense—in 
crafting a half-billion dollar community benefits package that supported noise 
mitigation, school upgrades, and job programs for communities adjacent to the 
airport. As a result of that campaign, Castellanos recalled that “there was some 
foundation for our relationship with our environmental partners already 
established . . . [that we were able to] then use as a building block and go deeper.”833 
Doing so meant linking into preexisting port advocacy networks and 
capitalizing on areas of interest convergence. NRDC, which played a crucial role 
shaping port development since the China Shipping case, was an essential partner—
already sharing some common political and legal ground with organized labor. 
Earlier blue-green collaborations built trust: NRDC was involved in the LAX 
community benefits campaign, and had worked with the Teamsters on previous 
litigation to ban Mexican trucks from entering the United States.834 There were also 
overlapping legal interests at stake. As the clean trucks campaign was taking shape, 
NRDC was simultaneously advancing a theory of market participation that 
supported labor’s vision for the port concession model. In Engine Manufacturing 
Association v. SCAQMD, NRDC argued that the SCAQMD should be permitted to 
develop its own emission rules governing commercial fleet vehicles despite Clean 
Air Act preemption—“seriously pushing the courts” to recognize “local jurisdiction 
through the market participant exception.”835 In 2005, a district court recognized 
the exception under the Clean Air Act and that decision was affirmed by the Ninth 
Circuit two years later836—at the height of the clean trucks campaign. 
It was against this backdrop that Castellanos initially reached out to Adrian 
Martinez, a staff attorney at NRDC, who had a deep background in environmental 
 
831. Telephone Interview with Adrian Martinez, supra note 692. 
832. Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, Staff Att’y, Natural Res. Def. Council (Apr. 
2, 2010). 
833. Interview with Patricia Castellanos, supra note 806. 
834. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004) (holding that neither NEPA 
nor Clean Air Act requires the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to evaluate environmental 
impact of cross-border trucking). 
835. Telephone Interview with Adrian Martinez, supra note 692. 
836. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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justice issues.837 Martinez studied environmental science in college and received a 
full-tuition public interest law scholarship to attend the University of Colorado Law 
School, where he went to pursue environmental law.838 A second-year internship at 
NRDC turned into a postgraduate fellowship; when Gail Feuer left to become a 
superior court judge, Martinez took over her position in NRDC’s clean air unit. 
Soon thereafter, he switched over to environmental justice, which was his 
passion.839 With experience on port trucking gained from his participation on 
Hahn’s No Net Increase Taskforce, Martinez became the primary NRDC staff 
member on the coalition, charged with thinking about “how legally they could create 
a more accountable system.”840 
Martinez was joined by David Pettit, a former legal aid lawyer who came to 
NRDC in 2007 after a stint as a partner in a boutique litigation firm in Los Angeles. 
Pettit “came into [the job] thinking, in environmental justice terms, that an alliance 
of labor and environment, should it happen, would be extremely powerful.”841 
Pettit’s first meeting as an NRDC attorney was about CAAP. From there, he was 
“able to figure out fairly quickly that the interests all pointed in the same direction,” 
which meant “shifting the costs and the economic burden of cleaning the trucks 
from the drivers to . . . the trucking companies.”842 
Melissa Lin Perrella was another NRDC lawyer involved in the ports 
campaign. An ethnic studies and social welfare major in college interested in the 
intersection of “public health, civil rights, and low-income issues,” Perrella had gone 
to Georgetown Law School with a desire to pursue a public interest career, initially 
taking a job as an associate with a big law firm, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe.843 
She was there for five years before applying to work on environmental justice issues 
at NRDC, where she started in 2004.844 
For the NRDC team, joining the coalition was a chance to build “effective 
power” to protect the community from harmful pollution.845 The alliance with 
organized labor helped them better understand how “the economics of the port 
drayage system . . . impact the environmental conditions.”846 Although NRDC 
lawyers felt “strongly that the economics of the system need to be changed” they 
“didn’t take a position on whether or not drivers should be unionized.”847 Martinez 
became a member of the campaign steering committee, where his role was to put 
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841. Telephone Interview with David Pettit, Senior Att’y, Urban Program, Natural Res. Def. 
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843. Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 832. 
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the legal issues “on the table” so that coalition members could understand the “legal 
constraints” before evaluating the policy issues.848 In participating in the coalition, 
NRDC lawyers represented NRDC’s own members, not the coalition, although 
Martinez would address legal issues that would “pop up.”849 In developing policy, 
NRDC lawyers would analyze issues from two perspectives: “[T]rying to do what’s 
best for the environment [and] broader coalition, but [also] mindful of: if this ends 
up in the courtroom, how is this policy going to play out before a judge?”850 
Generally, other coalition groups did not have separate legal counsel and would rely 
on NRDC to help them understand the legal stakes.851 
To expand the coalition, LAANE also built relations with other environmental 
and environmental justice groups that had begun moving toward similar strategies 
to reduce port emissions. The idea of using port concessions to reshape trucking 
was also percolating up from below. Convergence between labor and 
environmentalists occurred through the portal of CAAP, which provided the 
“perfect opening” for the concession plan.852 Thus, in Weiner’s terms, the creation 
of the Clean Truck Program occurred as strains of activism that had been running 
in parallel began to intersect. 
[O]n the ground in the environmental movement and . . . separately with 
the Teamsters there was this clean truck concept . . . . Everyone was kind 
of spinning around. We came up with a policy proposal that would unite 
the workers and the enviros. But there were folks on the ground who 
conceptually or intuitively were going there anyway . . . people had been 
close to that idea, but hadn’t quite nailed it . . . . [T]here was a lot of work 
to do and a lot of meetings . . . for people to sort of get it. What’s the 
concept? How do we put meat on the bones? How do we get it 
implemented? That all had to be sort of worked through.853 
To do that, Weiner and Canham-Clyne “had a bunch of meetings with people and 
got to know them, and build trust with them, and got them connected with the 
drivers and the organizers.”854 In connecting with environmental and community 
groups, Change to Win leaders sought to “deepen the community’s understanding 
of the economics by bringing the drivers into the conversation.”855 
Connections to environmental partners were built through different networks 
and sought to be attentive to the tensions between mainstream environmentalism 
and the environmental justice movement. Environmental activism around the port 
 
848. Telephone Interview with Adrian Martinez, supra note 692. 
849. Id. 
850. Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 832. 
851. See Telephone Interview with Elina Green-Nasser, Adm’r, UCLA Sch. of Pub. Health & 
Former Project Manager, Long Beach Alliance for Children with Asthma (Apr. 23, 2013) (Green 
changed her name to Green-Nasser after the campaign); Telephone Interview with Angelo Logan, supra 
note 414. 
852. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 807. 
853. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 480. 
854. Telephone Interview with John Canham-Clyne, supra note 479. 
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itself had multiple sources. Tom Politeo, a computer programmer and software 
developer who was born and raised in San Pedro, was involved in early 
environmental activism in the harbor area.856 Like Jesse Marquez, founder of the 
Coalition for a Safe Environment in Wilmington, Politeo ran high school track and 
became sensitive to the impact of air quality on his athletic activity; also like 
Marquez, he was moved to activism after two explosions in the 1970s revealed the 
dangers of chemical and oil storage around the ports.857 In the face of projected 
port growth, Politeo and other San Pedro residents, including homeowner activist 
Noel Park, began regularly attending harbor commission meetings in the 1980s. 
After the MATES II study was released, residents discussed strategies to reduce air 
pollution. 
Through their own analysis, the San Pedro activists also arrived at a concession 
model as a way to force trucking companies to have “consideration for the 
community where they are working.”858 In early 2000, Park presented the 
concession model to the harbor commission based on what the city, led by Council 
Member Cindy Miscikowski, had done at LAX to force concessionaires to meet 
codes of conduct.859 Politeo, a Sierra Club member along with Park, argued that 
truckers “should be paid by the clock and not by the can.”860 Thus, the concept of 
a concession model to address port trucking pollution was born of “multiple 
inventors.”861 As Politeo recalled: 
[T]hese trucks were starting to queue up in fairly long lines. The trucks 
would sit there in idle. All the time they’re idling, they’re inching forward, 
and they’re polluting. And they’re noisy. The truckers can choose to come 
to the Port anytime they want. But, if they want to move containers, they 
have to come when the containers are available to be moved. They end up 
lining up in these long lines, and sitting around for hours sometimes, three 
hours, four hours, before they get a can to move. They move the cans and 
they may end up moving the cans during rush hour. We’re looking at this, 
thinking in terms of the way their sources are being managed. The trucking 
companies and the shippers who control the terminals don’t see any of the 
costs associated with the truckers waiting in long lines. They don’t pay for 
the extra fuel because the truckers pay for that. They don’t pay them for 
sitting around for three hours because it’s the truckers’ time. We looked at 
this, and said, “This is an environment in which the people who have the 
decision making power don’t feel the effect of whether the decisions are 
smart or not.”862 
In 2001, Politeo, Park, and a handful of other members of the Los Angeles-
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Orange County chapter of the Sierra Club formed the Harbor Vision Task Force as 
a formal standing committee within the Sierra Club focused on the environmental 
impact of goods movement and how to grow the port “green.”863 The task force 
held its first meetings at the Long Beach Yacht Club (where one member happened 
to dock his yacht) and then moved to the San Pedro Public Library. The group was 
small but active, with a decidedly prolabor bent. There were “a couple of 
longshoremen” and two former Teamsters: Sharon Cotrell from Long Beach and 
Dr. John Miller, who had put himself through college in Tennessee by working on 
a truck loading dock.864 In 2002, Cotrell arranged a meeting with Gary Smith, head 
of the Teamsters local who was working on Long Beach port issues; the groups 
collaborated to help gain passage of Lowenthal’s anti-idling bill, which had little 
effect, but cemented a working partnership. The Sierra Club did not get involved in 
the China Shipping suit, because it “didn’t have the resources to make that happen,” 
and as a matter of triage decided “NRDC is doing that.”865 Organizationally, the 
Sierra Club did not support Hahn’s no-net-increase initiative, which Politeo 
believed was insufficient, although Park was active on that task force.866 
After Villaraigosa’s election, his administration brought together stakeholders 
under the auspices of Green LA (funded by the Liberty Hill Foundation),867 which 
formed a Port Working Group with Politeo, Andrea Hricko from USC’s Keck 
School of Medicine, Candice Kim from the Coalition for Clean Air, and other 
environmental representatives.868 Politeo suggested reaching out to labor, a move 
that resulted in a series of “brainstorming” meetings in Wilmington attended by 
Miguel Lopez from the Teamsters local, and representatives from the ILWU and 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.869 
Environmental justice and public health advocates also became networked 
through these processes. Angelo Logan of East Yard Communities for 
Environmental Justice was a member of the Port Working Group, as was Jesse 
Marquez.870 Marquez recalled how he was part of the initial Harbor Vision Task 
Force convened by the Sierra Club in 2001.871 In 2003, Marquez formed the Impact 
Project, along with Hricko, and produced a series of policy briefs on trade and 
transportation.872 During this period, he also began to meet with Latino truckers 






867. Telephone Interview with Candice Kim, Senior Campaign Assoc., Coal. for Clean Air 
(Apr. 26, 2013) 
868. Telephone Interview with Tom Politeo, supra note 856. The group was coordinated by 
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with the unions,” but were worried about port security projects implemented in the 
wake of 9/11.873 
Colleen Callahan, manager of air quality policy for the American Lung 
Association of California, also became involved in the Port Working Group.874 
Callahan was an urban and environmental policy major at Occidental College, where 
she studied under prominent progressive faculty Peter Dreier and Robert 
Gottlieb.875 After a stint at the Center for Food and Justice, in 2006 she joined the 
American Lung Association, where her charge was getting it “more involve[d] in 
the environmental health advocacy work locally.”876 As a member of the Green LA 
Port Working Group, Callahan linked up with other environmental activists and 
then with LAANE staff.877 Elina Green, who was project manager at the Long 
Beach Alliance for Children with Asthma (LBACA), recalled meeting Teamsters 
leader Miguel Lopez and LAANE’s Patricia Castellanos through advocacy on 
environmental mitigation in relation to a proposed intermodal rail yard for BNSF 
in West Long Beach called the Southern California International Gateway.878 
Community groups, including LBACA, contested the EIR in that project beginning 
in 2006, and through that process forged crucial alliances with organized labor. 
From Green’s point of view, the rail yard fight 
was actually how the Teamsters sort of started to see the community side 
of things and they recognized that, well, if they supported us in our ask for 
that rail yard, then there would be potential for support in their campaign 
and we started to see the issues from each other’s side.879 
For Green, the power of the coalition derived from this assemblage of “crazy-
strange bedfellows.”880 
The connection between environmental and community groups, LAANE, and 
Change to Win occurred through these formal networks and outside of them. 
Politeo of the Sierra Club recalled being contacted by Weiner in 2006 asking for 
support in developing a concession plan. “I remember my thought was ‘Holy shit! 
They want to do our work for us.’ I’m delighted. I sent a slightly less effusive 
message back, saying that ‘Yes, we’re interested in these things and even more.’”881 
 
873. Id. Security concerns were fueled by news of foreign entrants into the terminal operations 
markets. In the winter of 2006, the company Dubai Ports World publicized its plan to purchase twenty-
two U.S. port terminals. Although its plan did not include Los Angeles and Long Beach, it raised security 
concerns about the regulation of immigrant drivers—concerns that organizers tried to use to promote 
employee conversion. See Judith Lewis, A Heavy Load, L.A. WEEKLY, July 25, 2007, available at 
http://www.laweekly.com/2007-07-26/news/a-heavy-load/. 
874. Telephone Interview with Colleen Callahan, Deputy Dir., UCLA Luskin Ctr. for 
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Politeo began meeting with Change to Win and LAANE staff. The opportunity, as 
he saw it, was to leverage the staff and political power that was lacking before. “So, 
here we’ve got Change to Win, the Teamsters, and LAANE, all interested in this. 
Okay, I’m not going to skip on this.”882 Politeo recalls that his meetings with 
LAANE, Change to Win, and the Teamsters flowed seamlessly out of the Port 
Working Group. “[I]t’s almost as if Nick Weiner walked into the room and said at 
one of our other meetings, ‘I’m taking over. It’s my show now.’ Over some short 
period of time, those who acceded to that remained, and the rest left.”883 In short 
order, ILWU “sort of disappeared.”884 And other groups began to join, including 
Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice (CLUE), an interdenominational 
faith-based group closely aligned with LAANE, which organized clergy in Long 
Beach, making arguments for reform that sounded in terms of justice and 
morality.885 In addition, the coalition added immigrant rights groups, the Coalition 
for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles and Hermandad Mexicana,886 as well 
as the San Pedro-based Harbor-Watts Economic Development Corporation, a 
community-based group created in 1997 that focused on neighborhood capacity 
building and economic revitalization. 
In assembling this coalition, LAANE staff did the bulk of the outreach work. 
Because of her prior environmental justice organizing and South Bay campaign 
work, Castellanos was particularly sensitive to being inclusive: “I . . . did not want 
to be caught in the scenario where we were just working with the NRDCs and 
[Coalition for Clean Airs] of the world and not giving equal footing to like the East 
Yard Communities for Environmental Justice.”887 During July and August 2006, 
she and Zerolnick conducted a first round of meetings with a number of groups, 
including East Yard, the Coalition for a Safe Environment, and LBACA, in which 
they asked the groups to “download” what they knew about trucks and provide 
input on the potential campaign.888 “[W]e didn’t come into this campaign thinking 
there is nothing happening out there . . . . And so it was an opportunity for us to 
learn.”889 LAANE had already been in contact with some of the groups in 
connection with the CAAP process; others they met with for the first time.890 It was 
during the second round of meetings that LAANE staff sought to enlist groups to 
join the campaign. During these meetings, LAANE focused on presenting the main 
conceptual analysis, emphasizing that “the employment status of the drivers had to 
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companies in order to create “accountability in the system.”891 According to 
Zerolnick, the frame was less “Are you with us?” and more “Here’s our analysis. 
Does this make sense?”892 
The general approach to coalition building was to emphasize the opportunity 
to create a “potential solution” that would be in the “mutual interest” of labor, 
community, and environmental groups—creating a platform for long-term benefits 
and progressive policy change.893 At outreach meetings, some groups wanted to 
discuss policy details, while others focused on the working relationship with 
organized labor.894 There was “some trepidation” among the environmental justice 
groups about working with a “humongous labor union.”895 Castellanos shared those 
concerns and promised to “figure it out together.”896 Although the meetings 
produced active engagement, Castellanos did not “remember much resistance.”897 
Organizations went through different processes to consider whether to join 
the coalition. LAANE’s Castellanos and Zerolnick reached out to the American 
Lung Association’s Callahan to ask if the American Lung Association would join 
the emerging coalition.898 Callahan recalled having to raise the issue up to “some 
pretty high channels” within the national organization to get approval to join since 
there “were some concerns about whether it was necessary to support the 
concessionary model or whether just pushing for the most current EPA 
standards . . . was sufficient.”899 LBACA, itself a coalition of local residents and 
health organizations, had to get approval from the entire membership.900 East 
Yard’s Logan was one coalition member who was excited about the partnership but 
wanted details about how it was going to work. He recalled sitting on the CAAP 
stakeholder group when he was contacted by LAANE after “we had been trying to 
reach out to labor without success.”901 Although enthusiastic about the partnership, 
“our group’s questions were: How’s this all going to work out? What are the power 
dynamics? What is the decision making structure? . . . [W]e wanted . . . a governance 
structure that was really democratic.”902 
The mission statement for what would become the Coalition for Clean and 
Safe Ports sought to meet this democratic demand, while emphasizing the main 
goals of the campaign: 
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  Our objective is to improve the condition of the trucking industry and 
of truck drivers operating at the San Pedro Bay Ports and along associated 
goods movement corridors. We are guided by the need to reduce 
associated health impacts on workers and local communities by resolving 
shortcomings associated with current port trucking practices. In doing so, 
we will address port trucking’s many challenges that face industry, 
community, government, labor and the environment. 
  To accomplish our objective, we will foster an appropriate role for 
trucking as part of goods movement planning and solutions. We will ensure 
trucks run cleanly, quietly, safely and efficiently with a stable, employee 
workforce that pays livable wages and offers drivers all the rights and 
benefits of an employee. We will make sure improvements adopted in the 
San Pedro Bay area help create systemic solutions that improve conditions 
overall and don’t simply transfer problems to other areas, such as adjacent 
communities, our inland ports or other stops along the goods movement 
chain. 
  We will act on a timely basis as part of a democratic, broad-based 
coalition to promote public awareness of trucking problems and solutions 
and we will seek to influence policy makers to put decisive solutions into 
effect as rapidly as possible.903 
3. Policy 
The intense period of initial organizing saw the first instance of organizational 
coordination between members of the fledging coalition: the filing of written 
comments on the first public draft of CAAP. Released in July 2006, CAAP required 
its own EIR and thus both NRDC and LAANE filed comments.904 Although the 
CAAP draft identified clean trucks as an issue, it did not make the connection to 
employment status, providing the coalition with an opening. Zerolnick remembered 
the CAAP provisions on trucking to read like: 
“We’re not really sure how to do it. We’ll come back to this.” So we 
submitted public comment and said, “Well, actually we have some ideas 
for how to do this . . . . [A]nd the basic structural problems are 
independent-contractor status and the lack of a relationship between the 
port and this sector of the industry.”905 
Zerolnick drafted a comment letter and circulated it to all partners, who made 
editorial suggestions.906 He also worked closely with Manley and lawyers at NRDC, 
particularly Adrian Martinez, as he fine-tuned the proposal.907 The input was 
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focused on sharpening the link between industry accountability, employee status, 
and emission reduction. In Martinez’s terms, the focus was on remedying 
the Wild, Wild West situation where there really weren’t effective standards 
and there was no accountability . . . . [Workers] weren’t getting paid much, 
they were on the hook for all the insurance and the costs of the equipment, 
so it was this natural marriage that if you’re going to fix the problem, you 
need to fix the systemic problem which is the lack of accountability from 
these trucking companies.908 
The final letter seamlessly integrated these arguments, referencing the research 
that Change to Win had done as a basis to propose a Clean Truck Program built on 
the concession approach.909 The letter, sent to the directors of both ports, was 
submitted on behalf of LAANE and its “coalition partners.”910 The comments were 
conceptual, focusing on the “real market forces operating on the Port truckers,” as 
well as “the significant and persistent structural problems in the industry.”911 The 
bulk of the comments were devoted to detailing the economics of the drayage 
market and its dysfunctions, while explicating the concession model of transforming 
the industry. The letter emphasized the twofold problem of independent-contractor 
drivers and lack of port control over trucking companies.912 It then proposed a 
“long-term solution” under which the ports would “jointly enter into a direct 
contractual relationship with responsible motor carriers to provide drayage services 
at both Ports, utilizing the same model employed by airports to provide food and 
other services to air travelers.”913 The comments contemplated a request for 
proposal process awarding port entry only to trucking companies that met 
clear standards concerning capitalization requirements, revenues paid to 
the Ports, environmental standards for trucking equipment operating at the 
Ports, other environmental mitigation measures and benchmarks, 
employee status for drivers, employment preferences for the current 
workforce of owner-operators, and labor peace requirements to ensure 
that revenue streams to the Ports are uninterrupted.914 
Under this plan, the letter emphasized that the benefits would be clean trucks 
maintained over the long term, achieving emission reductions while also promoting 
security and greater accountability.915 The letter was short on specific policy 
proposals, but long on analysis and prescription, powerfully laying out the essence 
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of what would become the Clean Truck Program. Although the details were still 
unclear, the key move was linking clean trucks to employment status through a 
direct contract between the ports and the trucking companies.916 CAAP thus 
provided the critical opportunity to unite disparate labor, environmental, and 
community interests around a coherent policy program to attack diesel truck 
emissions. 
The last step was to officially convene the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports. 
The launch was timed to happen right before the joint ports CAAP review meeting 
on November 20, 2006; in order to maximize publicity, the coalition staged a major 
press conference.917 The coalition’s first order of business was to mobilize for the 
November 20 meeting, which it did by organizing a “massive community driver 
turnout,” which helped shape the electric environment leading to CAAP 
approval.918 
Although the coalition grew over the two-year fight for the program,919 its 
initial composition reflected wide support that underscored the success of 
LAANE’s outreach.920 In the end, the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports was broad 
and deep: “We had community, we had faith-based groups, we had the 
environmental justice community, we had the environmental community, we had 
economic development groups . . . . We had lawyers, we had scientists involved, we 
had economic experts, we had people on the ground.”921 
In keeping with its commitment to inclusivity and democracy, while also 
acknowledging the need for clear and efficient decision making, the coalition 
structured a tripartite governance system. Policy decisions were ultimately to be 
decided by a supermajority vote of the coalition members.922 To facilitate 
operations, members agreed to create a steering committee composed of a smaller 
group of representatives from key organizational partners: three labor, two 
environmental, two community, two immigrant/legal, and one to two research
/academic.923 This committee—which “played to the coalition’s strengths” by 
giving voice to the diverse groups involved924—was charged with agenda setting, 
providing strategic recommendations, and making day-to-day and urgent 
 
916. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 807. 
917. Interview with Patricia Castellanos, supra note 806; Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra 
note 807. 
918. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 807. 
919. Interview with Patricia Castellanos, supra note 806 (noting that End Oil joined the coalition 
after the initial launch). 
920. There were approximately thirty initial members in the coalition, which grew to around 
forty members. See id. 
921. Telephone Interview with Adrian Martinez, supra note 837. 
922. Coal. for Clean & Safe Ports, Structure & Decision-Making (unpublished document) (on 
file with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
923. Id. The first steering committee, not yet at full strength, included Adrian Martinez of 
NRDC, Elina Green of LBACA, Louis Diaz from Teamsters Local 848, Nativo Lopez from 
Hermandad Mexicana, Rafael Pizarro of Coalition for Clean Air, a representative from Teamsters Local 
63, and Tom Politeo from the Sierra Club. 
924. Interview with Patricia Castellanos, supra note 806. 
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decisions.925 The steering committee was created in recognition of the fact that the 
groups were part of a “live campaign” that required some quick decisions, but also 
was designed to vet policy and strategy ideas in order to make recommendations for 
full coalition approval.926 As necessary, the coalition also agreed to set up working 
subcommittees to deal with various policy issues and give recommendations to the 
full coalition. These subcommittees were established to develop coalition policy 
with respect to specific community, environmental, and labor issues. LAANE 
staffed the subcommittees, but did not formally sit on them. Thus structured, the 
coalition was ready to take action. 
B. The Affirmative Phase: Mobilizing Local Law 
1. The Outside Game: Developing the Program, Exerting Pressure 
With the coalition in place, LAANE’s effort shifted to rolling out the 
campaign to pass what would become the Clean Truck Program. The basic 
approach was twofold. First, the coalition would meet during an intense period to 
hammer out the details of the program—converting the model taken from Change 
to Win into a workable policy. Second, the coalition would engage decision makers 
and stakeholders to build support for the program. These elements—a clear policy 
draft and outside pressure—would then be used to move the policy through internal 
city and port channels. 
At the outset of the campaign, both the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports 
were still aligned in the process, reflecting the ongoing energy around implementing 
CAAP. In early 2007, the ports established a stakeholder group comprised of 
representatives from the ports, air agencies, industry, environmental and labor 
groups, and academia.927 Several coalition members participated, including Angelo 
Logan from East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice, Melissa Lin Perrella 
from NRDC, Jesse Marquez from Coalition for a Safe Environment, Elina Green 
from LBACA, Candice Kim from the Coalition for Clean Air, Miguel Lopez from 
the Teamsters, and Patricia Castellanos from LAANE.928 The stakeholder group 
was created to provide input into the ports’ larger process of CAAP 
implementation, which included the development of a detailed Clean Truck 
Program.929 
 
925. Steering committee decisions were by consensus; if no consensus could be achieved, 
decisions went to the full coalition. See Coal. for Clean & Safe Ports, Structure & Decision-Making, 
supra note 922. 
926. Interview with Patricia Castellanos, supra note 806. 
927. Port of Long Beach & Port of L.A., San Pedro Bay Ports Clean Air Action Plan 
Implementation Stakeholder Meeting [hereinafter San Pedro Bay Ports Clean Air Action Plan 
Implementation Stakeholder Meeting] (Powerpoint presentation) (on file with the UC Irvine Law 
Review). 
928. See Port of L.A. & Port of Long Beach, San Pedro Bay Ports Clean Air Action Plan, CAAP 
Stakeholder Group Members (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
929. See San Pedro Bay Ports Clean Air Action Plan Implementation Stakeholder Meeting, supra 
note 927. 
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To inform that process—and ultimately shape what the final program would 
look like—the coalition moved quickly to build out the policy. Following on the 
heels of CAAP approval, which established the general framework for port truck 
regulation, “things really kicked into high gear.”930 In late 2006, the coalition set to 
work on filling in program details in order to shape the final rules. At the outset, 
the coalition had its basic “yardstick”: that any Clean Truck Program had to be 
“accountable, sustainable, and comprehensive,” which meant that it would rest 
upon fleet and employee conversion—thus avoiding a short-term solution 
converting the fleet to clean trucks through a one-time public subsidy that left the 
trucking companies without responsibility for long-term maintenance.931 The 
question for the coalition members was “what are the standards going to be?”932 
To answer this question, the coalition engaged in external and internal 
discussions. Externally, LAANE and Change to Win organizers met with port staff 
and key elected officials to present the general framework provided by Change to 
Win. From there, Zerolnick—working closely with the Teamsters’ Manley and 
NRDC’s Martinez—began to draft the policy. This was an iterative process that 
connected to the coalition’s internal discussions. Within the coalition, members 
broke into subcommittees charged with developing standards around labor, 
environmental, and community issues.933 To advance this process, the coalition 
initiated monthly standing meetings, with individual subcommittees engaged in 
intensive policy discussions that continued during the interim periods.934 
Community partners responded to specific requests for evaluating provisions and 
came up with some of their own. For example, residents working with coalition 
member East Yard proposed to make trucking companies park trucks off 
neighborhood streets and adhere to specified truck routes that would minimize 
community disruption.935 Once vetted at the subcommittee level, provisions were 
passed onto the steering committee for incorporation into the working draft and 
then presented to the entire coalition for general approval. Although full coalition 
approval was technically by supermajority vote, Zerolnick recalled that decisions 
were all made by consensus.936 As the draft details evolved, LAANE and Change to 
Win organizers would meet again with city and port officials, getting their feedback 
and buy-in.937 
What emerged from this process was a document that the coalition called a 
Request for Proposal (RFP) designed as a vehicle for implementing the concession 
 
930. Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 832. 




935. Telephone Interview with Angelo Logan, supra note 414. 
936. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 807. 
937. Interview with Patricia Castellanos, supra note 806. 
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model. The RFP was essentially a scoring system to rate potential concessionaires.938 
Scores were based on responses to application questions designed to ensure that 
trucking companies met criteria necessary to effectuate the Clean Truck Program.939 
The RFP model was chosen because the coalition assumed that for ease of 
administration the ports would limit entry to a handful of trucking concessionaires 
and the RFP provided a standard system to allow the ports to rank applicants.940 
The RFP document was primarily drafted by Zerolnick, shaped by extensive 
discussions among coalition members, and contained items the coalition viewed as 
“a bottom line”—phasing out old trucks and employee conversion—and others 
that were on a “wish list.”941 
The RFP’s main purpose was to ensure “that the most responsible entities 
operate at the Port.”942 Toward that end, the RFP designated responsible business, 
security, environmental, labor, community, and efficiency standards, though the 
overall plan hinged on converting old dirty trucks to new clean ones, while also 
converting the drivers to employees. The standards were to be implemented 
through the ports’ contract power: “[s]uccessful applicants will enter into a contract 
with the Port mandating a turnover of the entire truck fleet over five years.”943 
Applicants were also required to “use only employee drivers (as opposed to 
independent contractors) to provide drayage services.”944 The RFP was structured 
so as to assign a baseline qualification to applicants meeting minimum criteria, while 
then giving extra points to applicants that could demonstrate good business 
practices and community relations—which were the “wish list” items.945 The 
minimum standards were framed to advance core elements of the Clean Truck 
Program. Applicants were asked: “Does the Applicant utilize only employee drivers 
to perform drayage services?” and were informed that they “must comply with the 
requirements of the Clear Bay Clean Air Action Plan (CAAP) regarding the 
reduction of pollution from diesel trucks.”946 Applicants also had to “provide an 
assurance of labor peace”947—an agreement that they would not disrupt 
unionization efforts in exchange for a commitment on the part of employees not to 
strike. The time frame for employee conversion was not specified, though 
applicants were told that they had five years to convert their entire fleets to EPA 
2007 standards (by purchasing new trucks or through retrofit) with a minimum of 
 
938. Coal. for Clean & Safe Ports, Request for Proposals: Port Drayage Service Contract, 
Executive Summary 5 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished document) (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
939. Id. at 5–6. 
940. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 807. 
941. Id. 
942. Coal. for Clean & Safe Ports, Request for Proposals, supra note 938, at 2. 
943. Id. at 3. 
944. Id. 
945. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 807. 
946. Coal. for Clean & Safe Ports, Request for Proposals, supra note 938, at 10–11. 
947. Id. at 4. 
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one-fifth of the fleet converted each year.948 Applicants were also asked “to make 
arrangements to provide off-street parking” for out-of-service trucks and to “work 
with the Port . . . to develop a plan to minimize the impact of HDVs on port-
adjacent communities.”949 Concession fees were to be set at an initial level of $5000 
per truck in addition to a ten percent monthly revenue fee.950 In April 2007, the 
RFP was submitted to both harbor commissions, which said that they would take it 
“under advisement.”951 Although it was not meant to be public, the RFP was leaked 
to the press. 
On April 12, 2007, the ports jointly issued their own Proposed Clean Trucks 
Program, which gave the coalition most of what it wanted—adopting the 
concession model as its cornerstone—though in a very different format.952 In what 
NRDC’s Perrella called “a huge, huge step forward in our quest for clean air,”953 
the ports agreed to use their “tariff authority”—their power to pass port rules, called 
“tariffs”—to “only allow concessionaries operating ‘clean’ trucks to enter port 
terminals without having to pay a new Truck Impact Fee at the gate.”954 For the 
purposes of the program, a clean truck had to meet the so-called “CAAP standard,” 
which meant EPA 2007 compliant new trucks, retrofitted trucks for those model 
year 1994 and newer, and trucks replaced through the Gateway Cities program 
created under the China Shipping settlement.955 Older trucks would be progressively 
banned (with a 2012 target date), though could continue to enter if their 
companies—referred to as Licensed Motor Carriers, or LMCs—paid a Truck 
Impact Fee of thirty-four to fifty-four dollars per container.956 Proceeds from that 
fee and a twenty-six dollar cargo fee, along with other sources of public funding, 
would be used to subsidize truck replacement and retrofit. Concessionaires would 
also have to commit to “require employee drivers (after a transition period),”957 with 
the goal of achieving full employee conversion by January 1, 2012.958 Following the 
coalition model, the ports proposed to confer concessions after an RFP process in 
 
948. Id. at 3. The RFP also stated that twenty-five percent of the converted fleet must be natural 
gas trucks. 
949. Id. at 12–13. 
950. Id. at 4. 
951. Telephone Interview with Jon Zerolnick, Dir. of Clean & Safe Ports Project, L.A. Alliance 
for a New Economy (Feb. 20, 2013). 
952. Janet Wilson & Ronald D. White, 2 Ports Aim to Slash Diesel Exhaust, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
2007, at B1. 
953. Id. 
954. PORT OF LONG BEACH & PORT OF L.A., PORTS OF LONG BEACH AND LOS ANGELES 
PROPOSED CLEAN TRUCKS PROGRAM 1 (2007) (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
955. Id. at 1–2. 
956. Id. at 2. 
957. PORT OF LONG BEACH & PORT OF L.A., PROPOSED CLEAN TRUCKS PROGRAM FACT 
SHEET (2007) (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
958. PORT OF LONG BEACH & PORT OF L.A., supra note 954, at 8. 
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which “applicants w[ould] be evaluated for financial strength and asset control.”959 
The ports’ proposed plan did not go as far as the coalition’s in limiting entry to 
those companies that best met business practice standards. Nonetheless, from the 
coalition’s perspective, “it really did contain most of what we wanted.”960 Industry 
representatives viewed it through the opposite lens and immediately asserted the 
threat of litigation. As Curtis Whelan, executive director of the Intermodal Carriers 
Conference of the ATA, put it: “We are looking at it now from our lawyers’ point 
of view to see what we might do. I think we might challenge that. . . . By definition, 
these containers represent interstate commerce. It would impact interstate 
commerce in a dramatic way. Can a port authority do that?”961 
The coalition believed that the answer was “yes” and seized the opportunity 
to push forward. In response to the ports’ proposal, Zerolnick (again with input 
from lawyers Manley and Martinez) drafted another comment letter—this time 
submitted under the formal auspices of the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports.962 
Unlike the first letter, which was conceptual, this one was “more concrete,” 
addressing specific policy details.963 The letter, while commending the ports for 
their “leadership” and “hard work,” sought to offer areas for the plan’s 
improvement.964 Although it addressed a variety of technical details, it emphasized 
the employee component, which was not explicated in detail in the ports’ draft. 
Specifically, it argued that—unlike the conversion to clean trucks—there should be 
no transition period for the conversion to employee drivers.965 To do otherwise, the 
letter suggested, would create potential unfairness for companies that complied 
earlier and would impose insurmountable administrative problems.966 
It was the spring of 2007 and negotiations over the terms of the Clean Truck 
Program had begun in earnest. As the negotiations developed, they would focus on 
three crucial elements of the program: (1) the nature and timing of the ban on dirty 
trucks and the related phase-in of clean trucks; (2) the amount and structure of fees 
imposed on truck cargo, and the related amount of financial incentives allocated to 
fund clean truck conversion; and (3) the structure and content of the concession 
agreement, with particular emphasis on extent and timing of employee conversion. 
 
959. Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, Clean Trucks Program: Program Elements for 
Stakeholder Discussion, CAAP HDV1 (Apr. 11, 2007) (Powerpoint presentation) (on file with the UC 
Irvine Law Review). 
960. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 807. 
961. Wilson & White, 2 Ports Aim to Slash Diesel Exhaust, supra note 952. 
962. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 807. 
963. Id. 
964. Letter from Coal. for Clean & Safe Ports to Dr. Geraldine Knatz, Exec. Dir., Port of L.A. 
& Richard D. Steinke, Exec. Dir., Port of Long Beach, at 1 (May 10, 2007) (on file with the UC Irvine 
Law Review). 
965. Id. at 2. 
966. Id. The letter also reiterated its argument for imposing minimum business standards on 
LMCs, requiring labor peace agreements, mandating some alternative fuel trucks, and developing an 
off-street parking and community impact plan. Id. at 5–9. 
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To advance the coalition’s positions on these issues, members sought to 
“debate it out in public,” organizing around a series of port commission meetings 
to demonstrate that the coalition was “a force to be reckoned with.”967 The Los 
Angeles and Long Beach harbor commissions held regular public meetings to 
discuss policy development, at which coalition members, community residents, and 
truck drivers turned out to press the argument that “we need to fix the trucking 
system.”968 As NRDC’s David Pettit described with wry humor, the coalition would 
turn these normally staid events into dramatic affairs by bringing hundreds of 
people “with torches and pitchforks.”969 There were also special meetings devoted 
specifically to the Clean Truck Program, which were in Zerolnick’s memory “even 
longer and even more contentious.”970 In one, held in June 2007, 300 drivers turned 
out to support the program. Edgar Sanchez, a driver from Long Beach, pointed to 
coalition support as motivating him to speak out: 
Before we didn’t have the courage or the confidence to tell people how we 
feel out of fear we’d be fired or labeled as troublemakers . . . . Not anymore. 
We see the smoke pouring out of our trucks and we breathe it all day, every 
day . . . . But we also work long hours at minimum rates. We can be fired 
at any moment, like slaves without a voice.971 
A few months later, on October 12, the ports held a Joint Public Workshop on the 
Clean Truck Program—a six-hour meeting at which the ports took “tons of 
testimony” from various stakeholders,972 including LAANE’s Castellanos and 
NRDC’s Perrella, as well as numerous truckers and community residents.973 As the 
Joint Public Workshop underscored, a primary function of the coalition was to turn 
out members at these meetings to testify in favor of the proposed program. These 
meetings were also often a focal point for circulating and responding to draft 
policies. Drafts would emanate from the ports and Zerolnick would work primarily 
with NRDC lawyers to craft a response; that draft would be circulated among 
coalition members for comments and then once finalized sent back to the ports for 
review. Meetings were opportunities for exchange and amplification. During this 
back-and-forth, coalition members would shape program language and clarify 
objectives. For instance, a LBACA community resident working with the coalition 
developed the idea to put placards on trucks indicating a number to call to report 
any emission and safety issues974—an idea that was eventually incorporated into the 
working plan. 
 
967. Interview with Patricia Castellanos, supra note 806. 
968. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 807. 
969. Telephone Interview with David Pettit, supra note 841 (recalling statement by port general 
counsel Tom Russell). 
970. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 807. 
971. Louis Sahagun & Ronald D. White, Port Drivers Steer Toward Clean-Truck Program, L.A. 
TIMES, June 6, 2007, at B2. 
972. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 807. 
973. See Agenda of the Regular Meeting of the L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs (Oct. 12, 2007), 
http://lacity.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=14&clip_id=2191&meta_id=27885. 
974. See Telephone Interview with Elina Green-Nasser, supra note 851. 
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During this period, coalition pressure was applied in open spaces and behind 
closed doors. The coalition staged a number of public actions, including a caravan 
of 100 big rigs down the 110 freeway to the Port of Long Beach.975 Coalition 
members also met privately with harbor commissioners, mayor’s office staff, and 
council staff in both cities—though the approach increasingly diverged between Los 
Angeles and Long Beach. In Los Angeles, the coalition had allies in key elected 
politicians and harbor commissioners and thus the outreach was designed to give 
them the materials and arguments necessary to hold the line against industry 
lobbying. The big push was convincing “people to understand that the employee 
provision was an environmental provision.”976 This was true at the commission level 
and in the mayor’s office, where there were some divisions among the mayor’s staff 
about whether the program should just focus on the green elements or should also 
include the blue focus on employee drivers. As a result, the coalition had to “fend 
off repeated attempts by . . . forces within the mayor’s office who wanted to jettison 
the labor components of the Clean Truck Program.”977 In Los Angeles, the coalition 
also had a powerful champion in Council Member Janice Hahn, with whom 
members met regularly to work out strategy and policy details.978 In Castellanos’s 
view, Hahn “genuinely was supportive of workers and workers’ issues. I think this 
was in her district and she cared about it.”979 
In Long Beach, the approach was different given the perceived skepticism of 
recently elected Mayor Bob Foster to the employee conversion provision of the 
program. Foster, a Democrat who had headed Southern California Edison, won the 
Long Beach mayor’s race in a run-off election in June 2006. He took office that next 
month, just as CAAP was moving toward approval and the battle for clean trucks 
was taking shape. Los Angeles Harbor Commissioner Jerilyn López Mendoza 
recalled having lunch with Foster early in his term to discuss the prospects for port 
coordination around CAAP. After the lunch, she called LAANE organizer William 
Smart to ask: “Have you guys talked to Bob Foster yet? . . . I don’t think he’s on 
board with an employee mandate . . . . I think you all have some work to do.”980 
Coalition members were deployed to increase the pressure on Foster—since 
unilateral action by Los Angeles could undermine the entire project by diverting 
cargo to Long Beach. Colleen Callahan of the American Lung Association would 
“bring health professionals” to meetings with Long Beach harbor commissioners 
and Mayor Foster, to whom she would emphasize “why the policy proposal would 
address health.”981 Similarly, Elina Green of LBACA mobilized the group’s 
community-based membership to share the challenges they experienced caring for 
 
975. Tiffany Hsu & Rong-Gong Lin II, Taking a Message to the Streets, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2007, 
at B1. 
976. Telephone Interview with Candice Kim, supra note 867. 
977. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 820. 
978. Telephone Interview with Candice Kim, supra note 867. 
979. Interview with Patricia Castellanos, supra note 806. 
980. Telephone Interview with Jerilyn López Mendoza, supra note 723. 
981. Telephone Interview with Colleen Callahan, supra note 874. 
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children with asthma and how the Clean Truck Program would promote better 
public health.982 As LBACA members worked to “pull any strings” they had with 
Long Beach officials, they also faced local reprisal: Green recalled one meeting with 
Mayor Foster and a small group of coalition members in which the mayor was 
“literally yelling at us the entire meeting.”983 
Coalition members played different roles in exerting outside pressure over the 
course of the two-year campaign. In private meetings and public hearings, LAANE 
and Change to Win made the case for industry restructuring, while NRDC 
emphasized the environmental benefits (and held out the implicit litigation threat). 
LAANE’s Castellanos, Change to Win’s Weiner and Canham-Clyne, and NRDC’s 
Martinez, Perrella, and Pettit met regularly with port staff, both mayors’ offices, and 
both city councils, though the emphasis was on the Long Beach council because of 
Janice Hahn’s support in Los Angeles.984 The goal of these meetings was to make 
the case for sustainability, while also demonstrating the power of the blue-green 
coalition. In this regard, Castellanos recalled the coalition’s first meeting with the 
Los Angeles mayor’s office and port staff: When NRDC showed up with the 
Teamsters, port director Geraldine Knatz was “a little confused” and there was a 
lot of “brow raising.”985 To complement these efforts, environmental justice 
organizers mobilized their base. Marquez and Logan would turn out community 
members to attend commission meetings and meet with elected officials.986 Other 
groups similarly engaged in turn out efforts, and everyone attended periodic public 
rallies. 
Although all the groups played their roles, some also acknowledged that 
LAANE was in charge. While each coalition member spent considerable time and 
resources advancing the campaign, in the end, LAANE “had staff dedicated to this 
campaign” and was “really in the driver’s seat.”987 Some members expressed 
concerns about being tokenized but generally praised LAANE’s ability to “really 
listen” to coalition members and bring everyone on board.988 With the coalition 
thus united, members worked to hold officials accountable as they attempted to 
move the program through internal political channels. 
  
 
982. Telephone Interview with Elina Green-Nasser, supra note 851. 
983. Id. 
984. Interview with Patricia Castellanos, supra note 806. 
985. Id. 
986. Telephone Interview with Angelo Logan, supra note 414; Telephone Interview with Jesse 
Marquez, supra note 406. 
987. Telephone Interview with Colleen Callahan, supra note 874. 
988. Id.; Telephone Interview with Elina Green-Nasser, supra note 851. 
          
2014] PREEMPTIVE STRIKE 1067 
Figure 8: Coalition Rally at Port of Los Angeles989 
 
2. The Inside Game: Mobilizing Legal Expertise, Moving Policy 
In Los Angeles, as the campaign heated up in 2007, internal policy 
development proceeded along parallel, though deeply interconnected, paths. It 
started at the very top, with an effort to obtain a commitment by the Los Angeles 
mayor and port officials to support some version of the Clean Truck Program. It 
then went through three phases of policy development. First, city lawyers—in 
conversation with campaign lawyers—conducted a legal analysis to evaluate and 
ultimately sign off on the policy, focusing primarily on the risk of preemption. 
Second, the mayor’s office staff managed industry resistance by contracting for an 
outside economic analysis of the program’s costs and benefits that set the 
framework for the final policy drive. Third, in that final drive, port staff took the 
lead in thinking through policy details and resolving conflicting industry and 
coalition views, producing the version of the Clean Truck Program that would 
ultimately be approved. During this final phase, the Long Beach harbor commission 
broke ranks with Los Angeles and pursued an independent policy. 
In November 2006, James Hoffa, president of the Teamsters, met with Los 
Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa to seek his support for the clean trucks 
 
989. Photograph from Patricia Castellanos & Doug Bloch, A Smart California Port Policy for  
the Green-Growth Future, Spearheaded by Progressives - Part II, CALIFORNIA PROGRESS REPORT (May  
28, 2008), http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/smart-california-port-policy-green-growth-
future-spearheaded-progressives-part-ii. 
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campaign.990 The mayor agreed to the concept, which was then tracked for policy 
development at the port, where the mayor’s new appointments to the harbor 
commission and port directorship—made to advance CAAP—would play a key 
role in the approval of the Clean Truck Program.991 
Inside the Los Angeles mayor’s office, staff understood that a clean truck 
policy was a priority and worked to advance it. Staff knew about the LAANE 
campaign and Weiner met directly with some members of the mayor’s office to 
present Change to Win’s analysis of the drayage truck market and how the Clean 
Truck Program would affect it.992 On the basis of this analysis and their own their 
own review, staff concluded that the drayage sector was “a perfectly competitive 
market with . . . a strong negative externality.”993 As the outside pressure of the 
coalition—and industry opponents—scaled up, the mayor’s staff faced multiple 
challenges. One was “to maintain the integrity of the internal policy making 
process . . . by keeping outside influence outside.”994 Mayor staff member David 
Libatique, and later Sean Arian, provided a “buffer” against the coalition.995 While 
the mayor’s staff continued meeting with coalition and industry representatives 
throughout the process, they attempted to minimize the degree to which there was 
any perception of unfairness in the negotiating process. 
A key challenge was advancing the program in the face of increasingly intense 
industry opposition—and, partly as a consequence, some opposition within the 
mayor’s office itself and at the port. To effectively engage that opposition—and to 
assess whether it was worth spending political capital to do so—the mayor’s and 
port’s staffs needed to be comfortable with the legal foundation for the program. 
In early 2007, the coalition’s legal analysis was presented to the mayor’s staff, who 
wanted assurance that it had been done.996 Once it became apparent the program 
was really moving forward, port lawyers began “leading the charge” to make sure 
they had their “ducks in line” on the legal issues.997 As a result, there were several 
meetings between port general counsel, city attorney Thomas Russell; other city 
attorney lawyers assigned to the port, particularly Joy Crose; the Teamsters’ Mike 
Manley; and lawyers from NRDC. These meetings focused on solidifying the legal 
argument for the concession approach. Manley circulated versions of the memos 
he had drafted for the Teamsters to the city attorneys, came out to meet with them, 
and responded to questions and concerns.998 In these discussions—also attended 
by LAANE and Change to Win organizers—Manley viewed his role as “trying to 
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convince [port lawyers] not to recommend to the port commission to reject” the 
program.999 Manley’s view when he talked to port counsel was “that the ATA is 
going to sue you,” but “if you’re sued you can win.”1000 He argued for the program 
as a “unified whole”: 
We had these allies and the thing about labor and environmental groups is 
we always accuse each other of ditching . . . for our own interests. . . . And 
so I was careful not to come across as if I were saying, “Well, this 2007 
truck stuff doesn’t matter as long as they’re employees . . . .”1001 
Labor and environmentalists converged around legal theory as well as political 
interests. NRDC was present at these meetings as the legal “hammer,” but also to 
help make the case for local authority.1002 NRDC and other environmental groups 
were independently “pushing using this market participant exception and at the 
same time, labor had been eyeing it as a potential approach to resolve several issues. 
And so it kind of came together where we were both saying” the same thing.1003 
NRDC, like the labor lawyers, understood the legal risk of the concession plan and 
believed that there was “a unified view of how strong the arguments were.”1004 
Ultimately, it was port counsel who had the last word on the legal analysis. 
Much of this work fell to city attorney Joy Crose, who was lead counsel to the Port 
of Los Angeles on the Clean Truck Program. Her role was to conduct a “legal review 
of the program” and prepare all “program implementing documents, including 
contracts, tariffs, ordinances and resolutions.”1005 To do this, Crose worked with 
her counterpart in Long Beach, and also engaged outside counsel, Steven Rosenthal, 
chair of litigation in the Washington, D.C. office of Kaye Scholer. After interviewing 
a number of law firms toward the end of 2006, the city attorney’s office hired 
Rosenthal and his team to advise the port. Rosenthal had deep expertise on “the 
commerce clause, federal preemption, and federal statutes relating to the regulation 
of commerce,” gained in representing airports and ports over the course of his 
thirty-year career.1006 Together with the city attorneys, Rosenthal advised the port 
on the legal issues related to enacting the Clean Truck Program. Reflecting on his 
general approach to city policy, Rosenthal noted that when it comes to reviewing 
“new, complex programs, you can identify risks” and can suggest “this is why we 
think this approach is a better idea” but always in a context in which the client 
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The policy makers and their staff were not seeking certainty, just credible 
assessment. Weiner felt that the campaign’s legal groundwork helped to get the port 
attorneys to “buy into our analysis,” which was basically: “yeah, there’s a risk. But 
it’s good policy. . . . [W]e’ve got a good legal case.”1008 NRDC’s Martinez described 
the value of the legal analysis in similar terms. He believed that the legal analysis 
empowered the city and port to take a stronger position on the bottom-line policy 
details: If the ATA was going to sue on whatever policy passed, he argued, it freed 
the port to develop the most effective policy on its own terms and then to “go to 
court with the best program we have.”1009  
Similarly, the initial legal analysis provided a ready response to the industry’s 
legal push-back that would occur during policy formulation. Martinez recalled that 
industry groups had “a lot of legal power, so whenever the port or somebody would 
propose something, they’d give this very long, threatening legal letter that said you 
can’t do this, you can’t do this, you can’t do this, you can’t do this and here’s the 
legal reasons why.” But the coalition had “lawyers on the other side . . . firing back 
comment letters: oh, but look at this case, look at this case, and making these similar 
sophisticated arguments on why you can do it. And I think that was the big 
difference.”1010 For the mayor’s office staff tasked with advancing the program, this 
legal analysis was critical as a predicate to moving forward: “the legal analysis that 
was provided by the attorneys basically told us if . . . we’re going to have an effect 
on port trade . . . we would have to act as a market participant and the way we would 
do that would be through a concession-based model.”1011 The mayor’s general 
counsel, Tom Saenz—who had joined Villaraigosa in 2005 after serving as director 
of litigation at the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund—also 
reviewed the program and provided a legal opinion to his client. 
The context of mayoral decision making was also shaped by politics. Mayor 
Villaraigosa’s first major policy initiative—a controversial attempt to take over the 
Los Angeles Unified School District board through the enactment of a state law—
was held unconstitutional by a superior court judge in late 2006, giving the mayor a 
stinging defeat.1012 The mayor needed a policy win and a strong pro-environment 
position at the port promised to deliver political dividends, while also solving a 
critical regional problem. While Villaraigosa supported employee conversion, he 
understood its legal and political vulnerabilities—and could not risk a signature 
policy going down in the courts twice in a row. 
The urgency of solving the trucks problem was underscored as both ports 
faced community resistance to several massive expansion projects, delayed by 
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CAAP, which were unveiled to the public in mid-2007. These included replacing 
the Gerald Desmond Bridge to permit entry of larger container vessels; expanding 
and upgrading facilities in several terminals, including TraPac, China Shipping, and 
APL; creating new rail and road access; and building a new terminal for crude oil.1013 
The pressure once again was on the ports to accommodate growing container 
volume and local officials were eager to solidify the ports’ position given its vital 
regional economic role—by one account, responsible for over 250,000 jobs in 
Southern California and nearly $7 billion in state and local taxes.1014 In light of this, 
Los Angeles Harbor Commission President David Freeman vowed: “We’re going 
to grow and we’re going to clean up this place or my head will be served up on a 
silver platter in Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa’s office.”1015 Some 
coalition members seemed ready to sharpen their knives. The Sierra Club’s Tom 
Politeo warned that the ports’ growth rate would outpace mitigation efforts, while 
LBACA’s Green put it more bluntly: “They say growing green means expanding 
terminals and putting more trucks on the road. What’s cleaner about that? It’s not 
logical.”1016 Both ports, for their part, seemed to recognize the fight ahead, with the 
Port of Long Beach director of planning stating that he expected that “every one of 
the environmental impact documents for these projects will be challenged and end 
up in court.”1017 The ports also sought to market to community members, 
attempting to “make the ports hip” through a “traveling educational exhibit” 
designed “to dazzle students with port facts”—at a price tag of one million 
dollars.1018 
The ports simultaneously had to calibrate their response to increasing industry 
resistance to the Clean Truck Program, which focused on concerns about cost. 
After the ports released their joint proposal in April 2007, “the real fight began. 
Once that was public . . . industry came out strong and . . . the ports, the mayors, 
the electeds reacted to that.”1019 A report by the Los Angeles Economic 
Development Corporation in May warned that the cargo fee proposed to fund clean 
trucks might divert cargo to other ports.1020 In June, agricultural exporters 
complained that the program could make U.S. agriculture “uncompetitive.”1021 
The ports’ response was to conduct their own economic analysis of the 
proposed program, which was contracted to outside consultants at Economics & 
Politics, Inc. Completed in September 2007, the report (called the Husing Report 
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after its main author, economist John Husing), rested on extensive interviews with 
industry actors, as well as a statistical analysis of a variety of economic data.1022 The 
report compared the cost of converting the estimated 16,800 trucks regularly serving 
the ports to clean trucks through the existing structure of independent-contractor 
drivers to the cost of a plan based on employee conversion. It concluded that the 
proposal to convert to employee-operated clean trucks would cost LMCs nearly 
$150,000 per truck, which would include the cost of retrofitting or replacing the 
trucks and the cost of compensating the drivers—for a total cost of nearly $2.5 
billion for converting the entire fleet.1023 This cost was calculated after factoring in 
port subsidies for fleet conversion, which were to be funded through truck fees and 
other public sources (including SCAQMD and Proposition 1B funds).1024 The 
report focused on two costs associated with driver compensation. First, the report 
analyzed the impact of the federal government’s new security program, which 
required anyone accessing foreign entry points, including ports, to obtain a 
Transportation Workers Identification Credential—a biometric ID card also known 
as a TWIC card.1025 The federal regulations barred undocumented immigrants from 
obtaining a TWIC card and Husing estimated that this would reduce the supply of 
port trucking drivers by up to twenty-two percent, causing LMCs to raise their 
prices by up to twenty-five percent to cover the costs of luring new drivers.1026 The 
second type of driver-related costs were the payroll and benefits cost increases 
associated with the conversion of drivers to employees.1027 Combining these driver 
costs with the cost of clean truck conversion, the report estimated that LMCs would 
raise their prices by an average of eighty percent to offset the cost of implementing 
the Clean Truck Program.1028 Although emphasizing that this would be a “relatively 
insignificant” increase in overall shipping costs, it was notable that the price increase 
under a fleet conversion plan that continued to use independent contractors was 
significantly lower (at less than fifty percent).1029 
Worried that the ports would primarily focus on costs, Jon Zerolnick and 
others at LAANE set out to “quantify the benefits of passing the program.”1030 
Zerolnick thus took the lead in authoring The Road to Shared Prosperity—released a 
month before the Husing Report—which projected “direct and indirect financial 
benefits of over $4.2 billion” as a result of increased employee income and shifted 
taxes, as well as health care savings resulting from better community health and 
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reduced taxpayer subsidies for driver health care.1031 When it was released, the 
Husing Report also made a nod toward the benefit side by acknowledging an 
SCAQMD estimate of a “cumulative economic benefit of $4.7 to $5.9 billion due 
to reductions in premature deaths, lost work time and medical problems.”1032 
However, its overall conclusions about employee conversion were negative. The 
Husing Report suggested that shippers “will resist the LMC price increases due to 
their size” and “would delay such an increase as long as possible and explore other 
options.”1033 For the LMCs themselves, the report warned that in the transition 
period, “there is the risk of the destruction of their firms and possibly bankruptcy. 
For those that survive, the question arises as to how they would recoup the 
accumulated loss created during the transition period.”1034 Husing predicted that 
one-third of small LMCs would go out of business.1035 The report did not engage 
the issue of long-term sustainability emphasized by the coalition. 
Predictably, industry reaction focused on the Husing Report’s cost analysis, 
which strengthened opposition to employee conversion. The PMSA and National 
Industrial Transportation League—jointly representing Wal-Mart, Exxon, General 
Motors, and other major importers—formally asked the Federal Maritime 
Commission to intervene to stop the Clean Truck Program.1036 Some trucking 
company owners threatened dire consequences. One family-run business owner 
said in response to the Husing Report: “Do the math. They want just a handful of 
companies to do business with . . . . I am not interested in having 500 truck drivers 
as employees. If I have to remodel my business, I will probably walk away. I won’t 
want to go through it.”1037 Industry groups pressed their position and ratcheted up 
the litigation threat. In a letter sent to both harbor commissions and mayors, a 
coalition of business groups urged that the ban on dirty trucks be scrapped in favor 
of emission standards, and warned that the proposal was “anti-competitive,” was 
outside the ports’ “legal authority under state law,” and thus “will result in 
litigation.”1038 Against this backdrop, staff members within the Los Angeles mayor’s 
office and port were legitimately concerned and a key question became why 
employee conversion was essential to a program that purported to advance 
environmental goals. Even Los Angeles Harbor Commission President David 
Freeman, a staunch program supporter, appeared to equivocate: “We all, of course, 
want to get the truck program up and running . . . . But quite frankly, when we do 
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the economic analysis it raises some questions.”1039 In response, coalition members 
expressed frustration that the ports were mishandling program implementation and 
had lost valuable momentum. As NRDC’s David Pettit put it: “The ports of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach get a failing grade for slipping behind in the 
implementation of their landmark Clean Air Action Plan.”1040 It was fall 2007 and 
the program was at a crossroads. 
The “turning point” was born out of tragedy,1041 when Los Angeles mayor’s 
staffer David Libatique was hit and seriously injured by a port drayage truck while 
walking out of a meeting at the TraPac Container Terminal. Although he would 
recover to full strength and eventually return, his temporary absence left a personnel 
gap at the Los Angeles mayor’s office. That gap was filled by Sean Arian, who was 
almost preternaturally well-suited for the task ahead. Arian was the product of 
“multiple generations of longshoremen in San Pedro”—someone who as a boy 
suffered asthma and thus understood the Clean Truck Program in “very personal” 
terms.1042 He also had a unique combination of skills. A Columbia-trained lawyer, 
Arian had spurned the practice of law for the high-powered world of management 
consulting at McKinsey & Company, which he joined after a Fulbright fellowship 
in Latin America (where he focused on access to justice) and a federal court 
clerkship.1043 As a McKinsey analyst, Arian worked for Mayor Villaraigosa setting 
up a Project Management Unit to audit and track the mayor’s accomplishments. In 
early 2007, Arian left McKinsey and became the city’s director of economic 
development on the mayor’s Business Team. Once Libatique was injured, the port 
portfolio was given to Arian. 
Arian entered a situation in which the foundation for a Clean Truck Program 
had been laid, but significant industry roadblocks remained. Arian took measure of 
the political context. He was told that the coalition had “done all the legal work,” 
and understood that the coalition had also set forth the “big picture” in a way that 
made clear “what the community thinks” and what the “political upside and 
downside were.”1044 This gave the mayor “political space” to advance a policy that 
would be “truly ground breaking.”1045 But the case for the link between the 
environmental benefits of the program and employee conversion had not been 
persuasively made and industry arguments against it were gaining traction after the 
Husing Report. Arian sought to more forcefully make the case that port pollution 
was a “systemic problem” of “market failure,” and thus not amenable to 
environmental regulation by itself.1046 Although the Clean Truck Program was 
fundamentally about environmental remediation, to get there, Arian argued it was 
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crucial to attack “the root cause of the problem as opposed to just trying to attack 
one of the externalities.”1047 The issue was how to convince the ports to move 
toward what Libatique called an “asset-based market,” in which LMOs owned their 
trucks.1048 
Two decisions changed the program’s course—at least in Los Angeles. First, 
Arian and others within the Los Angeles mayor’s office recognized that for the 
program to succeed, staff at the port had to buy in. To achieve this, Arian—working 
closely with Castellanos and Weiner1049—was able to convince the mayor to “put 
somebody high ranking” in charge of developing the program at the Los Angeles 
port.1050 
That person turned out to be John Holmes, who held what was arguably the 
second most important job in the port after the director: overseeing day-to-day 
operations as the port’s deputy executive director. Holmes had spent nearly thirty 
years in the Coast Guard, the last three of which directing operations in Southern 
California—making him a “known quantity” at the port.1051 In Holmes’s view, he 
was charged with designing the Clean Truck Program because figuring out how to 
get clean trucks in and out of the terminals was ultimately an “operational issue.”1052 
When he was assigned to the program by Knatz in late 2007, the “two things” he 
knew were that the program was “going to have a rolling ban . . . to culminate in 
five years in having all the trucks . . . be EPA 2007 or newer” and there was going 
to be employee conversion.1053 As Holmes recalled: “My role was to basically figure 
it all out.”1054 
On the campaign side, it was Weiner’s role to facilitate this process. Weiner’s 
goal was to help Holmes credibly advance the employee conversion piece as an 
integral part of the environmental program and not just a union project.1055 In 
Weiner’s analysis, because port staff were on the front line of dealing with industry 
opposition, they were under the most pressure to respond to industry claims that 
“the sky is going to fall.”1056 That front line pressure was a constant challenge for 
the campaign, since port staff would report industry concerns up the ladder, 
ultimately landing back at the mayor’s office, where the mayor’s staff would get 
“nervous and weak-kneed” and the coalition would have to “prop up our 
supporters” and “beat back all these claims.”1057 As a result, the coalition believed 
it was crucial to have “someone at the staff level at the port . . . able to push back 
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and move this agenda.”1058 Weiner understood that the politics were fraught, since 
industry was “trying to tag the port as basically in bed” with the unions.1059 Weiner 
also knew that Holmes was politically astute and appreciated the stakes: that he 
technically worked for the mayor, while having to deal with industry as the port’s 
primary constituency.1060 
Arian introduced Holmes to Weiner. As Weiner recalled, the pitch to Holmes 
was: “the mayor really wants this, so [Weiner] could help you understand why this 
makes sense and talk it through.”1061 Weiner recalled that Holmes’ initial posture 
was “skeptical”—asking “what does this have to do with the Clean Truck 
Program?”1062 To answer that question, Weiner initiated a series of “one-on-one 
discussions” with Holmes about the concession model and, specifically, the 
employee conversion piece. From Weiner’s vantage point, these discussions were 
fruitful as Holmes eventually became comfortable with the idea that “the employee 
requirement is really so that the companies will be responsible . . . to maintain the 
trucks and not these drivers.”1063 Thus, Holmes accepted the main thrust of the 
coalition’s argument: that if the maintenance costs were not shifted onto the 
trucking companies, the maintenance could not be sustained over the long term 
since the drivers could not shoulder the expense.1064 From there, Holmes began to 
work on the program details. Given concerns about cost, a key issue was 
determining the appropriate level of financial incentives, which trucking companies 
had advocated for as necessary to make the conversion “happen as soon as 
possible.”1065 For the incentive piece, Holmes brought in the port’s director of 
finance. But they were working off the basis of the Husing Report, which did not 
provide a strong framework for advancing the entire clean truck package. 
This led to the second crucial decision. After Holmes was on board, Arian 
received the mayor’s permission to bring in another consulting firm to reevaluate 
the economics of the Clean Truck Program. After reviewing the Husing Report, 
Arian believed that there was an insufficient “fact base” to convince stakeholders 
of the need for industry transformation and thus argued for what amounted to a 
more sophisticated cut at the economics done by “one of the top consulting 
firms.”1066 Using his connections, Arian was able to bring in Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG) (his former firm’s chief rival), which agreed to send in its “A Team” 
on a pro bono basis to analyze the economic impact of converting to clean trucks. 
To justify this, Arian dissected the Husing Report in a way that conveyed to port 
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to evaluate our options.”1067 From Weiner’s perspective, Arian was able to “basically 
rip apart” the analysis of John Husing, whose response was ‘You’re right, I can’t do 
that’”—setting the stage for the entry of BCG.1068 Arian viewed BCG as “potentially 
a huge risk” because its consultants’ reputational capital was based on telling “you 
what they think the right answer is regardless of whether that’s the answer you 
wanted to get from them,” and their analysis would become part of the public 
record.1069 However, Arian firmly believed that “we needed to have a really strong 
fact base by a mutual third party respected organization.”1070 Arian recalled that port 
counsel, Tom Russell, was the “very first person who hopped on board” with the 
BCG plan since for the market participation theory to work as a legal rationale for 
the program, there needed to be a strong evidentiary record of why the program 
made business sense.1071 
Holmes also worked closely with BCG analysts. Holmes recalled that a “key 
factor” was BCG “working a month with us, locked in a room basically trying to 
figure out how this could work.”1072 Holmes’s view at this stage was that to get 
where the Los Angeles port wanted to be “required a sea change in the drayage 
trucking industry.”1073 To do that, he saw the basic choice as regulating or 
incentivizing the industry—which was not going to go green “just to do the right 
thing.”1074 Industry’s basic question was: “Are you going to pay me to do it or make 
me do it?”1075 The answer was: some combination of both. 
Toward that end, Holmes’s work with BCG was designed to promote trucking 
participation in the program and “get the numbers right.”1076 BCG modeled 
industry responses to different program scenarios, in which the main elements were 
the amount of the cargo fee, the timing of the truck ban, the development of security 
structures, the nature of driver status (independent contractor or employee), and 
the amount of incentives (which varied by whether the new trucks would run on 
diesel or alternative fuel). The port wanted to encourage companies to buy Liquid 
Natural Gas (LNG) trucks, which were an average of $50,000 more expensive than 
diesel trucks. One issue Holmes grappled with was how much the incentive had to 
be to persuade companies to buy LNG trucks. In addition, Holmes was focused on 
working out the details of the concession arrangement and its impact on the 
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community. In his view, the employee mandate was closely associated with the off-
street parking provision, since employees would “slip seat”—transfer their trucks 
to different drivers from one shift to the next—which meant that there needed to 
be a place to park the trucks during the transfer period.1077 Holmes was sensitive to 
complaints about traffic and saw the placard as an effort to respond to community 
concerns.1078 
Once the economic models were run, Holmes visited “the twenty-five biggest 
trucking companies in the country” to validate the results.1079 In these meetings—
which included major carriers like Schneider, Swift, and Knight, as well as shippers 
like Wal-Mart—Holmes would say: “We’re thinking of doing the program this way. 
What are we missing?” Through that process, Holmes and the consultants gained 
“a whole bunch of knowledge” about industry structure and equipment costs that 
were then factored back into the modeling analysis.1080 Holmes recalled that his 
meetings with industry were not all adversarial. To the contrary, many 
representatives of major trucking companies expressed support for minimum 
standards in an industry they viewed as built on “caveman economics,” in which 
fly-by-night carriers forced a “race to the bottom.”1081 Yet although these firms 
supported many of the environmental elements of the program “and gave good 
feedback,” they uniformly did not agree with employee conversion.1082 Holmes also 
understood that even those companies that supported the general approach were 
likely to join an industry lawsuit against the program if it passed, simply because 
industry rejected port regulation on principle.1083 
As Holmes and BCG carried out their analysis, the commissioners were also 
working to iron out the policy details. Commissioner Mendoza recalled that her 
starting point was at odds with Freeman’s, who thought that the Los Angeles port 
should simply “mandate the purchase of 500 LNG trucks” and thus become the 
direct owner of a portion of the port trucking fleet.1084 However, as the program 
developed around employee conversion within the mayor’s office, Freeman 
embraced the concept and fought for it like a “momma bear.”1085 Together, 
Mendoza and Freeman took the lead in moving the entire program forward. 
Mendoza described her approach to dealing with the city attorneys assigned to the 
program: 
[W]e didn’t ask them, we would tell them, “This is what we’re going to do. 
You guys have to figure out how to make it work.” And although we got 
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or “we have outside consultants who have done the analysis and they think 
that we don’t have a really good chance.” Our response was, “Okay, do we 
know for certain that this would not be successful in court? No. Well, if 
we don’t try, we won’t know.”1086 
Freeman saw his role as motivating the staff, which “required, shall we say, 
inspiration. And my role was to inspire them . . . by just telling them that if they 
didn’t get this stuff done, there was going to be hell to pay.”1087 In Freeman’s view, 
“Holmes was the best staff person there in getting religion and helping to make it 
happen.”1088 Policy issues brought up by port staff were hammered out, either in an 
ad hoc committee on environmental review staffed by Mendoza and Freeman, or 
in a closed session of the entire board. In the face of concerns that “truck companies 
would boycott” the port,1089 
David Freeman and John Holmes would get on a plane and go fly to Wal-
Mart in Bentonville, Arkansas, or they’d fly to the different trucking 
companies that were in Texas and Virginia and places like that, and they 
would sit down and talk to the business owners and say, “Look, we know 
this is uncomfortable, we know this is different, we know this is the first 
time you’ve been asked to do something like that but at the same time if 
we clean up, it will allow us to expand in a way that the community will not 
rise up and riot the way they have in the past. If you want to grow, if you 
want the port to grow, if you want your goods to get in and out faster, we 
also have to be as green as possible so that we can grow.”1090 
The information gained in these trips allowed Freeman to respond to staff concerns 
about costs. And Mendoza used her lawyering skills to respond to issues raised 
about the legality of employee conversion, asking: “Well, why aren’t we a market 
participant? . . . Why can’t we make that argument? What do we have to do to make 
that argument compelling?”1091 Freeman knew that “our furthest reach under the 
law was to require the truckers to have employees.”1092 
3. The End Game: Passing the Clean Truck Program 
As BCG worked on its analysis, the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports 
initiated a sequential approach to program implementation. Based on a political 
calculus that it was best to lock in elements of the program in stages—ranging from 
least to most controversial—the ports began moving forward specific elements of 
the Clean Truck Program: from clean truck conversion, to industry incentives, to 
employee conversion. This order tracked the key elements of the program debated 
from the outset and set an agenda for phased implementation: first, the progressive 
 
1086. Telephone Interview with Jerilyn López Mendoza, supra note 723. 
1087. Telephone Interview with S. David Freeman, supra note 751. 
1088. Id. 
1089. Id. 
1090. Telephone Interview with Jerilyn López Mendoza, supra note 723. 
1091. Id. 
1092. Telephone Interview with S. David Freeman, supra note 751. 
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ban on dirty trucks; second, the Clean Truck Fee; and third (and most 
controversially), the concession plan with employee conversion. In the first two 
steps, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach moved in synch, but in the third, 
they diverged. Throughout the process, industry pressure mounted to split off the 
environmental standards from the employee conversion piece—and to sever the 
environmentalists from organized labor in the coalition. 
The first step was, in relative terms, the easiest. On November 1, 2007—as 
the BCG team was just getting under way—the Port of Los Angeles Board of 
Harbor Commissioners unanimously approved a progressive dirty truck ban.1093 
Following a strong staff recommendation,1094 the board approved Order 6935 to 
phase in the ban over five years.1095 The legal structure of the ban, drafted by city 
attorney Crose, highlighted the legal authority of the port, while the operational 
structure bore the imprint of Holmes’s expertise. Legally, the order amended port 
Tariff No. 4, which was originally adopted in 1989 to govern the rates and terms of 
terminal operations.1096 As amended, Tariff No. 4 imposed a prohibition on the 
terminal operators—not the trucking companies or the truck drivers. Specifically, the 
ban stated that “no Terminal Operator shall permit access to any Terminal in the 
Port of Los Angeles” to nonconforming trucks.1097 In the order’s findings section, 
the justification for the ban was made in market participant terms. There, the case 
was strongly asserted for the port as a proprietary entity with business interests in 
pollution reduction: 
Independently, the failure of the Port to adequately address air pollution 
impacts, including diesel truck emissions, would threaten future Port 
growth both because of legal constraints under the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the National Environmental 
Policy Act and the opposition of surrounding residents and communities 
to further expansion without an actual improvement in environmental 
conditions surrounding the ports.1098 
The findings focused on trucks as “a critical element in the efficient operations of 
the Port,” and concluded: “Reasonable environmental measures are simply good 
business practices.”1099 
On the operations side, the order established a new system for efficiently 
 
1093. Louis Sahagun, L.A. Panel OKs Plan to Cut Port Truck Soot, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at 
B1. 
1094. Memorandum from Ralph G. Appy & Michael R. Christensen, Envtl. Mgmt. Div., 
Permanent Order Amending Port of L.A. Tariff No. 4 (Oct. 29, 2007). 
1095. L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs., Order 6935, Items 2010, 2015, 2020 (Nov. 1, 2007). The 
progressive ban operated by barring drayage trucks built before 1989 by October 1, 2008; barring 
unretrofitted trucks built before 2004 (and retrofitted trucks built before 1994) by January 1, 2010; and 
completely barring any trucks that did not meet 2007 model year standards by January 1, 2012. Id. 
1096. L.A., Cal., Ordinance 165789 (Apr. 10, 1990) (adopting L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, 
Order No. 5837 ( July 12, 1989) (adopting Port of L.A. Tariff No. 4)). 
1097. L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Order 6935, Items 2010, 2015, 2020. 
1098. Id. ¶ 12. 
1099. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14. 
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identifying clean trucks—requiring all trucks to install a Radio Frequency 
Identification Device by August 1, 2008. The device would contain a unique 
identification number that could be electronically read by terminal operators, which 
could cross-reference the number against records showing the vehicle model year 
and compliance with clean trucks standards.1100 The Long Beach Board of Harbor 
Commissioners unanimously approved an identical ban five days later,1101 
prompting Long Beach Mayor Foster at a joint news conference with Los Angeles 
Mayor Villaraigosa to tout the two cities’ effort “to lead the world in pushing for 
cleaner air and healthier environment with our shared goal of having the cleanest 
ports in the world.”1102 
With the dirty truck ban legally and logistically in place, the battle immediately 
turned to the issues of new truck financing and employee conversion. Upon passage 
of the Los Angeles ban, port director Knatz struck a stern negotiating posture, 
acknowledging the need for short-term program funding, but making clear “we 
can’t subsidize it forever.”1103 With respect to employee conversion, trucking 
companies again emphasized the litigation threat. Cecilia Ibarra, assistant operations 
manager for Total Distribution Service of Wilmington was explicit—and articulated 
industry’s particular hostility toward the employee piece. “We want clean air as 
much as anyone, but the board’s actions may drive us into litigation. A concession 
program is a step toward unionization. I can already hear the ka-chink, ka-chink, ka-
chink in union coffers.”1104 Despite this effort to isolate employee conversion from 
the program’s environmental elements, coalition members continued to assert a 
unified front. LBACA’s Green made the strong case: “I don’t understand why the 
board decided to vote on just the clean-truck portion of the clean-air plan . . . . It’s 
hard not to think that they were pandering to the environmental community by 
throwing us a bone, as though we would be happy with just a progressive ban.”1105 
In an official statement released after the Long Beach ban was adopted, the coalition 
kept up the pressure to move forward: “Without reform, the Los Angeles and Long 
Beach ports remain unprepared to meet ever-increasing trade demands, and they 
will be unequipped to compete in today’s rapidly changing economy.”1106 
 
1100. Id. at Items 2000, 2005, 2025. 
1101. Long Beach Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Minutes of a Special Meeting, PORT LONG BEACH, 20 
(Nov. 5, 2007). At this meeting, during which the board approved the ordinance’s first reading, the 
coalition turned out several drivers, who spoke, as did NRDC’s Martinez, the Clean Air Coalition’s 
Kim, and the American Lung Association’s Callahan. Id. at 3–10. The Long Beach harbor 
commissioners approved the ordinance’s “second and final reading” on November 12. Long Beach Bd. 
of Harbor Comm’rs, Minutes, PORT LONG BEACH, 9 (Nov. 12, 2007). The ordinance, as adopted, was 
No. HD-1997, which amended Long Beach Tariff No. 4 to include findings and policy language that 
were identical to Los Angeles Order 6935. Long Beach, Cal., Ordinance HD-1997 (Nov. 12, 2007) 
(amending Ordinance HD-1357, Tariff No. 4 (Dec. 27, 1983)). The Long Beach Clean Truck Program 
was drafted by City Attorney Robert Shannon. 
1102. Louis Sahagun, Long Beach Joins Port Ban on Old Trucks, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007, at B4. 
1103. Sahagun, L.A. Panel OKs Plan to Cut Port Truck Soot, supra note 1093. 
1104. Id. 
1105. Id. 
1106. Sahagun, Long Beach Joins Port Ban on Old Trucks, supra note 1102. 
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On the financing side, the issue from the outset had been at what price to set 
the Clean Truck Fee (a charge on containers carried by drayage trucks to be imposed 
on shippers) in order to create a fund for clean truck conversion. The ports’ initial 
proposal contained a range—from thirty-four to fifty-four dollars per container—
which set the bargaining zone. Industry sought to push the ports toward the lowest 
end of the range, while other stakeholders sought to keep up the pressure for the 
ports to act aggressively. In 2006, state Senator Lowenthal from Long Beach 
advanced a bill to impose a sixty-dollar fee on cargo loaded in forty-foot containers 
to fund emission reduction, but Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed it on the ground 
that it would hurt U.S. exports.1107 In 2007, Lowenthal reintroduced the bill, but 
agreed to withdraw it in September as the Clean Truck Program appeared to 
advance.1108 Other public funds were potentially available for truck conversion, but 
not at the levels anticipated.1109 The financial viability of truck conversion thus 
hinged on the cargo fee. 
Long Beach made the first move, approving a cargo fee of thirty-five dollars 
per loaded twenty-foot container on December 17, 2007.1110 The Clean Truck Fee 
would be “assessed on containerized merchandise entering or leaving the Ports by 
Drayage Truck,” to be paid by the “Beneficial Cargo Owner,” and collected by the 
terminal operator.1111 The fee was expected to raise $1.6 billion for a Clean Truck 
Fund,1112 to be used by the port “exclusively for replacement and retrofit of Drayage 
Trucks serving the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.”1113 Still marching in 
lockstep, the Los Angeles harbor commissioners approved an identical fee four days 
later.1114 
Finally, the stage was set for the showdown over employee conversion. Both 
sides in the debate pushed hard. In Long Beach, Mayor Foster worked to isolate 
organized labor. As Weiner recalled, Foster “kept . . . wanting to meet with the 
environmental folks in our coalition without the labor folks . . . [asking:] “Why can’t 
 
1107. Sahagun, Port OKs ‘Green’ Cargo Fee, supra note 790. 
1108. Id. Lowenthal reintroduced the measure, which was again vetoed by Schwarzenegger in 
September 2008. Louis Sahagun & Ronald D. White, Local Ports Initiate Antipollution Program, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 2, 2008, at B2; Sahagun, Port OKs ‘Green’ Cargo Fee, supra note 790. 
1109. Editorial, Long Beach and L.A. Port Officials Should Vote for Container Fees That Will Lead to 
Cleaner Air, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2007, at A18 (noting that a disproportionately small proportion of 
Proposition 1B funds had been allocated to Southern California). 
1110. Sahagun, Port OKs ‘Green’ Cargo Fee, supra note 790. The Ordinance, No. HD-2005, was 
unanimously approved in its second and final reading (with one commissioner absent) on January 7, 
2008. See Long Beach, Cal., Ordinance No. HD-2005 ( Jan. 9, 2008); Long Beach Bd. of Harbor 
Comm’rs, Minutes, PORT LONG BEACH, 9 ( Jan. 7, 2008). 
1111. Long Beach Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Clean Truck Tariff Amendment and Fee, Item 1030 
(Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.polb.com/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?BlobID=4708. 
1112. Sahagun, Port OKs ‘Green’ Cargo Fee, supra note 790. 
1113. Long Beach Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Clean Truck Tariff Amendment and Fee, supra note 
1111, at Item 1035. 
1114. L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs Order No. 6943 (Dec. 20, 2007). This order also followed 
a strong staff endorsement. See Memorandum from Ralph G. Appy & Michael R. Christensen to L.A., 
Cal. Board of Harbor Commissioners (Dec. 20, 2007). 
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we just do this? Why do you need this employee thing?”1115 Commissioner Freeman 
perceived Foster as set against employee conversion: “He just did not believe that 
we had the right to force these [trucking companies] to have employees.”1116 And 
Foster was worried that “the Teamsters will take over” and undermine future 
environmental programs.1117 
The coalition kept up the pressure with a series of public demonstrations—
against the backdrop of ongoing private negotiations. On the day that Long Beach 
approved its Clean Truck Fee, the coalition organized a rally of 150 truckers at the 
port entrance to stress the need for employee conversion. “We all support cleaner 
air, but none of us wants a loan or a grant to buy a new truck,” said driver Miguel 
Pineda. “If these plans become law, I won’t be able to put food on the family 
table.”1118 He added that “a lot of truckers have stopped spending money on repairs 
because they aren’t sure they will still have jobs next year . . . . It’s a terrible situation; 
we live like slaves in the 19th Century.”1119 A month later, the Los Angeles Times ran 
a front-page story on “unsafe trucks” coming out of the ports, focusing on the 
plight of low-income independent contractors who could not afford to replace tires 
on their big rigs and frequented “llanteros” who would use hot blades to carve new 
grooves into seriously worn tires; the story highlighted other drivers engaged in 
desperate measures like “lashing bumpers to chassis with bungee cords and 
smearing mud over cracked parts to hide the problems from CHP officers.”1120 
In the face of pending expansion plans—the Los Angeles Times noted that 
fifteen port projects had been held up since the China Shipping case in 2001—the 
coalition also pressed to underscore the legal stakes.1121 NRDC’s Adrian Martinez 
and the Teamsters’ assistant director of ports, Ron Carver, sent a letter to the ports 
stating: “Unless we are assured that your plans include reasonable proposals for 
mitigating the environmental harm of your existing facility, let alone your proposed 
expansion, we cannot see how we could let the process continue without a 
challenge.”1122 The message was clear—and industry reacted strenuously, with the 
vice-president of the TraPac Terminal calling it a “shakedown.”1123 Martinez 
observed that “things are getting nasty out there,” while Mayor Villaraigosa tried to 
give a positive spin: “In the interests of green growth, historic adversaries have 
become part of a very delicate coalition. It’s as though everyone is coming to this 
party holding hands but reluctant to get on the dance floor. But they will, eventually. 
They have to.”1124 
 
1115. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 820. 
1116. Telephone Interview with S. David Freeman, supra note 751. 
1117. Id. 
1118. Sahagun, Port OKs ‘Green’ Cargo Fee, supra note 790. 
1119. Louis Sahagun, Ports Turn Over a New, Green Leaf, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2007, at A1. 
1120. Louis Sahagun, Unsafe Trucks Stream Out of L.A.’s Ports, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, at A1. 
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Before that could happen, the coalition sought to make clear that the legal 
consequences of inaction would be further logjam. Markers were laid down at both 
ports. In Los Angeles, the proposed TraPac Terminal expansion was the legal 
flashpoint. On December 6, 2007, the Los Angeles Harbor Commission, in a 
statement of overriding considerations,1125 unanimously approved the EIR for a 
$1.5 billion upgrade projected to create 6000 jobs and $200 million annually in 
taxes.1126 Four individuals and sixteen groups—including the Coalition for Clean 
and Safe Ports, NRDC, the Coalition for Clean Air, the American Lung Association, 
Sierra Club, and LAANE—appealed the approval to the Los Angeles City Council 
on the ground that it did not adequately address the air pollution impact.1127 One of 
the individual appellants was Kathleen Woodfield, president of the San Pedro and 
Peninsula Homeowners Association, which had been a lead plaintiff in the China 
Shipping litigation.1128 As she recalled, the appellants were not represented by legal 
counsel: “NRDC was clear that they were not representing us.”1129 Yet NRDC did 
flex its own legal muscle, indicating its intent to file a CEQA lawsuit if the council 
appeal was unsuccessful.1130 In response, Council Member Hahn blocked the EIR 
from getting out of a key council committee and began negotiating with 
environmental and neighborhood groups.1131 
Two months later, in Long Beach, NRDC and the Coalition for a Safe 
Environment filed an intent-to-sue letter with the port, asserting an innovative legal 
theory: that the port was an entity subject to federal oversight as a hazardous waste 
site under the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.1132 NRDC’s Pettit 
claimed: “We want the court to take over the whole thing at once in order to enforce 
a new priority of public health over profit . . . . We think that will require court 
appointment of a port czar to force the port to use currently available technology 
to fix the problem.”1133 The letter requested that the port stop expansion projects 
until it could prove they would not “at any time increase the level of hazardous 
diesel particulates emanating from the port.”1134 
 
1125. See ENVTL. MGMT. DIV., PORT OF L.A., DRAFT FINDINGS OF FACT AND STATEMENT 
OF OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS, BERTHS 136-147 [TRAPAC] CONTAINER TERMINAL PROJECT 
(2007). 
1126. L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Los Angeles Board of Harbor 
Commissioners, PORT L.A. (Dec. 6, 2007). 
1127. Letter from David Pettit et al. to Members of the Los Angeles City Council, Re: Appeal 
from Board of Harbor Commissioners Decision to Approve the Final EIR for TraPac Container 
Terminal (Dec. 14, 2007) (on file with author). 
1128. Telephone Interview with Kathleen Woodfield, Member, Sierra Club (May 14, 2013). 
Woodfield was also a member of the Port Community Advisory Committee. Id. 
1129. Id. 
1130. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 
WL 3386436, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010). 
1131. David Zahniser & Louis Sahagun, Harbor Reaches Pollution Accord, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
2008, at B1. 
1132. Louis Sahagun, Long Beach Port Faces Suit Threat, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at B3. 
1133. Id. 
1134. Id. 
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If the NRDC letter was meant to put pressure on the Port of Long Beach as 
the clock ticked down toward a resolution on employee conversion, it did not have 
that effect. To the contrary, on February 16, 2008, the Port of Long Beach officially 
broke ranks with its Los Angeles counterpart, announcing a meeting to approve the 
final element of its Clean Truck Program—a concession plan—without the 
employee conversion piece.1135 “Their announcement caught us all by surprise,” 
said LAANE’s Castellanos.1136 In its concession plan, trucks would be granted a 
“right of access to port property” in exchange for LMCs entering into contracts that 
ensured compliance with existing laws (including the preexisting elements of the 
Clean Truck Program), as well as “local truck route and parking restrictions.”1137 
The ordinance also modified the Clean Truck Fee for cargo moved on trucks not 
purchased with port subsidies, waiving the fee for containers transported on 
alternative fuel trucks and halving it for clean diesel trucks.1138 
Released on the cusp of a three-day weekend, the plan was slated for vote the 
following Tuesday, February 19, by the Long Beach Harbor Commission. Despite 
the short turnaround, the coalition mobilized to attend the six-hour hearing, with 
public comments given by several residents, drivers, and coalition members—
including Zerolnick, Martinez, Politeo, Kim, Logan, Green, and Callahan.1139 
Nonetheless, board approval was unanimous,1140 and port officials touted their 
program as a “victory for clean air”1141—one that cleaved apart the environmental 
and labor elements.1142 Mayor Foster’s chief of staff, responding to the mayor’s 
break with Los Angeles, said: “It doesn’t scare us that there is a difference of 
opinion . . . . What scares us is not acting to clean the air as quickly as possible. If 
their board is not ready to go yet, fine . . . . Ours is.”1143 NRDC, unsurprisingly, 
disagreed in its letter to the board: “Perhaps the most glaring flaw in the port’s 
program is the lack of its key partner and neighbor, the Port of Los Angeles. If Los 
 
1135. Louis Sahagun, Officials of Area Ports Split Over Truck Issue, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2008, at 
B1. 
1136. Id. 
1137. Long Beach, Cal., Ordinance No. HD-2011, ¶ 14 (Mar. 17, 2008). 
1138. Id. at Item 1030. 
1139. Long Beach Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Minutes, PORT LONG BEACH, 5–6 (Feb. 19, 2008). 
1140. A second and final reading of the ordinance was approved on March 17, 2008, with two 
commissioners (Topsy-Elvord and Walter) absent. Long Beach Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Minutes, PORT 
LONG BEACH, 6–7 (Mar. 17, 2008). The board authorized the port director to execute the concession 
agreements on June 2. Long Beach Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Minutes, PORT LONG BEACH, 10 ( June 2, 
2008). 
1141. Louis Sahagun, Public Health, Labor Groups Decry Harbor Panel’s Air Plan, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
20, 2008, at B4. 
1142. The port’s concession agreement stated that a concessionaire “shall give a hiring 
preference to drivers with a history of providing drayage services to the port,” but did not require 
conversion. Long Beach Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Port of Long Beach Concession Agreement § III(e). 
Like the Los Angeles program that would follow, the Long Beach agreement required compliance with 
truck routes and parking restrictions, a maintenance plan, and placards, though it reduced the 
concession fee to $250 per concessionaire. Id. §§ III(f ), (g), (m) & 2.1.1. 
1143. Sahagun, Officials of Area Ports Split Over Truck Issue, supra note 1135. 
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Angeles decides to go in a different direction in its clean-trucks program, the result 
would be chaos at the ports.”1144 
All eyes therefore turned back to Los Angeles. Industry opponents of 
employee conversion sought to cast it as a union ploy. NRDC’s Martinez perceived 
that opponents were “freaked out” by the unified front maintained by NRDC and 
the Teamsters and recalled a lot of “fearmongering.”1145 The Los Angeles Times, in 
reporting on the ongoing battle, emphasized the unionization angle: “Critics of the 
employee provision of the clean truck program . . . are concerned that it could be 
used by the Teamsters as a springboard to launch unionization efforts at ports 
nationwide.”1146 It also noted that that Change to Win had donated $500,000 to 
Mayor Villaraigosa’s local telephone tax initiative, Proposition S, insinuating that 
the unions expected a quid pro quo.1147 A month later, an editorial began: 
“Pollution, death and economic stagnation. These catastrophes are being brought 
to you by the Natural Resources Defense Council and the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters.”1148 It argued that the clean trucks deal was being 
jeopardized over a “dispute that has nothing to do with pollution and everything to 
do with an unholy alliance between environmentalists and organized labor.”1149 
Noting that Long Beach had already passed its plan without employee conversion 
and that Los Angeles seemed on the verge of doing the opposite, the editorial board 
suggested that the Clean Truck Program of both ports would be tied up for years 
in litigation—in Long Beach by NRDC and in Los Angeles by the ATA.1150 The 
editorial argued that it did not have to be so, since “[u]nder a lease-to-own program, 
a nonprofit or other organization could buy new trucks and lease them to the 
truckers, charging low fees that would be subsidized by the ports.”1151 
Coalition members fought back. Coalition for Clean Air director Martin 
Schlageter responded to the Los Angeles Times in the editorial pages that he was 
“baffled at your editorial placing the blame for delay on advocates of clean air,” 
noting that it was an NRDC lawsuit that produced CAAP in the first instance and 
that the Long Beach plan suffered from the “glaring weakness” of failing to 
influence driver working conditions, which was a concern “for environmentalists 
and labor advocates alike.”1152 Coalition members also sought to make fun of the 
 
1144. Sahagun, Public Health, Labor Groups Decry Harbor Panel’s Air Plan, supra note 1141. The 
coalition appealed the board’s decision to the city council to no avail. NRDC then filed a Freedom of 
Information Act suit to get all documents relevant to the Clean Truck Program. “We just wanted to 
find out what was going on because they just kept on making these bizarre decisions behind closed 
doors, with no public process.” Telephone Interview with Adrian Martinez, supra note 837. 
1145. Telephone Interview with Adrian Martinez, supra note 837. 
1146. Sahagun, Officials of Area Ports Split Over Truck Issue, supra note 1135. 
1147. Id. 
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argument that there must be “something wrong” in a collaboration between labor 
and environmentalists, with Pettit and his colleagues donning T-shirts with “The 
Unholy Alliance” printed on them.1153 In retrospect, Pettit thought “we, NRDC—
did a poor job of messaging what [the program] had to do with clean air. And I 
think we came off poorly . . . in all the media attention.”1154 Yet in a sign that political 
support was holding firm, the Los Angeles City Council formally adopted the board 
of harbor commissioners’ progressive ban and Clean Truck Fee at the end of 
February.1155 
By March 2008, on the brink of the Los Angeles port’s final decision on 
employee conversion, the political back-and-forth reached a fever pitch. The 
coalition had taken out five full-page color advertisements in the Long Beach Press-
Telegram denouncing Mayor Foster, while Los Angeles City Council Member Hahn 
was privately urging him to reconsider.1156 For their part, the Teamsters were 
seeking to use their political clout to block state funding for Long Beach to complete 
renovation of the Gerald Desmond Bridge.1157 LAANE sent Foster a public records 
request seeking all his communications with industry representatives.1158 Yet Foster 
remained defiant: “So the end result is, if this happens to be the only office I ever 
hold and the only term I ever serve, I’m comfortable with that.”1159 Industry groups 
also struck a strident tone in advance of the Los Angeles decision. Curtis Whalen, 
executive director of the ATA, stated that Villaraigosa’s “biggest problem is he has 
good intentions, but they are not legal.”1160 
It was at the height of this debate, on March 7, 2008, that BCG released its 
long-awaited report—which had been delayed in the wake of the Long Beach 
decision. At its heart was an analysis of the economics of employee conversion—
the sole remaining piece of the Los Angeles Clean Truck Program. In clinical terms, 
far removed from the supercharged rhetoric of campaign adversaries, the report 
evaluated three program options: the first would permit the continued operation of 
independent contractors and give them a share of the incentive financing to acquire 
clean trucks; the second would also permit continued operation of independent 
contractors, but limit financing to LMOs; and the third would require LMOs to 
make what it called an “employee commitment.”1161 The report’s key move—and 
what made it different than the Husing Report—was that it compared short-term 
(one to five year) and long-term (more than five year) outcomes in relation to stated 
 
1153. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 820. 
1154. Telephone Interview with David Pettit, supra note 841. 
1155. L.A., Cal., Ordinance 179707 (Feb. 27, 2008) (adopting L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, 
Order No. 6935 (Nov. 1, 2007) (progressive truck ban)); L.A., Cal., Ordinance 179708 (Feb. 27, 2008) 
(adopting L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs Order No. 6943 (Dec. 20, 2007) (clean truck fee)). 
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environmental, port operations, and safety and security goals.1162 The report’s 
bottom line was that the employee model provided “the best path to long term 
sustainability” although it posed some “near term risks.”1163 Specifically, the report 
concluded that the employee model would “maximize the likelihood of creating a 
market in which the reciprocal obligations between the Port (granting a 
commission) and LMCs (providing drayage services) create a sustainable reliable 
supply of truckers attracted to stable and relatively well paying jobs in an 
operationally efficient and orderly drayage market.”1164 It went on to recommend 
that a “100% employee driver requirement, phased in over five years” was the best 
option: “transparent, aligning incentives and easiest to administer.”1165 Financing 
support for clean truck conversion was set at eighty percent for new diesel trucks 
and up to eighty percent for LNG trucks, with $5000 given to scrap pre-1989 
trucks.1166 
The report was not all rosy. It predicted that under the “employee 
commitment” scenario, there would be more cargo diversion—approximately three 
percent—than under the other options, but that this cost would likely be 
outweighed by overall benefits.1167 The “key risk” was that shippers would divert 
cargo over and above this three percent threshold based on factors other than 
increased price,1168 such as fear of “future disruption or instability.”1169 This risk 
would be exacerbated, the report stated, if the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of 
Long Beach adopted different programs1170—which, of course, had already 
happened, though the report seemed to hold out hope that there was still a 
possibility that Long Beach might reverse course. In reporting on the plan, the Los 
Angeles Times highlighted the cargo risk, beginning its article by emphasizing its 
conclusion “that ‘substantial diversions’ of the Los Angeles port’s business probably 
would shift to the neighboring port of Long Beach or to other harbors.”1171 
Despite these market concerns, the BCG report ultimately did the work it was 
designed to do. At the staff level, the cost analysis permitted Holmes and other port 
managers to solidify the employee conversion piece and calculate the precise level 
of financing. On March 12, 2008, a staff report authored by Holmes and deputy 
director of finance Molly Campbell recommended approval of the concession and 
incentive plans analyzed in the BCG report.1172 At the board level, Arian recalled 
 
1162. Id. 
1163. Id. at 10. 
1164. Id. at 9. 
1165. Id. 
1166. Id. at 68. 
1167. Id. at 70, 79. 
1168. Id. at 74. 
1169. Id. at 9. 
1170. Id. at 74. 
1171. Ronald D. White & Louis Sahagun, Risk Seen in Port Plan, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008, at 
C1. 
1172. Memorandum from John Holmes, Deputy Exec. Dir. of Operations & Molly Campbell, 
Deputy Exec. Dir. of Fin. & Admin., to the Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs (Mar. 12, 2008). 
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that the report was the “key study” that persuaded skeptical commissioners to move 
toward approval.1173 
On the day the Los Angeles board was set to meet on the concession plan, the 
Los Angeles Times took one last opportunity to hammer home the litigation threat. 
In an editorial titled “Harbor No Illusions: L.A.’s Plan to Clean Up Port Pollution 
Is Sure to Wind Up in Court,” the editorial board argued that “[i]n the real world 
of lawsuits and endless court proceedings, [the truck plan] would stall progress on 
cleaning the air indefinitely.”1174 Yet at this stage in the game, the early legal work 
on the port’s authority to pass the program seemed to fortify city staff. As Libatique 
recalled, staff did not shy away from the concession model: Because of “the amount 
of work and time we put into the legal underpinnings of the program . . . I think 
there was a level of confidence here that we had a strong legal case.”1175 If litigation 
came—which it would—the city was prepared to defend its program then, rather 
than back off it now. The program that the board did adopt on March 20, 2008, 
contained the signature element of what the coalition had spent almost two years 
working toward: the concession plan.1176 Resisting industry pressure, the board in 
Order 6956 (again drafted by Crose) further amended Tariff No. 4 to “require 
parties who access Port land and terminals for purposes of providing drayage 
services to the Port of Los Angeles to have a Concession Agreement” with the 
port.1177 Following the same format used in the earlier order banning dirty trucks, 
the amendment placed enforcement responsibility on the terminal operators, stating 
that “no Terminal Operator shall permit access into any Terminal in the Port of Los 
Angeles to any Drayage Truck unless such Drayage Truck is registered under a 
Concession.”1178 Terminal operators that violated the order were subject to criminal 
sanction under the tariff’s general penalties provision, which made any violation of 
the tariff a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment of 
up to six months.1179 
The order set forth the legal justification for the concession plan. Expressing 
concern about the “environmental, operational, and safety and security objectives 
of the Port” (language adapted from the BCG report), the findings emphasized the 
goal of encouraging “evolution of the Port drayage market towards an asset-based 
market in which Licensed Motor Carriers that hold the motor carrier concessions 
also own the truck assets used to perform under the concession.”1180 After noting 
that the port “currently has no business relationship with the thousands of trucks, 
 
1173. Telephone Interview with Sean Arian, supra note 991. 
1174. Editorial, Harbor No Illusions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, at A20. 
1175. Telephone Interview with David Libatique, supra note 754. 
1176. The presentation of the concession plan provided at the meeting drew heavily on the 
BCG findings. See The Port of Los Angeles Clean Truck Program: Program Overview & Benefits, PORT L.A., 
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/ctp/CTP_O&B.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2014). 
1177. L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Order No. 6956 ¶ 3 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
1178. L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Port of L.A., Tariff No. 4, Item No. 2040 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
1179. Id. Item No. 220(b). 
1180. L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Order No. 6956 ¶¶ 16, 19. 
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drivers or licensed motor carriers” hauling cargo, the order mandated a concession 
program “that specifies conditions that must be met in order to provide drayage 
services” at the port.1181 It stated that a drayage company “must enter into” an 
agreement, which would last for a term of five years, “in order to access” the 
port.1182 Although the order itself did not explicitly discuss employee conversion, a 
separate transmittal by staff (circulated to the full board) proposed a “non-
exhaustive list of the main Concession requirements,” which included that LMCs 
“[t]ransition to 100% employee drivers for Port of Los Angeles drayage in five years, 
according to a schedule specified by the port.”1183 The list also included the 
concessionaire’s commitment to create an “off street parking plan”; to affix 
“placards on all Concession controlled trucks referring to a 1-800 phone number to 
report concerns regarding truck emissions, safety and operations”; and to pay a 
concession fee of “$2500 plus an annual fee of $100 per truck.”1184 The order also 
modified the Clean Truck Fee—exempting cargo transported by concessionaires 
who used 2007-compliant alternative fuel trucks (even if purchased with port 
subsidies) and any who purchased clean diesel trucks without port subsidies1185—
while deferring collection of the Clean Truck Fee from June 1 to October 1, 
2008.1186 
In what appeared as a recognition of the legal vulnerability of at least some 
elements of the concession plan, a severability provision was also added. It stated: 
If any provision of Port of Los Angeles Tariff No. 4 shall be determined 
by court or agency of competent jurisdiction to be unenforceable, unlawful 
or subject to an order of temporary or permanent injunction from 
enforcement, such determination shall only apply to the specific provision 
and the remainder of the provisions . . . shall continue in full force and 
effect.1187 
The purpose of the provision was to reduce legal and political risk to the 
overall Clean Truck Program. Legally, the severability provision would permit a 
court to excise some provisions, while keeping intact the broader plan. 
Commissioner Freeman recalled “the meeting in the mayor’s office where we 
decided, well, we want a severability clause . . . so that if we lose that one, it doesn’t 
contaminate the rest of the case. And we all went ahead with that.”1188 For the 
mayor, there were also political implications. Severability maximized the possibility 
of sustaining some aspects of the Clean Truck Program—and thus being able to 
declare political victory while also addressing an important policy concern. Perhaps 
 
1181. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23. 
1182. Id. ¶ 24. 
1183. Transmittal 1, Port of Los Angeles Drayage Truck Concession Requirements ¶ (b). 
1184. Id. ¶¶ (f ), (m), (o). 
1185. L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Order No. 6956, ¶ 26. 
1186. Id. ¶ 25. The order also made a technical change to the definition of cargo owner that 
affected application of the fee. Id. ¶ 28. 
1187. L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Port of L.A., Tariff No. 4, Item No. 2095 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
1188. Telephone Interview with S. David Freeman, supra note 751. 
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most crucially, if the employee provision was ultimately struck down, progress could 
still be made toward greening the port and organized labor would be no worse off 
than if the effort had not been made at all. 
In connection with the board order, a separate resolution drafted by Crose and 
approved by the board laid out the market participation rationale for the concession 
plan, while also adding in the core financial incentives. The resolution noted that 
the objective of the plan was to “create and sustain an efficient, reliable supply of 
drayage services to the port,” which “as land owner of the Harbor District land and 
assets has the right and the obligation to manage and control the access to its land 
by tenants and invitees to ensure that operations thereon maintain safety and 
security of Port operations on a sustainable basis.”1189 The resolution went on to 
stress that the “air quality, port security, and safety goals” of the plan were “more 
likely to be achieved and sustained over the long term” through concessions. It also 
pointed to the “[s]erious and long-standing problems” produced by “inadequate 
maintenance” and “unsafe, negligent or reckless driving of trucks” at the port, and 
asserted that the concession model was the “most efficient,” “greenest,” “safest,” 
“most community friendly,” “most responsive and flexible,” and “easiest model to 
administer.”1190 In addition, the resolution—following the staff report and BCG 
analysis—authorized a Truck Funding Program, to “provide funding of up to 80% 
of the value” of clean trucks (in the form of either a lease-to-own agreement or up-
front grant to purchase or retrofit) “in order to make the transition . . . more 
affordable.”1191 Other incentives included a Truck Procurement Assistance 
Program to “provide volume discounted pricing” to concessionaires and a Scrap 
Truck Buyback Program providing $5000 to owners of pre-1989 trucks who turned 
them in.1192 With that, the centerpiece of the Clean Truck Program was approved. 
The following day, the ATA’s Whalen called it a “scheme to unionize port drivers” 
and vowed that: “We’re going to go after Los Angeles with everything we’ve got so 
their plan goes to hell in a handbasket. We will win and we will win handily.”1193 
Yet a few steps still remained. The Los Angeles port wanted resolution of the 
dispute over the TraPac expansion—which had served as the coalition’s final 
“bargaining chip.”1194 As homeowner activist Kathleen Woodfield recalled, the port 
“wanted to move forward with the TraPac project. For as long as it was appealed it 
was in limbo.”1195 To move this along, Woodfield, Martinez, and other coalition 
members met with Council Member Hahn, Mayor Villaraigosa, port director Knatz, 
and Commissioner Freeman to hammer out a deal.1196 Working closely with 
Hahn—whose support coalition members thought was “strong and pretty much 
 
1189. L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Resolution 6522, at 1 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
1190. Id. ¶¶ a–o. 
1191. Id. at 7. 
1192. Id. 
1193. Louis Sahagun, Port Shifts Plan’s Cost to Shippers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, at B5. 
1194. Telephone Interview with Tom Politeo, supra note 856. 
1195. Telephone Interview with Kathleen Woodfield, supra note 1128. 
1196. Id. 
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unequivocal”1197—the coalition negotiated a settlement in early April.1198 Under its 
terms—negotiated primarily by Martinez and port general counsel Tom 
Russell1199—the port agreed to create a Mitigation Trust Fund with an immediate 
$12 million contribution towards community improvements and an air filtration 
system for local schools.1200 The agreement also provided—as a means of avoiding 
future litigation—that more funds would be contributed for mitigation in 
conjunction with future expansion projects at the port:1201 $1.50 for each additional 
cruise ship passenger and $2 for each additional container.1202 The funds were to go 
to a nonprofit group, the Harbor Community Benefit Foundation, created for the 
purposes of disbursing the money.1203 The agreement also committed the port to 
continue working to support the Clean Truck Program.1204 It was the first EIR 
approved at the port since China Shipping, and Commissioner Freeman touted the 
agreement as a model for pending expansion plans. “The entire environmental 
community is giving its blessing to Mayor Villaraigosa’s green growth program . . . . 
We will work together on all future [projects] and not resort to litigation.”1205 The 
NRDC’s Pettit, though pleased with the outcome, did not go quite that far, 
emphasizing that: “The agreement does not give up our right to sue on any project 
other than TraPac.”1206 
The accord did, however, clear the way for the concession agreement itself to 
be approved. The draft agreement, circulated in early May, spelled out the 
mechanics of “driver hiring” in detail, setting forth a phased implementation in 
which a concessionaire “shall be granted a transition period . . . by which to 
transition its Concession drivers to 100% Employee Concession drivers by no later 
than December 31, 2013.”1207 Under the transition plan, twenty percent of drivers 
had to be converted by the end of 2009, sixty-six percent by the end of 2010, eighty-
five percent by the end of 2011, and one hundred percent by the end of 2013.1208 
The agreement also required concessionaires to “submit for approval . . . an off-
 
1197. Telephone Interview with Tom Politeo, supra note 856. 
1198. See Press Release, Port of Los Angeles, Mayor Villaraigosa, Councilwoman Hahn 
Announce Historic Agreement that Will Allow TraPac Terminal Renovations to Go Forward at Port 
of L.A. (Apr. 3, 2008); see also Zahniser & Sahagun, Harbor Reaches Pollution Accord, supra note 1131. 
1199. Telephone Interview with Kathleen Woodfield, supra note 1128. Woodfield also noted 
the contributions of Serena Lin, a lawyer at Public Counsel Law Center. Id. 
1200. L.A. Harbor Dep’t Agreement 09-2764, Memorandum of Understanding 4 (Apr. 2, 2008) 
(on file with the UC Irvine Law Review); see also Zahniser & Sahagun, Harbor Reaches Pollution Accord, 
supra note 1131. 
1201. See L.A. Harbor Dep’t Agreement 09-2764, supra note 1200, at 4. 
1202. Id. 
1203. Id. at 3; see also L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Minutes of a Special Meeting, PORT L.A., 15–
16 (Oct. 26, 2010) (approving creation of nonprofit organization to administer the Mitigation Trust 
Fund). 
1204. See L.A. Harbor Dep’t Agreement 09-2764, supra note 1200, at 2–3. 
1205. Zahniser & Sahagun, Harbor Reaches Pollution Accord, supra note 1131. 
1206. Id. 
1207. L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Drayage Services Concession Agreement for Access to the 
Port of Los Angeles ¶ III(d) (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
1208. Id. 
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street parking plan,” “post placards” on their trucks, agree to regular maintenance, 
attest to financial capability, and pay the concession fees.1209 The agreement further 
specified enforcement procedures, identifying (though not defining) minor and 
major defaults, and imposing sanctions, which included revoking the concession 
agreement itself.1210 The final loose ends were quickly tied. The board approved the 
concession agreement on May 15.1211 Then, at a meeting on June 17, the city council 
approved the final concession plan.1212 With the mayor’s signature, the Clean Truck 
Program was city law.1213 
 





1209. Id. ¶¶ III(f), (g), (l), (n) & § 2.1.1. 
1210. Id. §§ 4.3 & 4.4. 
1211. See L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Minutes of the Regular Meeting, PORT L.A., at 19–20 (May 
15, 2008). 
1212. See L.A., Cal., Ordinance No. 179981 ( June 17, 2008). 
1213. Phil Willon, Mayor Signs Law to Clean Port Air, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2008, at B4. There 
were a number of subsequent technical amendments that clarified exemptions to the Clean Truck Fee, 
clarified the basis for charging the Clean Truck Fee, delayed the implementation of the fee, and made 
other adjustments. See L.A., Cal., Ordinance No. 180681 (Aug. 21, 2008); L.A., Cal., Ordinance No. 
180679 (May 5, 2009); L.A., Cal., Ordinance No. 180923 (Oct. 14, 2009); L.A., Cal., Ordinance No. 
1809253 (Oct. 14, 2009); L.A., Cal., Ordinance No. 180942 (Oct. 27, 2009); L.A., Cal., Ordinance No. 
181125 (Mar. 12, 2010); L.A., Cal., Ordinance No. 181126 (Mar. 12, 2010); L.A., Cal., Ordinance No. 
181255 ( June 27, 2010). 
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In the end, after nearly two years of struggle, the coalition had won a program 
in Los Angeles that included the twin goals of fleet and employee conversion. Both 
were achieved through a legal structure that linked the port’s contractual and police 
powers: trucking companies were required to sign concession agreements to enter 
the port and terminal operators were required to bar entry to any trucking 
companies that did not comply with port rules—or incur criminal sanctions. The 
program was to be financed primarily through the imposition of cargo fees, which 
would shift the costs of clean truck acquisition to shippers, while providing 
incentives for trucking companies to upgrade their fleets. Looking at the final 
program as a whole, there were some details with which the coalition could quibble. 
At the outset, the coalition had set its sights on full conversion to alternative fuel 
trucks, a higher fee, and immediate employee conversion.1214 What it got was partial 
alternative fuel conversion, a lower fee with significant exceptions, and a five-year 
phase in for employee conversion. However, these were minor sacrifices to achieve 
the ultimate program, which closely tracked the outlines proposed in the coalition’s 
RFP a year earlier. 
C. The Defensive Phase: Responding to Federal Law 
The ink was barely dry on the Clean Truck Program when legal challenges to 
it commenced. From the outset, this had been anticipated by the coalition as part 
of the overall process of enacting and defending the law. As LAANE’s Jon 
Zerolnick described, from the beginning, it “was always a part of the timeline” that 
the “ATA sues here.”1215 Teamsters counsel Mike Manley’s early legal opinions had 
predicted lawsuits on preemption and maritime law grounds—precisely what ended 
up occurring. The campaign, premised on enacting local law, now turned to 
defending that law against efforts to negate it on federal grounds. 
1. Private Litigation I: The Injunctive Phase 
As it had long threatened, the ATA was first to the federal courthouse.1216 On 
July 28, 2008, the ATA filed a complaint in federal district court in Los Angeles for 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.1217 The lawsuit took aim at the 
concession plans of both the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports, arguing that they 
were preempted by the FAAA’s prohibition against municipalities enacting “a law, 
regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, 
 
1214. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 820. 
1215. Telephone Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 951. 
1216. Ronald D. White & Louis Sahagun, National Trucking Group to Sue Ports Over Cleanup Plan, 
L.A. TIMES, July 26, 2008, at B9. 
1217. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. 
City of L.A., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. CV 08-04920 CAS (CTx)) (filed July 28, 2008). 
The ATA was represented by its in-house counsel, Robert Digges; outside counsel law firm Constantine 
Cannon LLP, appearing pro hac vice; and local counsel Christopher C. McNatt, Jr. of Scopelitis, Garvin, 
Light, Hanson & Feary, LLP, in Pasadena. Id. 
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route, or service of any motor carrier.”1218 The complaint further alleged that both 
plans violated the Commerce Clause by imposing “invasive regulatory requirements 
on virtually all aspects of the business of a federal motor carrier, including truck 
maintenance, on-street and off-street parking, employee wages, employee benefits, 
hiring practices, truck signage, recordkeeping, auditing, frequency of service to the 
Ports, and even upon sale or transfer of the motor carrier’s business.”1219 Although 
challenging both ports, the complaint used the fact that Long Beach had broken 
ranks on employee conversion to buttress its Commerce Clause argument: “The 
Port of Los Angeles prohibits motor carriers’ use of more than 10,000 independent 
owner-operators of trucks on their side of the city line that bisects the San Pedro Bay 
port complex, while the Port of Long Beach permits such subcontracting on its side 
of the line—a text-book case . . . for federal preemption to prevent [the] patchwork 
of service-determining laws, rules, and regulations from disrupting the motor 
carriage of property in interstate commerce.”1220 
The ATA complaint also sought to distinguish the environmental provisions 
of the Clean Truck Programs from what it called “extraneous, burdensome 
regulations regarding wages, benefits, truck ownership, preferences for certain types 
of trucks, and frequency of service to ports, which have no material environmental 
impact.”1221 Making clear that it did “not challenge the Ports’ truck engine-retirement 
programs”1222—that is, the progressive ban on dirty trucks—the ATA set its sights 
specifically on the operational provisions of the concession plans. As the ATA’s 
CEO put it, “the litigation is not aimed and should not interfere with the ports’ 
clean air efforts. We are challenging only the intrusive and unnecessary regulatory 
structure being created under the concession plans.”1223 
That the ATA was especially concerned about employee conversion was 
revealed in its prayer for relief, in which it first sought to enjoin both plans in their 
entirety (Count I) and then separately sought to enjoin just that portion of the Los 
Angeles plan that precluded “independent owner-operators” from port entry 
(Count II).1224 The ATA was thus giving the court a choice: Even if it did not think 
the concession plans as a whole were preempted, the court could decide to simply 
enjoin the employee conversion piece. Overall, the ATA’s complaint deftly carved 
lines: distinguishing Long Beach from Los Angeles, and within Los Angeles 
isolating the employee conversion piece from the other concession provisions. Two 
days later, the ATA moved for a preliminary injunction to bar implementation of 
 
1218. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2012). 
1219. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, supra note 1217, ¶ 2. 
1220. Id. ¶ 3. 
1221. Id. ¶ 4. 
1222. Id. 
1223. Louis Sahagun, Truck Group Sues Ports, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2008, at B4. 
1224. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, supra note 1217, ¶¶ 37–47 
(Count I), ¶¶ 48–54 (Count II). Count III argued that both plans were preempted by the Commerce 
Clause. Id. ¶¶ 55–66. 
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the concession plans.1225 Speaking later about the injunction, the ATA’s Whalen 
sounded what would be the industry group’s talking points: “Let’s be clear: We are 
not against clean trucks . . . . We are objecting to concession plans that are going to 
squeeze out a lot of existing motor carriers and thousands of independent owner-
operators.”1226 From the coalition’s point of view, this argument rang hollow. As 
NRDC’s Martinez recalled, the ATA was “trying to just throw monkey wrenches 
after monkey wrenches” to stop the plans, while all the time insisting it was 
“supportive of clean air.”1227 
Confronted with a new effort to split the environmental and labor elements 
of the program, and facing the prospect of the cities’ legal interests diverging from 
their own, the coalition—not formally party to the suit—had to decide how to 
respond. Playing to its legal strength, and emphasizing the connection between the 
environmental and labor pieces of the Los Angeles program, the coalition turned 
again to its environmental partners. On July 31, the NRDC, Sierra Club, and 
Coalition for Clean Air moved to intervene in the case, arguing that its members 
had “significantly protectable interests” that would not be adequately represented 
by the defendant ports, which “as public proprietary entities, . . . must balance 
resource constraints and the interests of various constituencies—some of which 
(such as those of Plaintiff) are at odds with the proposed intervenors’ interest—and 
have often taken positions on port-related policy and regulatory matters contrary 
to” the intervenors.1228 The court agreed and the intervenors proceeded to make 
their case in support of the concession plans.  
In their brief opposing the ATA’s preliminary injunction motion, NRDC’s 
Pettit, Perrella, and Martinez sought to lay out the environmental case for market 
participation, devoting the first part of their brief to explicating why the plans were 
“necessary to protect public health.”1229 In addition to reviewing the evidence of air 
pollution and public health impacts, the intervenors’ brief stressed how all elements 
of the concession plans, including employee conversion (not mentioned by name) 
were “intertwined and . . . all necessary to achieve the Ports’ clean air goals.”1230 
NRDC’s Perrella recalled that although it was “very clear that we were in favor of 
L.A.’s program,” NRDC intervened to protect both the Los Angeles and Long 
Beach plans since “the heart of [the] ATA’s argument really attacked the 
 
1225. Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction on Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s 
Complaint, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (No. CV 08–04920 CAS (CTx)) (filed July 
30, 2008). 
1226. Louis Sahagun & Ronald D. White, Truckers and Ports Head to Court, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
2008, at B3. 
1227. Telephone Interview with Adrian Martinez, supra note 837. 
1228. Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene of Natural Res. Def. Council, Sierra Club and 
Coal. for Clean Air at 1–2, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (No. CV 08-04920 CAS 
(CTx)) (filed July 31, 2008). 
1229. Opposition of Proposed Defendant-Intervenors Natural Res. Def. Council, Sierra Club 
and Coal. for Clean Air to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 
577 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (No. CV 08-04920 CAS (CTx)) (filed Aug. 20, 2008). 
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fundamentals of both programs. And so we felt like it was important to protect” 
them.1231 As Martinez put it, “Part of your goal is to defend the whole damn thing, 
so ultimately we think the ports have rights to do this.”1232 In the litigation, NRDC 
represented its own interests, which meant that the organization’s lawyers “work[ed] 
together to figure out the best approach.”1233 In also representing the Sierra Club 
and Coalition for Clean Air, NRDC’s retainer identified one person within each 
organization that served as the representative for client relations purposes, keeping 
NRDC out of the other client organizations’ internal deliberations.1234 
Throughout the litigation, NRDC worked with counsel for the Port of Los 
Angeles, with whom it had a much closer relation than with counsel for Long 
Beach—based on the Los Angeles city attorneys’ supportive posture during the 
policy phase.1235 NRDC lawyers had a “joint defense agreement” with the Port of 
Los Angeles lawyers,1236 with whom they would discuss “who would take what 
approach to what issue,”1237 and exchange drafts.1238 Although the city defendants 
were definitely in the lead, NRDC did not “shy away from . . . being parties in the 
case.”1239 Toward that end, NRDC sought to make arguments that built upon its 
comparative advantage as environmental experts. In this vein, NRDC pressed the 
argument that the ports needed to implement the concession plans to avoid 
potential environmental liability. As the “troublemakers” that initiated port litigation 
in the first instance, NRDC could make that case “more forcefully” than the city 
defendants, particularly since the ports were not going to concede that they had 
ongoing environmental legal risk.1240 In addition, NRDC was well-positioned to 
make the strong case for showing how the employee driver piece “benefits the 
environment.”1241 Particularly to the extent that the ATA was seeking to paint the 
Los Angeles plan as a sop to unions, having NRDC make the labor argument was 
a way to keep the entire plan within an environmental frame. During the lawsuit, 
Teamsters counsel Manley recalled that the plan was for him to “recede as much as 
possible to the background,” although he believed that the ATA representatives 
were “going to paint it as a Teamster case anyway—which they did.”1242 Manley 
participated “indirectly” by providing his analyses of the market participant doctrine 
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1235. Telephone Interview with David Pettit, supra note 841. 
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1240. Id. Indeed, Rosenthal suggested that although the city was “aligned” with NRDC in the 
litigation, they had “differing interests,” noting that “NRDC certainly supported what we were doing, 
but NRDC sues the port as well.” Telephone Interview with Steven S. Rosenthal, supra note 1006. 
1241. Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 1238. 
1242. Telephone Interview with Michael Manley, supra note 460. 
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to NRDC lawyers, to whom he told: “here’s the argument, here’s why it supports 
us.”1243 
Asserting a unified front in the preliminary injunction phase, both ports filed 
a joint opposition that strongly asserted local authority for their respective 
concession plans—though with a different emphasis than the environmental 
intervenors’ brief. On the Los Angeles side, outside counsel Steven Rosenthal was 
the defendants’ lead attorney, supported by his colleagues at Kaye Scholer, who 
worked closely with city attorneys Tom Russell, Joy Crose, and Simon Kahn. Long 
Beach was similarly represented by its city attorneys and outside counsel from two 
law firms.1244 
In their opposition, the ports made three arguments against preemption. First, 
they asserted that the ports had sovereign control over the tideland areas under the 
state Tidelands Trust Act.1245 Second, they argued that the programs fell squarely 
within the market participant exception to federal preemption as the product of “a 
proprietary action of the Ports in their capacity as commercial enterprises and 
landlords.”1246 Here, the ports emphasized the market dimensions of the concession 
plans: 
The CTP is a product of the Ports’ recognition that in order to grow and 
to continue to compete successfully in that market, they need to address 
major environmental and security issues. The concession programs reflect 
the Ports’ efforts to secure trucking services—services critical to their 
commercial operation—in a way that will further those objectives. Hence 
those programs fall squarely within the market participant doctrine.1247 
In making this argument, the ports relied heavily on the Engine Manufacturers 
case, litigated by NRDC, applying the market participant exception to the Clean Air 
Act in upholding SCAQMD rules setting emission standards for vehicles acquired 
by the state.1248 Based on that case, the ports emphasized that they were acting as a 
market participant in the “efficient procurement” of trucking services and that the 
plans’ “narrow scope” defeated an inference that their “primary goal was to 
encourage a general policy rather than address a specific proprietary problem.”1249 
As a third ground of opposition, the ports argued that the concessions fell within a 
statutory exception to FAAA preemption, which stated that the act “shall not 
 
1243. Telephone Interview with Michael Manley, Staff Att’y, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters (Mar. 29, 
2013). 
1244. The outside counsel was Paul L. Gale from Ross, Dixon & Bell, LLP, and C. Jonathan 
Benner and Mark E. Nagle, appearing pro hac vice, from Troutman Sanders, LLP. See Defendants’ 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 2d 
1110 (No. CV 08–04920 CAS (CTx)) (filed Aug. 20, 2008). 
1245. Id. at 11. 
1246. Id. at 17. 
1247. Id. at 22. 
1248. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2007). 
1249. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 1244, 
at 26–29. 
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restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.”1250 
Specifically, the ports claimed that the plans were designed to enhance port security 
and eliminate unsafe trucks1251—drawing on arguments that were laid out in the 
findings sections of the Clean Truck Program legislation. To buttress this argument, 
the ports submitted an affidavit from John Holmes averring that the Los Angeles 
program was, in addition to addressing environmental harms, “designed to address 
other problems that result from the truck activities at the Ports—safety and 
security.”1252 
Weighing these arguments was District Court Judge Christina Snyder, who 
had been appointed in 1997 by President Clinton after serving as a partner in a Los 
Angeles law firm.1253 In the early part of her career, Judge Snyder was a founder of 
Public Counsel Law Center, one of Los Angeles’s largest legal services 
organizations, serving on its board and as its president.1254 Her first opinion was an 
early victory for the ports. In an order dated September 9, 2008, she denied the 
ATA’s motion for a preliminary injunction.1255 Yet the scope of the order 
highlighted the challenges that the ports would face ahead. First, the court held that 
the concession plans likely regulated the “price, route, or service” of trucking 
companies and thus fell within the scope of FAAA preemption.1256 The issue was 
therefore whether an exception to preemption would save the plans. Of the ports’ 
three arguments for an exception, Judge Snyder only agreed with one: that “the 
defendants have shown that there is a significant probability that the concession 
agreements fall under the safety exception to the FAAA, and that they may therefore 
be saved from preemption.”1257 
Although acknowledging that there “does not appear to be any case law 
addressing the question of whether security concerns analogous to the concerns 
identified by the Ports fall within the safety exception,” Judge Snyder ruled that it 
was likely they did even though the concessions were not passed for the “exclusive 
 
1250. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
1251. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 1244, 
at 38. 
1252. Declaration of John M. Holmes in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1110 
(C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. CV 08–04920 CAS (CTx)) (filed Aug. 20, 2008). Affidavits of other port officials, 
including Los Angeles executive director Geraldine Knatz and Long Beach executive director Richard 
Steinke, were also submitted to support the defendants’ broader market participant arguments. 
Declaration of Dr. Geraldine Knatz in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (No. CV 08–04920 CAS (CTx)) 
(filed Aug. 20, 2008); Declaration of Richard Steinke in Support of Defendants’ Opposition, Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (No. CV 08–04920 CAS (CTx)) (filed Aug. 20, 2008). 
1253. Susan Gordon, Beverly Hills Bar Association Honors the Honorable Christina A. Snyder and Top 
Trial Attorney Marshall B. Goldman, WESTSIDETODAY.COM (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.westsidetoday 
.com/s7-8972/beverly-hills-bar-association.html. 
1254. Id. 
1255. Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 26, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 
Inc., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (No. CV 08–04920 CAS (CTx)) (filed Sept. 9, 2008). 
1256. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. 
1257. Id. at 1125. 
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purpose of promoting safety.”1258 However, the court rejected the state tidelands 
argument, noting that it was “not convinced that the fact that the Ports rest on 
sovereign tidelands renders them immune from preemption under the FAAA.”1259 
Perhaps more alarmingly for the ports, the court ruled against application of the 
market participant exception on the grounds that the programs were not about 
“efficient procurement” but rather were “akin to a licensing scheme,” and they were 
not sufficiently narrow in scope to qualify as meeting a “specific proprietary 
problem.”1260 Because it lost the motion, the ATA appealed.1261 While both ports 
separately filed answers to the ATA’s complaint, the case would now move—for 
the first time—to the Ninth Circuit. 
As it did, the coalition continued its organizing and media work outside of 
court to make the case for employee conversion. Part of this strategy involved 
criticizing Long Beach’s program. Speaking for a coalition of civil rights and 
consumer groups, NAACP President Julian Bond compared Long Beach drivers, 
who were being forced to take on debt to finance low-emission trucks, to 
sharecroppers in the Deep South, warning of a wave of “foreclosures on 
wheels.”1262 Under the Long Beach plan, the Mercedes-Benz/Daimler Truck 
Finance Company was administering a lease-to-own program in which drivers 
would be given loans to purchase new clean trucks worth over $100,000.1263 
However, as the coalition stated in a report delivered to Daimler headquarters, even 
with port incentives many drivers would not be able to meet the payments and 
would thus be subject to Daimler’s aggressive collections department.1264 While the 
coalition urged Long Beach to adopt the Los Angeles employee conversion 
approach, some workers were confused, with one quoted as stating: “A lot of 
truckers have no idea what’s going on with all these different plans and protests, so 
they are just going with the flow.”1265 Yet the protests continued, with sixty 
truckers—some chanting “Clean trucks, yes! Bankruptcy, no!”—gathering to 
condemn the opening of Long Beach’s Clean Trucks Center, charged with 
administering the financial incentive component of the Long Beach program.1266 
Concerns that trucking companies would boycott the Los Angeles program 
when it officially began on October 1, 2008, were allayed when two large national 
firms—Swift and Knight—agreed to participate in exchange for financial 
 
1258. Id. at 1124–25. 
1259. Id. at 1118. 
1260. Id. at 1121–23. 
1261. Preliminary Injunction Appeal, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (No. CV 
08–04920 CAS (CTx)) (filed Sept. 10, 2008). 
1262. CONSUMER FED’N OF CAL. ET AL., FORECLOSURE ON WHEELS: LONG BEACH’S TRUCK 
PROGRAM PUTS DRIVERS AT HIGH RISK FOR DEFAULT, LAANE (2008), available at 
http://laane.org/downloads/B568P314C.pdf. The coalition included the NAACP, Consumer 
Federation of California, the League of United Latin American Citizens, and LAANE. 
1263. Id. at 2. 
1264. Id. 
1265. Louis Sahagun, Long Beach Port’s Truck Loans Criticized, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2008, at B3. 
1266. Louis Sahagun, Truckers Blast Long Beach Loan Program, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2008, at B4. 
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incentives.1267 This was followed by an announcement that 120 carriers—many 
members of the ATA—had applied to service the port under program criteria.1268 
With the Great Recession taking its economic toll, some viewed both ports’ Clean 
Truck Programs as coming at the most inauspicious economic time as container 
traffic had dropped sharply from the previous year.1269 However, the recession also 
made clean truck conversion more attractive for many trucking companies.1270 As 
diesel prices soared in 2008 and hundreds of companies failed, converting to cleaner 
technology with port subsidies made economic sense.1271 When the Los Angeles 
and Long Beach programs were formally initiated on October 1, both mayors hailed 
them as a success: with ninety-five percent of trucks entering the ports meeting 
program standards, only 2000 had to be turned away.1272 Coalition member Martin 
Schlageter praised the programs’ arrival: “Powerful institutional forces representing 
billions of dollars had for years urged that the ports not do anything. But the mayors 
and the ports stood firm.”1273 
It was against this backdrop that the ATA’s appeal of Judge Snyder’s 
September 2008 denial of injunctive relief took place. On appeal, the industry 
group—represented by the same lawyers as below—contested the lower court’s 
interpretation of the preliminary injunction standard and its ruling that the FAAA’s 
“safety exception” likely protected the concession plans from federal 
preemption.1274 The ports countered these arguments and also reasserted their own 
claims for local authority under the market participant exception.1275 As they had in 
the court below, the environmental intervenors reiterated the public health benefits 
of the plans, defended the lower court’s application of the safety exception, and 
then reasserted the case for market participation.1276 The appeal attracted wider 
attention: the U.S. government (Department of Transportation, Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration, and Department of Justice) filed an amicus brief in 
support of the ATA,1277 as did the National Industrial Transportation League1278 
 
1267. Ronald D. White & Louis Sahagun, 2 Big Haulers Accept L.A. Port’s Clean-Truck Criteria, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008, at C2. 
1268. Ronald D. White, Truckers on Board with Clean-Air Plans, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at C1. 
1269. Sahagun & White, Local Ports Initiate Antipollution Program, supra note 1108 (noting a 9.9% 
decrease in Long Beach and 4.6% decrease in Los Angeles). 
1270. Francisco Vara-Orta, Clean Air Program Revs Up Truck Sales, L.A. BUSINESS J., May 25, 
2009. 
1271. Ronald D. White, Truckers Unload Fuel Costs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2012, at A1. 
1272. Sahagun & White, Local Ports Initiate Antipollution Program, supra note 1108. 
1273. Id. 
1274. Brief of Appellant Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. at 15, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of 
Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-56503) (filed Oct. 8, 2008). 
1275. Opening Brief for Appellees, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 559 F.3d 1046 (No. 08-56503) 
(filed Nov. 26, 2008). 
1276. Intervenor-Appellees’ Brief at 3–4, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 559 F.3d 1046 (No. 08-
56503) (filed Nov. 5, 2008). 
1277. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 559 
F.3d 1046 (No. 08-56503) (filed Oct. 21, 2008). 
1278. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Nat’l Indus. Transp. League in Support of Appellant Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 559 F.3d 1046 (No. 08-56503) (filed Oct. 20, 2008). 
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and National Association of Waterfront Employers,1279 all arguing against the lower 
court’s application of the safety exception. The California attorney general came in 
on the side of the ports.1280 
The stage was thus set for a ruling by a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit. 
Although they differed in ideological orientation—Robert Beezer and Ferdinand 
Fernandez were conservatives appointed by Ronald Reagan, while Richard Paez was 
a liberal former legal aid lawyer appointed by Clinton—they spoke with a 
unanimous voice. In an order issued on March 20, 2009, the panel reversed the 
district court’s denial of injunctive relief.1281 The court’s key move was to distinguish 
among the various provisions of the concession plans, holding that “the district 
court legally erred in not examining the specific provisions of the Concession 
agreements, and it is likely that many of those provisions are preempted.”1282 The 
panel’s analysis rejected the ports’ claims with devastating thoroughness. 
Although it agreed with the district court on the preliminary injunction 
standard and its application to the tidelands and market participant arguments,1283 
the panel disagreed on the safety exception. Noting that “the mere fact that one part 
of a regulation or group of regulations might come within an exception to 
preemption does not mean that all other parts of that regulation or group are also 
excepted,”1284 the court proceeded to highlight the non-safety rationales for the 
plans, including “an extensive attempt to reshape and control the economics of the 
drayage industry” and to “ameliorate . . . adverse economic effects.”1285 
The court then turned to analyzing the plans’ individual provisions. Homing 
in on the employee conversion piece in the Los Angeles plan, the court used the 
 
1279. Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Waterfront Employers in Support of Appellant 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 559 F.3d 1046 (No. 08-56503) (filed June 30, 2009). 
1280. Brief of the Attorney Gen. of the State of Cal. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees 
the City of L.A., Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 559 F.3d 1046 (No. 08-56503) (filed Dec. 18, 2008). At the 
same time, CARB was finalizing its own emission rules to phase out old, dirty diesel trucks by requiring 
all diesel trucks to meet 2010 standards by the year 2023. Margot Roosevelt, Community Groups, State 
Battle Pollution, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, at B1. This was viewed by the coalition as a backstop, 
requiring trucks to move away from diesel irrespective of the outcome of the ATA litigation. See 
Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 1238. The Los Angeles Times editorial board 
praised the CARB plan, but also used it to take another jab at the Los Angeles port’s employee 
conversion program: “The port needs a separate truck plan because it has a separate mechanism for 
funding cleaner vehicles, but it would be better off imitating state regulators and focusing on cleaning 
the air, not trying to reinvent the steering wheel.” Editorial, A New Day for Diesel, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2008, at A32. Industry groups challenged the CARB standard and NRDC intervened to support it. 
Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 1238. The standard was approved in 2008, 
though it still has not been fully implemented. Tony Barboza, Date for Cleaner Trucks Delayed, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 26, 2014, at AA1 (stating that CARB agreed to postpone compliance deadline for “small fleets, 
lightly used trucks and those operating in rural areas”). The Port of Los Angeles subsequently amended 
Tariff No. 4 to be consistent with the CARB standards. L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Order No. 09-
7031 (Dec. 8, 2009). 
1281. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 559 F.3d at 1060. 
1282. Id. at 1057. 
1283. Id. at 1053. 
1284. Id. at 1055. 
1285. Id. 
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very findings the port had included in the ordinance to support market participant 
status to undercut the safety exception argument, asserting that “the record 
demonstrates that the Ports’ primary concern was increasing efficiency and 
regulating the drayage market.”1286 On that basis, the court held that “as we see it, 
the independent contractor phase-out provision is one highly likely to be shown to 
be preempted.”1287 The court expressed similar skepticism about provisions in both 
plans that required job posting, hiring preferences for experienced drivers, and 
financial disclosure, as well as Los Angeles’s off-street parking ban and Long 
Beach’s driver health insurance requirement.1288 Moving through the preliminary 
injunction test, the court went on to suggest that a company faced with a concession 
plan would suffer irreparable harm by being put to a “Hobson’s choice”: if it refused 
to sign, its port drayage business likely would “evaporate” with the result for a small 
carrier probably “fatal,” while if it did sign, a company would “incur large costs,” 
which would “disrupt and change the whole nature of its business.”1289 Noting that 
the public interest in deregulation further supported issuing a preliminary 
injunction, the court stopped just short of complete reversal, stating that in light of 
the severability provision: “we are not prepared to hold that every provision must 
be preempted.”1290 Accordingly, the appellate court remanded the case back to the 
district court for “further consideration of the specific terms of each agreement and 
for the issuance of an appropriate preliminary injunction.”1291 
Smelling blood, the ATA renewed its motion for preliminary injunction 
against both ports’ plans on the ground of FAAA preemption.1292 It was at this stage 
that the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports once again parted ways, each filing 
separate oppositions. In its brief, the Los Angeles port decided to play defense, 
conceding the provisions the Ninth Circuit had explicitly addressed (employee 
conversion, off-street parking, job posting and driver hiring requirements, and 
financial capability), while arguing against preemption on safety grounds for those 
that remained.1293 There was a tension in this position given that it conceded the 
severability of a plan that the port had long argued constituted an indivisible scheme 
to redress port pollution. Yet the terms of the Ninth Circuit opinion seemed to 
require this tactical position to salvage any part of the plan. Long Beach was more 
 
1286. Id. at 1056. 
1287. Id. 
1288. Id. at 1056–57. 
1289. Id. at 1057–58. 
1290. Id. at 1059–60. 
1291. Id. at 1060. 
1292. Notice of Plaintiff’s Motion on Remand for Entry of a Preliminary Injunction on Counts 
I and II of Complaint, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., No. CV 08-4920 CAS (CTx), 2009 
WL 1160212 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2009) (filed Apr. 3, 2009). 
1293. Los Angeles Defendants’ Opposition to ATA’s Motion on Remand for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 6–11, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. CV 08-4920 CAS (CTx), 2009 WL 1160212 (filed Apr. 
13, 2009). The remaining provisions included those requiring concessionaires to prepare maintenance 
plans, ensure driver enrollment in TWIC, guarantee compliance with federal, state, and local laws 
(including other provisions of the Clean Truck Program), and post placards. 
          
1104 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:939 
aggressive, arguing that none of its plan’s provisions, including those singled-out by 
the Ninth Circuit, were preempted either because they simply duplicated already 
existing law or were related to port safety.1294 The ATA responded that duplicative 
provisions should be removed from the plans and because the preempted 
provisions were not severable, the plans “should be enjoined in their entirety.”1295 
The Los Angeles Times editors, anticipating the district court decision, weighed in 
against the Los Angeles program, asking Mayor Villaraigosa “and his union backers” 
to just “[ l ]et it go.”1296 
On April 28, 2009, the district court ruled for the second time on the ATA’s 
motion for preliminary injunction, issuing a split decision.1297 Taking a provision-
by-provision approach, the court preliminarily enjoined key elements of the ports’ 
plans—including Los Angeles’s employee conversion provision, as well as both 
ports’ provisions on hiring preferences, financial capability, and parking and route 
restrictions1298—while letting stand other provisions the court held to be related to 
port safety.1299 Rejecting the ATA’s claim that the plans should rise or fall as unified 
agreements, the court held that the preempted provisions were severable and that 
the safety provisions could be effectively implemented on their own.1300 NRDC 
released a statement criticizing the ruling: “Without the employee program, port 
cleanup goals could be severely delayed because most independent owner-operators 
cannot afford to maintain and repair their trucks.”1301 
The ATA once again took appeal, disputing the district court’s decision not to 
preempt the provisions deemed safety related.1302 By the time the Ninth Circuit 
 
1294. Long Beach Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion on Remand 
for Preliminary Injunction at 2–3, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. CV 08-4920 CAS (CTx), 2009 WL 
1160212 (filed Apr. 13, 2009). Long Beach also argued that its plan should be examined in the first 
instance by the Secretary of Transportation, which had statutory authority to determine whether its plan 
could be enforced. Id. at 7. 
1295. Reply of ATA in Support of Motion on Remand for Preliminary Injunction at 22–23, 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. CV 08-4920 CAS (CTx), 2009 WL 1160212 (filed Apr. 17, 2009). 
1296. Editorial, Let’s Get Truckin’, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, at A32. As he had in the past, the 
Coalition for Clean Air’s Martin Schlageter responded to the Times: “Without a systemic fix, today’s 
new trucks will be tomorrow’s broken-down trucks.” Martin Schlageter, The Road We’re On, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 2009, at A22 (letter to editor). 
1297. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. CV 08-4920 CAS (CTx), 2009 WL 1160212. 
1298. Id. at *20–21. The court also enjoined Long Beach’s driver health insurance provision, 
and both ports’ truck tariffs and concession fees. Id. However, in a subsequent ruling, responding to a 
motion by the ATA to modify the April 28 order so that it would not have to post bond, the court 
reinstituted the Port of Los Angeles’s concession fee. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., No. 
CV 08-4920 CAS (CTx), 2009 WL 2412578, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009). 
1299. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. CV 08-4920 CAS (CTx), 2009 WL 1160212, at *11–18. In 
total, the court let stand nine provisions requiring concessionaires to: (1) be LMCs; (2) use permitted 
trucks; (3) ensure driver compliance; (4) prepare a maintenance plan; (5) ensure driver enrollment in 
TWIC; (6) ensure that trucks have compliance tags; (7) ensure compliance with security laws; (8) post 
placards; and (9) keep records not related to safety. Id. at *21. 
1300. Id. at *19–20. 
1301. Ronald D. White, Judge Restricts Ports’ Truck Plan, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, at B2. 
1302. Brief of Appellant Am. Trucking Ass’ns at 13–16, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of 
L.A., 596 F.3d 602 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-55749) (filed June 11, 2009). 
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decided the case, however, Long Beach was no longer part of it. With the appeal 
pending, the Port of Long Beach decided to strike a deal with the ATA, in which 
the port would permit truck access under a new “Registration and Agreement” to 
supersede the concession plan.1303 The new agreement stripped away provisions 
deemed unrelated to clean truck conversion—including those dealing with parking, 
truck routes, and financial capability.1304 Under the final agreement, concessionaires 
would certify truck compliance with basic registration, identification, safety, and 
security standards, while also certifying compliance with the environmental 
provisions of the Clean Truck Program.1305 On the basis of that settlement, the 
court dismissed the Long Beach defendants on October 20, 2009.1306 While Long 
Beach port director Richard Steinke affirmed his port’s commitment to going green, 
Los Angeles director Geraldine Knatz asked, “Who will pay for the next fleet of 
clean trucks when today’s new trucks will need to be replaced?”1307 
Left to fend for itself, the Port of Los Angeles confronted an invigorated 
adversary. In court, the ATA sought to compel the disclosure of internal port 
documents reflecting staff deliberations over the concession agreement, to which 
the ATA claimed to be entitled in order to rebut port assertions that the agreement 
was motivated by safety concerns.1308 Although the ATA would ultimately lose this 
argument on privilege grounds,1309 it suggested the extent to which the ATA was 
 
1303. Stipulation of Settlement and Joint Motion for Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice 
between Plaintiff ATA and Long Beach Defendants, Exhibit A, Motor Carrier Registration and 
Agreement at 1–2, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., No. CV 08-4920 CAS (CTx) (filed Oct. 
19, 2009). The settlement was approved by the board after a closed session meeting, with Commissioner 
Cordero voting against. Long Beach Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Minutes of a Special Meeting, PORT LONG 
BEACH 1 (Oct. 19, 2009). 
1304. Ronald D. White, Port Settles Truckers Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, at B4. 
1305. Exhibit A, Motor Carrier Registration and Agreement, supra note 1303, at 2–4. The 
settlement also required the port to amend provisions of its Clean Truck Program to be consistent with 
the settlement terms, which it did after a full hearing at which Pettit, Zerolnick, Schlageter, and other 
coalition members spoke out against the changes. Long Beach Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Minutes, PORT 
LONG BEACH 9–11 (Nov. 16, 2009). 
1306. Order of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice of Long Beach Defendants, Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., No. CV 08-4920 CAS (CTx) (filed Oct. 20, 2009). NRDC and other environmental groups 
challenged this settlement on CEQA grounds, arguing that it “substantially weakened the 
environmental benefits of the Port’s Clean Truck Program” and that the port violated CEQA by failing 
to conduct an appropriate environmental review. NRDC, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, No. CV 10-826 
CAS (PJWx), 2011 WL 2790261, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2011). The district court agreed, ordering 
an initial environmental study in July 2011. Id. at *5. The city conducted a study and issued a negative 
declaration, stating that the proposed project could not have a significant effect on the environment. 
THOMAS JOHNSON ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANT LLC, PORT OF LONG BEACH ATA 
LITIGATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: INITIAL STUDY (2011), available at http://www 
.polb.com/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?BlobID=9236. 
1307. Ronald D. White, Ports Split on Union Stance, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2009, at B1. 
1308. Joint Stipulation Regarding Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of Documents 
Withheld Due to the Deliberate Process Privilege at 1–3, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS 
(RZx), 2010 WL 3386436 (filed Oct. 19, 2009). 
1309. Order Re: Plaintiff’s Motion for Review of the Order of the Magistrate Judge Declining 
to Require Production of Documents Withheld due to the Deliberative Process Privilege at 13, Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436 (filed Dec. 21, 2009). 
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willing to go to win. Out of court, ATA allies sought to take a page from the 
coalition’s book, organizing drivers in opposition to the Los Angeles program. In 
November 2009, the National Port Drivers Association, claiming to represent 
independent-contractor drivers, staged a protest in which 400 truckers drove up the 
710 freeway to Los Angeles City Hall, criticizing the fact that clean truck funding 
had not been given to independent-contractor drivers.1310 Around the same time, 
the Long Beach port began a marketing campaign to promote its program to 
community residents, featuring the president of ILWU Local 11, George Lujan, 
stating that his “union supports the Port of Long Beach Clean Trucks Program.”1311 
On appeal, the Port of Los Angeles lost a little more ground in front of a 
different three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit.1312 On February 24, 2010, the panel 
agreed with the district court’s decision to enjoin the provisions it did but also 
decided to enjoin one more—the placard provision, which the court found to be 
specifically outlawed by a separate section of the FAAA to which the safety 
exception did not apply.1313 The Ninth Circuit opinion contained a slight bit of good 
news for the Los Angeles port: holding that the port could exclude motor carriers 
that did not comply with the concession agreement and permitting implementation 
of the non-preempted provisions.1314 However, the overall picture for Los Angeles 
looked grim. With Long Beach out of the case and the core features of its 
concession plan subject to a preliminary injunction, the Port of Los Angeles 
appeared to face long odds heading into trial,1315 which was set for April 2010. 
The dramatic turnaround—from the district court’s initial support of the 
concession plan prior to its official launch date in the fall of 2008 to its preliminary 
injunction in the spring of 2009—affected the rollout of the Clean Truck Program. 
Although scheduled to begin on October 1, 2008, it was widely assumed that the 
port would not strictly enforce the concession plan until April 2009 as it worked 
out technical issues and permitted trucking companies to purchase new trucks and 
begin the phase-in of employee conversion.1316 Despite the ATA lawsuit filed in 
July 2008, program implementation proceeded apace. As Jon Zerolnick recalled, at 
first, “nothing changed.”1317 Trucking companies drew upon port and state funding 
 
1310. Seema Mehta, Truckers Protest New Rules, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A3. 
1311. Bill Mongelluzzo, ILWU Backs Long Beach Clean Trucks Program, J. OF COM. ( Jan. 7,  
2010, 4:04 PM), http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/ilwu-backs-long-beach-clean-trucks-program 
_20100107.html. 
1312. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 596 F.3d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 2010). This 
time, the panel consisted of a staunch liberal, Harry Pregerson, appointed by President Jimmy Carter; 
Ronald M. Gould, a conservative appointed by President Bill Clinton in a deal to break a nominations 
impasse; and Myron H. Bright, a senior Eighth Circuit Judge (appointed by President Lyndon Johnson) 
sitting by designation. 
1313. Id. 
1314. Id. at 606–07. 
1315. On February 25, 2010, the district court denied both ATA and Port of Los Angeles’s 
cross motions for summary judgment, clearing the way for trial. Civil Minutes – General, Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436 (proceedings in chambers on Feb. 25, 2010). 
1316. Telephone Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 951. 
1317. Id. 
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to begin converting their fleets, while some, like Southern Counties Express and 
Swift, took initial steps to convert their drivers to employees.1318 By early 2009, the 
coalition was supporting Teamsters organizing at companies that had moved to 
employee drivers.1319 The preliminary injunction ruling in April 2009 changed 
everything. With the threat of port sanction lifted, companies promptly moved back 
to independent-contractor drivers. Zerolnick described his impression of the 
industry’s position this way: “Now once it’s clear that I don’t have to do this stuff 
and in fact by doing this stuff I’m putting myself at a pretty serious competitive 
disadvantage, then why the hell am I going to keep doing this?”1320 
As trucking companies kept or moved back to independent-contractor drivers, 
they also shifted to them the new costs associated with purchasing clean trucks. The 
ban on old, dirty trucks—the second phase of which was set to go into effect on 
January 1, 2010—forced drivers to purchase or lease new and expensive low-
emission vehicles. Although the port offered subsidies, some drivers could not take 
advantage of them to buy their own trucks because they could not qualify for loans 
to pay off the balance—or simply could not afford to pay off the loans, even with 
port incentives.1321 As one driver ominously predicted: “The first of the year will 
probably be the end of my family.”1322 
Even for those who could acquire their own trucks, the total burden of the 
loan payments, higher maintenance and insurance costs, and higher registration fees 
placed new burdens on drivers who struggled before the program was 
implemented—and who faced even more intense challenges as the recession 
reduced work opportunities. In this context, trucking companies were cutting 
contract rates, putting the drivers in even more economic peril. The Los Angeles 
Times profiled one driver who sold his old truck and joined a company that still 
hired some employee drivers: “We’re like slaves. We’ve lost our freedom.”1323 Those 
drivers who stayed independent owners appeared to have no more autonomy. 
Trucking companies that had directly purchased clean trucks made drivers lease 
them back, deducting insurance and maintenance costs from their pay.1324 The Los 
Angeles Times reported that these new trucks cost fifty percent more to operate on 
top of lease payments of $1000 per month.1325 “Things were bad enough when we 
owned our trucks, but I would say the situation is desperate now,” one driver 





1321. Patrick J. McDonnell, Truckers Caught in a Tight Spot, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2009, at A18. 
Critics charged that most port incentives went to fund big trucking companies (Swift Transportation 
received $12 million for 591 clean trucks, while Knight Transportation got $4.4 million for 172 trucks), 
although the port stated that $200 million went to small firms. Id. 
1322. Id. 
1323. Id. 
1324. Patrick J. McDonnell, Truckers Assail ‘Green’ Cost, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, at A1. 
1325. Id. 
1326. Id. 
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take-home pay was seven dollars an hour—less than the minimum wage. His 
assessment was harsh: “This program has been a great deception to us . . . . We no 
longer have hope to be in the middle class. We are all poor now.”1327 
2. Public Litigation: Federal Agency Intervention 
In the midst of the program rollout—and before the ATA trial—another legal 
altercation over the Clean Truck Program would be resolved. On the heels of Judge 
Snyder’s first preliminary injunction denial in 2008, a second front opened in the 
litigation battle—this one initiated by the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) 
exercising its jurisdiction to approve cooperative agreements of ports.1328 On the 
verge of passing the CAAP program back in 2006, the ports asked for FMC 
approval of their plan to “promote cooperation, openness and joint action through 
means of discussion, development of consensus and agreement” in order to 
“decrease port-related air pollution emissions.”1329 In August 2008, after passage of 
the Clean Truck Programs, the ports filed an amendment further detailing their 
agreement to “discuss, exchange information, cooperate and, to the extent each Port 
in its sole discretion deems appropriate, coordinate the adoption and 
implementation of programs to reduce truck emissions and improve Port safety and 
security (Clean Truck Programs).”1330 
Responding to this amendment, on September 12, the five-member FMC 
(staffed with a majority of members appointed by President George W. Bush) issued 
a nine-page Request for Additional Information to determine the competitive 
impact of the coordinated programs—sparking a strong dissent by Commissioner 
Joseph Brennan, who argued that the commission was “making a monumental 
mistake in delaying, yet again, the overall environmental plan of the ports.”1331 From 
the coalition’s point of view, the FMC action was the result of industry 
representatives going to Washington, D.C. to pressure “a more favorable agency” 
to create problems for the ports in the wake of the industry’s initial district court 
loss.1332 After an exchange of documentation with the ports, the FMC formally 
 
1327. Id. Similar reports came out of Long Beach. See Kristopher Hanson, Straining Under the 
Load, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Aug. 23, 2009, available at http://www.cleanandsafeports 
.org/fileadmin/files_editor/LBPTTruckDriverFacesHardRoad_082309.doc.pdf (quoting one driver as 
saying: “Between payments for the new truck, insurance, fuel, taxes and the lack of work, I’m barely 
making it”). 
1328. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 40301(b), 40302, 40304, 40307 (2012). 
1329. FED. MAR. COMM’N, LOS ANGELES AND LONG BEACH PORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS COOPERATIVE WORKING AGREEMENT, FEDERAL MARITIME 
COMMISSION, AGREEMENT NO. 2011170, at 1 (original effective date Aug. 10, 2006). 
1330. FED. MAR. COMM’N, LOS ANGELES AND LONG BEACH PORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS COOPERATIVE WORKING AGREEMENT, FEDERAL MARITIME 
COMMISSION, AMENDED AND RESTATED AGREEMENT NO. 2011170-001, at 3 (filed Aug. 1, 2008). 
1331. Ronald D. White & Louis Sahagun, Ports’ Truck Plan May Be Delayed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 
2008, at B3. 
1332. Telephone Interview with Adrian Martinez, supra note 837. 
          
2014] PREEMPTIVE STRIKE 1109 
voted to seek the “surgical removal of substantially anticompetitive elements of the 
agreement, such as the employee mandate.”1333 
On October 31, 2008, three months after the initial ATA lawsuit was filed—
and in the waning days of the Bush administration—the FMC filed a complaint in 
the D.C. district court to enjoin both ports’ Clean Truck Programs pursuant to 
section 6(h) of the Shipping Act of 1984,1334 which authorized the FMC to bring a 
civil action if an “agreement is likely, by a reduction in competition, to produce an 
unreasonable reduction in transportation service or an unreasonable increase in 
transportation cost.”1335 The complaint, though framed broadly, homed in on the 
Los Angeles employee driver provision, challenging as “substantially 
anticompetitive” any program “to discuss, agree or implement a concession plan or 
plans . . . that requires, directly or indirectly, the use of only employee drivers to 
perform truck drayage service” or that “prohibits, directly or indirectly, the use of 
independent owner-operator drivers.”1336 In elaborating its legal claim, the 
complaint stated that 
the Commission determined that the CTP-induced changes to the drayage 
market and corresponding reduction in competition caused by the 
requirements to use employee-drivers exclusively . . . will give rise to 
substantial transportation cost increases, beyond what is necessary to 
generate the public health and environmental benefits asserted by the 
Ports.1337 
The case moved quickly—and came to an abrupt resolution after President 
Barack Obama, who wrote a letter in support of the Clean Truck Program as a 
candidate,1338 took office in early 2009.1339 On November 17, 2008, the FMC moved 
for a preliminary injunction against that portion of the Clean Truck Program that 
“(1) requires the use of employee-drivers by LMC concessionaires; or (2) establishes 
truck purchasing incentives, subsidies and clean truck fee exemptions that 
disadvantage Independent Owner Operators” at the ports.1340 Because this motion 
 
1333. Ronald D. White, Agency Objects to Clean Truck Program, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at C1. 
1334. Complaint for an Injunction Pursuant to Section 6(h) of the Shipping Act of 1984 46 
U.S.C. § 41307, Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. City of L.A., 607 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-1895 
(RJL)) (filed Oct. 31, 2008). 
1335. 46 U.S.C. § 41307(b)(1) (2012). 
1336. Complaint for an Injunction Pursuant to Section 6(h) of the Shipping Act of 1984 46 
U.S.C. § 41307, supra note 1334, at 27–28. 
1337. Id. at 10. 
1338. Kristopher Hanson, Obama and Clinton Push for Truckers’ Rights at Port, LONG BEACH 
PRESS-TELEGRAM, Jan. 12, 2008, at A7. 
1339. See Press Release, Coal. for Clean & Safe Ports, Federal Maritime Commission’s Move to 
Drop Lawsuit Against Clean Trucks Program Signals President Obama’s Support to Protect Port 




1340. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 607 F. Supp. 2d 192 
(No. 08-1895 (RJL)) (filed Nov. 17, 2008). 
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was the first time since the enactment of section 6(h) that the FMC had sought a 
preliminary injunction, there was no precedent for the standard to be applied. In its 
pleadings, the FMC argued for a less onerous rule than that typically applied in 
preliminary injunction cases, urging the court to adopt a “more flexible” standard 
based on section 6(h)’s test for permanent injunctions in which the court would only 
consider whether the FMC had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.1341 
The FMC argued that it was likely to succeed based on an “extensive economic 
impact study” performed by its chief economist showing that the “the net cost 
impact of the explicit POLA employee mandate, as presently confined to that port 
alone, likely will range between $3.0 billion and $4.6 billion through 2025—without 
offsetting benefits.”1342 
Both ports—Los Angeles still represented by Kaye Scholer’s Rosenthal and 
Long Beach by outside counsel from Troutman Sanders—vigorously disputed both 
the characterization of the doctrinal test for preliminary injunction and the 
assessment of the FMC’s likelihood of success.1343 In a ruling on April 15, 2009, the 
district court for the District of Columbia, in an opinion by President George W. 
Bush appointee Richard Leon, squarely sided with the ports.1344 Calling the FMC’s 
interpretation of the preliminary injunction standard a “stretch,” the court ruled that 
the FMC could not meet it anyway.1345 Although the commission had shown a 
potential increase in transportation costs, it had not demonstrated that the increase 
was the product of reduced competition—both because any trucking cost increase 
seemed to result from compliance with the programs’ terms (rather than market 
concentration) and because Long Beach’s rejection of employee conversion showed 
that the ports were “actually in competition.”1346 
 
1341. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction – Expedited 
Hearing Requested – Pursuant to Local Rule LCvR 65.1(d) at 19–20, Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 607 F. Supp. 
2d 192 (No. 08-1895 (RJL)) (filed Nov. 17, 2008). 
1342. Id. at 29. 
1343. On December 22, 2008, both ports moved to dismiss the complaint. Memorandum in 
Support of the Los Angeles Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 607 F. Supp. 2d 192 
(No. 08-1895 (RJL)) (filed Dec. 22, 2008); Memorandum in Support of Long Beach Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss, Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 607 F. Supp. 2d 192 (No. 08-1895 (RJL)) (filed Dec. 22, 2008). 
In January 2009, the FMC filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s Reply to Motions to 
Dismiss of Defendants Los Angeles and Long Beach, Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 607 F. Supp. 2d 192 (No. 08-
1895 (RJL)) (filed Jan. 15, 2009), and the ports filed reply briefs, Los Angeles Defendants’ Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 607 F. Supp. 2d 192 (No. 08-
1895 (RJL)) (filed Jan. 29, 2009); Long Beach Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motions 
to Dismiss, Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 607 F. Supp. 2d 192 (No. 08-1895 (RJL)) (filed Jan. 29, 2009). The FMC 
filed an amended complaint adding further allegations of coordinated activity by port staff. First 
Amended Complaint for an Injunction Pursuant to Section 6(h) of the Shipping Act of 1984 46 U.S.C. 
§41307, Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 607 F. Supp. 2d 192 (No. 08-1895 (RJL)) (filed Feb. 11, 2009). 
1344. Carol J. Williams, Court Refuses to Halt Clean-Truck Program, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at 
A10. 
1345. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 197–204. 
1346. Id. at 200–01. The court also held that the FMC had not shown irreparable harm and that 
the balance of equities and the public interest weighed in favor of upholding the programs. Id. at 202–04. 
          
2014] PREEMPTIVE STRIKE 1111 
The FMC swiftly retreated—perhaps motivated more by political change than 
legal defeat. In early June 2009, President Obama appointed Commissioner 
Brennan—the lone dissenter from the initial lawsuit—as acting FMC chair.1347 One 
week later, the commission moved to dismiss the proceeding (and the court’s April 
preliminary injunction ruling), arguing that a number of “events resolve the issues 
underpinning the Plaintiff Commission’s decision to bring this action and render 
unnecessary an injunction by this Court.”1348 One basis that the FMC raised in 
moving to dismiss its lawsuit was the fact that the district court in the ATA suit had 
by then already enjoined the employee conversion provision of Los Angeles’s 
concession plan—thus mooting the FMC challenge.1349 Another factor motivating 
the FMC’s dismissal was the Great Recession, which had significantly reduced cargo 
shipments and imposed financial hardships on both ports as they sought to 
implement their truck conversion programs.1350 When it was initially filed, the FMC 
action had blocked the ports’ power to collect the fees they had planned to use to 
fund clean truck purchases, contributing to a shortage of promised incentive 
financing.1351 After the district court rejected the FMC’s preliminary injunction 
motion, the Port of Long Beach sought to bring its incentive program in line with 
the more generous program instituted in Los Angeles. Toward that end, on April 
20, 2009, the Long Beach harbor commission harmonized its clean truck incentives 
with those of Los Angeles.1352 In its motion to dismiss, the FMC argued that this 
harmonization mooted the case to the extent that it had “sought to enjoin the 
disparities between the Ports.”1353 The court agreed and the action was formally 
dismissed the following month.1354 
 
1347. Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Proceeding and for Vacatur of the Court’s April 15, 2009 
Order and Memorandum Opinion at 2, Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 607 F. Supp. 2d 192 (No. 08-1895 (RJL)) 
(filed June 16, 2009). 
1348. Id. at 1–2. 
1349. Id. 
1350. Id. at 7. 
1351. See Ronald D. White, Port’s Clean-Rig Program Is Running on Empty, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
2009, at C1. Despite this glitch, the Clean Truck Programs had succeeded in adding 3000 new clean 
diesel trucks to the port fleet within the first five months of its implementation. Ronald D. White, 
Cleanup at Ports Starts to Pay Off, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009, at C1. One year after the programs’ launch, 
port officials “said they expect to reduce truck emissions at both ports by 80% by the end of 2010—a 
year ahead of schedule.” Phil Willon, Diesel Emissions Are Down Dramatically at Port Complex, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 2, 2009, at A11. The trucks were touted as improving driver comfort and safety, though some 
independent contractors complained about the prospect of being barred from the Port of Los Angeles. 
See Ronald D. White, Reaping Benefits of Clean Trucking, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, at B1. 
1352. Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Proceeding and for Vacatur of the Court’s April 15, 2009 
Order and Memorandum Opinion, supra note 1347, at 7. 
1353. Id. 
1354. Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 607 F. Supp. 2d 192 (No. 08-1895 
(RJL)) (filed July 24, 2009). In a startling turnaround, less than one year later, the FMC issued its 
inaugural “Chairman Earth Day Award” to the Port of Los Angeles for its Clean Truck Program. Press 
Release, Coal. for Clean & Safe Ports, National “Blue-Green” Coalition Applauds Key Obama 
Appointee’s Inaugural Earth Day Award to LA Clean Truck Program (Apr. 21, 2010), available at 
http://cleanandsafeports.org/resources-for-the-media/press-releases/national-blue-green-coalition 
-applauds-key-obama-appointees-inaugural-earth-day-award-to-la-clean-truck-program/. In another 
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3. Private Litigation II: The Merits Phase 
The dismissal of the FMC suit in the summer of 2009, at the moment the ATA 
was taking its appeal from Judge Snyder’s second preliminary injunction ruling, 
raised the stakes of the ATA lawsuit, which was now the only legal barrier to the 
Los Angeles port’s Clean Truck Program. As the case moved toward trial, following 
the 2010 Ninth Circuit ruling that preliminarily enjoined the employee driver 
provision (as well as the provisions on hiring preferences, financial capability, off-
street parking and truck routes, and placards), each side focused on strengthening 
their arguments. While this effort concentrated on crafting legal briefs and 
assembling evidence, the coalition also sought to reinforce its arguments for clean 
trucks in the public domain. Seeking to shore up the economic case in favor of the 
vulnerable employee provision, LAANE issued a report on the cusp of trial 
demonstrating that “the combined costs for clean truck leases and vehicle 
maintenance are out of reach for individual port drivers” thus undermining the 
“heart of the environmental policy.”1355 Timed to correspond with the parties’ final 
briefings, the stage was set for trial. 
The trial briefs laid out the now-familiar pattern of disagreement. The ATA 
argued FAAA preemption of the Los Angeles concession plan; contended that 
although it did not have to show each provision was unrelated to safety, it could; 
and then argued against market participation and in favor of finding that the plan 
unduly burdened interstate commerce.1356 Narrowing its focus for trial, the ATA 
only challenged five key provisions of the Los Angeles concession plan related to: 
(1) employee conversion, (2) off-street parking, (3) maintenance, (4) placards, and 
(5) financial capability.1357 Reprising a back-up argument first made at the 
preliminary injunction hearing, which had gained increasing court attention 
throughout the case, the ATA also sought to apply the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, which held that states were prohibited under the Motor 
Carrier Act from interfering with a carrier’s right to operate in interstate 
commerce.1358 Although the district court had earlier rejected this argument on the 
ground that the Motor Carrier Act was passed forty years before the FAAA—whose 
 
twist, President Obama appointed then Long Beach Harbor Commissioner Mario Cordero to chair the 
FMC in 2013. Chairman Mario Cordero, FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION, http://www.fmc.gov 
/bureaus_offices/commissioner_mario_cordero.aspx (last visited April 1, 2014). 
1355. SEJAL PATEL, FROM CLEAN TO CLUNKER: THE ECONOMICS OF EMISSIONS 
CONTROL 5 (2010), available at http://www.cleanandsafeports.org/fileadmin/files_editor 
/FromCleantoClunker.pdf. 
1356. Plaintiff’s L.R. 16-10 Trial Brief at i, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., No. 08-
4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010) (filed Apr. 13, 2010). That the commerce 
argument was relegated to a subsidiary position did not surprise NRDC’s Martinez, who reflected that 
the freight industry “lawyers will scream commerce clause violations to the top of their lungs during 
the advocacy or administrative stage, . . . [b]ut ultimately I haven’t found them to want to litigate it 
because . . . there’s fear of bad precedent . . . [since] I don’t think their case is that strong.” Telephone 
Interview with Adrian Martinez, supra note 837. 
1357. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436, at *2–3. 
1358. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61, 63–64 (1954). 
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safety exception permitted states to suspend carrier service—the Ninth Circuit had 
cryptically stated that “this issue is not finally resolved and may be reconsidered in 
further proceedings for a permanent injunction.”1359 The ATA used this opening to 
argue that Castle stood for the proposition that only the federal government could 
determine a carrier’s safety fitness and thus the port could not enforce the safety 
provisions of its concession agreement by barring truck access.1360 
For its part, the Port of Los Angeles took a slightly different approach than in 
the preliminary injunction phase. First, the port contended that the concession 
plan’s individual provisions did not have the “force and effect of law related to a 
price, route, or service” and therefore were not preempted by FAAA section 
14501(c) at all. The port then argued that—assuming preemption did apply—the 
provisions fell within the market participant exception and also were permitted 
under the FAAA’s safety exception.1361 This order reflected the port’s sense that 
the safety exception was a relatively weaker argument, but one that it “was kind of 
stuck with” after the district court upheld several provisions on that basis.1362 
Sending a similar message, the port devoted only a page to the ATA’s commerce 
clause argument and relegated the Castle claim to a footnote.1363 Not feeling as 
constrained by the lower court ruling, the NRDC’s position at trial emphasized the 
validity of the concession plan under the market participant exception.1364 
The trial lasted seven days. The ATA’s chief counsel, Robert Digges, appeared 
on behalf of the plaintiffs, alongside outside counsel Christopher McNatt, Jr. from 
Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary. On the Los Angeles side, city attorneys 
Tom Russell and Simon Kahn appeared with outside counsel from Kaye Scholer 
(Steven Rosenthal and his team). NRDC lawyers Melissa Lin Perrella and David 
Pettit appeared on behalf of the environmental intervenors. At trial, port counsel 
and NRDC each made opening statements, emphasizing distinct themes that 
foreshadowed counsels’ division of labor throughout the remaining litigation. Port 
counsel Rosenthal sought to lay out the case that the Clean Truck Program was 
adopted to “address specific proprietary concerns at the port.”1365 He suggested 
that the evidence would show the need for the port as an “enormous commercial 
enterprise” to address environmental and community impacts that had “brought 
significant expansion and improvement at the port to a screeching halt.”1366 He also 
stressed the port’s need to respond to security risks in laying out the case for 
 
1359. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 596 F.3d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 2010). 
1360. Plaintiff’s L.R. 16-10 Trial Brief, supra note 1356, at 25. 
1361. Defendants’ Trial Brief (L.R. 16-10) at 1, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS 
(RZx), 2010 WL 3386436 (filed Apr. 13, 2010). 
1362. Telephone Interview with David Pettit, supra note 841. 
1363. Defendants’ Trial Brief (L.R. 16-10), supra note 1361, at 22–23 n.10, 24–25. 
1364. Telephone Interview with David Pettit, supra note 841. 
1365. Transcript of Defendant The City of Los Angeles’ Opening Statement at 35, Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436. 
1366. Id. at 28, 33. 
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application of the safety exception.1367 For the environmental intervenors, NRDC’s 
Perrella focused on “[w]hether the remediation of port-generated air pollution by 
the Clean Truck Program and specifically by the concession agreement is protected 
under the market participant doctrine.”1368 As she made clear, the intervenors’ case 
would stress the public health impacts of port pollution and tie them directly to the 
independent-contractor status of the drivers.1369 
During trial, Rosenthal and his team presented evidence to show how the 
Clean Truck Program responded to proprietary concerns. Rosenthal questioned key 
port decision makers: Executive Director Geraldine Knatz, who discussed program 
details;1370 Commissioner David Freeman, who emphasized that the program was 
designed to facilitate port expansion;1371 and Deputy Executive Director of 
Operations John Holmes, who discussed how the program was intended “to 
provide a level of accountability, but also to insure the program was sustainable and 
that it met the environmental and security goals of the port.”1372 Rosenthal’s 
colleagues elicited testimony from witnesses highlighting how the program 
responded to local port traffic problems and transportation security concerns.1373 
Perrella took the lead in questioning Dr. Elaine Chang, who outlined the case for 
port-induced air pollution and the need for the Clean Truck Program to address 
it,1374 and Long Beach resident Bernice Banares, who testified about her own 
asthma and safety concerns raised by port trucks.1375 NRDC’s role was to “get into 
the record what the public health and environmental problem is and then to draw 
out facts related to how the port sought to address those problems and how 
addressing those problems was really intertwined with its pursuing its commercial 
interests.”1376 
With the evidence thus tendered, the parties waited for Judge Snyder to rule, 
which she did on August 26, 2010, in a decision that gave a sweeping victory to the 
port. In the court’s detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judge Snyder 
 
1367. Id. at 30, 41. 
1368. Transcript of Intervenor National Resource Defense Council’s Opening Statement at 49, 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436. 
1369. Id. at 52–53. 
1370. Transcript of Testimony of Defendant’s Witness, Dr. Geraldine Knatz, Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436. 
1371. Transcript of Testimony of Defendant’s Witness, Simon David Freeman, Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436. 
1372. Transcript of Testimony of Defendant’s Witness, John Merrill Holmes at 84, Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436. 
1373. Transcript of Testimony of Defendant’s Expert Witness, Jeffrey Walter Brown, Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436; Transcript of Testimony of 
Defendant’s Expert Witness, James Evan Hall, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 
WL 3386436; Transcript of Testimony of Defendant’s Witness, Bruce Charles Wargo, Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436. 
1374. Transcript of Testimony of Defendant’s Expert Witness, Dr. Elaine Chang, Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436. 
1375. Transcript of Testimony of Intervenor’s Witness, Bernice Banares, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 
Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436. 
1376. Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 1238. 
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ruled that none of the provisions challenged by the ATA were preempted—
contradicting the Ninth Circuit’s assessment during the preliminary injunction 
phase. The trial court’s decision—with an eye on the ATA’s inevitable appeal—set 
forth alternative grounds for different provisions. With respect to the maintenance, 
placard, and financial capability provisions, the court ruled that there was 
insufficient evidence that they would affect truck prices, routes, or services and were 
thus not preempted under section 14501(c);1377 alternatively, the court concluded 
that even if these provisions were preempted, the maintenance and placard 
provisions fell within the safety exception (though the financial capacity provision, 
enacted to ensure “the Port will not lose its investment in truck grants,” did not).1378 
With respect to the employee driver and off-street parking provisions, the court 
held both preempted and neither within the safety exception.1379 
However, here the court moved to a different rationale: market participation. 
Rejecting the ATA’s narrow definition of proprietary action, the court stated that 
“where restrictions are placed on services essential to the functioning of a 
government-run commercial enterprise, the market participant exception applies to 
non-procurement decisions.”1380 The court then ruled that the entire concession 
agreement was “essentially proprietary”1381—and thus not preempted—because it 
was passed “in response to litigation and the threat to POLA’s continued economic 
viability by community groups . . . as a ‘business necessity,’ in order to eliminate 
obstacles to its growth.”1382 Wanting to cover all its bases, the court also found each 
individual provision to fall within the market participant exception. Focusing on 
employee conversion, the court agreed with the port that it was “designed to 
transfer the financial burden of administration and record-keeping onto the 
trucking companies,” which was “clearly an economically motivated action, and one 
that a private company with substantial market power—such as the oligopoly power 
of the Port—would take when possible in pursuit of maximizing profit.”1383 The 
court further found that the off-street parking and placard provisions were 
“designed specifically to generate goodwill among local residents and to minimize 
exposure to litigation from them,” while the financial capability and maintenance 
provisions were “aimed to ensure that the trucking companies had the resources to 
sustain the Port’s investment in cleaner trucks.”1384 Finally rejecting the ATA’s Castle 
and dormant commerce clause claims,1385 the court resoundingly validated the port’s 
 
1377. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436, at *20. 
1378. Id. at *22–23. 
1379. Id. at *19–22. 
1380. Id. at *26. 
1381. Id. 
1382. Id. at *27. 
1383. Id. at *28. 
1384. Id. at *29. 
1385. Id. at *29–32. In reaching this conclusion, the court dismissed the port’s tideland trust 
power claim. Id. at *23. 
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Clean Truck Program and the legal strategy that produced it—at least for the 
moment. 
That moment passed quickly. In September 2010, the ATA appealed—and 
back up the ladder the case went. In doing so, the ATA requested that the court 
stay the implementation of the Clean Truck Program pending the appeal.1386 Judge 
Snyder agreed to temporarily enjoin the employee provision, which she held was 
likely to produce irreparable harm to plaintiffs that was not outweighed by other 
equities, while permitting implementation of the rest of the concession plan.1387 By 
this point, the issues dividing the parties were fully crystalized and their briefs 
reflected well-worn arguments for and against preemption.1388 However, to 
underscore the stakes, a number of new amici weighed in on the side of the ATA’s 
appeal: the Intermodal Association of North America, asserting the negative impact 
of the concession plan on the intermodal industry;1389 the National Right to Work 
Legal Defense Foundation, which argued that the concessions forced independent-
contractor drivers to sacrifice their right to work as such;1390 the Owner Operator 
Independent Drivers Association, which argued that the concession plan was not 
responsive to the issues facing non-short-haul drivers;1391 and the Center for 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, which argued that market participant status could 
only be exercised through procurement.1392 
The judges assigned to the appellate panel hearing the case were Betty 
Fletcher, an iconic liberal appointed by President Carter as only the second woman 
judge in the Ninth Circuit; Randy Smith, a strong conservative from Idaho 
appointed by President George W. Bush; and Rudi Brewster, a senior district court 
judge from San Diego who had been appointed by President Reagan. In a two-to-
one decision, with Smith in dissent, the panel upheld the bulk of the concession 
 
1386. Memorandum of Points & Authorities On Motion To Stay Final Judgment Pending 
Appeal, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436 (filed Sept. 24, 2010). 
1387. Civil Minutes – General on Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal at 8, Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. 08-4920 CAS (RZx), 2010 WL 3386436 (proceedings in chambers Oct. 25, 
2010). 
1388. Compare Brief of Appellant Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City 
of L.A., 660 F.3d 384 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-56465) (filed Dec. 28, 2010), with Brief for Appellees, Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 384 (No. 10-56465) (filed Jan. 31, 2011) and Brief for Intervenor-
Appellees, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 384 (No. 10-56465) (filed Jan. 31, 2011). 
1389. Intermodal Ass’n of North America, Inc. to Participate as Amicus Curiae, Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 384 (No. 10-56465) (filed Jan. 4, 2011). 
1390. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief in Support of Appellant by Raymond Porras, et 
al., Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 384 (No. 10-56465) (filed Jan. 4, 2011). 
1391. Brief of the Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellant Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., for Reversal of District Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 384 (No. 10-56465) (filed Jan. 4, 2011). 
1392. Brief Amicus Curiae of Ctr. for Constitutional Jurisprudence & Harbor Trucking Ass’n 
in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 9, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 384 (No. 10-56465) (filed Jan. 
4, 2011). The California Attorney General again supported the port. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the 
State of California, ex rel. Attorney General Kamala Harris in Support of Appellees and Affirmance, 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 384 (No. 10-56465) (filed Feb. 17, 2011). 
          
2014] PREEMPTIVE STRIKE 1117 
plan—but dealt the decisive blow to employee conversion.1393 Taking an expansive 
view of market participation, the court held that “when an independent State entity 
manages access to its facilities, and imposes conditions similar to those that would 
be imposed by a private landlord in the State’s position, the State may claim the 
market participant doctrine.”1394 Here, because the “Port has a financial interest in 
ensuring that drayage services are provided in a manner that is safe, reliable, and 
consistent with the Port’s overall goals for facilities management,” the court 
concluded that “the Port acted in its proprietary capacity as a market participant 
when it decided to enter into concession agreements.”1395 However, the court 
stopped short “of holding that every provision in the concession agreement” was 
therefore valid, instead opting to “examine whether the provisions at issue further 
the State’s interests as a facilities manager, or whether the provisions seek to affect 
conduct unrelated to those interests.”1396 The court also made clear that the safety 
exception was available for appropriate provisions, despite the ATA’s reading of 
Castle to the contrary.1397 
Turning to the specific provisions at issue, the court upheld four on diverse 
grounds: it concluded that the financial capability provision did not affect rates, 
routes, or services and thus was not preempted; it found the maintenance provision 
to fall within the safety exception; and it upheld the off-street parking and placard 
provisions as proprietary acts of the port as a market participant.1398 Yet the court 
could find nothing to save employee conversion, which it concluded sought “to 
impact third party behavior unrelated to the performance of the concessionaire’s 
obligations to the Port.1399 Recognizing the port’s interest in providing higher wages 
to attract drivers lost to the Transportation Workers Identification Credential 
program, the court nonetheless concluded that the port could not achieve market 
stability “by unilaterally inserting itself into the contractual relationship between 
motor carriers and drivers.”1400 Further recognizing the port’s interest in protecting 
its investment in clean trucks, the court concluded that the concession agreements 
swept too broadly by binding all LMCs, “not merely those who drive Port-
subsidized trucks.”1401 Finally, acknowledging the port’s interest in “streamlined 
administration” over a smaller number of LMCs, the court found it “insufficient to 
outweigh the Port’s avowed desire to impact wages not subsidized by the State.”1402 
 
1393. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 384 (filed Sept. 26, 2011). Dissenting, Judge Smith 
would have held the entire plan to be preempted, that market participant status did not apply because 
the relevant market was trucking services (in which the port did not participate), and that the safety 
exception was precluded by Castle. Id. at 410–15 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
1394. Id. at 401. 
1395. Id. at 401–02. 
1396. Id. at 402. 
1397. Id. at 402–03. 
1398. Id. at 403–09. 
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With this, employee conversion—the lynchpin of a monumental campaign and 
innovative local policy—was held to be “tantamount to regulation” and thus 
preempted.1403 
It was September 2011, five years after the campaign for clean trucks had 
begun, and the piece that had held the labor-environmental alliance together was 
gone. LAANE’s Patricia Castellanos, responding to the decision, stated that it would 
“have devastating consequences for working families and port communities plagued 
by dirty air and dead-end jobs.”1404 The port’s (and coalition’s) early calculation that 
it could win at the Ninth Circuit level—made with full knowledge of the 
uncertainty—turned out to be wrong as to employee conversion. The editorial 
board of the Los Angeles Times, on the eve of the Ninth Circuit decision, had 
expressed hope that it would “end the city’s misguided attempt to team up with the 
Teamsters.”1405 And, indeed, the port decided not to appeal the ruling—though not 
for the reasons suggested by the Times. On the negative side of the ledger, the Ninth 
Circuit ruling sent an undeniable signal: unable to persuade one of the circuit’s most 
liberal judges, Betty Fletcher, it seemed fruitless—even reckless—to press the case 
for employee conversion in front of the conservative majority on the Supreme 
Court. On the positive side, it also was possible for the port and coalition to count 
the Ninth Circuit ruling as a win and walk away. As NRDC’s Pettit saw it, the Ninth 
Circuit ruling endorsed the idea that a port “can have a concession plan and can put 
conditions on trucks . . . even [those] in interstate commerce.”1406 With the basic 
foundation of the concession concept thus left “intact,”1407 NRDC lawyers “viewed 
what we got from the Ninth Circuit as a victory.”1408 As it turned out, so did the 
ATA. 
4. Private Litigation III: The Supreme Court Phase 
Refusing to settle for the victory over employee drivers, the ATA again set its 
sights on gutting the concession plan, this time by appealing to the Supreme 
Court.1409 NRDC saw the appeal as a statement by the ATA that “state and local 
government should not be able to place . . . really any requirements on motor 
carriers, so it was: ‘If we can show that you can’t even do this placard provision, 
then that means that you can’t do anything.’”1410 In pressing this case, the ATA 
retained new counsel for the appeal: Supreme Court specialist Roy Englert, an 
 
1403. Id. 
1404. Louis Sahagun, Panel Throws Out Part of Port’s Clean Truck Program, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2011, at AA3. 
1405. Editorial, Truckin’ Toward a Cleaner Port, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, at A12. 
1406. Telephone Interview with David Pettit, supra note 841. 
1407. Telephone Interview with Adrian Martinez, supra note 837. 
1408. Telephone Interview with Adrian Martinez, Staff Att’y, Natural Res. Def. Council (March 
29, 2013). 
1409. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 133 S. Ct. 
2096 (2013) (No. 11-798) (filed Dec. 22, 2011). 
1410. Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 1238. 
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assistant solicitor general under President Reagan who had started his own appellate 
firm in 2001 and boasted a nearly perfect record in front of the Court. NRDC’s 
Perrella noticed the difference, recalling that the ATA’s Supreme Court counsel was 
“phenomenal,” framing the briefs in a way “that was just really compelling.”1411 
In its petition for certiorari, the ATA asked the Court to resolve what it 
characterized as three significant circuit splits: one over the application of the 
market participant exception to preemption, a second over the scope of FAAA 
preemption, and a third over the vitality of Castle. With respect to market 
participation, the ATA argued that the Ninth Circuit created a conflict by saving the 
port’s concession plans from preemption based on its status as a property owner 
when it did not “actually participate in the market” for drayage trucking and when 
the plan’s restrictions were “unrelated to the efficient procurement of services.”1412 
The ATA further asserted that the Ninth Circuit read the FAAA “rates, routes, or 
services” preemption too narrowly and that Castle still barred a state from 
“enforcing its laws through even a partial suspension of the motor carrier’s ability 
to operate in interstate commerce.”1413 
In response, the port sought to minimize the legal stakes, arguing that the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision was in fact congruent with those of other circuits on market 
participation and thus no circuit split existed. Furthermore, the port suggested that 
the other issues presented were not substantial enough to warrant Court review: 
specifically, the Ninth Circuit’s single ruling that the FAAA did not preempt the 
financial capability provision and its narrow application of the safety exception to 
the maintenance provision were too minor to justify granting cert.1414 For their part, 
the environmental intervenors emphasized that the Ninth Circuit’s decision on 
market participation was based on the trial court’s extensive factual findings on the 
port’s health and community impacts, which the ATA did not challenge on 
appeal.1415 They also continued to emphasize the business benefits of the port going 
green, which NRDC as an environmental organization believed it was better 
positioned to do.1416 In March 2012, the Supreme Court invited the U.S. Solicitor 
 
1411. Id. 
1412. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1409, at 2. In their amicus briefs, the Chamber 
of Commerce and National Industrial Transportation League, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence 
and Harbor Trucking Association, and Airlines for America (the airline trade group) all sided with the 
ATA to limit the market participant exception. See Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States of America & Nat’l Indus. Transp. League as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2096 (No. 11-798) (filed Jan. 23, 2012); Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amicus 
Curiae of Ctr. of Constitutional Jurisprudence & Harbor Trucking Ass’n in Support of Petitioner, Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2096 (No. 11-798) (filed Jan. 23, 2012); Brief of Amicus Curiae Airlines 
for America in Support of Petitioner, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2096 (No. 11-798) (filed Jan. 
23, 2012). 
1413. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1409, at 25–26. 
1414. City of L.A. Brief in Opposition at 9–38, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2096 (No. 
11-798) (filed Feb. 21, 2012). 
1415. NRDC Brief in Opposition at 5–14, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2096 (No. 11-
798) (filed Feb. 21, 2012). 
1416. Telephone Interview with Adrian Martinez, supra note 1408. 
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General to express its views on the matter, which it did, coming in on the side of 
the ATA.1417 In the U.S. brief, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli argued for an 
expansive concept of preemption, rejecting the idea that a port should be able to 
impose special rules, claiming instead that the port was “akin to a public managed 
transportation infrastructure” and thus should not be able to impose restrictions 
that were inconsistent with other ports.1418 However, the solicitor general also threw 
a line to the port by recommending that the Court not grant certiorari based on the 
limited significance of the Los Angeles case.1419 
If supporters of the Clean Truck Program were surprised when the Ninth 
Circuit struck down the employee driver provision, they were shocked when the 
Court agreed to consider the ATA’s market participant and Castle claims: setting up 
review of the concession plan’s placard and off-street parking provisions.1420 
NRDC’s Perrella described her response: 
Surprised? . . . It completely devastated us . . . . I don’t think I’ve had that 
really horrible feeling in my stomach . . . the way I did when I found out 
the Supreme Court had decided to take the case . . . . [H]ere we go again 
with a wacky environmental case in the Ninth Circuit before a bunch of 
conservative judges . . . probably not the best forum for us.1421 
The Court decision to take the case signaled an interest in perhaps curtailing 
the market participant doctrine at the core of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 
Accordingly, the port adjusted its market participant argument in its merits brief. 
Parrying the ATA’s claim that the port did not participate directly in the drayage 
market, the port emphasized its right as a property owner to enter into agreements 
affecting access to its land. In summarizing its core position, the port asserted that 
“absent a statement of clear congressional intent to the contrary, the courts should 
presume that proprietary state conduct dealing with the management of state-owned 
property is within the market-participant doctrine.”1422 Because the port as property 
owner had a clear “commercial motivation” in the contested provisions—
promoting truck safety and improving community relations—they fell within the 
scope of the market participation doctrine.1423 NRDC shaped its merits brief in 
response to the city’s draft, emphasizing the commercial benefits of the port’s 
 
1417. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2096 (No. 11-798) (filed Feb. 22, 2013). 
1418. David G. Savage, High Court to Hear Case on Port’s Clean Truck Program, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
12, 2013, at B2. 
1419. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, supra note 1417, at 6. 
1420. The ATA technically did not seek review of the Ninth Circuit holding that the truck 
maintenance provision fell under the safety exception; it did ask for review of the financial capacity 
provision, but the Court refused to grant it. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2102 n.3. 
1421. Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 1238. 
1422. Brief for the City of L.A. Respondents at 15, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2096 
(No. 11-798) (filed Mar. 18, 2013). 
1423. Id. at 29–30. 
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“green growth” strategy.1424 In making the market participant argument, NRDC 
drew upon its now-deep well of experience and also exchanged views with port 
counsel and the Teamsters’ Mike Manley.1425 In preparing for oral argument, 
Perrella helped organize two moot courts, one at the University of California, Irvine 
School of Law, and another at Public Citizen in Washington, D.C., where she 
persuaded former Solicitor General Seth Waxman to be on the panel.1426 
At oral argument, it was immediately clear that the port’s position would be 
greeted with skepticism. Almost as soon as port counsel Rosenthal began his 
opening statement, Justice Scalia pounced: “What exception do you appeal to? 
There are a number of exceptions there.”1427 Barely letting him finish a sentence, 
Scalia insisted that Rosenthal was asking for “an exception for private contract 
operations as opposed to public matters,” adding that “[t]here are exceptions to the 
preemption [sic] and that is not one of them.”1428 For Perrella, this was “difficult” 
because their argument hinged on the Court recognizing, as a first step, that there 
was in fact a market participant exception to the FAAA and she “felt like at least a 
few of the justices couldn’t even get past step one.”1429 Contending with Justice 
Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts about whether the concessions were enforced 
through the port’s criminal sanctions, Rosenthal focused on whether the provisions 
carried the “force and effect of law” under the FAAA.1430 This took the 
conversation away from market participation, meandering through an analysis of 
Castle and then back to questions of concession enforcement1431—in this way, 
previewing the grounds for the Court’s ultimate resolution. 
If the supporters of the Clean Truck Program were bracing for a sweeping 
curtailment of the market participant exception, what they got on June 13, 2013—
in a unanimous decision by Justice Kagan—was a narrow, technical reading of 
FAAA section 14501(c)(1)’s operative language, preempting a state “law, regulation, 
or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or 
service of any motor carrier.”1432 Stating that the parties agreed that the provisions 
at issue related to a motor carrier’s price, route, or service, Kagan’s decision focused 
on the “force and effect of law” language. While the Court acknowledged that the 
FAAA’s terms exempted “contract-based participation in a market,”1433 it 
concluded that the placard and off-street parking provisions, though contained in a 
 
1424. Brief for Respondents Natural Res. Def. Council, et al. at 10, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2096 (No. 11-798) (filed Mar. 18, 2013). 
1425. Telephone Interview with Michael Manley, supra note 1243. 
1426. Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 1238. Perrella also recalled 
circulating information on the Supreme Court case on a ports listserv, responding to listserv questions, 
and explaining the case to coalition members. Id. 
1427. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2096. 
1428. Id. at 31. 
1429. Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 1238. 
1430. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1427, at 39. 
1431. Id. at 44–51. 
1432. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2102. 
1433. Id. 
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contract, were “part and parcel of a governmental program wielding coercive power 
over private parties, backed by the threat of criminal punishment.”1434 Specifically, 
because the objectives of the agreement were accomplished “by amending the Port’s 
tariff” to impose legal liability on terminal operators—a violation of which was 
subject to criminal sanction—it did not stand alone as contract, but rather was part 
of a comprehensive regulatory scheme backed by “the hammer of criminal law.”1435 
Although the Court acknowledged that the “line between regulatory and proprietary 
conduct has soft edges,” this case was “nowhere near” it since “the threat of 
criminal sanctions” showed the government acting “qua government, performing 
its prototypical regulatory role.”1436 In the Court’s view, the fact that the port may 
have passed the Clean Truck Program to “turn a profit” was irrelevant to the 
question of whether it had acted with the “force and effect of law.”1437 What 
mattered was not intent, but rather the means used, which here involved 
enforcement of the placard and off-street parking provisions through “a coercive 
mechanism, available to no private party”—thus bringing them within the FAAA’s 
preemptive scope.1438 With this characterization of the concession provisions and 
reading of the statute, the Court sidestepped deep analysis of the scope of market 
participation. 
The court then punted on the ATA’s Castle claim. The ATA argued that Castle 
prevented the port from enforcing the remaining concession provisions on financial 
capacity and truck maintenance, which operated to deny noncompliant trucks port 
access; this denial, the ATA claimed, infringed a power reserved by statute to the 
federal government.1439 However, the Court read Castle to only prevent a state actor 
from punishing “an interstate motor carrier for prior violations of trucking 
regulations,” rather than “taking off the road a vehicle that is contemporaneously 
out of compliance.”1440 Because the port had not yet begun to enforce the 
provisions, the Court concluded that it was not clear whether enforcement would 
be for past violations of the agreement—which would possibly be barred by 
Castle—or for ongoing violations—which the Court noted that even the ATA 
agreed would be permissible.1441 Because “the kind of enforcement ATA fears, and 
believes inconsistent with Castle, might never come to pass at all,” the Court—
threading a very fine needle—decided simply not to decide.1442 
 
1434. Id. at 2103. 
1435. Id. 
1436. Id. 
1437. Id. at 2104. 
1438. Id. 
1439. Id. 
1440. Id. at 2105. 
1441. Id. 
1442. Id. In a concurrence, Justice Thomas, while agreeing entirely with the opinion, noted an 
issue that the port failed to raise but, in his view, should have: that the FAAA’s application to intrastate 
trucking was quite likely unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and thus the FAAA itself would 
lack preemptive force. Id. at 2106 (Thomas, J., concurring). “Although respondents waived any 
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In the end, although the port lost, it did manage to limit the doctrinal damage. 
The Court noted that the port had occasionally framed the question as whether “a 
freestanding ‘market-participant exception’ limits § 14501(c)(1)’s express terms.”1443 
However, mirroring the shift to the “force and effect of law” discussion in oral 
argument, the opinion’s text did not mention the market participation doctrine by 
name, thought it asserted that “contract-based participation in a market” was not 
preempted by the FAAA.1444 In that sense, the port—along with the environmental 
and labor groups that had urged it on—dodged a doctrinal bullet. 
Yet that was cold comfort to the city staff and coalition personnel who had 
struggled so mightily to win passage of the Los Angeles Clean Truck Program. 
Reflecting on the litigation loss, the port’s John Holmes—one of the key architects 
of the concession plan—saw a contradiction at the heart of the legal outcome. 
Although the port remained legally liable for environmental compliance, he read the 
Court’s analysis as depriving the port of full legal power to achieve it. The result, in 
his view, was that the port had “accountability without authority.”1445 
For the coalition, the Court’s opinion officially laid to rest the boldest 
aspirations of the Clean Truck Program. Built upon interconnected labor, 
community, and environmental claims for redress, what remained of the program—
clean truck conversion and port financing to achieve it—spoke most directly to the 
environmental concerns. Although community residents would benefit from clean 
trucks, their other issues—off-street parking and placards to enable reporting of 
bad drivers—had been legally excised from the concession plan. And one of 
organized labor’s preeminent goals—changing truck drivers from independent 
contractors to employees—once tantalizingly close, was again a distant dream. 
Litigation, which had been such a powerful tool in bringing together the coalition, 
had been used by its adversary to tear its accomplishment apart. 
D. The Aftermath: Maneuvering Around Preemption 
The ATA litigation reinforced the outlines of the difficult legal box that the 
labor movement was in. Although federal labor law did not generally serve the 
movement’s strategic interests—at least when it came to port trucking—federal 
transportation law was held to preempt local efforts to change the balance of power. 
The environmental movement, on the other hand, was able to wield strong federal 
and state law to carve out space for local action. In this regard, the ATA’s own 
strategic behavior helped the environmental cause by foregoing a challenge to the 
truck ban in favor of focusing its arguments on the concession plan and, specifically, 
employee conversion. This was both a tactical and economic choice. Supporting the 
ports’ green initiative demonstrated industry social responsibility and sharpened the 
 
argument that Congress lacks authority to regulate the placards and parking arrangements of drayage 
trucks using the port, I doubt that Congress has such authority.” Id. 
1443. Id. at 2102 n.4 (majority opinion). 
1444. Id. at 2102. 
1445. Interview with John Holmes, supra note 148. 
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union critique. And facing the reality of increasing fuel costs and the promise of a 
local subsidy, it made economic sense to convert the port fleet.1446 From the 
industry’s point of view, employee conversion was a dead-weight loss to be fought 
tooth and nail. 
As a result of the litigation, environmentalists could claim short-term victory 
in reducing emissions, but at the cost of long-term uncertainty about maintenance 
and the effect on truckers, who continued as independent contractors—only now 
with the added burden of having to acquire and maintain costly new clean trucks.1447 
In the face of federal preemption, the coalition pursued two strategies to maneuver 
around it. One centered on amending the FAAA to explicitly permit the Clean 
Truck Program—with employee conversion. The other sought to promote 
conversion and unionization through a company-by-company approach that 
combined misclassification litigation and direct driver organizing. Both, again, 
focused on changing the drivers’ independent-contractor status to enable labor 
action. 
1. A Legislative Window—Closed 
By the time the Supreme Court finally resolved the ultimate fate of the 
concession plan, the coalition had long since turned to “Plan B.”1448 After the Ninth 
Circuit’s first preliminary injunction ruling in March 2009—in which it opined that 
the employee conversion provision was “one highly likely to be shown to be 
preempted”1449—the coalition made a strategic decision not to wait idly by for the 
court process to wend its way toward resolution. As the district court issued its 
preliminary injunction against key elements of the concession plan a month later, 
the coalition had already set in motion a legislative campaign to moot the litigation. 
As Change to Win’s Nick Weiner put it after the district court ruling: “We need to 
talk to our friends in Congress and see what our options are . . . . We’ve come this 
far, and we are not going to give up because there are crummy laws.”1450 
The campaign’s first move was to the federal government, where it mobilized 
 
1446. Ronald D. White, Cleaner Port Air, but How?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at B1 (noting that 
the Los Angeles port had given out $44 million in incentives); David Zanhiser, Trucking Group to Appeal 
Port Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2010 at AA3 (stating that harbor department had given out $57 million 
to subsidize vehicles). 
1447. The Clean Truck Program did not mandate that truck drivers purchase and maintain their 
own trucks. To the contrary, it directed terminal operators to bar noncompliant dirty trucks, while 
stating that trucking companies “shall be responsible for vehicle condition and safety and shall ensure 
that the maintenance of all Permitted Trucks . . . is conducted in accordance with manufacturer’s 
instructions.” L.A. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, Drayage Services Concession Agreement for Access to the 
Port of Los Angeles, supra note 1207, ¶ III(g). However, the program did not preclude trucking 
companies from passing on the purchase and maintenance costs to drivers and, as a matter of practice, 
that is what the companies did. See McDonnell, Truckers Assail ‘Green’ Cost, supra note 1324. 
1448. Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 832. 
1449. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009). 
1450. Louis Sahagun & Ronald D. White, Groups to Ask Congress for Help on Port, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 15, 2009, at A12. 
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to amend the FAAA preemption rule to explicitly permit the Clean Truck 
Program—employee conversion and all. Jon Zerolnick remembered the coalition’s 
calculation in mid-2009 this way: “So we thought, okay, we’re pretty sure that we’re 
going to win the court case. But maybe we’re not. Maybe we’re wrong. We don’t 
think so. But, you know, if the F-quad-A—the Federal Aviation Administration 
Authorization Act of 1994—does preempt what we’re doing, well, then let’s just 
clarify the F-quad-A.”1451 
The legislative campaign started with promise. In mid-2009, President Barack 
Obama had recently taken office and the Democrats controlled both houses of 
Congress—with a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate. The political stars were 
thus aligned and, while the focus was on health care reform, the coalition sought to 
capitalize on the opportunity. 
A key early step was drafting language to modify the FAAA to carve out an 
exception for the Los Angeles program. To advance that piece, the Los Angeles city 
attorneys, with input from NRDC and Teamsters counsel, generated an early 
draft.1452 The draft modified section 14501(c) of the FAAA, which prohibited state 
or local laws “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier,” to make 
clear that preemption “does not apply to the authority of a State, or a political 
subdivision of a State or other municipal authority of a State, to condition entry to 
Port Facilities for the purpose of . . . improving the environmental, safety, security 
or congestion conditions of Port facilities or in nearby areas.”1453 With that tentative 
language in hand, the port and coalition sought to build political support to move 
the policy forward. They would need to secure sponsors in both houses and to 
persuade the relevant committees—the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure in the House, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation in the Senate—to take up the bill. 
In a display of its seriousness, in May 2009, the Port of Los Angeles paid 
$150,000 to hire former House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt’s high-powered 
political consulting firm, the Gephardt Group, to lobby Congress on behalf of the 
amendment.1454 To support this effort, the coalition, spearheaded by LAANE, 
reached out to Southern California congress members to educate them about the 
lawsuit and the proposed legislative fix, and to gain their support and potential 
cosponsorship.1455 To make the coalition’s case, LAANE put together a 
comprehensive Briefing Book entitled, “Clearing the Roadblocks: A Map to Green 
and Grow a Key American Industry to Create 85,000 Middle-Class Jobs at Our 
Nation’s Ports,” which included an analysis of the “positive impacts” of the Los 
 
1451. Telephone Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 951. 
1452. Telephone Interview with Melissa Lin Perrella, supra note 832. 
1453. Coal. for Clean & Safe Ports, Background on the Port of Los Angeles Clean Trucks 
Program ( July 15, 2009) (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
1454. Art Marroquin, Port Panel Extends Lobbying Contract, PASADENA STAR-NEWS ( Jan. 20, 
2010), http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/20100121/port-panel-extends-lobbying-contract. 
1455. Telephone Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 951. 
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Angeles port’s Clean Truck Program, an overview of the ATA’s litigation, key 
reports from the campaign (including the BCG report), press clippings, statements 
of support from prominent elected officials, and a list of organizational partners.1456 
The coalition also assembled a two-page background paper, proclaiming that the 
“trucking industry, under the leadership of the American Trucking Association . . . 
is attacking” the Clean Truck Program.1457 This effort bore fruit. On November 4, 
2009, twenty-four members of the California congressional delegation wrote to 
James Oberstar (D-Minnesota), chair of the House Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure, to urge him to “consider making changes to the FAAAA so that 
California ports can successfully implement and enforce needed truck management 
programs.”1458 
Supporters of the amendment also made their case in the media. On the first 
anniversary of the Los Angeles Clean Truck Program, Mayor Villaraigosa touted its 
accomplishments and urged “lawmakers in Washington to update federal law and 
allow a first-of-its-kind emissions reduction initiative like the Clean Truck Program 
to flourish.”1459 Port director Geraldine Knatz sounded a similar note,1460 while 
other port city politicians lent their support.1461 New York City Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg threw his weight behind the campaign: “Today, I’m calling on Congress 
to support legislation that will empower ports to implement the L.A. Clean Truck 
Program, an innovative initiative that will create good, green jobs and improve the 
quality of the air that New Yorkers breathe.”1462 In what came as no surprise, the 
nation’s biggest trade associations were not persuaded: “We strongly oppose the 
efforts of the port to support changing long-standing federal law . . . to include a 
provision within the Clean Truck Plan that has nothing to do with reducing truck 
emissions.”1463 
For such a small change to an esoteric law, supporters assembled a powerful 
coalition to make its case on Capitol Hill. It included familiar players from the Los 
 
1456. LAANE, Briefing Book, Clearing the Roadblocks: A Map to Green and Grow a Key 
American Industry to Create 85,000 Middle-Class Jobs at Our Nation’s Ports (on file with the UC Irvine 
Law Review). 
1457. Coal. for Clean & Safe Ports, Background on the Port of Los Angeles Clean Trucks 
Program, supra note 1453. 
1458. Letter from Zoe Lofgren et al., Representatives from the State of California, United States 
House of Representatives, to James L. Oberstar, Chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee, United Sates House of Representatives (Nov. 4, 2009) (on file with the UC Irvine Law 
Review). 
1459. Antonio Villaraigosa, Clean Trucks: One Year Later, HUFFINGTON POST GREEN (Dec. 1, 
2009, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/antonio-villaraigosa/clean-trucks-one-year-lat_b 
_307158.html. 
1460. Geraldine Knatz, Port Clean-Truck Program Is Goal Worth Fighting For, L.A. DAILY NEWS 
(Dec. 8, 2009, 9:00 PM), http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20091209/geraldine-knatzport-clean 
-truck-program-is-goal-worth-fighting-for. 
1461. White, Port Settles Truckers Lawsuit, supra note 1304. 
1462. Id. 
1463. Ronald D. White, L.A. Port Urged to Stop Lobbying Over Clean Truck Program, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 26, 2009, at B2. 
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Angeles campaign—including Change to Win, CLUE, East Yard Communities for 
Environmental Justice, LBACA, LAANE, and NRDC—as well as other powerful 
supporters (the national Blue-Green Alliance, the Steel Workers union, UNITE 
HERE, and Sierra Club) and community partners from around the country. Thus 
united, the coalition coordinated congressional visits in late 2009 and early 2010. 
Change to Win’s Weiner helped bring in truck drivers from Los Angeles and 
coordinated a lobbying day on which Mayor Villaraigosa, consultant Gephardt, and 
Teamsters president Hoffa met with key lawmakers.1464 Jonathan Klein, director of 
CLUE, recalled making the faith case for the amendment, arguing “how unfair” the 
current law was “in the struggle for working people.”1465 After delays negotiating 
support due to ILWU resistance, the coalition eventually won crucial backers, 
including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis, and—in 
a key advance—persuaded Democratic Congressman Jerrold Nadler from New 
York to sponsor the House version of the bill. Nadler was a “good progressive guy,” 
who had worked on port issues in New York and New Jersey and had strong ties 
to the Teamsters.1466 
As this push was underway, the politics began to unravel. The first thread 
came loose in January 2010, when Republican Scott Brown, in a surprise victory, 
won the Massachusetts Senate seat vacated by the passing of liberal stalwart Ted 
Kennedy. Deprived of its filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, the amendment’s 
supporters nonetheless fought on. Their strategy was to attach the amendment to a 
must-pass transportation reauthorization bill that could be carried in both houses 
on a Democratic majority.1467 The enactment of Obama’s health care reform law in 
March 2010 fueled Tea Party resentment and drew predictions of a Republican 
House majority after the November midterm elections. 
With Nadler’s support in place, there was a vigorous campaign to pass the 
amendment before the midterms. In a letter dated April 22, 2010, the coalition—
now with over 100 organizations representing labor, environmental, and 
community groups from port cities around the country—again urged Oberstar’s 
transportation committee to take up the amendment. After detailing the state of the 
litigation and challenging the ATA’s “erroneous claims, not the least of which is 
that they really support the environmental goals of Los Angeles’ Clean Truck 
Program,” the letter promoted a concession model to “ensure trucks are adequately 
maintained,” “eliminate bad actors,” and “prevent fraud.”1468 It concluded: “We can 
have both high trade volume and clean, safe communities, but only if ports are able 
to implement programs that give them the tools to address and solve the pollution 
 
1464. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 820. 
1465. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Klein, supra note 885. 
1466. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 820. 
1467. Id. 
1468. Letter from LAANE et al. to James B. Oberstar, Chairman of the Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee, United States House of Representatives, and John Mica, Ranking Member 
of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, United States House of Representatives (Apr. 22, 
2010) (on file with author). 
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problem in the ports, including enforcing compliance by bad actors.”1469 The House 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure agreed to move forward, and on 
May 5, 2010, held a hearing on port trucking conditions,1470 at which NRDC’s 
Perrella spoke on the status of the litigation.1471 The draft amendment then was 
circulated to lawyers in the Department of Transportation, who were charged with 
FAAA enforcement (and who opposed the Port of Los Angeles in the ATA 
litigation). With their “wordsmithing,” the draft went back to Nadler and the 
coalition, which signed off.1472 With a final “big push,” the coalition gained 
commitments from key cosponsors—Democratic members of the California 
delegation, plus progressive allies from Maryland, Virginia, Wisconsin, Florida, New 
Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts—and the bill was ready. 
On July 29, 2010, Nadler introduced the Clean Ports Act in the House as H.R. 
5967.1473 The bill—in language that echoed the coalition’s early draft—proposed to 
revise FAAA section 14501(c)(2)(A) to declare that federal preemption of local laws 
related to “a price, route, or service of any motor carrier” would not apply to 
the authority of a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority 
of 2 or more States to adopt requirements for motor carriers and 
commercial motor vehicles providing services at port facilities that are 
reasonably related to the reduction of environmental pollution, traffic 
congestion, the improvement of highway safety, or the efficient utilization 
of port facilities . . . .1474 
The campaign effort now turned to getting sufficient votes to pass—which meant 
more congressional lobbying—in a harrowingly narrow time frame. To do this, the 
coalition circulated the results of a survey of driver conditions one year after the 
ATA litigation, which emphasized that “[m]any port drivers, in order to compensate 
for new clean truck expenses, are working significantly longer hours, earning less, 
and feel considerably less optimistic about the future.”1475 Noting that “trucking 
companies have seized greater control over drivers’ work and the trucks they 
operate through drastic changes in methods of compensation,”1476 the coalition 
feverishly worked to gain support for an omnibus transportation bill. But with 
Republican electoral chances looking good as the midterm elections drew nearer, 
 
1469. Id. 
1470. Assessing the Implementation and Impacts of the Clean Truck Programs at the Port of Los Angeles and 
the Port of Long Beach: Hearing Before the Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 2 (2010). 
1471. Telephone Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 951. 
1472. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 820. 
1473. Clean Ports Act of 2010, H.R. 5967, 111th Cong. (2010); see also Darren Goode, E2 
Morning Round-up: Green Groups Highlight Oil Accidents, Spill Response Debate Heats Up, Nadler Floats ‘Clean 
Ports’ Bill and Oil Spill Threatens Lake Michigan, THE HILL ( July 29, 2010, 11:22 AM), http://thehill.com 
/blogs/e2-wire/111569-e2-morning-round-up-green-groups-highlight-oil-accidents-spill-response 
-debate-heats-up-nadler-floats-clean-ports-bill-and-oil-spill-threatens-lake-michigan. 
1474. H.R. 5967. 
1475. COAL. FOR CLEAN & SAFE PORTS, LONGER HOURS, LOWER WAGES & LITTLE HOPE 
1 (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
1476. Id. 
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House Democrats were reluctant to make a strong push for a labor-backed bill, 
which was therefore delayed until after November. “And that’s when it all fell 
apart.”1477 
Although launched with great hope, the bill died an untimely death—undone 
by the catastrophic midterm election loss in November 2010 that negated the 
Democrats’ majority in the House. Deprived of the ability to pass legislation along 
party lines in either chamber of Congress, Democrats could not persuade any 
member of the newly energized and more conservative Republican caucus to cross 
the aisle in support of a union legislative priority. Although the coalition went 
through the motions, the legislative point was effectively moot. On February 9, 
2011, with fifty-nine cosponsors, Nadler’s House bill was reintroduced as H.R. 572, 
with the operative language virtually unchanged.1478 Putting on a brave face, Nadler 
proclaimed that the Los Angeles model for clean trucks should be promoted, 
emphasizing evidence showing that most port truckers earned too little to afford 
new rigs.1479 The coalition once again revived its legislative outreach. In its electronic 
briefing packet, the coalition presented “media coverage, reports, and other 
materials” to “show why local governments need action from Washington to reduce 
emissions, create green jobs, improve public health, and help responsible businesses 
grow and compete as part of our national economic recovery strategy.”1480 In a one-
page overview, the coalition reiterated its argument that the ATA appeal was 
“preventing key portions of LA’s Clean Truck Program from being enforced, 
threatening job-creating expansion and infrastructure projects from moving 
forward.”1481 The coalition thus urged passage of H.R. 572, which “will empower, 
but not mandate, local ports to adopt requirements for motor carriers and vehicles 
that are reasonably related to the reduction of environmental pollution, traffic 
congestion, improving highway safety, or for the efficient utilization of port 
facilities.”1482 
Yet it would not be. By late 2011, the coalition had secured a Senate sponsor, 
newly elected New York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, who introduced an identical 
 
1477. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 820. 
1478. Clean Ports Act of 2011, H.R. 572, 112th Cong. (2011). The new legislation added three 
words to the last clause of proposed section 14501(c)(2)(A) so that it now exempted local or state laws 
related to environmental, traffic, or operational concerns so long as “adoption or enforcement of such 
requirements” did not conflict with other federal laws. Id. 
1479. Kristopher Hanson, Congress Considers Law Allowing Other Ports to Mimic Clean Trucks 
Program, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM (Dec. 19, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://www.presstelegram.com 
/technology/20111220/congress-considers-law-allowing-other-ports-to-mimic-clean-trucks-program. 
1480. Support the Clean Ports Act of 2011, COAL. FOR CLEAN & SAFE PORTS (Dec. 7, 2011), 
http://cleanandsafeports.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Clean-Ports-Act-eBriefing-Kit-12-7-11 
.pdf. 




          
1130 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:939 
bill, S. 2011, on December 16.1483 The Senate bill was referred to the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, where it died stillborn. 
In a last-ditch legislative effort, the coalition turned to the California state 
legislature in the wake of the federal midterm congressional election defeat. On 
February 18, 2011, with the cosponsorship of staunch labor ally and Assembly 
Speaker John Perez (representing parts of east and south Los Angeles), and Labor 
and Employment Committee Chair Sandre Swanson (from Oakland), the coalition 
helped to introduce the Truck Driver Employment and Public Safety Act, labeled 
as A.B. 950. The bill sought to amend the California Labor Code “for purposes of 
all of the provisions of state law that govern employment,” to declare that “a drayage 
truck operator is an employee of the entity or person who arranges for or engages 
the services of the operator.”1484 As drafted, the bill would have effectuated by state 
legislative mandate what the coalition had failed to achieve through the port 
concession plan. However, industry push-back was swift and decisive. Although the 
bill was read into the Labor and Employment Committee record, and subsequently 
received a full hearing in May 2011,1485 it was ordered to the inactive file in June 
after Perez met with representatives of the California Trucking Association.1486 In 
arguing against the bill, the industry group claimed it would harm the state’s 
transportation industry and raised the problem of conflicting state and federal 
standards for employee status.1487 In addition, the California Trucking Association 
pointed to the 2008 investigation of drayage trucking companies by state Attorney 
General Jerry Brown—who found five small companies misclassifying truckers at 
the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports—as evidence that misclassification was not 
a significant problem.1488 The irony of this claim could not have been lost on 
coalition advocates, who knew that the five prosecuted companies represented a 
lower bound, not an upper limit on violators as the industry suggested. Indeed, as 
the campaign moved into its final phase, advocates had already begun to challenge 
trucker misclassification as a systemic problem—intent to prove the industry wrong 
and salvage the effort to reform port trucking. 
2. Law and Organizing—A Renewed Challenge 
a. Misclassification Litigation 
The second post-injunction path pursued by the coalition was to combine 
 
1483. Clean Ports Act of 2011, S. 2011, 112th Cong. (2011). Gillibrand had five cosponsors: 
Senators Barbara Boxer (CA), Sherrod Brown (OH), Al Franken (MN), Robert Menendez (NJ), and 
Charles Schumer (NY). 
1484. Assemb. B. 950, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
1485. Assembly Third Reading, Assemb. B. 950 (Feb. 18, 2011); Assemb. Comm. on Lab. and 
Employment, Hearing on Assemb. B. 950 (May 4, 2011). 
1486. California Bill Seeking to Ban Independent Truck Operators Shelved, PAC. MAR. ONLINE ( June 
7, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://www.pmmonlinenews.com/2011/06/california-bill-seeking-to-ban.html. 
1487. Id. 
1488. Id. 
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affirmative litigation with organizing in an effort to move some of the vast number 
of contractor-based companies to an employee model,1489 while simultaneously 
attempting to organize the handful of employee-based companies that already 
existed. The strategy was to build misclassification lawsuits against companies that 
wrongfully classified drivers as contractors—thus exerting pressure on the 
companies to accept employees, while also winning benefits for the misclassified 
drivers. At the same time, the Teamsters would launch union organizing campaigns 
at companies that, for their own reasons, already hired drivers as employees. 
Advocates had long believed that many drayage truck drivers were illegally 
labeled independent contractors by companies that nonetheless exercised employer-
like control. Challenges to misclassification had its roots in the early 1990s campaign 
by the Waterfront Rail Truckers Union and the Albillo v. Intermodal Container Services 
class action at the end of that decade.1490 Yet by the late 2000s, the context had 
changed in ways that refocused attention on the potential to make the 
misclassification case. The difference was twofold. First, particularly after the 
congressional midterm elections undercut the effort to amend the FAAA, the 
coalition was prepared to invest significant resources to promote a systematic 
enforcement campaign1491—something that had been lacking in previous 
enforcement efforts. And second, there were political allies in influential positions 
within relevant federal and state agencies that might be able to contribute additional 
enforcement resources. 
The path was not easy. In an industry of hundreds of small companies, 
misclassification litigation was necessarily a piecemeal approach. Moreover, the legal 
argument for misclassification was not straightforward. The test for whether a 
worker was a statutory employee hinged on the degree of employer control: a murky 
legal test that looked at the “economic realities” of the working relationship, such 
as whether the worker was engaged in a distinct business, supplied the materials, 
provided a special skill, worked without supervision, set the work schedule, and was 
paid by the job.1492 Failing to properly classify an employee as such was not an 
independent legal violation, but rather a predicate to showing an employer violation 
of other laws—for example, illegally deducting business expenses (like lease 
payments) from driver paychecks, or failing to pay minimum wage, keep appropriate 
records, or provide workers compensation and unemployment insurance. For 
private lawyers, bringing misclassification suits therefore depended on the extent to 
which the legal violation would generate sufficient legal fees. Cases for back pay 
involving small numbers of low-paid workers did not always provide fees large 
 
1489. A 2007 report found that only nine percent of Los Angeles and Long Beach port truck 
drivers worked as employees. See GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH, DEMOGRAPHIC 
OVERVIEW OF TRUCK DRIVERS AT THE PORTS OF LOS ANGELES AND LONG BEACH 3 (2007), 
available at http://www.cleanandsafeports.org/fileadmin/files_editor/GQRRdriverworkforcepoll.pdf. 
1490. See supra Section III.B. 
1491. Telephone Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 951. 
1492. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1012 (9th Cir. 1999); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. 
Dept. of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 403–05 (Cal. 1989). 
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enough to entice private lawyers to make the investment. Even successful cases 
could not force companies to hire employees—and often had the effect of simply 
making companies more stringent about following the independent-contractor 
rules. 
It was against this backdrop that the coalition simultaneously pursued public 
and private enforcement options. The public option avoided the private attorney’s 
fees problem by shifting the cost of litigation to government agencies responsible 
for enforcing employment law: the Department of Labor (DOL) at the federal level 
and the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) at the state level. 
Both agencies were empowered to investigate and bring enforcement actions 
against violators of minimum wage and overtime laws—and had the resources and 
staff to conduct large-scale operations. The key was persuading decision makers to 
exercise their power. 
In 2009, the Obama DOL launched a misclassification initiative to investigate 
the problem in various industries. At the state level, in February 2008, during the 
height of the campaign for clean trucks, California Attorney General Jerry Brown 
appointed a task force to investigate port trucking misclassification, which 
“uncovered numerous state labor law violations committed by several trucking 
companies operating at the ports.”1493 As a result, Brown filed lawsuits,1494 which 
alleged that port trucking firms had illegally avoided paying employment taxes and 
workers’ compensation benefits, and also gained an unfair business advantage over 
companies that followed the law.1495 Brown won judgments against five small 
companies,1496 though all went out of business.1497 Another suit against Pac Anchor 
Transportation elicited a strong response,1498 with the company criticizing the 
attorney general for seeking “political gain” by currying favor with the Teamsters to 
win their support in his planned 2010 run for governor.1499 Pac Anchor fought the 
suit and won a superior court decision in 2009, which held that the state’s unfair 
 
1493. Press Release, California Attorney General, Attorney General Brown Sues Three 
Trucking Companies in Ongoing Worker Abuse Crackdown at Los Angeles and Long Beach Ports 
(Oct. 27, 2008), available at https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-brown-sues 
-three-trucking-companies-ongoing-worker-abuse. 
1494. These companies included Pacifica Trucks, Guasimal Trucking, Jose Maria Lira Trucking, 
Esdmundo Lira Trucking, and Noel and Emma Moreno Trucking. Press Release, California Attorney 
General, Brown Wins Fifth Suit Against Port Trucking Companies that Violated Workers’ Rights, (Feb. 
4, 2010), available at http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/brown-wins-fifth-suit-against-port 
-trucking-companies-violated-workers-rights. 
1495. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200–17210 authorizes injunctive relief and civil restitution 
against anyone engaged in “unfair competition,” defined broadly as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent 
business act or practice.” 
1496. Press Release, California Attorney General, supra note 1494. 
1497. Telephone Interview with Michael Manley, supra note 1243. 
1498. See Complaint for Restitution, Penalties and Injunctive Relief, State v. Pac Anchor 
Transp., Inc., No. BC397600 (Sept. 4, 2008), available at http://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments 
/press_releases/n1606_complaint_pac_anchor.pdf. 
1499. Truckers Claim Brown’s Frivolous Lawsuit Designed to Curry Political Favor, LEGAL NEWSLINE 
(Nov. 25, 2008, 11:44 PM), http://legalnewsline.com/news/217658-truckers-claim-browns-frivolous 
-lawsuit-designed-to-curry-political-favor. 
          
2014] PREEMPTIVE STRIKE 1133 
business practices claim was preempted by the FAAA. The case was reversed on 
appeal, but that opinion was superseded as the case went up to the California 
Supreme Court—where LAANE, represented by Davis, Cowell & Bowe’s Andy 
Kahn, filed an amicus brief in support of the state’s position.1500 
As it did, the coalition sought to mobilize additional public enforcement 
pressure at the state and federal levels. When Brown was elected governor of 
California in November 2010, he appointed Julie Su to head the DLSE. Su was a 
prominent workers’ rights lawyer, who directed the litigation department at the 
Asian Pacific American Legal Center in Los Angeles, where she had worked since 
joining the group as a Skadden Fellow in 1994.1501 Su had gained recognition for 
her groundbreaking advocacy on behalf of Thai workers enslaved by garment 
contractors in El Monte, California—a case in which she had pressed for garment 
manufacturer and retailer liability for contract worker abuse under the “economic 
realities” test.1502 She thus came to the job in early 2011 as a natural coalition ally 
with directly relevant experience litigating employment cases in industries defined 
by contracting. 
Coalition members moved to reach out to Su to make the case that the DLSE 
should devote resources to target misclassification in port trucking. In doing so, 
they were equipped with multiple pieces of evidence. In December 2010, Rebecca 
Smith at the National Employment Law Project (NELP)—along with Professor 
David Bensman of Rutgers School of Management and Labor Relations, and Paul 
Marvy of Change to Win—released The Big Rig, a carefully documented report on 
port trucking finding that “the typical port truck driver is misclassified as an 
independent contractor” since drivers were subject to “strict behavioral controls,” 
“financially dependent,” and “tightly tied” to particular trucking companies.1503 
News reports highlighted the plight of truck drivers, with one article in the Spanish-
language daily, La Opinión, quoting a driver lamenting: “We are at the mercy of 
God.”1504 Other research linked misclassification to the concept of “wage theft,” 
with UCLA researchers finding that nearly one-third of Los Angeles workers in a 
typical week were deprived of the minimum wage.1505 The UCLA report urged a 
“move toward proactive, ‘investigation-driven’ enforcement in low-wage industries, 
rather than simply reacting to complaints.”1506 Making the link between wage theft 
 
1500. See People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc., 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 709, 716 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011), review granted by 329 P.3d 154 (Cal. 2011). The case was set for argument on May 28, 2014. 
1501. Marc Lifsher, Her Job: Putting a Stop to Wage Theft, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2013, at B1. 
1502. See Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1459–61 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
1503. SMITH ET AL., supra note 231, at 6. 
1504. Isaías Alvarado, ‘We Are at the Mercy of God,’ LA OPINIÓN, Dec. 8, 2010, available at 
http://cleanandsafeports.org/fileadmin/pdf/La_Opinion_december_article_Eng.pdf. 
1505. RUTH MILKMAN ET AL., WAGE THEFT AND WORKPLACE VIOLATIONS IN LOS 
ANGELES 2 (2010) (finding that 30% of L.A. workers were paid less than minimum wage in the week 
preceding the survey, while 21.3% were not paid overtime). 
1506. Id. at 56. 
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and the government budget, the Obama administration in 2010 estimated that 
stopping misclassification could generate $7 billion in tax revenue.1507 
To help develop the case for proactive enforcement—thus advancing what 
was now “Plan C” since the federal legislative strategy had collapsed—LAANE 
hired Sanjukta Paul as legal coordinator in early 2011.1508 Paul had worked at civil 
rights litigation boutique Hadsell & Stormer and then opened her own solo civil 
rights and employment firm. On the verge of taking a hiatus from practice, she 
heard from a colleague that LAANE was looking for a lawyer on a short-term 
contract to help address misclassification in port trucking.1509 Attracted to being 
“part of a larger movement,” Paul took the job, which involved advancing the 
coalition’s top-down effort to promote agency enforcement while also developing 
a bottom-up strategy to link individual enforcement to driver organizing.1510 She 
quickly set about “getting up to speed on the legal issues,” which involved drafting 
memos to Change to Win’s Weiner to “inform the top-down enforcement approach 
against the industry.”1511 Toward that end, Paul developed legal theories to 
strengthen the case for agency enforcement and looked into types of available 
damages.1512 
Paul shared her memos with state regulators, while coalition members, led by 
LAANE’s Castellanos, met with the DLSE’s Su in mid-2011. The Teamsters’ Mike 
Manley and port division director Chuck Mack also joined in some of the meetings. 
As Manley recalled, the thrust of these discussions was: “Here’s the evidence. Here’s 
what we found. This is a misclassification . . . . You’re losing a whole lot of money 
by not going after these people.”1513 This last argument was echoed by CLUE’s 
Jonathan Klein, who recalled attending some meetings and arguing that 
misclassifying companies “cheat[ed] the government” by depriving it of tax revenue 
collected on properly paid wages.1514 Manley described the overall goal of the agency 
meetings as “trying to move them to really do something other than just sit with 
us . . . and say, ‘Oh, my gosh, it’s awful.’”1515 
This same approach was taken at the federal DOL, where Weiner coordinated 
meetings in 2011 to urge Secretary Hilda Solis and top enforcement officials to 
undertake parallel federal action. Manley attended some of these sessions, as did 
NELP’s Smith, who discussed The Big Rig findings.1516 Both the DLSE and DOL 
 
1507. James Rufus Koren, Truckers Want Break on Audits, L.A. BUS. J., Oct. 1, 2012, available at 
http://cleanandsafeports.org/los-angeles-business-journal-truckers-want-break-on-audits/. 
1508. Telephone Interview with Sanjukta Paul, Legal Coordinator, L.A. Alliance for a New 
Economy (May 9, 2013). 




1513. Telephone Interview with Michael Manley, supra note 1243. 
1514. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Klein, supra note 885. 
1515. Telephone Interview with Michael Manley, supra note 1243. 
1516. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 820. 
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made commitments to ramp up investigations. The wheels of government 
bureaucracy, however, moved slowly—and industry resistance was strong. 
To reinforce the significance of the misclassification drive—and turn up the 
political pressure—Teamsters president James Hoffa visited the Los Angeles port 
in December 2011, just after the Ninth Circuit had issued its final ruling in the ATA 
case invalidating employee conversion. There to meet with striking workers at Toll 
Group, Inc., his general message to port drivers was that the Teamsters were still in 
the fight despite the unexpected setback: “We didn’t think we were going to lose . . . . 
We have to go a different way now.”1517 Industry representatives pushed back hard. 
Robert Millman, a lawyer from Littler Mendleson representing trucking companies, 
was dismissive of the misclassification campaign: “The short story is nothing (like 
this) has worked . . . . This is nothing new. The question is: Are they going to be 
able to come up with some new game plan?”1518 
Part of the new game plan focused on leases between companies that had 
converted under the Clean Truck Program and drivers with whom the companies 
contracted.1519 The lease arrangements between a company and driver in many cases 
precluded the driver from working for other firms, thus suggesting a degree of 
control tantamount to an employer-employee relationship.1520 Companies deducted 
loan payments from driver paychecks—a practice that was illegal under state law if 
the drivers were, in fact, employees. Paul’s legal research suggested that the 
“documentary evidence” of these deductions in paychecks could provide the 
“monetary hammer” for private lawsuits seeking damages.1521 Paul also suggested 
that a new state law sponsored by the Teamsters, the California Willful 
Misclassification Law (S.B. 459)1522—passed in October 2011—provided additional 
legal leverage. An outgrowth of the legislative effort that had stalled around the 
more robust A.B. 950, which would have simply declared all port drivers employees, 
S.B. 459 made misclassification an independent state law violation, subjecting 
employers to substantial financial penalties.1523 In a memo to the coalition, Paul 
concluded that “the Willful Misclassification Law represents a bold and important 
advance in the fight against employers’ misuse of the ‘independent contractor’ form 
to deny employees their basic legal rights.”1524 In his Los Angeles visit, Hoffa 
 
1517. James Rufus Koren, Port Access Still Drives Teamsters, L.A. BUS. J., Dec. 12, 2011, available 
at http://cleanandsafeports.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/LA_Biz_12.12.11.pdf. 
1518. Id. 
1519. Howard Fine, Leasing Could Be Roadblock for Trucking Companies, L.A. BUS. J.,  
Oct. 24, 2011, available at http://cleanandsafeports.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/LA_Biz 
_TruckLeasing10.24.11.pdf. 
1520.  Howard Fine, Contracting May Squeeze Employers, L.A. BUS. J., Oct. 24, 2011, available at 
http://cleanandsafeports.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/LA_Biz_Contracting10.24.11.pdf. 
1521. Telephone Interview with Sanjukta Paul, supra note 1508. 
1522. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 226.8 & 2753 (Deering 2013). 
1523. The act imposed penalties of up to $15,000 for individual violations and $25,000 for 
violations that showed a “pattern or practice” of misclassification. Id. § 226.8 (b) & (c). 
1524. Sanjukta Paul, Synopsis of the California Willful Misclassification Law 3 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
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stressed the systematic nature of misclassification, stating that drivers did not have 
the power to set their own rates or choose where to haul cargo, and also emphasized 
the tax loss to the government that resulted.1525 The industry response was sharp, 
with companies complaining that they were being penalized for following the clean 
truck rule. “It doesn’t seem fair. We are following a government mandate and now 
we have that mandate being used against us,” said Vic La Rose, president of Total 
Transportation Systems, Inc.1526 
The second element of the coalition’s misclassification strategy sought to 
complement public enforcement with private litigation—and to coordinate the 
private litigation with driver organizing efforts. This strategy had its roots in two 
high-profile state court class actions filed by plaintiff-side attorneys at the Law 
Offices of Ellyn Moscowitz, which targeted labor abuse, but not misclassification, 
of port drivers. The first, in November 2009, alleged that after the rollout of the 
Clean Truck Program in 2008, Total Transportation Services, Inc. committed 
numerous employment violations by failing to pay minimum wage and overtime, 
provide meal and rest breaks, and reimburse expenses.1527 The second suit was 
brought in June 2010 against Sun Pacific Transportation and Pacific Green 
Trucking, alleging similar violations.1528 As truckers’ attorney Adam Luetto put it: 
“Port drivers consistently claim that they are forced to drive long hours without 
breaks and required to perform work they never get paid for . . . . These drivers, 
unsurprisingly, are simply tired of working for free and we are working hard to hold 
their employers responsible for such unlawful employment practices.”1529 The 
Teamsters coordinated with the lawyers to provide evidence of violations.1530 Both 
of these cases settled. 
On the heels of these suits, individual drivers began to file their own wage 
claims with the DLSE, challenging their misclassification as independent 
contractors. Acting on their own, four Long Beach drivers filed claims against 
Seacon Logix, which resulted in a January 2012 DLSE ruling ordering the company 
 
1525. Koren, Port Access Still Drives Teamsters, supra note 1517. 
1526. Id. 
1527. See Fiona Smith, Truckers Claim ‘Wage Theft,’ L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 6, 2009; see also Class 
Action Complaint, Montoya v. Total Transp. Servs., Inc., No. BC 425121 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 2009). 
1528. Press Release, Coal. for Clean & Safe Ports, Class Action Wage-and-Hour Suit Filed 
Against Sun Pacific Trucking, Inc., and Pacific Green Trucking, Inc. on Behalf of Southern CA Port 
Drivers ( June 30, 2010), available at http://cleanandsafeports.org/resources-for-the-media/press 
-releases/class-action-wage-and-hour-suit-filed-against-sun-pacific-trucking-inc-and-pacific-green 
-trucking-inc-on-behalf-of-southern-ca-port-drivers-latest-suit-cites-labor-violations-including 
-failure/. Attorney Scot D. Bernstein was co-counsel on the Sun Pacific class action suit. 
1529. Another Case Against Port Trucking Firm Underscores Widespread Industry Abuse, Disregard of 
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to pay over $100,000 in back wages and penalties.1531 Seacon retaliated by suing the 
workers for breach of contract under their lease terms.1532 David Gurley, the DLSE 
attorney assigned to the ports, knew of the coalition’s misclassification effort and 
reached out to Paul to help the workers, which she did (along with private 
employment lawyer Stephen Glick) by assisting them in filing retaliation actions—
forcing Seacon to drop the lease claims.1533 The Seacon Logix case was prosecuted 
on appeal by Labor Commissioner Su and upheld by the superior court.1534 In 
commenting on the victory, Su stated: 
In this case, drivers had signed agreements labeling them independent 
contractors but the Court saw the truth behind the label . . . . This case 
highlights the critical need for labor law enforcement, particularly where 
misclassification cheats hardworking men and women like these port truck 
drivers out of the full pay to which they were entitled . . . . This is wage 
theft and we will do everything in our power to stop it.1535 
The DLSE’s involvement refocused attention on the push for greater public 
enforcement. In February 2012, the DOL and DLSE signed a memorandum of 
understanding outlining their partnership to reduce misclassification.1536 In spring, 
the DLSE sent out subpoenas to several trucking companies and initiated 
investigations; the DOL launched a similar enforcement effort, resulting in 
approximately fifty investigations in total.1537 Some companies noted that the 
subpoenas did not list specific violations, but only mentioned potential 
problems.1538 Industry decried the investigations, with a California Trucking 
Association representative stating: “We have a problem when companies are 
harassed or targeted unjustifiably simply because they use independent 
 
1531. Order of the Labor Commissioner, Garcia v. Seacon Logix, Inc., Order, No. 05-52821-
LT (Cal. Labor Comm’r Jan. 10, 2012); Order of the Labor Commissioner, Urbina v. Seacon Logix, 
Inc., Order, No. 05-53002-LT (Cal. Labor Comm’r Jan. 10, 2012). 
1532. Telephone Interview with Sanjukta Paul, Clinical Fellow, UCLA School of Law ( Jan. 23, 
2014). 
1533. Id. 
1534. Tom Gilroy, Shipping Company Drivers Are Employees, Not Contractors, California Court Decides, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 4, 2013). 
1535. Press Release, Dept. of Indus. Relations, California Labor Commissioner Prevails in 
Misclassification Case Against Port Trucking Company (Mar. 1, 2013), available at http://www.dir 
.ca.gov/DIRNews/2013/IR2013-11.html. 
1536. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Labor, US Labor Department, California Sign Agreement to 
Reduce Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors (Feb. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/WHD20120257.htm. 
1537. Koren, Truckers Want Break on Audits, supra note 1507. The DOL investigations resulted 
in some misclassification findings and orders of back pay. See, e.g., Wage & Hour Div. Investigation 
Findings Letter, Container Connection of S. Cal., Inc., Case No. 1634525 ( Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with 
the UC Irvine Law Review) (finding that two workers were owed one day of back pay for $211.52 and 
$26.17 respectively). In August 2012, the DOL brought suit against Shippers Transport Express on 
behalf of Oakland port truckers. See Complaint for Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Solis v. 
Shippers Transp. Express, Inc., No. 12-4249 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2012). 
1538. Koren, Truckers Want Break on Audits, supra note 1507. 
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contractors.”1539 In response, industry lawyers conducted trainings—styled 
“Teamster and worker misclassification update”—instructing trucking companies 
on how to avoid running afoul of misclassification rules. One such update 
recommended that companies “DO NOT Use a Driver Handbook that looks like 
an employee manual,” or require a driver to “[w]ear company logo,” “[p]aint the 
truck a particular color,” or “[d]isplay a company ID card.”1540 Industry 
representatives tried to characterize the misclassification effort as another 
Teamsters ploy, with the executive director of the Harbor Trucking Association 
pointing to a “smoking gun” letter from Hoffa to Governor Brown in April 2012, 
in which Hoffa stated he was “glad to know that California, in collaboration with 
the U.S. Department of Labor, is seeking to end this practice.”1541 In October, ten 
trucking companies (calling themselves the Clean Truck Coalition) escalated the 
fight, filing suit against Su. In the complaint, the companies sought a declaration 
that their “pooling agreement” to share clean trucks and lease them to independent 
contractors, because it was authorized by federal law, precluded Su from pursuing 
state enforcement actions against them; the companies also requested an injunction 
against further misclassification investigations.1542 Responding to critics, Su insisted 
that the trucking industry was not being singled out and placed the blame squarely 
on the companies: 
I think too often that entities have kept everything the same about their 
operation, but they once had employees and converted them to contractors 
to cut cost. It’s bad for employees, it’s bad for the competitors, and it 
cheats the public out of millions of dollars a year because they’re not paying 
taxes . . . . I reject the notion that we should blame hardworking people for 
the abuse they might suffer from the people who break the law . . . . That’s 
not the way our legal system is structured; that’s not the way our labor laws 
work.1543 
Yet the blame game continued, with industry groups insisting that they were 
being unfairly targeted and ratcheting up the political pressure to tamp down the 
investigations. In cases to recover expenses deducted from driver pay, companies 
complained that drivers could end up over-compensated, since their contract pay 
was as high as $60,000 (though deductions could bring their take-home pay down 
below the minimum wage). The DLSE was politically vulnerable to charges that it 
 
1539. Id. 
1540. Cameron W. Roberts & Sean Brew, Roberts & Kehagiaras LLP, Understanding the Clean 
Truck Litigation Part VI, at 1, 30–31 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.htc.org 
/downloads/RES111413HTC%20Clean%20Truck%202013%20-%20FINAL%20Presentation-rz.pdf. 
1541. Bill Mongelluzzo, Feds Take on Drayage Misclassification, J. COM., July 16, 2012, available at 
http://www.teamsters492.org/docs/Feds%20Take%20on%20Drayage%20Misclassification.pdf. 
1542. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Judgment at 12–13, Clean Truck Coal., LLC v. 
Su, No. 12-08949 (Oct. 17, 2012). The coalition included Green Fleet Systems, LLC, Pacific 9 
Transportation, Inc., Southern Counties Express, Inc., and Total Transportation Services, Inc., among 
others. Id. at 3. 
1543. Joseph Lapin, Notes from the Underground Economy: Are Companies at the Port of Long Beach 
Cheating Truckers Out of Their Rightful Wages?, OC WEEKLY, Jan. 10, 2013. 
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was investing enforcement resources helping drivers not viewed as sympathetic low-
wage workers. To buttress DLSE efforts, Paul drafted legal memos arguing for 
enforcement efforts against large trucking companies, like Harbor Express, Inc., 
which would not be based on illegal expense deductions. Nonetheless, government 
enforcement stalled. 
The coalition thus changed tack, trying to generate more bottom-up energy 
among workers to file wage claims, which they hoped would both put greater 
pressure on the DLSE to process claims coming from workers on the front lines 
and promote the organizing of misclassified workers. For this, the coalition turned 
to Paul to help “figure out” what to do.1544 In response, Paul planned an eight-week 
legal rights clinic, coordinated with state and federal enforcement agencies, 
beginning in September 2012. To prepare these clinics, Paul reached out to partners 
in the labor movement, as well as government agency officials, for whom she 
provided an analysis of legal violations in the port trucking industry.1545 In August, 
Change to Win organizers passed out leaflets to stopped trucks inviting them to 
attend an initial meeting to be held at the Teamsters Local 848 office in Long 
Beach.1546 At the meeting were representatives from DLSE, DOL, and the 
California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA), as well as labor 
lawyers and Teamsters organizers—all of whom provided information and 
encouraged the truckers to pursue their rights.1547 At this meeting, Paul facilitated a 
know-your-rights training for workers and organizers1548—explaining what facts to 
look for in support of misclassification.1549 From there, Paul instituted a regular 
legal clinic, open two nights per week, which helped drivers identify employment 
violations, provided counseling on legal options, assisted in the preparation of 
administrative claims, calculated wages owed, and made connections to private 
attorneys. 
Through this process, roughly fifteen cases were filed.1550 Although Paul did 
not represent the drivers directly, once they filed claims, she helped calculate 
damages, coordinated with DLSE attorneys, and used her private bar connections 
to help find plaintiff-side lawyers to represent the drivers in the ensuing 
proceedings.1551 Paul also provided private attorneys with supporting legal analysis 
 
1544. Telephone Interview with Sanjukta Paul, supra note 1508. 
1545. Telephone Interview with Sanjukta Paul, supra note 1532. 
1546. Telephone Interview with Sanjukta Paul, supra note 1508; see also Joseph Lapin, Local 
Coalition Tries to Organize Misclassified Workers, LONG BEACH POST, Aug. 24, 2012. 
1547. Telephone Interview with Sanjukta Paul, supra note 1508. Paul was joined by Carlos 
Bowker, Deputy Labor Commissioner at the DLSE; Abel Gervacio, an investigator with the DOL; 
Victor Narro, Project Director at the UCLA Labor Center; Peter Riley, Regional Manager of 
Cal/OSHA Region 3; Rebecca Smith, attorney at the National Employment Law Project; and Michael 
Manley from the Teamsters. 
1548. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 848, Know Your Rights Workshop, Sept. 14, 2012 (on file with 
author) (asking: “What is employee misclassification and what can you do to end it at the ports?”). 
1549. Telephone Interview with Sanjukta Paul, supra note 1508. 
1550. Telephone Interview with Sanjukta Paul, supra note 1532. 
1551. Id. 
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and developed creative theories for company liability. The number of these “first-
generation” cases was deliberately limited to those with strong legal claims in order 
to create good precedent for high-volume filings later.1552 In February 2013, as she 
was preparing to leave LAANE, Paul joined the Wage Justice Center in a class action 
lawsuit against QTS, Inc., seeking over $5 million in damages for violations 
including unpaid minimum wages, willful misclassification, unlawful pay 
deductions, and unfair competition.1553 In May, two drivers sued Wilmington-based 
Harbor Express on behalf of a broader class of drivers for misclassification. 
Describing the suit, Brian Kabateck, one of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, stated: “It looks 
like a traditional employment, but they slap the title of independent contractors on 
them.”1554 Then, in June and July, forty-seven drivers filed DLSE claims against 
Pacific 9 alleging more than $6 million in damages.1555 In addition, coalition 
organizers supported en masse trucker filings with the DLSE starting in the spring 
of 2013.1556 The message from the coalition was: “We’re going to continue to be 
here and be a problem.”1557 
An updated version of The Big Rig research—released by NELP, Change to 
Win, and LAANE in 2014—suggested the scope of the misclassification effort. 
Looking at cases since January 2011, it reported that “[s]ome 400 port drivers have 
filed labor law complaints” with the DLSE, resulting in “19 decisions finding that 
drivers are employees” and assessing “more than a million dollars in wages, unlawful 
deductions, and penalties on behalf of 19 drivers against five companies: Green 
Fleet Systems, Seacon Logix, Western Freight Carrier, Total Transportation 
Services, and Mayor Logistics.”1558 In addition, based largely on coalition efforts to 
place driver cases with private lawyers, the report noted that there were nine 
pending private lawsuits against trucking companies for violations related to driver 
misclassification (eight of which, including Harbor Express, were class actions).1559 
 
1552. Id. 
1553. Class Action Complaint at 17, Talavera, Jr. v. QTS, Inc., No. BC501571 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 22, 2013). In litigation that is ongoing, defendants have sought to prevent class members from 
participating in the suit by seeking to enforce releases drivers were required to sign as a condition of 
continuing to work for defendants. Plaintiffs’ Notice for Motion and Motion for Declaratory Relief and 
Curative Notice at 1, Talavera, Jr., No. BC501571. 
1554. Ricardo Lopez, Truck Drivers Sue for Overtime, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2013 at B2. 
1555. Paula Winciki, Port Truck Drivers Owed Millions in Wages, CITY WATCH (Sept. 13, 2013), 
http://www.citywatchla.com/in-case-you-missed-it-hidden/5708-port-truck-drivers-owed-millions-in 
-wages (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
1556. Telephone Interview with Sanjukta Paul, supra note 1532. 
1557. Telephone Interview with Michael Manley, supra note 1243. 
1558. REBECCA SMITH ET AL., THE BIG RIG OVERHAUL: RESTORING MIDDLE-CLASS JOBS 
AT AMERICA’S PORTS THROUGH LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 14 (2014); see also Dan Weikel, Labor 
Group Claims Port Trucking Companies Treat Drivers Unfairly, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2014, 3:56 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-port-trucker-conditons-20140219-story.html. 
1559. SMITH ET AL., supra note 1558, at 20–22; see also Ricardo Lopez, Port Truckers Load Up on 
Labor Suits, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2014, at B1. 
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b. Union Organizing 
Misclassification litigation was always understood as a means to an end—a 
way to pressure companies to accept employees and, perhaps, even a union. As 
such, it was meant to complement the final element of the coalition’s plan: 
organizing drivers toward the goal of winning union contracts. Unionization of port 
truckers, of course, was the prize that drove Teamsters involvement in the clean 
trucks campaign. And in the immediate wake of the Clean Truck Program’s passage 
in Los Angeles, the Teamsters initiated union organizing campaigns at the 
companies that had converted to employee drivers. In early 2009, the union 
protested driver terminations at Swift and Southern Counties Express, claiming 
employees had been fired in retaliation for union organizing and filing unlawful 
labor practice (ULP) claims with the National Labor Relations Board.1560 However, 
when the district court in the ATA litigation preliminarily enjoined employee 
conversion in April 2009, these companies shifted back to an independent-
contractor format and the union campaigns fizzled. As a result, the Teamsters were 
forced to refocus organizing on the handful of employee-based companies that—
for idiosyncratic reasons—remained. 
Of the hundreds of trucking companies that serviced the Port of Los Angeles, 
only a few had employee drivers. Pursuing unionization at them posed obvious 
risks. Employee drivers could lose their jobs, the Teamsters could lose the 
campaigns, and the companies could decide to do what all the other companies 
already did—contract out their driving. Yet there were also significant benefits. In 
the wake of the stymied clean trucks campaign, a victory was badly needed to show 
drivers that the Teamsters—and the broader coalition—could deliver tangible 
benefits. In addition, a unionized company could be held out as a successful model 
for others to follow—proving that employee-based drayage trucking could be 
economically viable. As CLUE director Jonathan Klein put it: “We needed to have 
a win. And we knew that it was important for all of the port truck drivers to see us 
win . . . to make people aware that this effort is brought to you by Teamsters.”1561 
The union, with coalition support, thus sought to “build some density,”1562 however 
modest, in the port drayage sector, with the hope of creating a foundation for 
further growth. 
To advance the union strategy, Teamsters Local 848 took the lead, with a “big 
investment from Change to Win” and the Teamsters’ national office.1563 The 
Teamsters Organizing Department assigned organizer Jason Gateley, who had 
organized Coca-Cola workers in Las Vegas, to run the campaign. The union’s crucial 
first decision was selecting an initial target, which had to be a firm against which 
the union could exert maximum pressure without risking its withdrawal from the 
port market or conversion to contractors. The campaign thus chose Toll Group, 
 
1560. Evelyn Larrubia, Union Protests Truckers’ Firings, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at B1. 
1561. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Klein, supra note 885. 
1562. Id. 
1563. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 820. 
          
1142 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:939 
Inc., an $8.8 billion Australia-based logistics company whose main U.S. activity was 
importing retail goods and shipping them to warehouses and retail outlets 
throughout the country. In Los Angeles, Toll employed seventy-five local port 
drivers. The key leverage against Toll was that the company was heavily unionized 
in Australia, where the Transport Workers Union represented 12,000 Toll workers, 
thus forming a powerful block that could pressure management to support the U.S. 
workers.1564 
To organize Toll drivers, the Teamsters ran a “traditional corporate campaign” 
that sought to gain union certification through an NLRB-sponsored election.1565 
After several months of Teamsters organizing, drivers at Toll filed an NLRB 
petition for a union election in January 2012.1566 When a female driver was fired in 
February for stopping at McDonald’s, the organizing campaign kicked into high 
gear. Local Teamsters organizers, alongside their Australian union counterparts, 
protested in front of Toll’s Los Angeles office in March,1567 while Teamsters 
president Hoffa and Los Angeles Mayor Villaraigosa made strong statements in 
support of the workers at the Los Angeles Good Jobs, Green Jobs Regional 
Conference a few weeks later.1568 The coalition lent organizing support, with clergy, 
community members, and environmental activists standing by workers during 
protests.1569 CLUE’s Klein joined a delegation to Toll’s Los Angeles office to 
protest driver terminations, asking management to “rehire these people” and 
emphasizing the “injustice of firing them.”1570 Another rally featured speeches by 
Janice Hahn and Congressman Eric Tate (who was also a principal officer at 
Teamsters Local 848). Against this backdrop, Teamsters counsel Mike Manley did 
NLRB-related legal work, filing ULPs in response to employee firings and, when 
Toll refused to agree to a bargaining unit limited to drivers, successfully litigating 
that issue at the NLRB.1571 
On April 11, 2012, in a historic vote, Toll drivers voted 46-15 in favor of 
 
1564. See Press Release, Grim Truth at Toll Group, America’s Port Truckers Deliver a 
Resounding Yes Winning Union Recognition as Teamsters in Historic Vote (Apr. 11, 2012), available at 
http://grimtruthattollgroup.com/files/2012/04/041112-TollDriverVictory9pm.pdf; Jobs Can’t Be Good 
or Green If They’re Not Union!, COAL. FOR CLEAN & SAFE PORTS (Mar. 20, 2012), http:// 
cleanandsafeports.org/blog/2012/03/20/jobs-cant-be-good-or-green-if-theyre-not-union/. 
1565. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 820; Telephone Interview with 
Michael Manley, supra note 1243. 
1566. James Rufus Koren, Toll Group Drivers File with NLRB, L.A. BUS. J., ( Jan. 27, 2012), 
http://labusinessjournal.com/news/2012/jan/27/toll-group-drivers-file-nlrb. 
1567. Toll Group in Dispute with Los Angeles Truck Drivers, THE AUSTRALIAN BUS. REV. (Mar. 
10, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/toll-group-in-dispute-with-los 
-angeles-truck-drivers/story-e6frg8zx-1226295773360. 
1568. Jobs Can’t Be Good or Green If They’re Not Union!, supra note 1564. Teamsters officials also 
initiated a federal investigation into Toll driver misclassification at the New York and New Jersey ports. 
See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Compliance Action Report, Toll Global Forwarding, No. 2012-332-05936 
(Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://grimtruthattollgroup.com/files/2012/07/TollNJ.pdf. 
1569. Telephone Interview with Jon Zerolnick, supra note 951. 
1570. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Klein, supra note 885. 
1571. Telephone Interview with Michael Manley, supra note 1243. 
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representation by Teamsters Local 848.1572 As Weiner recalled, it was “the first 
Teamster contract in L.A. in 30 years . . . . Big deal!”1573 Sounding a call to action, 
one driver cast the vote in these terms: “Our victory means we are finally getting 
closer to the American Dream. If we can win, I know other port truck drivers across 
the U.S. can unite just like we did.”1574 The contract, unanimously ratified on 
December 30, 2012,1575 gave drivers a nearly six dollar per hour pay raise with 
additional increases over the life of the contract (to take effect on January 1, 2013); 
made all Toll drivers part of the company’s retirement plan and guaranteed company 
pension contributions of one dollar per hour in the contract’s first two years; 
reduced driver payments for health insurance; provided paid vacation; and 
prohibited Toll from subcontracting out driving services.1576 Highlighting the hope 
that the Toll contract would be only the first, the coalition announced that to 
“encourage a more level playing field and wide-scale unionization, the contract 
provides drivers the ability to re-negotiate for higher wages when a simple majority 
of the Southern California market is organized.”1577 In exchange for accepting the 
union, Toll received some benefits: the Teamsters agreed not to make Toll follow 
the more stringent national Master Freight Agreement and also sought to promote 
Toll as a model worthy of additional business.1578 
With the Toll victory in hand, the Teamsters pursued other companies with 
employees—Green Fleet (mostly employee drivers) and American Logistics (all 
employee drivers)—while also moving more boldly against one company with only 
independent-contractor drivers (Pac 9 Transportation). Although there were 
common patterns and coordinated actions (in November 2013, for instance, drivers 
from all three companies went on a day-and-a-half strike protesting labor 
practices),1579 organizing proceeded differently across employee and nonemployee 
firms. 
 
1572. Press Release, Grim Truth at Toll Group, supra note 1564; Laura Clawson, Truck Drivers 
Win Union Representation at Toll Group, DAILY KOS (Apr. 12, 2012, 8:19 AM), www.dailykos 
.com/story/2012/04/12/1082732/-Truck-drivers-win-union-representation-at-Toll-Group. 
1573. Telephone Interview with Nick Weiner, supra note 820. 
1574. Press Release, Grim Truth at Toll Group, supra note 1564. 
1575. Toll Drivers Unanimously Ratify First Time Contract, TEAMSTERS LOCAL 848, 
http://www.teamsters848.org/toll-drivers-unanimously-ratify-first-time-contract/ (last visited Feb. 16, 
2014). 
1576. The Road to the Middle Class: Teamster Contract with Toll Group Fuels Port Driver Hope,  
COAL. FOR CLEAN & SAFE PORTS, http://toll.cleanandsafeports.org/files/2013/01/TollContract 
_Highlights.pdf. 
1577. Id. 
1578. Telephone Interview with Michael Manley, supra note 1243. 
1579. Port of L.A. Truck Drivers Stage 36-Hour Strike, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2013, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/18/local/la-me-ln-port-truck-drivers-strike-20131118. In July 
2014, drivers conducted a job action against Total Transportation Services, Inc., Green Fleet Systems, 
and Pacific 9 Transportation, walking off the job in protest of what they claimed to be their wrongful 
classification as independent contractors. Andrew Khouri, Five-Day Trucker Strike at Los Angeles and Long 
Beach Ports Ends, L.A. TIMES ( July 12, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-port 
-trucker-strike-20140712-story.html. Some drivers from Total Transportation Services were fired. In 
November 2014, workers fired from Green Fleet Systems were reinstated as employees after a district 
          
1144 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:939 
Organizing at employee-based firms followed the Toll template, in which 
Teamsters Local 848 initiated organizing, picketed company offices, and filed ULPs 
against driver terminations.1580 Beginning in 2013, drivers at Carson-based Green 
Fleet, which had a majority of employee drivers, conducted weekly picketing to 
protest the company’s labor practices. In August 2013, approximately thirty of the 
company’s ninety drivers went on strike, claiming that supervisors hired union 
busters and asked employees to sign an antiunion petition.1581 The Teamsters then 
filed an NLRB complaint protesting the company’s actions. 
At Pac 9—a company with no employee drivers—organizers took a different 
approach that sought to coordinate misclassification litigation with union 
organizing. There, organizers supported workers filing misclassification suits with 
the DLSE,1582 attempting to use litigation as leverage to advance subsequent 
unionization: if the suits resulted in drivers being reclassified as employees, the 
Teamsters could run an NLRB campaign; if not, the threat of damages could 
potentially be used to bargain for employee conversion and employer neutrality vis-
à-vis subsequent union organizing. More recently, the Teamsters have sought to 
directly organize truckers at nonemployee firms by using unfair labor practice 
strikes—in which drivers walk off the job to protest improper misclassification as 
independent contractors—to pressure those firms to hire the drivers as employees. 
Because a handful of companies account for a large share of port drayage services, 
a few successful campaigns at the biggest companies could reshape the labor market. 
Yet, while longtime supporter Janice Hahn urged activists to “keep on trucking,”1583 
organizing so far has not yielded another union contract, underscoring the ongoing 
challenge of unionization in the absence of systematic employee conversion—a goal 
once so close, but now still so far. 
Looking back at the monumental nearly decade-long clean trucks campaign, 
what stands out is the enormous energy, commitment, and ingenuity of the activists, 
lawyers, policy makers, and community members involved in the epic struggle 
against the related problems of pollution and poverty at the ports. In the end, the 
campaign accomplished an enormously impressive transformation: changing port 
law to produce a “green fleet.” Struggles remain. As the ports have cut back on their 
commitment to community engagement,1584 they have pursued new expansion 
 
court ruling that they had been misclassified as independent contractors. Two Fired Port Truck Drivers 
Return to Work in Landmark Case, CAPITAL & MAIN, http://www.laane.org/capitalandmain/two-fired 
-port-truck-drivers-return-to-work-in-landmark-case/ (Nov. 7, 2014). 
1580. Two Fired Port Truck Drivers Return to Work in Landmark Case, supra note 1579. 
1581. Ricardo Lopez, Truckers Strike, Push to Unionize, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013, at B1. 
1582. Email from Jon Zerolnick, Research Dir., L.A. Alliance for a New Economy, to Scott 
Cummings, Professor, UCLA School of Law ( Jan. 10, 2014) (on file with author). 
1583. See Janice Hahn, Op-Ed., To Keep on Trucking, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2013, at A11. 
1584. James Preston Allen, What’s Wrong with Ending PCAC?, CITY WATCH, May. 21, 2013, 
available at http://citywatchla.com/archive/5110-what-s-wrong-with-ending-pcac-why-the-port-has 
-taken-a-wrong-turn (noting that the Harbor Commission voted to dissolve the Port Community 
Advisory Committee on May 2); see also Telephone Interview with Kathleen Woodfield, supra note 1128 
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projects that threaten further community and environmental impacts.1585 Fights 
over rail pollution and the proposed intermodal yard in Long Beach have provoked 
new legal action.1586 And Long Beach has continued to gain ground in the 
competition for cargo against its more labor-friendly Los Angeles counterpart.1587 
But much has been achieved. In the wake of the Clean Truck Programs, diesel 
emissions from trucks decreased by ninety percent at both ports,1588 making the San 
Pedro port complex one of the cleanest in the world. This success has sustained 
momentum for reducing diesel emissions,1589 and advancing new green initiatives at 
the ports.1590 Although key personnel at the Port of Los Angeles have resigned, 
there are ongoing efforts to revise and thus revive elements of the concession plan 
that were struck down by the Supreme Court.1591 
Yet these efforts do not contain a solution to the fundamental driver 
contracting problem that sparked the monumental campaign in the first instance. 
Despite the labor movement’s enormous investment on their behalf, port truckers 
continue to bear the cost of port growth—which now includes the added cost of 
clean truck conversion. The Teamsters’ effort to unionize Toll and extend its reach 
to companies like Green Fleet shows that the fight is not over and instead has 
entered another phase of its long history.1592 In this sense, the Green Fleet campaign 
 
(stating that the committee was dissolved after the port kept adding industry representatives who failed 
to come, causing the committee to consistently not have a quorum). 
1585. Port of Los Angeles Announces Plans to Spend $400 Million on Projects, DAILY BREEZE  
( June 5, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.dailybreeze.com/general-news/20130606/port-of-los-angeles 
-announces-plans-to-spend-400-million-on-projects (listing expenditures to electrify terminals, create a 
more fuel efficient rail yard, and create a new waterfront promenade). 
1586. See Louis Sahagun, Railroads Sued Over Soot, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at AA5; Dan 
Weikel, Rail Yard Near L.A. Harbor Won’t Cut Pollution, Foes Say, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2012, at AA1; 
Dan Weikel, Rail Yard Near Port Is Approved, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2013, at AA1. 
1587. Ryan Faughnder, L.A. Port Numbers Fall, Long Beach’s Rise, L.A. BUS. J., May 15, 2013 
(stating that the number of containers through Los Angeles was down 9.5%, and up 13% in Long 
Beach, although Los Angeles still had more units overall (640,330 to 519,464)). 
1588. See Port of Long Beach, Clean Trucks, http://www.polb.com/environment/cleantrucks 
/default.asp; The Port of Los Angeles, Air Quality Report Card, 2005–2011, http://www 
.portoflosangeles.org/pdf/2011_Air_Quality_Report_Card.pdf. 
1589. Neela Banerjee, New Air Pollution Standards Aim to Reduce Soot Particles, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
15, 2012, at A15 (describing the Obama administration’s new air emission standards seeking reduction 
of soot from coal-fired power plants and diesel vehicles). 
1590. Rong-Gong Lin, Wilmington Celebrates Portside Park’s Opening, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2011, at 
A33 (noting creation of $55 million Wilmington Waterfront Park after 10 years of planning); Mai-Duc 
& Nelson, Turning Freeway to Park?, supra note 152 (describing plan to rip out part of Terminal Island 
Freeway and convert to green space); Matt Stevens, Work Is Flashing Forward, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, 
at AA3 (noting that the Angels Gate lighthouse was repainted with funding from the China Shipping 
settlement). 
1591. Holmes and Knatz resigned in 2013. David Zahniser & Dan Weikel, Executive Who Runs 
L.A. Port Will Retire, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2013, at AA1. Before he did, Holmes indicated that the port 
was working on an iPhone app to replace the placard struck down by the Supreme Court and was 
considering eliminating criminal sanctions for tariff violations. Interview with John Holmes, supra note 
148. 
1592. Steve Lopez, Truck Drivers at Port of L.A. Want a Fair Shake, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2014, at 
A1. 
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is thus an aptly named coda—and perhaps a new beginning—to the ongoing 
struggle to transform port trucking. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The clean trucks campaign reveals how sophisticated planning and political 
contingency converge to create moments in which social movements may deploy 
well-designed plans to challenge the status quo. In these moments, law plays a 
crucial role: framing the problem, shaping the solution, and providing the tools with 
which the struggle plays out. In Los Angeles (and to a lesser extent in Long Beach), 
a coalition of labor, environmental, and community groups—held together by a 
collective commitment to advancing the interests of low-wage workers—took on 
some of the most powerful economic actors in the global economy. And they 
won—for a moment, they won big, and even in the end, they won something 
substantial. That the change was cut back by court decisions does not negate the 
achievement. But it does invite reflection on how the campaign arrived at the point 
it did—bereft of structural labor policy reform, but still tenaciously in pursuit of 
innovative efforts to link misclassification litigation to driver organizing. 
This part steps back from the case to offer three frames of analysis. First, it 
situates the campaign within the broader context of the labor movement’s 
investment in local legal strategies, which have influenced local regulation, but also 
have been shaped by the political and legal levers that city policy making affords. 
This part then explores how labor’s turn to localism shaped the nature of the ports 
campaign and what it was able to achieve, offering reflections at a relatively low 
level of theoretical generality and letting the campaign largely speak for itself. It 
suggests how the local scale of engagement influenced the form the campaign 
took—coalition building to achieve industry restructuring as a predicate for 
organizing—and how that form affected the lawyering role. Finally, this part 
concludes by reflecting on the outcome of the campaign and what lessons it holds 
for local labor lawmaking. 
A. Context 
Law’s place in the labor movement has long been contested.1593 The struggle 
has played out in relation to distinct—albeit closely related—geographical spaces. 
The first can be thought of as the geography of legal mobilization, where the issue 
is which lawmaking forum at which level of government is the appropriate target of 
advocacy to advance labor goals.1594 Within this frame, activists engage in political 
 
1593. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT (1991); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004); see also Katherine Stone & Scott Cummings, 
Labor Activism in Local Politics: From CBAs to ‘CBAs,’ in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 273 (Guy Davidov 
& Brian Langille eds., 2011). 
1594. Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social Movements?, in HOW DOES LAW 
MATTER? 76 (Bryant G. Garth and Austin Sarat ed., 1998); see also Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power: 
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calculation about the appropriate scale of intervention (local, state, federal, 
international): they map power relations (which institutional targets can be most 
effectively influenced?) and evaluate the risks and rewards of different locational 
strategies (what is the scope of change afforded by a given target and how much 
can it be protected against countermobilization and backlash?).1595 This is also the 
frame within which activists consider relative institutional competencies: should 
mobilization proceed through courts, legislatures, agencies, or elsewhere? The 
second space within which the role of law has been contested may be thought of as 
the geography of legal regulation. Where should law apply? Should it regulate the 
workplace directly, mandating that employers accord employees specific rights, 
both as mandatory minimum protections and as bases upon which workers can 
bargain collectively? Or should it apply to a particular industry or trade? Should it 
create uniform national standards or instead facilitate local experimentation? 
Because of the nature of American federalism—and specifically the scope of 
preemption—the geographies of mobilization and regulation are linked, which is to 
say that where law is deployed as a matter of legal mobilization affects where it is 
applied as a matter of legal regulation. Federal regulation may be used to directly 
reshape the nature of labor relations, while local regulation often must impact labor 
relations indirectly. Thus, as a strategic matter, the choice of where to mobilize 
affects the regulatory scope of what may be achieved. 
Accounts of the labor movement over the past fifty years have offered a 
geographical story, located in the framework of American federalism, for the 
movement’s decline1596—and, in some places, its resurgence.1597 Tracing the 
narrative of other twentieth-century progressive social movements, the story 
emphasizes the shifting terrain of labor’s legal mobilization. It begins with the move 
by unions and their political supporters in the early twentieth century to seek 
national legislation to protect collective bargaining rights from local employer 
practices that thwarted early unionization drives and were not redressed by courts 
(or, in the case of injunctions targeting boycott activity, were actually effectuated 
through courts).1598 It charts the apogee of this project in New Deal-era legislation 
codifying the collective bargaining system,1599 judicial validation of that 
 
Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES 69 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998). 
1595. Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 
81 (1994); see also Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT 
Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151 (2009). 
1596. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1767 (2001). 
1597. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375 (2007); see also 
WORKING FOR JUSTICE: THE L.A. MODEL OF ORGANIZING AND ADVOCACY (Ruth Milkman et al. 
eds., 2010). 
1598. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 
(2002). 
1599. Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2012)); 
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151–169 (2012)). 
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framework,1600 and the subsequent rise of private sector unionization that it ushered 
in.1601 This narrative then locates the forces of decline at the national level, 
attributing decline to eroding federal support for, and sometimes outright federal 
hostility to, the very legal framework that the movement had fought so hard to 
achieve.1602 Here, the story is the familiar one of reactionary legislative 
amendments,1603 damaging judicial interpretations,1604 and industry capture of 
administrative processes—all contributing to the steep decrease of private sector 
unionism.1605 In response to federal political stalemate and judicial hostility, activists 
turned away from the federal system of collective bargaining and toward other 
possibilities—and here is where local political systems enter as potential spaces of 
alternative mobilization. Local activism had, to some degree, always been a part of 
labor struggles. The labor movement throughout this period also battled at the state 
level for public sector union rights. And movement challengers had their own local 
strategy, which succeeded in spreading right-to-work laws throughout the South 
and much of the Midwest. But mobilization to advance labor reform at the 
municipal level—conceiving of the city as a place where laws could be enacted to 
address labor conditions—did not emerge as a prominent strategy until the 
1990s.1606 
This story connects accounts of the labor movement to insights from social 
movement and local government scholarship that have been under-examined, but 
which offer a useful frame for thinking about the spatial dimension of labor activism 
and its effectiveness. Law and social movement scholarship has focused attention 
on how movement actors shape strategy in response to political opportunity and 
the availability of resources,1607 and have emphasized the channeling effect of the 
extant legal regime on movement activism.1608 This scholarship thus provides a 
framework to help understand the mechanisms by which unions and community-
based allies in other fields (like environmental justice and immigrant’s rights) have 
 
1600. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
1601. See Estlund, supra note 280. 
1602. See Catherine Fisk, Law and the Evolving Shape of Labor: Narratives of Expansion and 
Retrenchment, LAW, CULTURE, & HUMAN. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://lch.sagepub.com/content/early 
/2012/07/31/1743872112451016. 
1603. Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 29 U.S.C. (2012)); Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 29 U.S.C. (2012)). 
1604. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (validating the use of permanent 
replacements for striking workers). 
1605. See Sachs, supra note 284.  
1606. See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 483 (2009). 
1607. The classics are: DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930-1970 (2d ed. 1982), and John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource 
Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. SOC. 1212 (1977). 
1608. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 419 (2001). 
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made investments in local strategies in particular urban sites—Los Angeles,1609 
Chicago,1610 and New York1611 prominent among them—as places where legal 
mobilization could have an impact on unionization specifically and inequality more 
broadly. From a social movement perspective, there are several dynamics at work: 
national unions allocating resources to local campaigns in the face of federal political 
blockage; local unions experimenting with new strategies to advance organizing 
outside of the federal labor law system; distinct civil society organizations 
developing around issues of local concern (e.g., immigrant rights in Los Angeles) 
that find common cause and points of strategic intersection with labor 
counterparts;1612 coalitions being formed to advance discrete legal projects but also 
to build local power more generally; and the turn to local legal levers to augment 
worker power and potentially change employer behavior. 
The other part of this story, emphasized by local government and urban 
studies scholars, is the changing role of the city as a space for certain types of 
political and regulatory interventions targeting economic inequality. The important 
point is that it is not just that labor has gone local in response to federal stagnation, 
but that this has happened—and, crucially, has been enabled by—the parallel 
transformation of the city itself, marked by new approaches to economic 
development responding to the enervating, and inequality-reinforcing, patterns of 
postwar white flight, suburbanization, and deindustrialization.1613 Although these 
trends have not played out the same across all urban areas, and there is considerable 
variation among cities in terms of the causes and scope of change, there have been 
underlying “boom and bust” patterns,1614 which have reshaped development policy 
and empowered new political actors over time. As postwar cities struggled with a 
declining tax base and depopulation, many responded with job-creation strategies 
built on attracting business through tax cuts and other subsidies; the aggressive use 
of redevelopment policies that facilitated the acquisition and development of 
property in “blighted” neighborhoods, typically communities of color; the 
leveraging of federal urban and antipoverty funds to support public-private 
partnerships; and the outsourcing of city functions to reduce costs and provide 
incentives for local companies to stay put. In cities where these policies were used, 
critics charged that the distribution of benefits was unequal, creating counter-
pressures for greater accountability and equity in development programs. 
 
1609. Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement’s Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the 
Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1927 (2007). 
1610. See Virginia Parks & Dorian Warren, The Politics and Practice of Economic Justice: Community 
Benefits as a Tactic of the New Accountable Development Movement, 17 J. COMMUNITY PRAC. 88 (2009). 
1611. Ashar, supra note 1; Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the 
Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1999 (2007). 
1612. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282 (2013); Stephen Lee, Screening 
for Solidarity, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (2013). 
1613. See FROM CHICAGO TO L.A.: MAKING SENSE OF URBAN THEORY (Michael J. Dear ed., 
2002); DAVID HARVEY, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE CITY (rev. ed. 2009); EDWARD W. SOJA, SEEKING 
SPATIAL JUSTICE (2010). 
1614. Schragger, supra note 1606. 
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Community-based organizations were often in the forefront of this accountability 
movement, but frequently lacked the political clout to significantly redirect city 
policy. But the strong economic growth of the 1990s created a new environment 
for political change, with rapid private development in previously disinvested 
neighborhoods generating community opposition—but also creating opportunities 
to rethink how development policy could create good jobs and mixed-income 
neighborhoods. In this environment, organized labor, in the midst of its own 
evolution, emerged as a key player in the struggle to build a more progressive city.1615 
This frame recasts labor’s move to the local arena in ways that raise important 
questions. Commentators have often looked at local efforts as targeted instances of 
leverage—that is, of using the tools available to promote specific labor goals. Yet 
local activism occurs within, and contributes to, a broader set of efforts that coalesce 
around (contested) visions of changing the city itself. Placing local labor activism in 
the context of a broader project of city transformation reframes labor campaigns as 
not simply about reconstituting labor law outside the federal sphere by leveraging 
local opportunities, but also about reimagining the city as a dynamic space for 
progressive regulation to redress inequality in its multiple forms. From this 
perspective, local campaigns are more than ad hoc uses of local government power 
to indirectly regulate work and instead operate as part of broader efforts to challenge 
inequality within cities—efforts that move beyond the regulation of work to address 
housing, environmental justice, immigrant rights, health, and other issues. 
Situating the ports campaign in this context invites analysis at two levels. First, 
it focuses attention on how the local scale of intervention shaped campaign 
development: how the coalition came to define the legal problem, how resources 
were mobilized to address it, how local policy reform unfolded, and how lawyers 
were involved. It then invites reflection on how these same local factors affected 
campaign outcomes and what lessons can be drawn for social movements 
mobilizing to challenge the conditions of low-wage work. 
B. Campaign 
How did law shape the initiation and evolution of the ports campaign? This 
section explains why labor activists and lawyers focused on the ports as a target, 
how they developed an alliance with environmentalists, and what influenced 
decisions about legal objectives (locally mandated concession agreements governing 
truck entry at the ports) and legal strategies to achieve it. 
1. Scale 
Law was fundamental to the construction of the ports as an environmental 
and labor problem and hence was also fundamental to framing a solution. Free trade 
transformed the ports from engines of regional growth to conduits of globalization, 
 
1615. Richard C. Schragger, Is a Progressive City Possible? Reviving Urban Liberalism for the Twenty-
First Century, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231 (2013). 
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imposing negative externalities on surrounding communities in the form of 
pollution and incompatible development. Deregulation facilitated the explosion of 
trade by reducing the cost of transport, while also producing the specific problem 
of fragmentation in the drayage trucking industry and the shift toward independent-
contractor drivers. The independent-contractor relation was the key legal barrier to 
unionization, since independent contractors were not exempt from antitrust law and 
thus were legally proscribed from organizing. Weak federal labor law therefore 
interacted with federal deregulation and antitrust law to put truckers in a difficult 
legal box: unable to organize to improve their dismal working conditions. These 
working conditions, in turn, interacted with port expansion to produce pollution: as 
the scale of drayage trucking increased to keep up with cargo growth, truck drivers 
could not afford to maintain and upgrade their trucks, thus contributing to massive 
port-generated air pollution. Local government promoted port expansion as an 
engine of job creation, but did not have the political will or legal tools to directly 
regulate the environmental and labor externalities. 
As the case study suggests, framing the solution to these interlocking problems 
required identifying the political space and power to change the underlying 
structural legal problem. Different stakeholders approached the problem from 
distinct points of view. For organized labor, beginning immediately after 
deregulation undercut unionization in the nationwide trucking industry, finding a 
way to restructure the industry on a foundation of employee drivers was the central 
political and legal issue. The Teamsters, in particular, devoted significant resources 
to identifying possible solutions, which included supporting recognition strikes and 
advancing state legislation to permit independent-contractor organizing. But none 
of these early efforts gained any political traction. Port trucking was identified as a 
target not because of its size (it was a relatively small proportion of the overall 
trucking industry), but because of its strategic importance in evolving plans to 
organize the logistics supply change—with the ports viewed as a key “choke point” 
to exert organizing pressure. Local port policy making to transform drayage labor 
relations was conceived as a way to leverage city contracting power to change driver 
status. This idea had roots in labor campaigns to promote living wage ordinances 
and attach labor-friendly requirements to city concession and development 
agreements. These efforts depended on the availability of market participation as a 
space for local labor-enhancing regulation outside the scope of federal preemption. 
Thus, the political and legal calculus converged around a local political strategy to 
use the ports’ contracting power to require employee conversion. 
In this sense, the city was both a target and a tool of legal reform. The ports 
were targeted by Change to Win as a strategic possibility precisely because they were 
city entities—proprietary departments within city government and thus subject to 
mobilization to change city policy. This was an important lever—and one used by 
both ports to pass landmark Clean Truck Programs requiring all trucking companies 
to enter into concession agreements. At the Los Angeles port, it was through these 
concessions that trucking companies would be made to comply with operational 
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standards like off-street parking and placard posting, while also converting to 
employee drivers. Failure to comply on the part of trucking companies would 
subject them to contract penalties—up to and including contract termination and 
port disbarment. This system hinged on enforcement by terminal operators, which 
were prohibited from admitting noncompliant trucks on the threat of port-imposed 
criminal sanctions. 
2. Opportunity 
To advance the campaign, activists identified targets and developed strategy 
through extensive research and careful planning. They targeted the ports as a sticky 
industry tied to the regional economy, thought of ways that working conditions 
could be raised, connected labor to other issues in order to build coalitions, and 
developed legal, political, and educational strategies to achieve their goals. Yet 
achieving local policy reform required more than a well-designed plan; it also 
depended on political support and mobilized resources. In addition, it required 
framing the campaign in terms calculated to maximize its potential for success. 
The campaign’s most ambitious and controversial aim was to fix the legal 
problem at the heart of the dysfunctional drayage trucking industry: the 
independent-contractor status of drivers. This goal was core to the labor-movement 
stakeholders, but ancillary to the environmental movement—at least in the period 
leading up to the campaign. Although environmental and community activists made 
the connection between port trucking and environmental degradation, they focused 
on using the tools they had (particularly litigation) to promote environmental 
compliance. These activists had to be persuaded to adopt the blue-green goal of 
fusing fleet conversion with employee conversion; that negotiation was successful 
in bringing together coalition members with different, though overlapping, 
interests. 
With respect to campaign development, the legal framing of the concession 
plan as a “win-win” for labor and environmental groups was the key basis for 
coalition building. Environmentalists brought the litigation power, labor the policy-
making power, and each group benefitted from a Clean Truck Program that 
committed trucking companies to a double conversion: of their fleet (from dirty to 
clean) and of their drivers (from independent contractors to employees). Framing 
the Clean Truck Program as a legal solution to the twin problems of environmental 
pollution and low-wage work at the ports helped to mobilize significant resources 
for the campaign—without which stakeholders remained in a more defensive 
position. These resources were mobilized at a moment of political opportunity. That 
opportunity was itself partly a function of those resources in that the political 
alignment that produced a Villaraigosa mayoralty in 2006 was based on the power 
of the Los Angeles labor movement. But while labor power was necessary to move 
the Clean Truck Program forward, it was not sufficient. 
The campaign thus offered a moment of labor and environmental interest 
convergence. Labor saw the environmentalists as bringing legal power and political 
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appeal. NRDC had been successful in halting port expansion, which fed into the 
development of Los Angeles Mayor James Hahn’s “no net increase” plan and Mayor 
Villaraigosa’s Clean Air Action Plan (CAAP). Framing the campaign as primarily 
about the environment was a key strategic move that provided political and legal 
benefits: minimizing the salience of unionization, while also emphasizing the threat 
of litigation if the campaign failed. Early on, activists decided that clean trucks were 
necessary to reduce emissions and promote port growth. The employee piece of the 
Clean Truck Program was framed as a way to strengthen the green growth project, 
not to permit an independent mechanism for unionization, although the program 
stressed the importance of job quality for drivers. NRDC lawyers emphasized that 
they did not have a position on unionization, though they supported better 
conditions for drivers, and during both the campaign and litigation, they played the 
role of linking clean trucks to employee conversion. 
For their part, environmentalists appreciated the local power of the labor 
movement to move policy and were eager for an alliance that would alleviate 
tensions over development—which labor unions often promoted for the job 
benefits, while environmentalists opposed on pollution grounds. Although NRDC 
lawyers could threaten additional slowdowns, which gave them significant power, 
their environmental litigation could not ultimately stop growth. They needed 
proactive policy reform that would guide future port development toward green 
goals. CAAP promised that and, along with structures like the Port Community 
Advisory Committee and No Net Increase Task Force, provided critical 
institutional frameworks connecting activists and putting pressure on local political 
officials to come up with genuine political reform. But the details of CAAP were 
vague. Folding in employee conversion created the opportunity for more significant 
policy change and brought an investment by organized labor. Labor’s investment 
provided the basis for the campaign’s launch, which was already underway as part 
of a national strategy organized by Change to Win. There were significant local 
organizations working on the issue of port trucking, but none had the staff and 
political connections to sustain a decisive policy campaign. Change to Win’s entry 
into the local scene and collaboration with LAANE changed that. Change to Win 
provided money and staff to craft a concession model, design a campaign, and staff 
its implementation. LAANE became the organizational hub for the campaign, 
supported by Change to Win funding and expertise, but also able to draw upon a 
store of internal expertise built upon two decades of successful local policy reform. 
Ultimately, however, the interests of the blue-green alliance were not 
completely aligned. Environmentalists could claim victory with a program that 
banned dirty trucks and promoted the acquisition of new clean vehicles, while labor 
needed employee conversion to win. The linked package of reforms—the dirty 
truck ban, financial incentives for clean truck conversion, and a concession plan 
with employee conversion—constituted a finely wrought political compromise that 
deftly advanced all stakeholder interests. However, because it was severable, and 
because industry countermobilization specifically sought to “divide and conquer” 
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by not challenging the environmental piece of the program, that compromise could 
be (and ultimately was) undone. 
3. Strategy 
Political and legal strategy to advance a Clean Truck Program was both 
planned and fortuitous. Planning came in terms of the groundwork laid for 
employee conversion. But the opportunity to advance the policy came through 
litigation. The opportunity was created by sustained community push-back against 
port expansion, which was funneled into and given additional power by law—in the 
form of the NRDC’s China Shipping lawsuit against the Port of Los Angeles. 
Community opposition, channeled into the secession movement, extracted political 
concessions from local politicians: James Hahn’s election as Los Angeles mayor, 
accompanied by his sister Janice’s election to city council, were built in part on 
promises to community groups to mitigate the port’s impact. These promises were 
laid bare by the Los Angeles port’s pursuit of China Shipping, which provoked a 
legal reaction showing how community and environmental groups could impose 
real costs on port development. It was this combination of legal and political 
pressure that induced Mayor Hahn to commit to “no net increase,” which although 
unsuccessful, laid the groundwork for Mayor Villaraigosa’s CAAP. It was CAAP 
that provided the environmental portal through which the Clean Truck Program 
was translated from concept designed by the Teamsters and Change to Win to real 
policy reform that advanced the green port project. 
Thus, strategy was shaped by the interplay between labor, environmental, and 
local government law. Weak federal labor law interacted with antitrust and 
deregulation to limit labor’s power. However, port expansion ran afoul of relatively 
stronger federal and state environmental law, which ultimately offered a tool to slow 
port growth in the face of expensive and time-consuming litigation. Armed with the 
leverage of environmental litigation, the coalition sought to pass local port law to 
facilitate the twin goals of environmental and labor remediation. To do so, it 
attempted to nest the Clean Truck Program within the framework of local 
government law so as to take advantage of the city’s contracting power, while 
avoiding the negative preemptive effect of a deregulatory federal law: the FAAA. 
To achieve this end, the campaign combined an outside game of protest and 
external pressure with an inside game focused on alliance formation and lobbying 
within government policy-making arenas. The clean trucks campaign was enabled 
by local political pressure in favor of greening the ports, pushed forward by 
community and environmental groups. In Los Angeles, this pressure locked Mayor 
Villaraigosa into a process of genuine port reform, which he strategically advanced 
through his appointments to the harbor commission and his selection of the port’s 
executive director. With these personnel in place, a legal framework, CAAP, was 
created to advance green growth through coordinated action at both ports, but 
without specific attention to implementing employee conversion. This piece was 
folded in by Change to Win after CAAP was already underway. It began in Los 
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Angeles with a high level contact by Teamsters president Hoffa and a commitment 
by Mayor Villaraigosa to support the campaign. It then proceeded through a series 
of negotiations between industry, labor, environmental, and community 
stakeholders. Inside pressure on local decision makers was brought to bear by the 
unions; outside pressure was exerted by community groups as well as ongoing legal 
challenges by NRDC, most notably around the TraPac expansion. This created the 
conditions for policy success, which the mayor’s staff advanced through key 
decisions: placing the Los Angeles port’s John Holmes in charge of policy 
development and commissioning the Boston Consulting Group analysis of 
concession plan options. 
4. Lawyering 
The local nature of the campaign also influenced the role of lawyers connected 
to it. Preemption shaped how movement lawyers thought of the possibilities for 
regulatory reform at the local level—and how those understandings were translated 
into policy reform. Movement lawyers from labor and environmental groups 
mobilized law in the administrative and legislative process to support readings of 
legal doctrine in a context of jurisprudential uncertainty and they sought to craft 
policy to minimize the risk of preemption. 
Within this context, legal analysis played a crucial facilitative role. In the 
campaign, an important aspect of legal advocacy occurred far from the glare of court 
in the more mundane—but no less critical—process of administrative review 
through meetings with elected officials, city attorneys, and port staff. In this process, 
officials ultimately had to sign off on legislation that they were confident passed 
relevant legal standards. Elected officials cared both as a matter of principle and 
because they did not want to be on the hook for provoking, and potentially losing, 
expensive litigation when strong arguments did not support their positions. 
Although movement actors and policy makers understood that a litigation 
challenge to the Clean Truck Program would ensue, legal opinions by the Teamsters’ 
Mike Manley and analysis by NRDC were important to providing policy makers 
with some degree of confidence in the outcome. These analyses were supplemented 
and reinforced by legal opinions from city attorneys and outside port counsel. The 
legal opinions were necessarily predictions and thus ultimately uncertain. However, 
under conditions of uncertainty, plausible legal arguments supporting the program 
helped move policy making forward. In Los Angeles, the coalition and port 
attorneys’ preemption analysis contributed to the harbor commission’s and city 
council’s support for the program. These local officials were, of course, predisposed 
to be supportive (because of coalition outreach and lobbying), but the opinions 
provided legitimate legal grounds. In addition, the presence of Teamsters and 
NRDC lawyers in the policy review process meant that the city attorneys were 
accountable to a wider audience for their legal analysis. As a result of input by a 
range of movement and city lawyers throughout the policy development phase, the 
legal foundation for the program was carefully scrutinized and crafted to minimize 
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the risk of FAAA preemption, which was well known. That it only partially 
succeeded underscored the uncertainty built into this type of prospective legal 
analysis. 
C. Outcome 
The Los Angeles Clean Truck Program was the culmination of two years of 
impressive organizing by the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports. Under the 
program, the environmental movement would achieve one of its long-standing 
goals—“greening” the port—while the Teamsters could pursue unionization of the 
newly converted employees. It was a win-win designed to address the structural 
economic problem contributing to port pollution: low-paid independent 
contractors did not have the resources to maintain and upgrade their trucks to 
current environmental standards. In the coalition’s terms, the port was thus where 
old, dirty diesel trucks “went to die.” The Clean Truck Program would take 
maintenance out of the drivers’ hands, making the companies internalize the costs, 
thus creating a sustainable foundation for clean trucking over time. It was a 
compelling concept, brilliantly executed. 
But it was not meant to be. Despite the impressive local policy win, the 
program was quickly swept into court, subject to a lawsuit by the ATA on FAAA 
preemption grounds. The case bounced back and forth between the district and 
appellate courts in the Ninth Circuit. Los Angeles’s employee conversion provision 
was preliminarily enjoined, but after trial held to be a valid exercise of local 
government power under the market participant exception to the preemption 
doctrine. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and reversed the trial court on that point. The 
case went to the Supreme Court on other grounds and, in a unanimous decision, 
the court struck down two additional minor provisions of the Los Angeles port’s 
Clean Truck Program. However, by this point, the dream of employee conversion 
and possible unionization on a mass scale had already all but died. The city did not 
contest the invalidation of the employee conversion provision on appeal to the 
Supreme Court, so that chapter had already been closed. The one silver lining of 
the Court’s decision was that it did not erode the underlying doctrinal basis for local 
government efforts to intervene in labor issues through the market participant 
exception to federal preemption. 
But that was likely cold comfort to the activists who had worked so hard to 
get the Clean Truck Program passed in the first instance. It was also a blow to the 
Los Angeles port, which viewed itself as caught in a bind: accountable for pollution 
and other negative externalities, but without complete authority to redress them. 
Port Deputy Executive Director John Holmes’s reading of the Court’s decision 
suggested that the port’s connection to interstate commerce and thus to the federal 
system meant that much of its activity, though having massive local impacts, was 
outside the ambit of local control. The litigation outcome was also another blow to 
port truckers, who found themselves additionally burdened: obliged to acquire and 
maintain new, more expensive low-emission trucks, yet still in the degraded 
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economic position of independent contractors. This outcome focuses attention on 
the tradeoffs of local labor lawmaking. What accounts for the outcome in the clean 
trucks campaign and what lessons can be learned? 
1. Constraint 
With the decline of federal labor law after mid-century, the labor movement 
was cast in the position of having to use alternative legal regimes as leverage to 
advance labor rights. The ports campaign was an instance in which the Teamsters, 
lacking legal power because of independent-contractor rules, sought to leverage the 
power that NRDC litigation created to change the union’s structural bargaining 
position—using environmental law as a springboard to surmount the legal barrier 
to organizing posed by truckers’ independent-contractor status. 
That leverage came in the form of the China Shipping litigation brought by 
NRDC, which changed the power dynamic of port growth. Whereas for nearly 100 
years the ports could expand into adjacent communities with meager legal 
resistance, federal and state laws requiring environmental review permitted 
environmental groups to demand greater accountability in port expansion plans. 
NEPA and CEQA, in this regard, were imperfect instruments—allowing groups to 
delay but not to stop port development—but ones that nonetheless provided 
leverage in the competitive context of intermodal logistics. 
In the ports campaign, environmental litigation had the power to force 
environmental reform in a context in which two factors were present: the polluting 
industry was fixed in place based on massive up-front infrastructure investment, 
and there was intense inter-regional competition for the industry’s service. Because 
the ports were geographically sticky, but could potentially lose business to other 
regional competitors, delay and uncertainty were potent bargaining chips. Since 
litigation could impede port expansion plans and shippers could potentially reroute 
cargo to other West Coast ports (or even through the Panama Canal), the ports had 
a strong incentive to mitigate uncertainty to maintain profitability. This incentive 
gave NRDC negotiating power through lawsuits to enforce environmental 
compliance. Such lawsuits were limited in important respects: environmental review 
could mandate good environmental process, not good environmental outcomes. It 
could require that local agencies fully consider negative impacts and take steps to 
mitigate them; but ultimately project-based environmental harms could not be 
stopped through environmental review. However, review could impose costly 
delays if agencies had to redo environmental reports. In addition, because 
environmental review of port development ultimately had to be approved by city 
council, it provided a means for exerting political influence in that body. 
Labor sought to mobilize its local political influence to address the 
independent-contractor problem. For the campaign, employee status was firmly 
connected to the idea of environmental sustainability: without employee drivers, a 
short-term incentive program might produce clean truck conversion, but over time 
drivers would be unable to maintain truck quality, thus necessitating another round 
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of public funding. That argument proved compelling as a way of advancing the 
Clean Truck Program through political channels. Yet, partly because of the 
industry’s litigation tactics, the linkage of environmental and labor goals did not 
prevail in court. The ATA declined to challenge the dirty truck ban and made the 
industry’s legal and public relations case on the ground that the concession plan 
was, at bottom, a concession to the power of organized labor. 
In the end, the Ninth Circuit also viewed the employee conversion plan as too 
tenuously connected to environmental mitigation, instead characterizing employee 
conversion as an attempt to “impact third party behavior unrelated to the 
performance of the concessionaire’s obligations to the Port”1616—in other words, 
an attempt to change trucking company labor practices to enable unionization. The 
court thus did not buy the argument that employee conversion was about 
environmental sustainability first and unionization second (if at all). As a result of 
industry litigation strategy and court analysis, the environmental components of the 
Los Angeles Clean Truck Program were left standing, while the labor and 
community provisions were gutted (though the power of the port to create a 
concession plan was upheld). 
This outcome correlated to ex ante legal strength: because environmental law 
was the most potent weapon in thwarting port growth, mitigating environmental 
concerns was ultimately viewed as most central to the ports’ role as market actors. 
Conversely, requiring employee conversion (and thereby strengthening labor law) 
was not seen as market participation, despite the arguments connecting conversion 
to long-term environmental sustainability. In this way, labor lawmaking was doubly 
disadvantaged by its relationship to federalism: the weakness of the NLRA regime 
pushed labor law down to the local level, where that same weakness made it too 
insignificant to count toward legitimate city market participation. 
From this perspective, the campaign outcome was a product of the deeply 
uneven playing field on which organized labor sought to advance. The campaign 
itself spotlighted the high threshold barrier to effective local labor activism in low-
wage sectors defined by contracting: specifically, the legal predicate for 
unionization—employee status—must be in place before local-government-based 
legal strategies to facilitate it can work. In industries in which statutory employees 
already exist, local governments may bargain with employers for labor neutrality in 
exchange for public benefits in order to facilitate union organizing without running 
afoul of labor preemption.1617 However, the clean trucks campaign underscores the 
challenge of even getting to this step in low-wage industries characterized by 
pervasive independent contracting and thus outside the purview of labor law. In 
such industries, where baseline employment conditions are not established, federal 
preemption on nonlabor law grounds (i.e., deregulatory transportation rules) may 
 
1616. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 660 F.3d 384, 408 (9th Cir. 2011). 
1617. See Sachs, supra note 4. 
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preclude local legal reforms to create employment relationships (and thus get to the 
locally mediated bargaining process in the first instance). 
As a result, the structure of low-wage industries defined by independent 
contracting creates a formidable double barrier to labor organizing since unions 
must first overcome the legal challenge of transforming the employment status of 
workers in the industry in order to even create the possibility for collective action—
which still has to be fought for and won. Because this weak starting position is a 
product of federal law—and organized labor is too politically disfavored to change 
that law outright—the labor movement must anchor reform efforts in receptive 
local government law processes. But doing so may subject labor efforts to the risk 
of non-labor-law preemption—underscoring the movement’s deeply disadvantaged 
position in pursuing unionization. Thus, as the clean trucks campaign shows, it is 
both the weakness of labor law and the strength of nonlabor law (antitrust and 
deregulation) that may converge to erect substantial challenges to organizing 
industries—like port trucking—in which workers are assigned the label of “owner-
operators” but live a reality indistinguishable from that of low-wage employees. In 
such industries, even if (against the odds) campaigns manage to succeed, they do so 
merely by restoring workers back to the baseline of being organizable—aligning their 
legal label with their lived reality—and thus removing extant legal barriers that now 
preclude even the possibility of demanding better conditions. 
2. Countermobilization 
For the trucking industry, conditions at the outset of the campaign were the 
mirror image of those confronted by labor—and thus placed industry in a favorable 
starting position. The legal playing field that disadvantaged labor mobilization 
empowered industry countermobilization. Just as the structure of local government 
law and its relation to preemption placed limits on coalition efforts to reform port 
trucking, it facilitated industry resistance and, ultimately, industry success in 
overturning the Los Angeles concession plan mandating employee conversion. 
Industry began from a position of strength—seeking to protect the legal and 
economic status quo against change. Its strategy from the outset was to defend 
against structural market reform and thus keep labor in the posture of litigating 
individual misclassification suits, which the industry could defend in a war of 
attrition. 
Politically and legally, industry sought to sow division where the coalition had 
attempted to build unity. When industry could not stop the Clean Truck Program 
in Los Angeles, it ramped up lobbying pressure on Long Beach and succeeded in 
defeating employee conversion there. The Los Angeles-Long Beach split paid 
political and legal dividends. Politically, it heightened inter-union division, further 
undercutting the support of already unionized longshoremen by increasing the risk 
that the Los Angeles program would divert cargo to neighboring Long Beach. The 
split also eroded the support of Los Angeles officials who confronted the prospect 
of lost economic benefit to the city and the real chance of political failure. This put 
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pressure on Mayor Villaraigosa to create an escape hatch, agreeing to a severability 
provision in the Clean Truck Program that would allow him to claim an 
environmental victory if employee conversion ultimately failed in court. In the end, 
it was precisely the employee provision’s severability that allowed the ATA to focus 
its attack on employee conversion while professing support for green growth. As 
this suggests, the split between the two ports also produced legal benefits for the 
ATA: sharpening the legal focus on employee conversion (and its connection to 
unionization), facilitating the ultimate legal settlement with Long Beach (thus 
allowing the ATA to direct its full resources to defeating the Los Angeles plan), and 
adding weight to the ATA’s preemption claim (by revealing the danger of 
inconsistent port regulation). 
In similar fashion, industry also sought to weaken the ties binding labor and 
environmental allies—using litigation to promote the breach it could not achieve 
during the policy campaign. This divide-and-conquer strategy was enabled by the 
industry’s favorable legal starting point. Labor and environmental partners had to 
overcome substantial legal uncertainty weighing against their core argument that 
local government had authority to enact joint clean truck and employee conversion 
as a coherent—and intrinsically connected—market participation strategy. 
Recognizing this vulnerability, industry pushed against the weakest part of the 
coalition’s argument: that employee conversion was central to the port’s proprietary 
interests. And industry pit the coalition partners’ ultimate interests against each 
other. Although the labor and environmental movements stood firm in their 
commitment to the entire Los Angeles Clean Truck Program, they ultimately had 
distinct aims: environmentalists wanted emission reductions while organized labor 
sought unionization. The industry plan was to drive a wedge by effectively 
conceding on emissions in order to thwart unionization. This plan was advanced 
through the industry’s litigation decision not to challenge the dirty truck ban and its 
public relations strategy repeatedly linking the concession plan to the Teamsters. 
Although NRDC lawyers valiantly defended the environmental-labor linkage, they 
could not convince the courts to agree on the intrinsic connection between 
employee conversion and long-term environmental sustainability. In the end, while 
NRDC litigation brought the coalition together, ATA litigation succeeded in 
dividing the coalition’s achievement apart. 
3. Adaptation 
Litigation setback did not end the clean trucks campaign, but rather caused it 
to adapt and retool. As in any campaign for social change, the coalition had a range 
of goals and fallback positions, as well as linkages to related campaigns to which 
resources could be redeployed (and lessons applied). In the immediate context of 
the clean trucks campaign, failure to achieve the highest order goal (passage and 
validation of a Clean Truck Program with employee conversion at both ports) 
channeled resources into backup goals: ensuring enforcement of the clean truck 
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mandate while continuing the fight to convert truckers to employee drivers, even if 
in more piecemeal fashion. 
At each stage of the campaign, the coalition planned for and (when necessary) 
pivoted to pursue alternatives to its primary goal of implementing the full Clean 
Truck Program. Thus, after the Ninth Circuit’s unfavorable March 2009 preliminary 
injunction decision, the coalition swiftly adapted its strategy—deploying Plan B (and 
then C). Plan B focused on passing federal legislation explicitly exempting the Clean 
Truck Program from the FAAA—a move that failed when the Democrats lost 
control of Congress in 2010. The campaign was then forced backed to its default 
position (Plan C): facilitating misclassification lawsuits, brought by governmental 
and private lawyers, to impose costs on companies that wrongfully denied drivers 
employee status, while simultaneously organizing to unionize trucking firms (like 
Toll) that already recognized their drivers as employees. The goal of the (currently 
ongoing) misclassification campaign is to expand the number of companies that 
hire employee drivers, and then to increase union density company-by-company. 
This is, of course, where the campaign started—and where industry would prefer 
to be—but the aggressive nature of the Plan C litigation phase, buttressed by 
government agency support, shows that the coalition is not willing to give up 
without a fight to expose the pervasive nature of trucker misclassification and abuse. 
As this misclassification fight has persisted, the coalition strategy that fell short 
at the ports has been redesigned to advance a parallel (and ongoing) campaign to 
organize city waste haulers—in which the hard lessons of port failure have been 
used to strengthen the legal grounds for securing victory in a distinct sector of the 
local trucking industry. Because the broader labor movement goal is increased union 
density, failure to achieve one of the movement’s biggest prizes—unionization of 
port trucking as the supply chain “choke point”—has nonetheless produced 
important learning that continues to inform ongoing policy cycles in which labor 
movement actors are repeat political players. LAANE is currently leading a 
campaign to require private sanitation companies servicing Los Angeles businesses 
and some residential properties to obtain city-issued franchises for waste hauling to 
and from eleven designated city zones. Titled “Don’t Waste L.A.,” the campaign 
brings together the same environmental and labor alliance that sought to green the 
ports, now around the mutual goals of converting the waste fleet of over 1000 trucks 
to clean emission technology, while improving conditions for waste drivers and 
promoting recycling to achieve the city’s “zero waste” goal.1618  
However, this time around, the coalition—drawing upon its port experience—
has designed the policy so as to avoid the litigation that undercut the Clean Truck 
Program. Instead of granting concessions to all companies that agree to employee 
conversion (among other requirements), the waste hauling plan awards an exclusive 
 
1618. Don’t Waste LA Facts and Impacts, http://www.dontwastela.com/wp-content 
/uploads/2014/08/DWLAFactsandImpacts.pdf; see also Sabrina Bornstein, Don’t Waste L.A.: A Path 
to Green Jobs, Clean Air and Recycling for All ( Jan. 2011), http://www.dontwastela.com/wp 
-content/uploads/2013/06/DWLA_Report_Finalweb1.pdf. 
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franchise for trucking companies selected through a competitive bidding process 
(one franchise per zone), in which bids are judged based on a range of good business 
practices that include using clean trucks, following efficient routing, promoting 
recycling and organic waste diversion, and implementing strong driver work 
standards. In so doing, the plan operates outside the scope of FAAA preemption 
(not regulating motor carriers in the transportation of property) and also fits 
squarely within the heart of market participation (dealing with the efficient 
procurement of city services). The waste hauler plan passed the Los Angeles City 
Council in April 2014 and the city bureau of sanitation is currently soliciting bids 
from trucking companies for the exclusive franchises.1619 This new achievement 
suggests that the labor movement’s investment in the port campaign—though itself 
disappointing—was not wasted. 
4. Accountability 
Although, in the end, organized labor may not have been left worse off by the 
loss of employee conversion, port truck drivers were: saddled with the costs of clean 
trucks without the benefits of employee status. The failure of the concession plan 
in court thus raises the question of how to evaluate the coalition’s ex ante judgment 
about the legal viability of the Clean Truck Program. The problem, from the 
coalition’s perspective, was how to evaluate campaign risk and reward in relation to 
the ambiguous and contested boundaries of preemption. The key legal prediction 
centered on the risk of litigation failure—specifically, the risk that the program in 
general and the employee conversion piece in particular would be struck down. 
Movement lawyers believed that a legal challenge to the entire plan was inevitable, 
but that the ports would win a FAAA challenge at the Ninth Circuit and that the 
Supreme Court would not grant certiorari. This prediction turned out to be wrong: 
only the concession plan was challenged, the Ninth Circuit struck down the critical 
employee conversion provision, and the Supreme Court decided to consider (and 
reject) remaining concession provisions. 
This outcome highlights the limits of predictive judgments in legal opinions, 
which are ultimately affected by so many factors that even a careful prospective legal 
opinion can ultimately miss the mark. The dynamics of crafting legal opinions may 
shape their content and accuracy. Legal opinions generated by movement lawyers 
may be influenced by lawyers’ bias in favor of their reform position. However, in 
policy campaigns, movement-side legal analysis must be accepted by lawyers on the 
inside of the political decision-making process. In Los Angeles, the coalition’s 
preemption analysis in support of the Clean Truck Program was also vetted by 
inside and outside port counsel, as well as the mayor’s general counsel—which 
 
1619. Emily Alpert Reyes, L.A. Council Overhauls Trash Collection for Business, Big Apartments, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-trash-franchise 
-overhaul-20140401-story.html#ixzz2xgQePq3n; L.A. Opens Bidding for Firms to Serve New Trash 
Collection Zones, L.A. TIMES ( June 11, 2014, 1:56 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me 
-ln-trash-collection-overhaul-20140611-story.html. 
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enhanced opportunity for independent review. All converged around the same 
ultimate conclusion: that the Clean Truck Program was a legally defensible exercise 
of local government power under the market participant exception to preemption. 
All of the legal reviews acknowledged the risk of litigation failure, but ultimately 
concluded that it was a risk worth taking. From the point of view of port counsel 
(both inside counsel at the city attorney’s office and outside counsel at Kaye 
Scholer), one might understand legal support of the Clean Truck Program in terms 
of presenting the client with the strongest defense of its proposed course of action: 
when port lawyers conducted their legal review of the Clean Truck Program, the 
political decision to move it forward had already been made, and therefore port 
lawyers viewed their job as advancing the wishes of their client, the harbor 
commission. (The mayor’s general counsel played a similar role relative to his client.) 
The fact that coalition and government lawyers all understood that the ATA would 
sue the ports no matter what their programs required strengthened political resolve (at 
least in Los Angeles) to press for the most ambitious set of policy changes.  
Legal review was also connected to an assessment of political risk. For the Los 
Angeles mayor, the political upside of the Clean Truck Program was transformative 
policy that made two important constituencies happy. On the other hand, losing the 
entire program in court would be another catastrophic political failure (following 
the mayor’s defeated bid to take over the school district). The mayor sought to 
hedge this downside risk by pursuing severability in the Clean Truck Program. This 
meant that in the event employee conversion was struck down, the environmental 
provisions could survive—allowing the mayor to claim a major environmental win, 
while leaving the Teamsters (though not necessarily the truckers) no worse than 
where they started. 
The mayor’s choice put the coalition in the position of having to make its own 
political calculus about severability and how it might impact one of the key 
constituencies it was attempting to help: port truckers. With severability in place, 
there was a small, but nontrivial, risk that if clean truck conversion passed without 
employee conversion, drivers could be left worse off: remaining independent 
contractors forced to bear the cost of acquiring and maintaining more expensive 
clean trucks. In a context in which the prize was so big (industry transformation 
with the possibility of organizing the entire logistics supply chain) and the legal 
analysis suggested that the risk of losing was so small, coalition leaders decided to 
pursue the policy in the face of risk. From the record, it is not clear whether the 
truck drivers involved in the campaign—who were a subset of the roughly 16,000 
serving the ports—understood the precise nature of the risk, though it is reasonable 
to believe that those who were active would have agreed with the coalition’s analysis 
and thus supported the policy despite the risk of losing on employee conversion. 
Yet, even with activist driver support of the plan, the accountability problem 
in the clean trucks campaign was a thorny one. The activist drivers were only a 
fraction of the total port trucker population and could not claim representative 
status (and, indeed, there were challenger groups, like the National Port Drivers 
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Association, which claimed to represent thousands of owner-operators who wanted 
to maintain that status). Without organizing and polling all drivers, coalition leaders 
had to rely on the support of those drivers most committed to the clean truck 
project.  
Moreover, the nature of the coalition itself—while strengthening its claims to 
broad stakeholder representation—complicated its members’ representative roles. 
The coalition was made up of a range of groups, but environmentalists and 
organized labor were acknowledged to be the most powerful. Environmentalists 
were committed to emission reduction and were not in a position of direct 
accountability to the drivers. Although the Teamsters’ constituency, broadly 
defined, included port truck drivers, the drivers were not union members—only 
potential ones. The Teamsters and their allies at Change to Win thus had to consider 
the impact of a successful Clean Truck Program not just on port truckers, but the 
union movement more generally. And this was a judgment ultimately made by labor 
movement leaders, not the movement lawyers, who were in a more conventional 
position of general counsel to the unions—thus shifting the crucial representational 
choices to the client level. In the end, those movement leaders decided that the 
campaign was strategically important enough (with significant potential benefits to 
a much wider universe of workers), and the downside limited enough, that it was 
worth the risk—that to change the equation for organized labor in the United States, 
it was necessary to seize the once-in-a-generation chance to go big at the ports. Had 
the gamble paid off, labor’s representation of port truckers would have been put to 
the test in the unionization drive that would have ensued. As it stands, the 
campaign’s outcome highlights the importance of incorporating the voices of 
vulnerable constituency members with the most to lose in movement decision 
making—and the challenge of ever neatly resolving conflicting movement interests 
in complex and high-stakes campaigns for transformative social change. 
CONCLUSION 
The clean trucks campaign at the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports is a 
monumental story of the power, and tradeoffs, of labor lawmaking at the local 
level—as well as an example of how such local lawmaking is framed, and ultimately 
constrained, by federal preemption. This study of the campaign has showed how 
the legal regime of port governance imposed negative local impacts on low-income 
communities and low-wage workers, while also creating the possibility for a strategic 
alliance to advance labor and environmental change. This alliance, formed by 
deliberate design and unforeseen opportunity, executed sophisticated inside and 
outside games to achieve major policy reform in Los Angeles: the Clean Truck 
Program converting port trucks to clean vehicles and port truckers to employees. 
However, because the federal legal regime disadvantaged labor’s local bid to change 
the independent-contractor-based system of port trucking, the program was 
vulnerable to industry opposition and court revision that not only eroded the policy 
victory but also imposed new economic hardships on the constituency (port 
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truckers) the policy was designed to help. In this case, one of Los Angeles’s most 
ambitious and potentially transformative campaigns to restructure port trucking was 
undercut by industry litigation that split the policy interests of a formidable blue-
green alliance, validating the program’s environmental provisions (clean trucks), 
while negating the labor ones (employee drivers). As a result, while the ports are 
now on track to achieve green growth, it is still on the backs of their most vulnerable 
workers. 
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